

評：林安梧之「後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面—— 關於『外王—內聖』問題的一些回應」

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摘要

本文可說是 2022 年李瑞全在「『內聖外王』乎？『外王內聖』乎？——中國文化如何從內聖建構民主體制兼評駁所謂『外王內聖』之謬論」（以下簡稱「批謬文」）一文對林安梧在 2021 年發表的「從「外王」到「內聖」：新儒學之後對「內聖外王」的翻轉」（以下簡稱「翻轉文」）一文進一步的擴充版而寫的批評。因此本文主要只就此擴充版的部份作進一步的批判。本文首先是指出林安梧自以為超越牟宗三先生和當代新儒家而自稱為「後新儒學」的發展實是無理和無論證的自我認定。此中包括幾個誤解和曲解。首先，林安梧沿襲一般對儒家的批評，指「當代新儒家」為「保守主義」或「傳統主義」是為不了解、以至曲解當代新儒學以「返本開新」之重建和開創新儒學現代化哲學發展的貢獻和創造所在，包含牟宗三先生的「兩層存有論」、「道德的形上學」等之學術上創造所成的龐大中國哲學體系。其次，林安梧在文中更隨意指控牟宗三與當代新儒家的「心學」實與反儒學的「西化派」在結構上實同為波柏所批判的「方法論上的本質主義」。本文指出這種曲解當代新儒學的義理實為無據和無理的誣衊，既不知波柏對西方傳統思辨形上學之為獨斷之實義，亦不解當代新儒學之由道德實踐進路所成的道德形上學實為不同層次的論述。林安梧以為把方法論本質主義的批評扣於儒學頭上，即對當代新儒學作了成功的批判，此實為無理和不知義的說法，可謂西方現代哲學所謂錯置「範疇之謬誤」。至於林安梧引用一般攻擊傳統儒家之禮祭和禮樂之治乃上古的巫祝咒術轉變而來，而認為當代新儒學之「本心論」與「良知學」與此類古代巫術傳統有「密切的關連」，同是擁護帝王專制的迷信學說，是林安梧自創的中國傳統政治和歷史中「君父聖」之「血緣縱貫系統」表現，更是無稽之談。因為，這種說法根本上違反孔孟之由《書經》「天視自我民視，天聽自我民聽」所具有的以民為本為主，根據人民的自主決定而擁立天子之初步的民主觀念，以內聖開出外王的禮樂之治即仁政王道為根本的政治理想等，罔顧儒家自孔子以來已完全擺脫古代巫術的神權式的政治安排。而且，林安梧的論斷完全漠視當代新儒學所全力發揚的「新外王」之民主與科學的主張，所建立的重要學理發展，推進儒學現代化的論述和努力。至於林安梧更荒誕地把當代新儒家最感慨的「中華民族花果飄零」

的血淋淋事實和祈求能「靈根自植」的艱苦視為一種「形而上保存」的不知所謂的胡扯，無足論矣。由此可見，林安梧的「由外王開內聖」的說法實不是儒家的義理，而是法家式的現代集體主義或一黨專政的國家主義，內聖之優先性與獨立性已蕩然無存。

本文最後強力批判林安梧不知實況而妄把六十年代以來，東南亞國家的一些領袖主張之「亞洲價值」發展，視為他所主張的「由內聖開外王」學習成果的優良表現，而不知這種主張實是否定人民的主權，走上反民主反科學的帝王或一黨專制的舊路。這種反民主反人權的政治價值正與現代開放社會的發展背道而馳。東南亞國家之在具體政治制度和表現上，如排華和壓制華人在政治上的權利等，明顯表現為違反現代文明的種族和宗教歧視的現象，足以證明林安梧之由外王改變內聖實是依政治上的權力，改造人性和宰制人民的極權組織。這種政治發展正與當代新儒學追求民主與科學的理想背道而馳，更不是林安梧所謂「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民主的民本」的表現。在一個意義之下，中華民國基於傳統文化所實現的民主憲政才是儒家的「由內聖開外王」的一個現代版本。

關鍵詞：當化新儒家、牟宗三、後新儒學、李瑞全、林安梧

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壹、引言：內聖外王之辯是人禽義利之辨

自十九世紀中葉，晚清的中國和中國文化受到西方列強的武力和文化入侵。由此揭開中國文化近二百年的抵抗與發展求存的歷史，至此尚未能成功。而其中牽動中國文化最核心的是進行現代化以回應西方文化的強力挑戰。中國士人在滿清王朝二百多年的壓抑之下，不但在政治上受到全面的獨裁統治，和抄家滅族的「文字獄」的思想言論的強力壓制，加上滿清王權霸佔了道統，傳統知識分子不敢妄議朝政，不敢為民請命，更自矮化為奴婢。士人或知識分子完全缺乏自主自發的心靈，被禁錮在文字考據的囚牢中，喪失了回應時代挑戰的能力。因此，在十九世紀的上半頁，不斷受列強之侵凌，但節節敗退，瀕臨被瓜分的局面。腐敗的滿清王朝無力對抗外侮，引生知識分子的革命和對自身的政治和文化的全盤否定。辛亥革命是一個高峰，革掉了專制的王朝，邁向現代的民主政治，也開始了現代化的進程。「五四運動」是文化改革的一個高峰。但此高峰卻從自卑屈辱中自棄求存。知識分子之盲目和狂熱，反而造成中國與中國文化更大的挫折與屈辱。日本挾西化成功之力，開始吞食中國和亞洲，使中國不但在接受現代化的過程被中斷，人民受的苦難實讓人痛不忍言。日本之侵華實無疑是西方列強的代表，但中國傳統士人與人民卻仍然有力對抗這種堅船利砲的鋪天蓋地而來的強勢武力，中國並未應聲而倒，不致淪為日本的殖民地。但在文化上，五四所興起的「全盤西化」卻擴展為全盤共產主義化，中國文化實遭受更嚴厲的內部的壓迫和任意的誣蔑。儒家在四九年後一直被牽入各種運動中為陪葬品。中國大地沒有被外族統治，中國卻淪落為西方極端的共產主義意識形態的文化殖民地。「五四」高舉「科學與民主」似是啟蒙，卻只是口號，反而變形成為極端的西方文化的政黨意識形態的大山，壓在中國文化，中華民族頭上。因為中國文化的主體性已被摧殘殆盡，無力作主，真的只能如奴如婢，任人宰割！此可借用李澤厚所標榜的「西學為體，中學為用」一詞來描述中國成為西方文化殖民地的局面。主客易位，中國人只是西方文化的極端的一面的載體！此中，內聖與外王是文化中兩大課題，即，道德倫理與社會政治之主從關係的價值次序與現實的制度。中國傳統文化是「內聖開外王」，以道德為政治的依據，反之，主張中國文化要改換成「外王開內聖」，實是在理念上要完全取代儒家和中國文化的主體性。這不是儒者冥頑不靈，腐敗無能，而是政治獨裁者所施的無限的暴力和宰制的控制，以及一眾所謂「知識分子」之為虎作倀，所成的結果。因此，返本重建儒家的「內聖外王」之道，批判所謂「外王內聖」之謬誤，徹底批判和去除共產主義的核心原則，即，人沒有人性，只有階級性的主張，是當代新儒家所不能豁免的時代課題。由「外王開內聖」的主張可以使當權者以各種不人道的手段去對付與專制獨裁者的政治敵對者。這就是今天這個課題所謂由「外王開內聖」在現實上的表現。誠如牟先生已多次指出，若共產主義原則不變，則中國文化自必被根除為止，中華民族也永遠只是被文化殖民的奴隸。中國傳統文化的「內聖開外王」主張，是

表示儒家堅持每個人都具有人性，即具有「人之為人的不可被剝奪的本有價值」，每個人自身是目的，具有人格尊嚴，不可被當作純然的工具來利用。由此所指向的最終的政治制度是能保障人民生命尊嚴和財產的是民主制度。所以，這仍然是當今儒學所不能逃的時代課題。此本文之作仍有重要的哲學與文化的意義，也是指向完成儒者之「為生民立命」志業的必要之人禽與義利之辨。

儒家的「內聖開外王」之說自有許多義理內涵和必須釐清和澄清的重要關節，而由此所指向的中國文化的現代化（不是西化）課題更必須深論和辨正。但林安梧之「後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於『外王—內聖』問題的一些回應」（以下簡稱「回應文」）一文實只是把個人自己近二十多年所自以為是的論述作一簡要的綜述。此文用了「回應」一詞，似有回應他人的批評以辯護自己的觀點，或重建自己的論述之意，但細看本文實沒有任何新意，只是擇要地重述之前已在多篇相關文章或專書所已陳述過的觀點，也沒有真正和明確地回應已有的嚴正批評。這在下文會詳細以文獻和論據展示出此一「回應文」的內容如何地空洞和自我封閉，如何曲解當代新儒家的論述，和中國文化的表現與方向。對於此文的核心主題，先作一綜述式的批判，以為下文的詳論作一基本的起點。

自牟師宗三先生辭世之後，林安梧教授開始宣揚所謂「後牟宗三時代」已來臨，更一貫地以為自己的思考已超越牟先生以至當代新儒學之學理與義理而自稱為「後新儒學」的主張。其不實的觀點與論述，本人在多次參加相關的當代新儒家的國內國際會議中指出其所含的各種謬誤，但在會議上或之外都完全沒有得到任何回應，而林教授自以為是如故。而且，林教授更反指當代新儒學諸師友的論述為「護法的儒家」，好像唐、牟二師的眾多門人和師友都只是重覆當代新儒家大師的說法，無理地為當代新儒學辯護。林教授在不少論述中，更進一步主張與馬克斯主義的結合（或如一些大陸搞儒學研究者所說，自美其名為馬克斯哲學之儒學化），但實質卻是以儒學為馬克斯主義或共產主義之附庸⁵³，扭曲或矮化儒學的基本義理以迎合共產主義的說法，實是「儒學之馬克斯主義化」。一切主張由外王決定內聖（即由政治權力決定道德）的說法即是這種「馬克斯主義化之儒學」。這種說法實是中國傳統法家之以帝王獨霸所有政治權力來統治臣民的一種理論，明顯反對儒家的仁政王道的外王政治理論。

⁵³ 馬克斯認為人只有階級性，沒有所謂人性。而由下層的經濟結構決定上層的政治制度，所以傳統的經濟模式即決定國家社會的性質。因此，從封建階級而來的一切都是封建腐敗的，道德也如是。而在共產主義社會中，不但經濟是共產主義式的，主掌權力的是共產黨，因此，即以共產黨的意識形態為主導，以掌權力的政府去決定人民應有何種道德表現，其中一個現實的實況，就是人民都必須絕對服從黨的指揮來行動，否則即是反黨反國的罪行。這其實就是政治權力決定對錯，決定道德是非。此即所謂「外王開出道德」的基本意思，這也是與西方傳統哲學與文化所極力批判和反對的「權力即(道德上)正確」(might is right) 變形，由此可見此說不但有違社會基本原則，也有違西方政治傳統，即現代的民主人權理論。西方現代化的政治和社會的基本則仍然是以「公義原則」(principle of justice) 為國社會的基礎，如羅爾斯所建立的民主理論。詳見後文。究極言之，馬克斯的觀點才真正是波伯(Karl Popper)所批判的一種「方法論上的本質主義」，即認為人類「本質上只有階級性」而來的極權思想！此詞之所指，詳論請見下第5節。

歷來儒者也全力批判法家這種只為一人一家服務的私天下的觀點。但目前這種說法比傳統法家更壞的是扭曲儒學的義理和西方民主人權的政治哲學來支持專制獨裁政治的說法，魚目混珠地污衊儒家的基本義理。在道德與政治的關係上，儒家一貫是由內聖開外王的正道，或由道德以確立政治制度之結構與方向。此如孔孟之由仁心或不忍人之心為禮樂（即社會政治制度）之根據，用以建立仁政王道；荀子亦以人之有「義」有「辨」結合各個個人之力量，組成禮義群體，合力以征服牛馬猛獸，基本上亦是以義、辨而立客觀禮制的義理。荀子雖非儒家的主流思想，仍是儒家由「內聖開外王」之道的一途。縱使在西方之現代化中，西方哲人亦依道德以立政治體制，也是一義的由「內聖開外王」的表現。如休謨已指出西方哲學傳統是以公義原則為社會的第一原則。又如康德之由自由意志之自由法則以建立政治體制，即直接由意志之自由法則以開「公民社會」（civic society）（Kant, 1965/1999）⁵⁴。當今西方政治哲學的經典說法，如羅爾斯（Rawls, 1999）之 *A Theory of Justice*⁵⁵ 也是由公義原則建構現代民主政體的典型論述。公義原則基本上是道德原則。由此可見，西方政治哲學的理論和實踐，都是由道德法則建構政治制度，都是由道德開政治的理論。這是民主政體建構的基本原理，也就是由「內聖開外王」的基本方式。⁵⁶此亦可見出，儒家由道德所建構的政治理論不可能與自由民主不相容。反之，也由此可見由「外王開內聖」明顯是違反儒家的基本原則，是以當權者的權力為依歸的反儒學的政治論述。

傳統法家獨尊專權的大皇帝，實是儒者所鄙視的妾婦之道。法家式的以「外王開內聖」的主張正是把「道」寄托在個人或政黨之權力上，寄托在帝主君父身上，直是依政治之獨裁權力反過來規範道德與控制臣下和人民，方真正是「道之錯置」。這種說法基本上是諂媚取悅手握權力的獨裁者的說法，豈能是儒者的主張。由此也可見，這種由外王規定內聖的理論，明顯違反儒家之核心義理，而當代新儒家已不斷和明確地表明擁護現代民主自由政治制度的新外王，斬斷獨裁專制的惡根。這種由外王決定內聖的主張甚至比傳統帝王專制對儒家的消極的運用和壓制更為囂張！傳統儒者雖不能以行動推翻和反抗獨裁的大皇帝，因為儒者一方面反對在政治上結黨營私，也沒有相對的武裝力量可

⁵⁴ 參見Kant, I. (1999), *The Metaphysics of Morals, Part I The Metaphysical Elements of Justice* (pp.51-81) (J. Ladd, Trans.). The Bobbs-Merrill Company. (Original work published 1965)

⁵⁵ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1st ed., 1971, 2nd ed.1999).

⁵⁶ 如上所述，17 世紀的古典經驗主義殿軍的休謨即已指出，西方社會(包含政治)的第一原則是「公義原則」。當前的西方政治哲學所論的民主政治，如 David Held 在其名著 *Models of Democracy* 一書審視西方政治哲學傳統近二千多年的發展，不但引介了民主政治從希臘以來的發展，最後綜合西方民主政治發展的方向，也提出當前的民主政治的基本原則是「自律原則」(principle of autonomy)。「自律原則」即是出於自由意志之基本的道德原則。至於主張由社會的倫理觀念以論政治結構的，如馬克斯或社會科學一般所主張的倫理或道德是社會的產物之說的，實是違反西方哲學傳統的說法。但倫理學家一般也常把這種觀點限於所謂「經驗的倫理學」(empirical ethics)之經驗研究，不能取代「規範倫理學」(normative ethics)的研究和道德原則的基礎性，因公義原則不能以社會風俗來建立，更不能認同所謂「權力即(道德上)正確」(might is right)的主張。

以推翻專制王朝，但亦必以道統置於政統之上，以天或天道去限制獨霸的王權。若改以社會政治現實的權力來規範「內聖」（無疑是以禮法指導仁心），掌權力者的意向即成為道德的唯一標準，是社會價值的唯一來源，此真是把政治暴力無限化，明顯是支持帝王專制的主張，是退化到傳統的帝王獨裁統治的思想。這種觀點何足以言超越五四時代追求民主與科學的理想，更何足以言超越當代新儒家由返本以發揚儒家的內聖本義，和由此開新以吸收消化代表西方現代化成果的民主與科學為儒家的新外王之學。

以下就「回應文」的內容和荒謬之處，作一嚴正的學術與學理的駁斥。

一、「回應文」實乃舊文拼湊而成實毫無新意

林安梧此「回應文」實只是不同的舊文所剪接而成，隨意比附和前後自相矛盾，完全沒有新意。此文的觀點基本上在較近期的一文，即「從『外王』到『內聖』：新儒學之後對『內聖外王』之翻轉」（以下簡稱「翻轉文」）所擴充而成（林安梧，2021）⁵⁷。本人已在「『內聖外王』乎？『外王內聖』乎？——中國文化如何從內聖建構民主體制兼評駁所謂『外王內聖』之謬論」（以下簡稱「批謬文」）（李瑞全，2022）⁵⁸一文第5和第6節詳加批駁。而且在中國哲學研究中心以「內聖外王還是外王內聖」為題，於2022年9月3日特別舉辦之第四次「鵝湖會講」由本人與林安梧教授進行詳盡的互相就彼此不同的觀點進行詳盡的對話與論辯，而「批謬文」一文亦已先行刊出和與「翻轉文」並列於會講的參考文獻之中。本人在會講中實已直斥其非，但林安梧卻不面對「批謬文」所評其觀點在歷史事實與儒學義理之錯誤和論述之缺失等各方面的質疑和批判，作出任何正面的回應。林教授在會講中卻胡扯到王夫之的形上學等不相干的論述，而此「回應文」卻仍然一如舊貫，完全沒有任何對題的回應，只重覆其已受批判的錯誤與不實的論點，實不值得再評。只因本土諮商心理學學刊主編之力邀，乃勉為再作進一步的批評，希望林教授能正面面對其論點的錯誤，作出訂正，或指出本人的批評有何錯誤不當之處，明確地分辨，庶不枉費本人之勞力和主編之厚望。否則把學術之追求「愈辯愈明」的理想，變成「愈辯愈詭辯」的泥淖，只想混淆視聽，更嚴重的是遺忘了牟師宗三先生對這種扭曲語意文義的意識形態的嚴厲批判，實為哲學之罪人。

「回應文」中略與前之「翻轉文」論述不同的是重申其所謂當代新儒家與五四時代的「徹底反傳統主義者」雖表面看似敵對，但在方法論上卻持相同的「方法論的本質主義」（methodological essentialism）（Popper, 1945）⁵⁹，因此，林安梧教授認為不但可據此

⁵⁷ 此文刊於《鵝湖月刊》第552號(2021年6月)，頁2-14。

⁵⁸ 上文原是專為駁斥「翻轉文」而作，內容明確針對「翻轉文」的謬誤而論。原文請見《鵝湖月刊》第566號2022年8月)，頁2-19。

⁵⁹ 此詞出自西方科學哲學家 Popper, K. (1945). *Open Society and its Enemies*. Routledge. 用此名批判西方哲學上三種理論，包括柏拉圖、黑格爾與馬克斯，認為這三種理論都是開放社會（即民主自由社會）的敵人。Popper 以此詞與 methodological nominalism 相對而言，後者自是指「開放社會」之主張，又常以這對名詞

批判全盤西化派，更可據此而一併批判當代新儒家，蓋以某些西方人士稱當代新儒家為「傳統主義」而可一同批判之。至於林教授使用此詞所含的自相矛盾和不可解之處，以及混同當代新儒家為另類的「全盤西化派」之謬，下文再作詳細的分析。由於「回應文」明顯是以「徹底的反傳統主義」一名指稱五四以來的「全盤西化主義」，而當代新儒學的許多討論實都在反駁和反對「全盤西化」的主張，因此，為免以下的論述被名詞所誤導，本文以下仍以學界熟悉而且知所明確指調的意義和代表人物之「全盤西化派」或「西化派」一詞置換「回應文」所謂「徹底的反傳統主義」一名，以利學術的討論。

二、綜述牟先生「兩層存有論」之哲學意義與林安梧之錯解與不解之處

對於「回應文」第一節所述，茲分三點作出批判。首先是林教授對牟先生的哲學體系的了解。一如林教授既往的論述方式，「回應文」第一節開始，也從自己個人的一些主觀的感受開始，一方面是自我肯定是牟門弟子，是牟先生「在臺大指導的第一位博士」，而實不知牟先生一生最強烈批評的是臺大哲學系師生之胡攪和黨派的爭權奪利的各種惡劣的行徑！另一方面，林教授表面似乎也是頌贊牟先生之學為「道貫古今」云云，但內容所述卻完全未觸及牟先生哲學如何由深研西方當代的科學、數學與邏輯的論述，見出思辨理性之特質和貢獻，由超越的反省而上溯於康德的《純粹理性批判》，而成早期的《認識心的批判》的義理體系。牟先生中年以後，學思不絕，百尺竿頭更進一步，更進而就康德之「知性之為自然立法」與「自由意志之為道德王國立法」的兩重意義，批判康德對道德理性之自由意志之解悟不足，並經過多年消化和借助中國儒釋道三家，特別是佛家之義理，建立儒家的「兩層存有論」的哲學體系。「翻轉文」籠統地以「誠通天地」或只一句話說牟先生全面地消化了康德云云，以說牟先生之龐大而圓通之體系，實不足以言知牟先生之哲學者，更不知哲學之甘苦，不知牟先生自言「一生人專注所作的唯一一件事」之哲學意義（林安梧，2011）⁶⁰。「誠通天地」云云，只是襲取前人對不同的宋明儒者的稱述，籠統而空洞，根本上接觸不到牟先生的哲學核心義理和哲學的成就⁶¹。

分別類同於「集體主義」（methodological collectivism）與「個人主義」（methodological individualism）。「回應文」以 methodological essentialism 一名指稱「當代新儒學」（也常被林安梧指為「傳統主義」）和「徹底的反傳統主義」，即五四時代的「西化派」，實是 Popper 用詞的顛倒！Popper 以此名指馬克斯主義，而馬克斯主義正與當代新儒學相對反，所以駁斥「翻轉文」與「回應文」會化很多篇幅，因為要整清其中被混淆和污穢的名詞與理論和相關的要點是很費功夫之事！

⁶⁰ 綜觀林安梧之著作，實甚少引述和討論牟先生的哲學義理，常只是泛引幾句名詞或書名，未見有何真有功力而能讓人有啟發性的深入研究的論述。其相關的專書《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》（台北：台灣學生書局，2011年）更以牟先生為名，「批評」多位被稱當代儒家的思想，而專以「牟宗三」標名的更有5章之多。且不論其處理各個新儒家的哲學，單見論述牟先生的章節，都沒有認真把牟先生的學理呈現出來，而只把自己的觀點重覆論述，且多是演講或講課隨意發揮的講述轉錄而成，並不是嚴格的學術研究而成的論文。至於假名以牟宗三哲學為題，實只是自言自顧自己的所謂「後牟宗三」的觀點而已。但由此也可見林教授對牟先生的哲學實只有浮光掠影的名詞，而逕以為可據此而批判了牟先生的哲學云云，此見其不自量力和不見道之弊。

⁶¹ 林教授也曾就所要樹立的「後牟宗三」之發展而曾論列和批判牟先生之說，以至中國歷史精神與史實，

如此云云，便以為可蓋括牟先生的哲學體系之基本要義，又可進而妄稱自己進入了「後牟宗三時代」，超越了牟先生的成就，實是自欺欺人之言。

由於林教授的由「外王開內聖」的主張與其自認為批判了和超越了牟宗三先生的「兩層存有論」而來的「後新儒學」的「哲學」有直接的關係，在此需要先剖釋其主張和根本的錯解和不解當代新儒學之義理，特別是牟先生的哲學體系的要點和哲學上的貢獻，以見其由「外王開內聖」之說之謬。茲先正面略陳牟先生哲學的要點。牟先生在早期主要深研西方當代哲學、邏輯學、數學哲學和科學哲學的研習，中期全力反省中國現代化的課題和深研中國哲學與文獻之後，更進一步吸收和消化康德的《純理性批判》和《實踐理性批判》（含《道德形上學之基本原則》等論述）之後，以及融通海德格對康德的批判與發揚，在《現象與物自身》一書提出著名的「兩層存有論」，而哲學的建構首先表現為「知體明覺」的開展。牟先生依儒家之以道德意識為生命之首出之關懷，由道德本心或良知之呈現以確立道德世界的本體意義之存有，又名為「無執存有論」。道德意識直接開道德界，在道德行動中所呈現的主客一體之經驗，必有天人合一之義。而由道德主體要達成的道德實踐理想的需求，必須對行動世界中生活上的事事物物有所「認知」，方能使道德要求得以更有效地施行，因而由道德行動之「攝物歸心」的表現退而為「主客對立」的認知模式。此即所謂「客觀化」對象之義，即把在道德實踐中原為一體的存在，把客體的存在刺出去而成為主客對立的認知關係⁶²，由此以成功對於對象的認知，用以輔助道德本心之要求，如通過對食物與藥物和人體生理之知識，而使子女對父母之「孝」得以更好地完成。此即所謂由「良知之自我陷坎」以開現象界之學理意義。

由道德本心之「實踐理性」開展出「知性主體」，正明確回應道德理性與思辨理性（或認知理性）的不同表現的方式，建立兩層存有論的基本的存有論的觀點。這不是一般籠統不解的人所說的「開出說」，或無理地扭曲了良知之為主客相通一體之意義，或更垢病為主觀的「唯心論」等等的胡亂批評。由此可見，兩層存有論不但關注良知天理之為道德實踐之超越而內在的根據，亦解明如何落實在實踐的行動上，須要有對象之認知的要求和認知之不同於道德實踐的表現方式。兩層存有論自是貫通形上與形下的世界，

但實都是虛妄不實而錯誤連篇之說。彼以為牟先生的核心焦點是「智的直覺」、以「致曲」解讀「良知之自我坎陷」等，以及以為中國歷史中的儒學實是「道之錯置」，是一種「君父獨裁之血緣」表現，等等。完全不解，也看不到儒學之貶帝王獨裁、以道統置政統之上，當代新儒家更以「天地聖親師」取代在帝王專制下的「天地君親師」的觀點，更不知牟先生以及唐、徐二位先生，所據以申論中國文化與歷史之論述，均出自柳貽徵與錢穆等史學大家之論述，牟先生的歷史哲學更是直接以五經的文獻分析而來的中國文化，特別是儒家在中國歷史中的表現。傳統儒者如朱子等都無取於秦漢以下的發展，對三代也只是就其護衛中華文化與具有分權共治的一種天下為公的說法，當代新儒家更共同推動對內聖的深研與新的外王的建構為代表儒家回應時化問題的發展。牟先生對王夫之「史論」更具隻眼而大力發揚，建立歷史判斷與道德判斷之分野和應有的合理性。而林教授亦無任何學術和扣緊文獻的分析以建立自己之說，而敢謂自己已進到「後牟宗三」時代，可謂狂妄不實之至了。

⁶² 牟先生的論述，是依於海德格在著名的《康德書》中詮釋康德在《純粹理性批判》中最重要的建立知性認知的超越域（transcendental horizon），即由主體把客體「刺出去」（ob-jectify）而為對象（ob-ject）之說。不像林教授在其諸多著述中所籠統的說為「主體客觀化」一詞之含糊之說。

世界只是即形上即形下的一個世界，沒有兩個世界，或二元論的意思！而且，道德實踐自是在日常生活中的實踐，道德心或良知即躍動其間，是我們一切論述的起點，豈有如林教授批評牟先生之說為使心體成為一「理論化、超越化、形式化、純粹化」，以至「抽象化」⁶³等等之義（林安梧，2011）！牟先生和唐、徐三位當代新儒家都極為重視道德主體在日常生活中的實踐，都以道德實踐為良知所具體地呈現實現出來的所在。此自是直接繼承熊十力先生之「良知是呈現」與自孔子以下，歷代儒者對道德本心和良知之解悟與證悟之核心義理。三位先生常就每個人，以至全人類，特別是中華民族在當前各種人為災難，於具體的社會、政治、民生所受的痛苦與傷害等，對當權者的鞭撻，都是直接以良知提出明確而嚴厲的批判，以身體力行來表現，豈是一般躲在學院中，依附權威的「知識分子」之所為。此中所及的每一個「自我」，包括他們自己，都是活生生而且在巨大的政治力量和苦痛的生活之下的不斷奮鬥提升的生命。儒者所述都是在生活實踐中，千辛萬苦，披荊斬棘而來反省批判，在天性與命限中的實存實感而生，是日日在道德實踐中時時作出存在的道德決定的我（牟宗三，2000）⁶⁴，豈是林安梧教授所謂的「是一個超越的，純粹形式之我」（林安梧，2011）⁶⁵。

但此「我」所表現的理性意義，卻不受限於經驗特殊的情狀，而為通於一切相若的情況而為共同的理，故有超越之存有論的意義。說為道德主體，認知主體正在表示此主體之超越的地位，以及由此所成的道德與知識的普遍性，所具備的客觀性。在上述引用林教授之文之後一段，林教授又進一步指控牟先生所建立的道德主體的我，說：「那個我其實就是一個純粹的、超越的、自性的我，或睿智界的我，即可以及於物自身界的我。那個我不是經驗所能限制的，也不是歷史所能限制的，遠超乎經驗與歷史之上，而又作用於經驗與歷史之中。所以牟先生講的這樣的一個我，其實是一個超越的、純粹形式之我」云云（林安梧，2011）⁶⁶。如果林教授真懂熊先生所說的「建體立極」之義，他應不會如此不了解牟先生的「兩層存有論」所建的良知明覺的本體（心性天理為一的「本體」，即活動即存有的心體），這就是當代新儒家和熊先生所要重建的「本體」。但這本體不是如林教授所扭曲的（借用道德的名言）而成為由上而下的「獨斷的形上學」。⁶⁷在牟先生

⁶³ 參見林安梧《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》（台北：台灣學生書局，2011年），特別是第10-14章。

⁶⁴ 看看牟先生在《五十自述》中對自己與對同時代的生命所感受到的哀傷，唐先生在感受中華民族自1949年後離散於世界各地而有的「花果漂零」的存在痛感，徐復觀先生在許多雜文中的憤激之言，實都是血淚交流的肺腑之痛的具體而真實的流露。此所以，讀他們的書，常有一種牟先生說的「語言般若」的力量，此因這些真切語言真能激盪我們的心志。這種影響，深遠而巨大，豈是今日逞一時之暴力而橫行的政治人物之顛三倒四的言行所可比擬！

⁶⁵ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁166。

⁶⁶ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁166。

⁶⁷ 林教授認為牟先生的「兩層存有論」有嚴重的缺失，因而又借用《老子》之用語，建立自己的所謂「存有論三態」之說。其中諸多跳躍和比附的說法實難以澄清，不能在此詳論。其中所建立的「存有三態」由上而下的開展，實是一種獨斷的形上學。這一種比附的用法，使道家本有的一種實踐進路的形上學的說法被混蒙了，實慘不忍睹！尤幸牟先生早已點出道家的形上學是一種「境界形上學」，即由真人實踐所體證的

之義理中，儒者能如是挺立此本體是由道德實踐中而來的，即由道德經驗中所「逆覺體證」的道德本心的呈現而當下見證的活潑潑的生命體，由此人才可以得與「天地相似」，與天地參，才得以見證良知即天理。此實即牟先生所申論的「道德理性三義」與「道德形上學」的深義。

而逆覺體證的道德經驗正是在我們日用流行的生活之中，人人皆有，人人皆可以自證。實踐即是在日用倫常中的實事實理，成德即是在生命中擴充自己的仁心的感通，是每個人時刻所感受到的生命的躍動，活潑潑的真實存在。豈有因此而以為此「本體的我」只是一抽象的、形式的「我」！這正是我們的真我之在我們的真實的經驗中時時呈現，時時使我們保持惺惺之道德實感，常有不容已的道德感悟和道德判斷和行動！由於這本體是如是地超越任何特定的經驗與歷史之局限，所以能為自由之主體，使我們能衝破現實的限制，故有「不謂命」的性分之自我要求，「不容已」的捨生取義的道德行動。林教授在上述的引文內的指控，不但無理，而其中實含有一自相矛盾的說法，即一方面承認此本體可以超越具體特定的經驗與歷史的限制，卻又可以「作用於經驗與歷史之中」。如果此本體只是超越的、形式的或抽象的，那根本無與於歷史的發展；如果此道德的「我」能發揮於歷史之中，那又如何只是一形式的、抽象的東西？！西方哲學家由思辨理性所建立的「認知的我」才真是形式的，無與於現實生命的「我」之實踐，因此，知性主體絕對講不到道德實踐上去，故康德必須超越此「知性主體」的「邏輯的我」，而進到實踐理性中的「道德的我」或自由意志以建立實踐的原則或道德原則，由此以上通自由意志和下開現代的民主政治體制。若此本體能在經驗與歷史中真有影響力，此本體自必是在我們的真實而具體特定的生活流程之中呈現和發用，豈能只是一抽象的形式的「我」。林教授此類前後自相矛盾的地方甚多，以上一小段只是其中一個小小的樣板。

又如，林教授不斷指控牟先生所確立在我們每個人生命中所具有的道德主體性所代表的「自我」，實只是「這樣一個人的主體，是一個形式的主體、抽象的主體、空洞性的主體：這樣的實踐，往往也是屬於心性修養的實踐多，在現實社會發生意義上的實踐少」云云（林安梧，2011）⁶⁸。這一種無實和明顯違反牟先生的明文的論斷，居然可以如此毫無理據辨析而明目張膽地獨斷和指控曾掛名為自己導師的身上！此段文中實又可見林教授行文中的常自相矛盾而不自知的說法。蓋若這個主體只是抽象的、形式的等等，如何又能見於我們的「心性修養的實踐」？心性修養總指在日用倫常中的具體表現。而沒有儒家不講心性之道德實踐的表現，也沒有儒家以為這是一種抽象的思考或觀念而已（陽明更強調知行合一之實踐意義，更不待說了），不管林教授是否真理解儒者日日時時在作工夫實踐的實義為何，但心性修養實踐自是在日常生活中，不管你是在個人「靜涵靜養」或「靜坐以存天理去人欲」的道德自我反省之中，或是處理公堂審裁判案之時，

道的境界和所示或體證的形上學。此即是一由實踐工夫而實證的形上境界，而此境界即見出生命與宇宙的實相。此即牟先生在《心體與性體》暢發的道德形上學之義理，此義自非林教授所能了解或接受的了。

⁶⁸ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 170。

或是與當權者力爭民義，在改變國家與社會的風氣與制度的抗爭之中，你的生命也就貫徹在日常具體而真實的境況之中，這正是生命的真正的實踐的存在的活動。

聖賢只是更能點醒和確立此中的道德實踐的主體性和實踐主體之存在，更能擴展我們生命在人與人之間和人與宇宙天地萬物之間的感通與境界，不致沈淪在人欲與腐敗生活，言不及義與虛無之中。這豈非即是儒者或當代新儒家如牟先生等所必在生活的實踐中所呈現的本體！自孔子以下，二千多年來儒家在歷史上的影響有少了嗎？儒者的理想明明也是受歷史中制度與權力所局限而不得完全申展，也因此而有不斷的激烈的抗爭和遭受獨裁的王權和附庸的外戚內監等無情的摧殘！儒者豈不知此中種種阻力，但仍是不能已的盡自己生命的性分，抗爭到犧牲性命而後已！豈有道德實踐而不在社會現實上產生影響的！或林教授所謂「在現實社會發生意義上的實踐少」另有不同於儒者或牟先生等所代表的儒家的道德實踐和所要求於生命和行動中的表現，不是一種血淋淋的現實，或他所說的「心性修養」是另類的事物，不是真實地存在歷史與儒者的生命之中的「修養」。我相信，對於企圖由「外王改造內聖」的政黨或獨裁者敢於以暴力摧殘人民的惡行，不但儒者必反對，人民也必起而反抗，因為這是違反人性人倫之常的暴力與邪惡行為。

三、「回應文」所顯示的對中西文化與哲學之誤解誤讀以及罔視牟先生的哲學和當代新儒家的貢獻對文化與哲學的價值

至於「回應文」中又借用西方環境倫理學家所創一詞「在地全球化 (glocalization)」⁶⁹以稱儒家（概括當代新儒家和牟宗三先生等在內）之義理特色，以為用此詞可以突顯儒家講的「真理的普遍性」云云。但此實為不倫不類的比附，實不知當代新儒家之義理表現方式是「返本開新」的取向，展示所繼承的古聖先賢的義理如何具有真實的普遍性，而且是能在當前的時代發揮出進一步的創新的意義，遠非 **glocalization** 一辭所能表達的意義和內涵。由此亦可見林安梧之用詞不對當而常有比附式的跳躍，此又一例。

至於在「回應文」中提出牟先生有進於宋明儒和王船山之處以「闢佛說」為例，又是讓人感到極為片面而實不切合當代新儒學的主張的提法。「回應文」說「闢佛說」「從宋明諸儒，到王船山已經是一大進境，由王船山到熊十力，又是一大進境。由熊十力到牟宗三，又是一大進境」云云。林教授似乎忘記了王夫之也借闢佛而闢宋明儒者之為「陽儒陰釋」之說。唐君毅先生即曾評之為對宋明儒的義理「最無理之說」。此即見王船山之「闢佛說」所表現的對佛學和宋明儒學的了解實不可靠。因為，王船山把若干宋明儒者

⁶⁹ 把 **Glocalization** 一辭譯為「在地全球化」實為不相應，**Glocalization** 之對當的譯名是「全球在地化」。這是環境倫理學家討論如何進行真有意義和真能落實的行動時提出的一個方法，即，由於環境問題是全球性全人類相關的問題，但任何具體行動都必只在某一個時間在某一地區的具體的行動，但此行動必須同時具有全球性的意義，方真是一有效的保護環境的行動，故提出 **glocalization** 一詞，以表現出環境保護行動的特質。

之義理解讀為「陽儒陰釋」，不但對儒學實有嚴重的隔膜，恐怕更落後於許多宋明儒所了解之佛學和關佛的重要性與確切的觀點。但也同樣是使人失望的是回應文也沒有說出王夫之「關佛」的特點，以及如何超越了其他的宋明儒者。而更嚴重的卻是離題地假借此片面的論述把王船山夾帶進來，以為有助於表示自己曾研習王船山之學的根本為可靠，講王船山自有獨特的見解，卻無視此中的課題是內聖外王，講儒家的基本義理，與關佛之說相差不知幾萬里，更與王船山之形上學渺不相干⁷⁰。此即所謂混淆視聽，只胡扯夾帶便算是「回應」了之前在鵝湖會講中不面對質疑而講（實亦沒有講得出）王夫之的「外王」是什麼回事，只是胡扯一頓便以為論證了自己的觀點！至於說熊先生與牟先生之「關佛說」也實在是不知「回應文」說了些什麼。熊十力先生雖由唯識宗回歸儒家，亦仍多借用佛教之義理開展新儒學之論述，如擬開展佛家的「量論」等，用以開闢儒家的知識論方面的發展，具有積極的意義。熊先生所批的主要是認為熊先生不當背離金陵內學院之教的信徒而已。牟先生自然也是歸宗儒家之說，但對佛家的理論與境界，亦實極為借重和欣賞，對於佛家的義理的闡述，也具有高度的啟發與發揚，「實有貢獻於佛學」（牟先生語），更有批評牟先生多用佛學的義理，如「一心開二門」、「識心之執」、肯定天台宗之「圓教」義等等，已不是儒家云云。當然，這種批評實不入流，毫無學術義理之可言的瀾言。然而，林安梧教授以「關佛說」來比附牟先生之為「關佛」有巨大進步云云，實為比附無實義之詞，由此牽扯出王夫之，更是不倫不類之比附。如此之「表揚」牟先生，不但不能切於牟先生在佛學的創見與貢獻，也不外只是藉以此為自己的「後牟宗三」之說背書而已。

林教授更有一莫名其妙的嚴重的指控，即認為牟先生等之當代新儒學所主張的「本心論」，即「良知學」，實與中國古文化中的「巫祝」、「咒術」和君主專制密不可分。林教授認為，「本心論之所以會在中國哲學中成為一個重要的傳統，基本上是和中國的帝王專制、原先的巫祝咒術有著密切的關連」（林安梧，2011）⁷¹，又說，「所以我們可以發現良知學的傳統，是在明代達到顛峰，而明代也正是中國帝王專制最為顛峰的時代」云云（林安梧，2011）⁷²。這真不知何來的「神來之筆」的指控。中國歷史上專制的帝王統治不管是明朝，或是秦朝或清朝，都是都是帝王專制，在末期都是極度荒淫無道，殘害人民與儒者之烈實難以分高下，也終至滅亡而後止。帝王專制之禍又何止明朝。歷史記載彰彰明甚，帝王之專橫暴戾，又何止明朝，以此獨加罪於「本心論」或陽明學實為反對當代新儒家之特重陽明心學之義理而已，藉此牽連以為自己反對良心之說製造藉口而已！但儒學如何與帝王之專制獨裁有不可分的關係，本心論與專制之顛峰又有何關連，都是莫須有的罪名，實為蒙心之言。難道明朝的王帝都是心學家？難道林教授不知道陽

⁷⁰ 回應文更以為唐先生之「中華民族花果飄零」之嘆，而求「靈根自植」為「形而上的保存」云云，實是莫名其妙的亂混淆視聽的瀾言。

⁷¹ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 173。

⁷² 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 173。

明在生時也受到朝廷的排擠迫害？清朝雍正皇帝倒是以能通「禪」意而壓制學界和儒者的大獨裁者，而其政也以嚴苛為稱，不知是否算是相關？但相對其他大皇帝，他也不算太腐敗無道無能的獨裁者。

有謂日本明治維新的動力和成功來自治陽明學的學者與幕府將軍，此又是否可反證林教授之臆測為無理。這種類似西方也有人認為納粹黨的專制獨裁來自黑格爾的哲學影響，在學界少有接受的誣妄之詞。若依嚴謹的學術與論證而言，實則都是無根之談。回到陽明所主的「致良知」之說，此良知自是發自每個人內在本有的心體，也通於性體、天理、天道。何嘗有或只有通於專制帝皇之「心」之說？更何有連結於「巫祝」、「咒術」之處？一般在中國哲學的發展上都認可孔子是以天道轉化傳統的不可知的天命之說，更截斷了成德與巫術符咒的關係，而且孔子以仁心之安不安來定住人之為人的價值，使道德理性成為中國文化的核心動力與依據。事實上，在孔子之前的西周的文誥所見，早已有以「敬」、「敬德」為回應「天命」的道德實踐的方式，實已一步步脫離殷人之「尚鬼」的風俗。而道德意識所顯示出中國文化的特質之「憂患意識」，即是以治者和人民都以道德實踐為一切價值的首出之處，是政治文化發展所依據的基本取向。

而徐復觀先生在詳考由西周到春秋時代的文獻，可以見出中國文化已日漸從個人或家族獨佔「天命」的方式，轉為天命下降成每個人的生而有的內在的本性和價值（徐復觀，1969）⁷³，再經由孔子以「仁」定住人之為人的價值，使「天命」結合「人性」，因而才有近千年之後的《中庸》首句：「天命之謂性」，結穴成為中國的人性論的基本義理。此實是儒者在義理上轉化天命之古代宗教信仰的傳統，文化成為實踐理性的體現，不知此中何有與巫祝或咒術任何關連之處！至於那種以禮與祭、禮之主祭者為巫祝，祭治所用之符咒之遠古關係，以至古代文字所示的祭祀與鬼神的關係來限定禮文與巫祝的關係之說，限定禮制與咒術不可分的關係，而不顧歷史文化之發展與歷代賢哲的創造和轉化提升的實況，實一無可取。正如徐復觀先生已嚴正地批判了清末以來的疑古派或歷史語言學派一味以文字之原始根源意義來限制和曲解人類歷史文化創新的表現，莫名其妙地不准古聖先賢或哲學家可以開創新觀念，新理境和新世界觀，如以為「大禹只是一條大蟲」、「仁是二人為偶」之說等。這種觀點實不知如何理解周文以後的歷史發展？對祭治的解讀，荀子早已說：「民以為神，君子以為文」。這是儒者對祭治的最理性的理解和詮釋，足以反駁這種「文化原始論」，把人類文化和中國文化限定在遠古的巫術文化之中，以及由此而有諸如林教授之仍然以良知或道德本心牢結在巫祝與咒術之中，更無辜地被縛成為支持帝王專制的支柱！此實誣妄儒學太甚！也誣妄中國文化太甚！中國日後的祭天地等大祭，確是由帝王主持的，只因帝王為代表全體人民的身份而矣，豈能理解為由帝王扮演巫祝，因而把儒家追求聖王的理念結合巫術而成支持專制獨裁之說？這實是

⁷³ 詳論請參見徐復觀先生之《中國人性論史：先秦篇》（台灣：臺灣商務印書館，1969年）一書第1至第4章。

荒唐無理的想法。

人類歷史不斷向前發展，也不斷在轉化和提升語言與文化的創新，而有無可限制的新的論述的創造和發展。《中庸》、《大學》都不斷把道德實踐工夫提到「慎獨」，提到「人所不知而已所獨知」的深度，提到每個人之「良知良能」的出自自己本心本性的判斷和行動去，這正是儒家從工夫論進入最深層的道德實踐的自我反省和道德實踐的要求，以及由此以成就真實的道德行為，以通貫家國天下成為一明朗的道德世界。在西周之後，尚以為儒家之仁心與良知之說，仍然是結合在巫祝咒術專制之內等等，實是扭曲中國文化，厚誣儒者之說，更是為專制獨裁的統治作出為虎作倀的言論。至於其下又說「我這麼說，並不是說良知學就是帝王專制之學，而是說良知學就是在一個極端的不合理的帝王專制高壓統治之下，知識分子為了要對抗那個帝王專制，所形成的另外一個對立面的思考」云云（林安梧，2011）⁷⁴，這似乎是說良知學與帝王專制不但毫無關係，而且是對立的和針對帝王專制的真實的抗爭。若認真看待這幾句話，那麼林教授應該說是支持本心論或良知學的，以至認為儒家講良知不但不與帝王專制為同道，而且實是不斷對抗的。但林教授下一句卻認為「兩者在結構上是一致的，也就是良知學與帝王專制思考的內在本質結構往往是一樣的」云云（林安梧，2011）⁷⁵！這實在是不知所謂的自相矛盾的胡言亂語，混淆視聽的「語術」！

四、「回應文」對當代新儒家之追求現代化之盲點

林安梧教授總喜歡自稱自己是進到所謂「後五四」、以「後牟宗三」的口號自稱，但實質上如何的「後五四」、「後牟宗三」卻完全莫名其妙。林安梧以為牟宗三諸位先生只是到「五四後」，即尚未能越過五四的階段，而他自己則為「後五四」云云。「回應文」開始時提出牟先生等之回應五四之返本開新乃是保守主義的方式，又竟謂第二代的當代新儒家「與敵對的陣營有一點是一樣的，對於現代化的民主與科學，基本上是全盤接受的，都認為西方是先進的、進步的文明，華族應該努力的學習，要迎頭趕上」云云。讀來似乎都是「全盤西化」或後來「共產主義化」的口吻，完全不了解當代新儒家對「五四運動」之批判，即接受其中所含的對民主與科學的肯定，而且認為這正是儒家在外王方面所追求而未能達到的外王學問與事業上的理想，但從未認為西方文化是全面地先進和優越於中國傳統文化與哲學的。當代新儒家也不會認為傳統儒者忽視了外王的實踐，而是認為傳統儒者由內聖直接開出外王的方式並不成功，這是歷史事實，而反省如何能開出現代的民主與科學，因而有「良知之自我坎陷」之說，由道德實踐理性開出知性主體和政治主體，以開出現代的民主與科學。這是從人類的思辨理性與實踐理性之功能之

⁷⁴ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 173。

⁷⁵ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 173。

差別上，以重建儒家的內聖外王的理論，這正是一方面重新詮釋和發展儒家的基本義理（返本），而且由此開出新的民主與科學的發展（開新），這豈是如「回應文」所妄指為保守主義、更不是對西方現代化的「全盤接受」。

可以說，凡以為當代新儒家接受民主與科學即是對西方文化和政治全盤接受，實不知儒家的義理或當代新儒家的說法，也可說不知西方現代化的優點與缺失所在。林安梧教授似乎完全不知牟先生（以及唐君毅與徐復觀兩位先生）對西方政治與社會也有許多中肯的批評，牟先生即陳列出中國文化現代化所應有的社會實體的基本原則，即以儒家的倫理價值推展出現代化中的家庭與社會建構。唐先生更多從人文主義的反省和發展，表現出對西方社會與文化的批判，絕不是盲目的全盤接受，也不是片面的否定或反對。徐復觀先生也多有相類的批評。西方文化與哲學上種種的偏激和無理的表現，特別是演變成獨裁的法西斯主義和共產黨的組織和制度，都是當代新儒家所洞悉，也是儒家批判的對象。因此，當代新儒學真正是對西方哲學與文化的「批判地接受」的態度與方法，由此方見得出當代新儒家的「返本開新」的取向，完全不同於「中學為體，西學為用」，與「全盤西化」，更不同於「全盤馬克斯主義化」或「共產主義化」等取向。當代新儒家之吸收民主與科學所推行的現代化並不是「西方文化的現代化」，而是以中國傳統文化之核心義理吸收消化西方文化的優點，批判其缺點。此中的「開新」實即開發我們的思辨理性的功能，以開發我們當前所需要的民主與科學的建構，但從沒放棄或貶低實踐理性或道德理性的崇高地位。而且，當代新儒學並不像「回應文」所反映的一般庸俗不通義理和不知文化發展的複雜性與長期性的論述，以為儒者相信如此轉換一下心態，現代化即可以一蹴而至，更遑論一個哲學家即可以完成現代化的工作。當代新儒家當然都希望能當身見到中國文化成功真正的「現代化」，但也絕不虛矯以為已經成功了現代化。中國在民主政治體制與科學的思辨精神，仍然有長路要走，而且此中實有無盡的曲折與起伏，又豈是一、二位哲學家的思想即可竟其功的事。

林教授的說法常是混淆一通的，常把極端西化派的說法加諸當代新儒家頭上，而加以橫逆的誣衊。林教授其實一直在運用西化派或共產主義的術語形容當代新儒學，如指稱當代新儒家為「新保守主義」、「文化的保守主義者」、「新傳統主義者」、「新傳統主義者的、徹底反傳統主義的，這兩方陣營看似對，但他們都全面肯定了西方現代化的基本內容」、「當代新儒學之作為新傳統主義者」云云，實是在運用語言的「以名亂實」的方法，通過蒙混夾雜，把許多真正是傳統的保守主義者、傳統主義者混同當代新儒學，特別是把當代新儒學扣上「新保守主義」之名，打成與西化派一樣的主張，於是就可以在當代新儒學身上扣上各種根本不相干的罪名來批判，猶如共產主義總是把當代新儒家反對共產主義的論述必扣上「反共反華」的罪名來批判。此所以「回應文」讓人讀起來根本不是學術討論，只是亂扣帽子，在自己面上貼金的宣示，不知何有學術的意義。林安梧教授這種種混淆視聽和前後自相矛盾的說法，實在使清明的讀者的都感到「昏昏」！

在嚴正批判其以當代新儒家和澈底反傳統主義都共有一種名為「方法論本質主義」的謬誤之前，謹再舉一例以見此種誣衊與自相矛盾而不可解的說法。林教授指出，「一九四九之後，避居香港的當代新儒家們，不免感嘆花果飄零……在這情境下，要尋求『靈根自植』何等不容易」（林安梧，2024），又說：「錢穆、唐君毅、牟宗三、張丕介」，徐復觀等經營的新亞精神，真切的起了『靈根自植』的工作」（林安梧，2024），又說「不只靈根自植，而且這靈根必須植於天壤之間，必須要有雨露之滋潤，日月光華」，卻又說「當代新儒家由於太強調靈根自植，這『靈根』經由哲學的深度詮釋，它成了形而上的本體」（林安梧，2024）。「當代新儒家由於太強調靈根自植，這『靈根』經由哲學的深度詮釋，它成了形而上的本體。既為『形而上的保存』當然也就必要有『形而下的開啟』，本內聖以開出新外王，也就這樣成了一個必然要啟動的實踐力量」（林安梧，2024）云云。此中的問題是不知林教授如何理解「何以要靈根自植」？何謂「靈根」？眾所周知，唐先生提出「靈根自植」是祈求中華民族離散在異國的地方，寄居異族籬下，而遭受種種磨難與迫害（如東南亞國家排華、印尼暴亂之搶劫奸殺無數華僑婦女等）之生活中，得以身心和能夠安身立命於異域。這是祈望中華兒女在生活上能與異族異國融合而心安，此自是極為困難之事，但唐先生根於中國文化之儒家精神，仍然以樂觀的態度去面對，這是植於異國的土壤中的實事實況的問題，豈是什麼「形而上學的保存」！這是血淚斑斑的世代中人的生命之事！然後林教授認為「『形而上的保存』的是『道德』，而『形而下開啟』的是『知識』」云云。道德居然是靈根自植的形而上學的保存，這真是莫名其妙的夢囈，道德本是真實的見諸實踐的東西，不知如何形而上地保得了靈根？「形而上保存」一詞根本就不知所謂？真不知林教授是從那種形而上的思維而得出如此荒誕無聊的申論，而把當前中華民族在異地所受的災難視如一種語言玩弄的把戲！

凡此，只是略示「回應文」之多是夢囈式的自說自話，使人無法與學術文獻或歷史事實加以認真的考驗與檢驗。究其實，只是不知所謂的一堆語言，也實無學術和客觀的意義。

五、「回應文」批評當代新儒家與澈底反傳統主義者之方法論批判

林安梧不但誤解和不解當代新儒家以「返本開新」的方法重建儒學和已有的內聖外王的成果，更認為當代新儒家雖然反對「澈底反傳統主義」的西化派，但兩者其實是採取同一種方法論上的本質主義的同路人。林教授並借用波柏反獨裁專制的用語，作為「回應文」表示採取從外王開內聖所具有的最重要的理據。此因當代新儒家與西化派都犯了同樣的錯誤，即「方法論的本質主義」，當代新儒家變成與西化派和專制的擁護者，所以「後新儒學」就可以有戲唱了。表面看，這似乎是相對「翻轉文」而言，是「回應文」所舉的唯一有學理意義的論點（林安梧，2024），雖然依然不過是之前的一個自以為是的

論點，把一長串不是當代新儒家的論述，以及所指控而實不存在的觀念與歷史，由此虛構自己的「後牟宗三」、「後新儒學」的論述作為對照。由於此明確的指控宛似有合理的學術論據可言，也值得借此機會嚴正地批駁其錯謬之處。

反本質主義原是存在主義批評西方傳統哲學自柏拉圖以來的「本質先於存在」的失誤，存在主義認為人之真實存在更重要，更有優先性，故轉為主張「存在先於本質」，以解除現代人的疏離異化的痛苦。存在主義之從西方傳統哲學之由抽象的普遍的理念或概念的思考回到每個人在現實存在中的許多真實的存在感受，如焦慮、恐懼、怖慄、異化等，自有其合理性。但反本質主義最有力而且是順西方哲學傳統而來的是由思辨理性批判西方傳統形上學的謬誤，如康德所謂傳統哲學論證上帝存在、世界有開始或沒有開始、有沒有最簡單的單位等等判斷，都逾越了感性與知性的限制，所產的只是似是而非的「辯證的虛幻」。這是從思辨理性而來的對西方傳統形上學所建構的沒有經驗和認知基礎的虛構觀念之自身的批判。而近代的發展則是由維根斯坦的語言分析而來的指出形上學是語言的誤用，即，把只適合用於描述世界的語言用於虛構而不存在的事物，如靈魂、實體等，更以為這種用詞指謂出一種形而上的存在，作為人類與宇宙的「本質」(essence)，而實全是虛構。維根斯坦的「語言的批判」開出了之後邏輯實證論的「反形上學」的潮流，成為西方哲學在上世紀，即二十世紀二十年代以後的英美哲學的主流，至今不衰。但西方此一反形上學的主張不是所謂「方法論的」，而是指西方傳統中各種哲學實即本質主義或形上學的錯誤主張。維根斯坦後期的日常語言分析更指出許多名詞，如「宗教」一詞，用在各種宗教，如天主教、佛教、伊斯蘭教等，實只有「家族的相似性」(family resemblance)，並無確定的定指或實指。這一分析成為當代英美哲學的一個基本的教條。邏輯實證論者用於科學的研究上，則以檢證理論 (confirmation theory) 作為科學的實證的根據，並由此指出由形上學的重要「概念」而來的論述其實都是不能檢證其真假的判斷或真實存在，如「絕對精神」、「實體」(substance) 等，因為名詞都不能通過經驗的驗證，也不能依邏輯分析而得到其真理性，因此，都是「無意義的」(meaningless) 語詞。

波柏的否證論也是依一肯斷或語句能否被否證 (falsified) 作為科學與形上學的「分界線」(demarcation)。在反形而上學的說法上，波柏實與邏輯實證論者無異。⁷⁶波柏反

⁷⁶ 在邏輯實證論的陣營中，波柏也被認可為同道。而波柏的「否證論」實不如邏輯實證論更接近科學家日常的工作，因而波柏的說法更為科學家所拒絕。六十年代孔恩 (Thomas Kuhn) 的科學史研究成果指出，由科學史之研究與發展所見之科學家的工作，日常只是做「常態科學」(normal science) 的工作，即不斷去檢證科學理論和推展到更廣的科學領域去，而不是去否證科學理論，甚至明知有些科學現象是有違現行的科學理論的，也不會如波柏所主張的即認為該科學理論已被否證而放棄。這些有違現行科學理論的現象，只是暫列為異象 (anomaly)，直到此異象日後漸擴大化、嚴重化，成為一科學「危機」(crisis)，乃有偉大的科學家起而提出新的理論，形成一科學革命，化解此一異象，科學家們才會慢慢放棄原來的理論，接受新的科學理論。此如歷史上的哥白尼革命之以日心說取代地心說、氧化論取代燃素論，以及當代的愛因斯坦的相對論取代牛頓的古典物理學等。而且，牛頓的理論也沒有完全被趕出科學的領域之外，只被視為相對論的一個特殊狀況，即在質量不大和運動速度相對光速而為慢的情況中，可以有效地使用，只是其中的時空概念不再是絕對的時空。這才是上世紀六十年代之後被科學哲學家 and 科學家所接受的科學的實質工作和方法，也因此邏輯實證主義和波柏的否證論都被放棄了。這本是當前西方科學哲學界的常

對邏輯證主義是在科學方法的了解上的爭議，波柏也沒有認為邏輯實證論是他所說的「方法論的本質主義」！這可說是林教授的「錯誤詮釋」。若此指控可說，則不知林教授如何分析或理解邏輯實證主義在上世紀數十年來大力反對本質主義和形上學的現象，包括對黑格爾哲學的嚴重批評與主張，何以邏輯實證論仍然是一種波柏所謂的「方法論上的本質主義」？由此可見林教授對於科學方法的了解實有嚴重的錯誤，根本沒有學術和學理的依據的亂用。林教授由此而用到中國哲學如儒家的實踐進路的哲學上，根本是牛頭不對馬嘴的扣帽子的方法，只是借用波柏的用詞，通過由全盤西化派而來的對當代新儒家的不實指控，以表示自己的所謂「後牟宗三」、「後當代新儒學」之說之為有理有據！不知林教授所精熟的王船山是否認為傳統儒學是帝王專制的支持者，或實只是帝王借用陽儒陰法（再加所謂「陽儒陰釋」）的私心而引致中國政治的專制和腐敗？這種片面採取西方思辨哲學的架構硬套在當代新儒學的說法實比很多認為中國沒有哲學的人更惡劣，因為當代新儒學實已高度消化西方主流的哲學和論述，形構成與西方哲學大家足以相比較的龐大體系（如「回應文」表面地在文字上也承認的），而展現出中國哲學現代化的巨大進步。由此可見，林教授所謂對孔孟、宋明儒學以來和當代新儒家的「方法論的本質主義」的指控實為無理，不但不如理不如實，更扭曲宋明儒和當代新儒家之說，誣指為是造成「極端的專制」的禍首。從五四和之後的中國政治發展來看，「回應文」之說實是依當權派以歷史唯物觀和全盤西化派，而無理指控儒家是中國文化和社會政治上一切腐敗和獨裁的根源之反中國文化教條而來。由此可見其所謂的超越當代新儒學的構想，實是一種大話的幻想。

至於「回應文」批評胡適的「大膽的假設，小心的求證」一類的本質主義，不但不知胡適之說實近於波柏的「否認論」，而其根本理念是來自杜威的「實用主義」的「科學方法」，也沒有一點本質主義的意涵。這種指控實是以無可對證的人而立，可以胡亂批判一番以示自己之高明的自欺欺人之說。至於以自己的小孩時候的一個莫名的「錯誤的經驗」，日後的自我糾正，以為即可比於波柏和邏輯實證主義的「科學方法」，不知這種小兒科的學習糾正之舉，縱使提升到「試誤方式」（*trial-and-error method*）的方法，與真正的現代科學方法相差何止千萬里，根本上與現代科學的方法為不同類的初民式的經驗學習表現。西方現代科學也是經過幾千年思辨理性的發展，特別是十六、十七世紀幾位大科學家的突破，才逐漸打破宗教與神權的控制與迫害，而形成科學與科技的長足發展。林教授在此中的錯誤與浮泛聯想等等，實不足再論。至於「回應文」下一節討論所謂「自然科學的因果性」與「人文科學的因果性」之用詞，可謂逆返到西方十九世紀或更前的「科學方法」的幻想，不知現代科學與人文學都已不談「因果性」，實不知如何能有二十一世紀或已進到「現代化之後」的哲學與文化的進步可言？此無怪林教授所堅持的由「外王開內聖」實是前現代化的帝王極權主義的主張而已，何足以言解放和進步。

識，而在此寫此長注是為了批判以下林教授提到波柏的「證誤論」所犯的錯誤說法先做一鋪陳而已。

六、總評所謂「由外王而內聖」的謬論

澄清以上的所謂方法論上的分判之關鍵之後，只須要簡要地指出「回應文」所糾纏不清的歷史和現實的論述內容即見出其虛假性。首先，「回應文」一方面認為中國傳統文化與哲學實只是帝王專制獨裁的依據和落後西方文化的根源，一方面又認為傳統文化中的人倫、自覺與民本並非是落後腐敗的主張，更應在現代世界發揚，云云。「回應文」主張我們現代要「有人倫的人權、有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」，但又不知所謂的人倫、自覺（實踐上的自覺而有的自主自律自由的行動）、民本等如何由實踐來，為何在二千多年來，現代的人權、自由與民主都得不到客觀的落實，如落實在社會政治的制度安排，以使人權、自由、民主得以在中國生根？至於現實政治上的帝王獨裁自非儒家所說的仁政王道的外王，中國歷史上沒有自由民主政權的法制，彰彰明甚的是法家的專制獨裁取向所主張的，結合了佔據國家權力和武力的帝王所形成。此皆是歷代儒者所深感不安和不能為力的地方，故有明末儒者之祈能有「至仁大義的聖人」出來，以實現儒家的仁政王道，以解人民的倒懸。至於儒家所接受的「天視自我民視，天聽自我民聽」，以及如孟子所說的「天子不能以天下與人」等語所表示的天下最高的主權在人民的民主觀念，「回應文」根本上視而不見，或不理解此說中的「民主」的意義。這種觀念之被漠視，被傳統帝王所打壓，即顯見儒家的傳統實有民主人權與自由的基本理念，但被法家式的獨裁統治所禁制了，不但不能見諸行動，連口頭說說都被株連三族至死。而當代新儒家見出傳統文化與哲學由道德理性直接開不出現代化的民主自由之政治制度，所以要吸收西方文化中的科學與民主的成素，正是要在現代中國產生出人權、自由與民主政體，成立現代世界的客觀的社會政治制度。

當代新儒家的核心觀念正是主張學習西方之思辨理性的精神，從中國文化開展出人權、自由與民主政治，而在科學上開出認知主體或思辨理性的內容。由道德理性以道德倫理為核心，以確立外王制度上的人權、自由與民主，以保障治權上的民本，以科學科技發揮現代知識與生產效能，使人民生活無憂，資源充足，真正達到讓人民都能安身立命，養生送死無憾。何曾有當代新儒家主張沒有人倫的人權，沒有民本的民主，沒有自覺的自由？這是當代新儒家共同的核心觀念，實不知林教授所謂「後新儒學」在理念和學理上如何超過了「當代新儒學」諸位大師之說，更不要說「回應文」沒有一分及得上三位大師所具有的全面和紮實的歷史與學理分析和返本開新的開創性的工作成果。「回應文」或在其他論述都沒有對題和有效的分析或反對儒家的理據可言，而只由各種違反理性的口號而主張無理的由「外王而內聖」的說法，實只是一種無理無據的謬說。細看「回應文」所指為自五四以來不少人之以為反傳統即得到現代化的民主人權和自由等現代化成果，實是由極端西化派與共產主義者的謬說而來，根本與當代新儒家的說法

不相容，不知如何得出當代新儒家即具有所謂「方法論上的本質主義」的弊病，更不知如何可以說當代新儒家與西化派有任何方法論上的共同的而且在政治理論和哲學上嚴重錯失！至於林教授以為採用波柏的「方法論的唯名論」主張，就會取得「有人倫的人權、有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」成果，好像一旦這樣結合便可成功！豈是借用波柏的一個分判，即可以得到西方幾百年的政治奮鬥的成果，這真是語言「魔術」了！

至於「回應文」後文所指為「道之錯置」、中國歷史為「君父聖」之「血緣縱貫系統」等之說，實只是自己的臆造，與中國歷史不相應，更與儒家的外王論述毫無關係。儒家從來沒有什麼「道的錯置」，從來都把道統置在政統上面，歷史上正有無數儒者以道統抗拒無道的政統，自然也有無數儒者被殘殺，被株連三族以至十族的慘劇。如此血淚斑斑的歷史，都是儒者與儒家的太學生在歷史上遺留的和平抗爭史實，西方歷史也不多見。儒家主張的人倫也是倫理義務相對應的關係（reciprocal relation），明顯反對片面的遵從君父的無道無德之行，豈能說這是中國歷史文化的基本錯失，更何能加於儒者身上！人類歷史基本上是從野蠻走向文明的發展，統領部落或國家武力的領導人常是獨裁者，儒家早已知道這個政治暴力是人倫世界罪惡的根源，更表現在集體的治理上，因此，都全力支持以仁為核心，依禮樂而治，行仁政王道；如獨裁者施行暴力，人民得起而革命之（孟子之主張）。由此可見，「回應文」所代表的對儒家與中國文化歷史的詮釋都不對題，完全沒有歷史文獻依據。

林教授所謂的在中國歷史上的政治結構如「君父聖」、「道之錯置」等，大概是最接近法家的主張和現實帝王專制統治的狀況，以及由此扭曲儒家所主張的仁政王道、把以武力取得王者地位的大皇帝打扮成「得天命的聖人」。但這種說法不但只是片面地看中國傳統文化被扭曲的獨裁專制的一面，而完全不見中國傳統士人所力求「申張民主與理性」的行動與實踐的更重要的文化歷史的使命與行動。而中國歷史上專制獨裁的帝制和由一家一姓獨佔國家主權的制度，在中華民國革了滿清王朝之命之後，就已成為歷史。由「外王開內聖」的主張可說是要倒退回中國文化中這一負面和更顛倒的政治權力控制道德，即由帝王專制控制道統與學統的局面。由此可見林教授的主張都不是「後五四」的進步，更是違反當代新儒家開新的主張。當代新儒家從無擁護帝王復辟，更不會懷抱所謂「君父聖」的血緣縱貫式的專制主義和專制關係。至於「回應文」最後更以一般人誤認儒家道德的要求為「太道德」云云，以為是儒家應改為「由外王開內聖」的理由之一，實是莫名其妙毫無理據可說的民粹之言。

至於「回應文」所提的使中國文化能成功發展出民主與科學，必須要從教育與學習西方自由民主開始，而當代新儒家所主張的都只是「理論邏輯次序」的說明，也不是「歷史序的發生次序」云云。這都不是當代新儒家的理論和說法。當代新儒家所重建的由「內聖開外王」是以價值本末輕重之價值層位而立，自是以道德原則和判斷為優先，而以承體起用而由道德開展為社會政治制度。當代新儒家自然不是依歷史的發生次序來論述新

外王，因中國傳統社會在過去二千多年都開不出現代的民主自由的政制，自然也無所謂歷史發展的次序可言。但當代新儒家都知道實現民主政治制度並不是易事，而且必須在國民長期進行實踐方可望有成，民主制度須要相應的教育與社會的一步步發展而成。但這種學習與發展必須依「內聖開外王」的取向才可望能成功現代的民主體制。學習與實踐必須依內聖為基礎，所學習得到的才是民主與科學。如果所學習和教育的是要人民服從政治獨裁者的權威與權力的由「外王開內聖」的方式開展，根本上是與民主科學背道而馳的他律道德方向，只是讓人民更向反民主與反自由的，反智與反人權的發展，以獨裁者的主觀而殘酷的行事和強力壓迫的武力方式而生活和受教育，只是馴化的奴隸，毫無獨立思考能力的愚民，不知如何能成功現代的民主制度和使得科學能獨立發展？林教授把人民的教育與學習為依從政治權力而行，實與成功民主與科學背道而馳的向，實只回復當今人類已不能再接受的被奴役和成為奴隸的順民的政治制度和封閉社會，此豈是合理和有效的發展民主自由社會和取得相應的科學和科技發展的構想。

當代新儒家與宋明儒，以及先秦儒家都是從真切的道德經驗與實踐而來。都是從生命所受和在生活實踐中的經驗而立，因此稱為實踐的進路的哲學，不同於西方從思辨理性或純粹認知理性而來的哲學與長期的形上學的奮鬥。孔孟與宋明儒都明顯地從道德實踐和工夫作為起點而展現心、性、天、命、理、道的實義，孔子以禮樂生活的實踐而指引出仁之為道德價值根源和仁之生命直接而當下的感通意義，而由此進到對天命、人性與天道的詮釋，陳述自己實踐的進階：由立志、立於禮、不惑、知天命、耳順、從心所欲不踰矩等六個道德境界；孟子則由見孺子將入於井之類的日常道德經驗而見證不忍人之心或道德的本心，以及由此證知「盡心知性知天」之道德形上學，以知言和養浩然之氣為工夫，建立「善信美大聖神」六個道德位階。宋明儒者天天在進行道德工夫的實踐，由存天理以克人欲，他們所關心和討論的都是實踐中如何體現天理以成德行，都是見諸於日常的生活中的道德主體的發展，也都關懷和實踐於天下國家大事之中。陽明在朝之戒慎恐懼，東林黨之抗爭，都是儒者堅持良知與帝王專制對抗的血淋淋的史實。宋明儒者豈只是關起門來做聖賢，宋明儒者也實時刻對不當的朝政國事不但口誅筆伐，更捨生取義，不惜為人間公義洒熱血，擲頭顱。縱使在巨大的王權與錦衣衛的恐怖壓力之下，何曾有什麼太「內傾」、「躺平」、「內捲」的畏縮。

唐、牟、徐三位當代新儒家抗拒獨裁專制的統治，流亡海外，不但在學術和文化反省和推展中歷盡艱辛，仍然學富五車，而且受盡中共與左派人士的瘋狂攻擊，和在台的西化派的排擠與打壓，而仍昂然立於天地之間，對不當的政治政策和行動，發出嚴厲的批判與聲討，如牟先生之批判毛澤東的言論，大陸的鳥籠經濟，徐先生彈劾鄧小平的感謝日本人侵華之說，唐先生之痛心見到四個外國人的人像掛於天安門上，強烈象徵中國成為馬列主義的文化殖民地，等等。凡此都表示儒者對中國文化對中華民族受到的屈辱，敢於奮起而爭，不知林教授是否以為此尚不足以言活生生的存在行動，林教授或有更切

近時政時事的針砭之言與社會實踐？當代新儒家之為人景仰，不只是因為他們能為中國文化推動真實而宏大的文化建構，而更是因為他們對現實政治權力的不低頭，而不惜犧牲自己的私人利益，以至家庭的幸福，敢於強烈地批判這些當權者，以全幅生命頂上去，保持人間的正氣與正義。這豈是那些在玩弄哲學名詞，誇誇其談而實無擔當與貢獻之「有識之士」，那些藏頭露尾自甘為權力附庸者的人之所能望其項背者，或被大陸當權者稱為「有用的白痴」的各個領域的專家學者所能及一二者！

貳、結論：當代新儒學邁向成為全人類的共同理想世界

以牟先生的「兩層存有論」作為當代新儒家經由確實而深刻的「返本」於中國歷史文化與經典的研究和抉發其中的義理與洞見所成的中國哲學與文化的現代化的努力，由此所達成的中國哲學現代化的成果，實已融攝西方哲學與文化的精深論述在內，而成為當代儒學的宏偉體系。當代新儒學奠基於人類的日常經驗中的各種理性與價值的表現，建立上通於天理之常道，即人類崇高的價值與貢獻，確立人之為人的價值，人之存在上不可被剝奪的生命尊嚴，以及可寄望從中國文化發展出現代化的理性的新外王，永遠摒除政治權力的腐敗與壓逼民生的惡政，以使人人的生命真正得以「安身立命」，人人皆能各盡其道德的性分與才能之發展，真正達到養生送死無憾。新儒家所主張的圓教和所建立的多元世界，多元的人格和境界的表現，足以使人類由此邁進真正和而不同的大同世界，達到永久的和平和共同的富裕。這不是西方以思辨理性為主的文化所能獨力完成，更不是專制獨裁而暴戾的共產主義的政權所能達致的最高的政治社會民生的大同世界。中國文化與儒家由「內聖開外王」的主張所含藏的結合人倫與社會政治的有序而和諧的世界，此中自然具備人倫道德、民主人權、政治為民生服務，獨立的司法以保障人民的生命財產和安全，社會政治結構為能使人文各方面的價值得以各自發展和創造。如斯方是當代新儒家邁向全球一家，仁者與天地萬物為一體的世界。

在「翻轉文」中，林教授曾認為東南亞國家可以說是他所構想的由學習而成的「由外王開內聖」的範例。我在「批謬文」已根據東南亞的政治實況和發展，指出東南亞家的當權者用以抗拒現代民主人權的所謂「亞洲價值」，實是主張獨裁統治的制度。東南亞國家中所存在的宗教歧視，如以伊斯蘭教為唯一國教，馬來西亞之規定華人的商業體制必須給馬來人佔百分之 50 以上，必須由馬來人任最高的職位，等等，都是違反民主與人權的宗教歧視和種族歧視的制度，由此對人民，特別是華僑的侵凌傷害，已見諸歷年的慘烈的「排華」暴亂之中！但「回應文」卻對此有力的反駁和事實不置一詞，也沒有承認錯誤。若以一最接近林教授所謂「有倫理的人權，有自覺的自由，有民主的民本」的國家制度來說，則中華民國所成的在台灣的社會，可說既有倫常的家庭生活，公平的民主人權社會，執掌政治權力的政黨必須以人民的幸福為依歸，順乎民生需求來施政，

否則即被人民以和平而有效的政治權力，以公開公平的投票和平地趕下台等等。此豈非林教授所祈望能成功的「理想社會」嗎？如此之理想只能是由儒家之以「內聖開外王」才會達成，即，在人人皆為具有道德自覺的道德主體，道德地行使公民的權力，使政府的權力受到道德原則，即公義原則之駕馭和規範，一切政黨與政治機關都受到民眾握有的代表主權的選票所控制，任何政治權力（包括憲法、法律與政策）都不可以違反道德和人性，以及一切行政都必須依道德原理所制訂的至高無上的憲法與法律來施行，而且以政治分權的平衡方式所成的真正有客觀效力的制衡的民主制度。由此所成的人文社會，正是儒家的由「內聖開外王」的理想和目標。

昔日孔老夫子教門人之工夫曰：「博學而篤志，切問而近思，仁在其中矣。」孟子亦以「知言」、「養氣」為工夫。知言是能洞察各種以名亂實、混淆視聽的詖辭、淫辭、邪辭、遁辭而不為其所亂，養氣是培植自己的正義感和道德勇氣，視一切富貴、威武、貧賤等外在壓力如無物，方足以不為所動，而達到道德上的不動心。而王夫之在綜覽和反省歷代之興亡，痛感士人之各種議論之無知而誤國誤民，曾慨歎「害莫大於膚淺」。牟先生亦多反覆引述此言，是有見於當今之世，馬克斯主義者有意以語術傳播反人性的意識形態之禍害之深，使人陷於其意識羅網而不能自拔。凡此，是我們今日辨誣返正所應有之戒慎恐懼的態度。如孟子所言，此文若有所辯，實不得已也。

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Critical Comments on An-Wu Lin's "A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'"

Shui-Chuen Lee*

Abstract

This paper extends the criticism I made in my paper 'From Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness or Vice Versa? - How to Develop a Democratic Government within Chinese Culture? With a Critique of the Fallacy of Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood'(hereafter referred as "critique of fallacy", published in 2022, in response to Lin's paper 'From "Outer Kingliness" to "Inner Sagehood" : Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Turn of the Thesis of "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness" ', published in 2021. Hereafter referred as "overturning paper." Hence in the following I will focus my criticism more on his newly expanded arguments. First, this paper points out that Lin's self-proclaimed "Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism," which he claims surpasses Mou Zongsan and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, is an unreasonable and unsubstantiated self-designation. This includes several misunderstandings and misinterpretations. First, he follows the mistaken view that characterizing Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as conservatism or traditionalism is a misunderstanding and distortion of the "returning to the root and opening new development" movement of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism in their attempt to rejuvenate and development of Confucianism, which culminates in the building of an encompassing system of Confucian philosophy with new themes such as professor Mou's twofold ontology and moral metaphysics in contrast to the West. Lin also attacks the renewed theory of the moral mind of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, claiming it in fact has the same philosophical structure as its arch enemy of total westernizationism, that fell into the same obsolete "methodological essentialism" that Karl Popper raised as a critique of a major branch of western traditional philosophies that made the west into a closed society and ended up in totalitarianism. His charge is simply without ground since he did not know the problem of metaphysical essentialism that Popper critique and the completely different practical and moral approach of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism with

metaphysics embodied in a moral approach. He simply neglects the new Outer Kingliness that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism pursued in order to turn Chinese society into an open one with democracy and scientific development as part and parcel of a new Chinese culture. Lin's charge is no less than a categorical fallacy. His further charge is that since the ritual ceremony in traditional Confucianism had a lineage with the old sorcery tradition of ancient China, the theories of moral mind and moral conscience of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism are theories that support what Lin called the "King-father-sage" blood tie system of traditional Chinese society, and thus are theories that support totalitarianism with superstitious belief. This is obviously a distorted way of viewing both traditional and contemporary Confucianism. Pre-Chin Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius upheld the democratic saying from one of the most ancient classics, the Book of Documents: "Heaven sees through what the people see and hears what the people hear." This proposes that the ruler should be determined by the consensus of the people, and political governance should be guided by ren (benevolence), which was a rational and moral state far beyond a superstitious magical society. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has incorporated democracy and science into their "new Outer Kingliness" program. Lin's charges are obviously unfounded. Lin even mocks the heart-breaking expressions of one of the most prominent contemporary Neo-Confucian, Professor Tang Chun-I. Tang spoke about the difficult situation where many Chinese have been forced into exile by political turmoil in recent centuries, facing cruel political persecutions. He emphasized the need to seek self-protection and survival in foreign societies through with mental strength. Lin strangely interprets this as a kind of "metaphysical preservation" to escape the turmoil of real life. This interpretation sounds ignorant and heartless, disregarding the bloody suffering and shameful way of life of our Chinese fellows in such diaspora situations. Lin's idea of rebuilding the inner sagehood of Confucianism with "Outer Kingliness" is, in fact, not Confucianism at all. Instead, it's a camouflage of legalism with a modern totalitarianism and collectivist face.

Last but not least, this paper strongly criticizes Lin's ignorance of the development of Asian countries as good learners of Western culture and their becoming democratic and civic countries. Lin is totally ignorant of the fact that the so-called "Asian values" upheld by some political leaders of Southeast Asia is a slogan in opposition to democracy and freedom, and in fact a reaction against democracy and science development of modernization. Their anti-democratic governance is clearly exposed in their exclusion of the political rights of Chinese immigrants and is a kind of closed society with strong racial and religious discrimination, especially against Chinese immigrants. They are far from Lin's ideal of a society with "human rights with ethical relationship, liberty with self-consciousness, democracy with ethical

governance for people.” If there is any society close to his so-called ideal, it may be Taiwan society under the democratic constitution of the Republic of China, which is basically under the strong influence of the Confucian conception of “Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness” in its historical setting.

Keywords: Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Mou Zongsan, Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Shui-Chuen Lee, An-Wu Lin.

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I. Introduction: The Debate on Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness Is a Debate between Righteousness and Interests in Human Nature

Since the mid-nineteenth century, China and Chinese culture in the late Qing Dynasty were subjected to military and cultural invasion by Western powers. This unveils the nearly two hundred years of Chinese culture's history of resistance and development in pursuit of survival, which has not been successful. Among them, modernization affects the core of Chinese culture in response to the strong challenge of Western culture. Under the suppression of the Manchu Dynasty for more than 200 years, Chinese scholars were not only severely suppressed politically by the comprehensive dictatorship but also by the "literary prison" of confiscating their families and exterminating their clans. In addition, the Manchu royal power occupied the orthodoxy, and traditional intellectuals did not dare to discuss government affairs, did not dare to ask for orders from the people, and even reduced themselves to slaves. Scholars or intellectuals completely lacked an independent and spontaneous mind. They were imprisoned in the prison of textual criticism and lost the ability to respond to the challenges of the times. Therefore, in the first half of the 19th century, it was constantly being invaded by foreign powers, but it was retreating steadily and was on the verge of being partitioned. The corrupt Manchu dynasty's inability to resist foreign aggression led to an intellectual revolution and a total rejection of its politics and culture.

The Revolution of 1911 was a peak. It overthrew the autocratic dynasty, moved towards modern democratic politics, and started modernization. The May Fourth Movement was a peak of cultural reform. However, this high point descended into self-abandonment and struggle for survival due to self-abasement and humiliation. The blindness and fanaticism of intellectuals have instead caused incredible frustration and embarrassment to China and Chinese culture. Taking advantage of its successful Westernization, Japan began to devour China and Asia, not only interrupting China's process of accepting modernization, but also causing unspeakable suffering of its people. Japan's invasion of China was undoubtedly representative of the Western powers. However, traditional Chinese scholars and people could still resist the overwhelming force of powerful ships and cannons. China did not fall in response and did not become a Japanese colony. But in terms of culture, the "total Westernization" that emerged during the May Fourth Movement has expanded into total communism, and Chinese culture has suffered more severe internal oppression and arbitrary slander. Confucianism has been involved in various movements as a burial object since 1949. Foreigners have not ruled the land of China, but China has become a cultural colony of the extreme communist ideology of the West. The

"May Fourth Movement" held high "science and democracy" seemed to be enlightenment, but it was just a slogan. Instead, it transformed into a mountain of extreme Western cultural party ideologies, pressing down on Chinese culture and the Chinese nation. Because the subjectivity of Chinese culture has been exhausted, it cannot make decisions. It can only be like a slave, letting others slaughter it! This can be borrowed from Li Zehou's phrase "Western learning as the body, Chinese learning as the application" to describe China's situation as a Western cultural colony. Subject and object have changed places; the Chinese are merely carriers of the extreme side of Western culture! Among them, the inner sagehood and the outer kingliness are two major cultural topics: the value order and the realistic system of the master-slave relationship between moral ethics and social politics. Chinese traditional culture is "the inner sagehood creates the outer kingliness", which takes morality as the basis of politics. On the contrary, advocating that Chinese culture should be transformed into "the outer kingliness opens up the inner sagehood" is actually to completely replace the subjectivity of Confucianism and Chinese culture in concept. This is not due to the stubbornness and corruption of Confucian scholars, but the result of unlimited violence and authoritarian control exerted by political dictators, and a group of so-called "intellectuals" working together to help them. Therefore, we return to the roots and reconstruct the Confucian way of "inner sagehood and outer kingliness" and criticize the fallacy of the so-called "outer kingliness and inner sagehood". Thoroughly criticizing and eliminating the core principle of communism, that is, the proposition that people have no humanity but only class nature, is an issue of the times that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism cannot be exempted from. This is the practical manifestation of the so-called "outer kingliness opening up inner sagehood" in today's topic. As Mr. Mou has pointed out many times, if the principles of communism remain unchanged, Chinese culture will inevitably be eradicated, and the Chinese nation will always be enslaved and culturally colonized. The idea of "the inner sagehood opening up the outer kingliness" in traditional Chinese culture means that Confucianism insists that everyone has human nature; that is, they have "the inalienable original value of being a human being." Each person is an end in themselves, has personal dignity, and cannot be used merely as a tool. The ultimate political system pointed to by this is a democratic system that can protect people's lives, dignity, and property. Therefore, this is still an issue of the times that Confucianism cannot escape today. This article still has important philosophical and cultural significance. It also points to the necessary distinction between righteousness and interests in human nature to complete the Confucian ambition of "creating lives for the people."

The Confucian theory of "the inner sagehood creates the outer kingliness" has many theoretical implications and crucial aspects that need clarification. Furthermore, the issue of

Chinese cultural modernization (not Westernization) that this concept points to must be discussed in depth and critically examined. However, An-Wu Lin's article "A Side View of Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood" (hereinafter referred to as the "response article") is merely a brief overview of his self-proclaimed arguments from the past twenty years. This article uses the word "response," which seems to mean responding to other people's criticisms to defend one's views or to reconstruct one's argument. However, if you look closely at the content of this article, it does not contain any new ideas. It only reiterates the points stated in many related articles or books before and does not truly and clearly respond to the severe criticisms made. In the following, we will use documentary evidence and reasoned arguments to demonstrate in detail how the content of this "response" is hollow and self-enclosed, and how it misinterprets Contemporary Neo-Confucianism discourse as well as the expression and direction of Chinese culture. As a starting point for the detailed discussion that follows, I will first provide a summary critique of this article's core themes.

After the passing of Mr. Mou Zongsan, Professor An-Wu Lin began to proclaimed that the arrival of the so-called "post-'Mou Zongsan' era." He consistently maintains that his thinking has surpassed not only Mr. Mou's scholarship and doctrines but also Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, thus referring to himself as a proponent of "Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism." I have pointed out the inaccuracies in his views and arguments at numerous domestic and international conferences on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, but have received no response either during or outside these events. Professor Lin, meanwhile, remains as self-assured as ever. Moreover, Professor Lin even refers to the discussions of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism disciples and friends as "the protector of Confucianism." It seems that many disciples and friends of Masters Tang and Mou are just repeating the statements of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism masters and unreasonably defending Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. In many discussions, Professor Lin further advocates a synthesis with Marxism (or what some mainland Confucian scholars euphemistically term the Confucianization of Marx's philosophy). However, the essence of this approach is to subordinate Confucianism to Marxism or communism, distorting or diminishing its fundamental principle to accommodate communist ideology. This amounts to a "Marxistization of Confucianism." Any assertion that the outer king determines the inner sage (i.e. that political power determines morality) exemplifies this "Marxist Confucianism." Such a stance echoes the theory of traditional Chinese Legalism, where the emperor monopolizes all political power to rule his subjects. This political theory of outer kingliness stands in direct opposition to the Confucian ideal of benevolent

kingship.

Confucian scholars have always criticized the Legalist view that advocates for a private world serving only one person or one family. What is worse than traditional Legalism is that this approach distorts the principles of Confucianism and the political philosophy of Western democracy and human rights to support autocratic politics, thereby slandering the basic tenets of Confucianism. Regarding the relationship between morality and politics, Confucianism has always advocated using inner sagehood to establish the right path for outer kingliness, or using morality to establish the structure and direction of the political system. This is exemplified by how Confucius and Mencius used benevolence or empathy as the basis for rituals and music (that is, social and political systems) to establish a benevolent government; Xunzi also believed that people possess "righteousness" and "discernment." He advocated the strengths of individuals to form a community based on etiquette and righteousness, working together to overcome challenges. He also established an objective etiquette principle based on righteousness and discrimination. Although Xunzi is not the mainstream thought of Confucianism, it is still one way of transforming Confucianism from "the inner sagehood to the outer kingliness." Even in the modernization of the West, Western philosophers still established political systems based on morality, which is also a manifestation of the principle that "the inner sagehood creates the outer kingliness." For example, Hume pointed out that the Western philosophical tradition regards justice as the first principle of society. Another example is that Kant established a political system based on the free law of free will, directly based on the free law of will, to establish a "civil society" (Kant, 1965/1999). Today's classic statements in Western political philosophy, such as *A Theory of Justice* by Rawls (1999), are also typical discussions on constructing modern democratic regimes based on the principle of justice. Principles of justice are moral principles. It can be seen that Western political philosophy's theory and practice both construct political systems based on moral laws and develop political theories based on morality. This is the basic principle of building a democratic government, that is, the fundamental method of "internal saints opening up external kings." This also shows that Confucian political theory, constructed from morality, is not incompatible with liberal democracy. On the contrary, it can also be seen that the notion of "outer kingliness creating inner sagehood" violates Confucianism's fundamental principles and represents an anti-Confucian political discourse based on the power of those in authority.

The traditional Legalist view of a great emperor with exclusive power is the concubine way that Confucians despise. The Legalist idea of "opening up the inner sage through the outer king" places the "Tao" on the power of an individual or a political party, the emperor and the

father. Only by relying on political dictatorial power to regulate morality and control subordinates and people can it truly be a "misplacement of Tao." This statement flatters and pleases the dictator who holds power. How can it be a proposition of Confucianism? It can also be seen that this theory of stipulating inner saints by outer kings obviously violates Confucianism's core principles. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has continuously and clearly stated that it supports the new foreign king of modern democratic and liberal political systems and cuts off the evil roots of dictatorship. This idea of letting the outer king determine the inner saint is even more arrogant than Confucianism's harmful use and suppression by traditional imperial autocracy! Traditional Confucians could not overthrow and resist the autocratic emperor through actions because Confucianists opposed forming political parties for personal gain and did not have the corresponding armed force to overthrow the autocratic dynasty. However, the Taoist system must be placed above the political system, and the heaven or heavenly law must be used to limit the monopoly of the royal power. If we instead use the power of social and political reality to regulate the "inner saint" (no doubt using etiquette and law to guide benevolence). The intention of those in power becomes the only standard of morality and the only source of social value, allowing political violence to be completely unrestricted. It supports the idea of imperial autocracy and is a regression to the traditional notion of imperial autocracy. How can this view go beyond the pursuit of democracy and scientific ideals of the May Fourth era? How can it go beyond the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism that returns to its origins to promote the original meaning of Confucianism? Thus, a new Confucian study of foreign kings was created that absorbed and digested the democracy and science that represented the achievements of Western modernization. The following is a serious academic and theoretical refutation of the content and absurdity of the "response article."

1. The "Response Article" is Actually a Collage of Old Articles and Has No New Ideas.

An-Wu Lin's "response article" is merely a compilation of old articles. It is self-contradictory and lacks any new ideas. The views of this article are expanded from a more recent article, "From 'Outer Kingliness' to 'Inner Sagehood': The reversal of 'Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness' after Neo-Confucianism" (from now on referred to as "reversal article") (Lin, 2021). I have already published an article on "'Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness'? 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'? - How Chinese Culture Constructs a Democratic System from the Inner Sagehood and Refutes the Fallacy of the So-called 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'" (after this referred to as "Criticism" Article") (Li, 2022) Sections 5 and

6 of the article will be criticized in detail. Moreover, at the Chinese Philosophical Research Center, the fourth "Ehu Lecture" was held on September 3, 2022, with the theme of "Inner Sagehood, Outer Kingliness, or Outer Kingliness, Inner Sagehood." Professor An-Wu Lin and I conducted detailed mutual discussions. Different viewpoints were discussed and debated in detail, and the article "Criticizing Essays" was published in advance and is listed alongside the "Reversal Essays" in the lecture's reference materials. I directly criticized it in the lecture, but An-Wu Lin failed to respond positively to the questioning and criticism of his views in various aspects, including errors in historical facts, misinterpretations of Confucian doctrines, and lack of substantive exposition in the "criticism article." In his lecture, Professor Lin talked nonsense about Wang Fuzhi's metaphysics and other irrelevant discussions. However, this "response essay" remains the same as before, without any response to the topic at all, and only repeats the errors and mistakes that have been criticized. False arguments are not worthy of further comment. Because of the strong invitation from the editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Indigenous Counseling Psychology*, I reluctantly made further criticism. I hope Professor Lin can face the errors in his argument head-on and make corrections. Or point out the mistakes and inappropriateness of my criticisms and clearly distinguish them so that my efforts and the high hopes of the editor-in-chief are not in vain. Otherwise, the academic pursuit of the ideal that "debate brings clarity" will degenerate into a situation where "more debate leads to more sophistry." They only want to confuse the audience. More seriously, they have overlooked Mr. Mou Zongsan's stern criticism of ideology that distort semantics and meaning. Such distortion, in his view, is truly a sin against philosophy.

The "response article" is slightly different from the previous "reversal article" in that it reiterates that although Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and the "thorough anti-traditionalists" of the May Fourth era may seem hostile on the surface, they hold the same "methodology": "methodological essentialism" (Popper, 1945). Therefore, Professor An-Wu Lin believes that not only can this be used to criticize all Westernizers, but also Contemporary Neo-Confucianism can also be criticized based on this. This is because some Westerners call Contemporary Neo-Confucianism "traditionalism" and can be criticized together. As for the self-contradiction and incomprehensibility contained in Professor Lin's use of this term and the fallacy of confusing Contemporary Neo-Confucianism with an alternative "total Westernization school," we will provide a detailed analysis below. Since the "response article" clearly refers to the "total Westernization" since the May Fourth Movement as "thorough anti-traditionalism," and many discussions in Contemporary Neo-Confucianism refute and oppose the idea of "total Westernization". Therefore, to prevent the following discussion from being misled by

terminology, in the following article, the term "comprehensive Westernization school" or "Westernization school" will be used to replace the so-called "thorough Westernization school" in the "response article" with the meaning and representative figure that is familiar to the academic circle and clearly understood. "anti-traditionalism" to facilitate academic discussion.

2. A Summary of the Philosophical Significance of Mr. Mou's "Two-Level Ontology" and An-Wu Lin's Misinterpretations and Incomprehensible Points

I will criticize the first section of the "response article" in three points. The first is Professor Lin's understanding of Mr. Mou's philosophical system. Consistent with Professor Lin's previous discussion methods, the first section of the "response article" starts with some of his subjective feelings. On the one hand, he confidently asserts that he is Mou's disciple and the "first Ph.D. supervised by Mr. Mou at National Taiwan University." But he seems unaware that what Mr. Mou most strongly criticized in his life was the various forms of misconduct by teachers and students in the Department of Philosophy at National Taiwan University, including chaos and partisan power struggle. On the other hand, Professor Lin seems to praise Mr. Mou's teachings as "the Dao connecting the past and the present." However, the content fails to address how Mou Zongsan's philosophy evolved from an in-depth study of contemporary Western science, mathematics, and logic. See the characteristics and contributions of speculative reason. The transcendental reflection can be traced back to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and formed the early theory system of "Critique of the Cognitive Mind." After middle age, Mr. Mou kept learning and thinking and made significant progress. He further understood Kant's dual meanings: "intelligence is the law of nature" and "free will is the law of the moral kingdom." Criticizing Kant's insufficient understanding of free will in moral rationality and after years of digestion and use of the three schools of Chinese Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. In particular, Buddhist principles establish the Confucian "two-level ontology" philosophical system. The "reversal article" generally states that "sincerity connects the world," or just one sentence says that Mr. Mou fully digested Kant. Talking about Mr. Mou's vast and comprehensive system is not enough to explain his philosophy, let alone the joys and sorrows of philosophy and the philosophical significance of his self-statement that "philosophy is the only thing a person concentrates on in his life" (Lin, 2011). "Sincerity connects the world" is merely a repetition of previous descriptions applied to various Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming Dynasties. It is general, empty, and unrelated to Mr. Mou's core philosophical principles and achievements. By doing this, he assumes that he has captured the basic essence

of Mr. Mou's philosophical system, and then proceeds to falsely claim that he has entered the "post-Mou Zongsan era" and surpassed Mr. Mou's achievements. This is actually deceiving oneself and others.

Since Professor Lin's idea of "outer kingliness opening up the inner sagehood" is directly related to his self-proclaimed "philosophy" of "post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" that he believes criticizes and transcends Mr. Mou Zongsan's "two-level ontology." Here, we need to first analyze its propositions and fundamental misinterpretations and misunderstandings of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, especially the key points and philosophical contributions of Mr. Mou's philosophical system, in order to see the fallacy in his theory of "the outer kingliness opens the inner sagehood." First, let's briefly review the key points of Mr. Chen Mou's philosophy. In his early days, Mr. Mou mainly studied Western contemporary philosophy, logic, mathematical philosophy, and scientific philosophy. In the mid-term, Mr. Mou fully reflected on the topic of China's modernization, studied Chinese philosophy and literature, and further absorbed and digested Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and "Critique of Practical Reason" (including "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" and other discussions), then integrating Heidegger's criticism and development of Kant, he proposed the famous "two-level ontology" in the book "Phenomena and Things in Itself", and the construction of philosophy first manifested itself in the development of "awareness of the body." Mr. Mou relied on the Confucian concern that moral consciousness is the first source of life, and the existence of the ontological meaning of the moral world is established through the presentation of the moral original heart or conscience, also known as the "non-attachment theory of existence." Mr. Mou pointed out that Moral consciousness directly opens up the moral world, and the experience of the unity of subject and object presented in moral actions must have the meaning of the unity of nature and man. Moral practice ideals must be achieved by moral subjects, who must have "cognition" of things in life in the action world to implement moral requirements more effectively. Therefore, the "objects" of moral actions the performance of "returning to the heart" has retreated into the cognitive model of "subject and object opposition." This is the meaning of the so-called "objectification" of objects, that is, the existence of objects that are integrated initially in moral practice is pierced out to form a cognitive relationship of subject and object opposition to achieve successful cognition of objects and assist the requirements of the original moral heart, For example, get knowledge of food, medicine, and human physiology can better fulfill children's "filial piety" toward their parents. This is the academic significance of the so-called "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" to open up the phenomenal world.

The "intellectual subject" developed from the "practical rationality" of the original heart

of morality is a clear response to the different expressions of moral rationality and speculative rationality (or cognitive rationality), establishing an essential ontological perspective of two-level ontology. This is not the "explanatory theory" commonly used by general and incomprehensible people, the random criticism that unreasonably distorts the meaning of conscience as the unity of subject and object, or even the subjective "idealism" and other random criticisms. It can be seen that the two-level ontology not only focuses on conscience and natural principles as the transcendent and internal basis for moral practice but also explains how to implement practical actions, which require the recognition of objects and the differences between cognition and moral practice way of expression. The two-level ontology naturally connects the metaphysical and metaphysical worlds. The world is just one metaphysical and metaphysical world. There are no two worlds or dualism! Moreover, moral practice is daily, and the moral heart or conscience is active, the starting point of all our discussions. How can it be like Professor Lin criticizing Mr. Mou for making the mind become "theoretical and transcendental," formalizing, purifying, and even "abstraction" (Lin, 2011)? Mr. Mou and three Contemporary Neo-Confucianists, Tang and Xu, all attach great importance to the practice of moral subjects in daily life and regard moral practice as the concrete manifestation and realization of conscience. This is the direct inheritance of Mr. Xiong Shili's "Liangzhi is the manifestation" and the core principle of the understanding and realization of the original heart of morality and conscience by Confucian scholars of all ages since Confucius. The three gentlemen often criticize those in power directly with their consciences regarding the current various man-made disasters, the pain and harm suffered by the Chinese nation regarding specific social, political, and people's livelihood, and so on. Putting forward clear and severe criticism and expressing it through personal actions is not what ordinary "intellectuals" who hide in academies and rely on authority do. Every "self" mentioned here, including themselves, is a living being constantly striving to improve under the vast political power and painful life. What the Confucianists say is based on introspection and criticism through countless hardships and hardships in life practice and is born from the real sense of existence in nature and destiny. It is me who makes the moral decisions of my existence in moral practice every day (Mou Zongsan, 2000). Is it what Professor An-Wu Lin calls "a transcendent, pure form of me" (Lin, 2011) ?

However, the rational meaning expressed by this "I" is not limited to specific experience situations but is a common principle that applies to all similar situations, so it has a transcendent ontological meaning. Said to be a moral subject, the cognitive subject expresses the transcendent status of this subject and the objectivity of the universality and universality of

morality and knowledge resulting from it. In the paragraph following Professor Lin's article quoted above, Professor Lin further accuses Mr. Mou of establishing the moral subject of self: "I am actually a pure, transcendent, self-natured self, or the self in the wisdom world. That is, I can reach the realm of things themselves. That self cannot be limited by experience or history. It is far beyond experience and history and also affects them. So Mr. Mou talks about the self as a transcendent, pure form of self" (Lin, 2011). If Professor Lin really understood the meaning of "building the body and establishing the pole" mentioned by Mr. Xiong, he would not be so ignorant of the ontology of conscience and awareness established by Mr. Mou's "two-level ontology" (The "noumenon" of the nature and nature of mind is one, that is, the mind-body that is active and exists.) that contemporary New Confucians and Mr. Xiong want to reconstruct. But this ontology is not a top-down "arbitrary metaphysics" as Professor Lin distorts it (to borrow a famous saying from morality). In Mr. Mou's theory, the Confucian's ability to stand upright in this ontology comes from moral practice, that is, a lively life entity witnessed by the presentation of the original moral heart that is "reversely realized" in moral experience. Through this, people can be "similar" to heaven and earth, can sympathize with heaven and earth, and then witness that conscience is the law of heaven. This is the deep meaning of the "three meanings of moral rationality" and "moral metaphysics" discussed by Mr. Mou.

The moral experience of "ni-chueh-ti-jeng"(conscience insight) is present in our daily lives and actions. Everyone has it, and everyone can realize it. Practice is the practical principle in daily ethics, and becoming virtuous means expanding one's sense of benevolence in life. Virtue is the vitality of life that everyone always feels, the lively and real existence. How could one think this "substantial self" is just an abstract, formal "self"? This is how our authentic selves always appear in our actual experience, which enables us to maintain a sense of moral reality and often have unyielding moral perceptions, judgments, and actions! Because this ontology transcends the limitations of any specific experience and history, it can be a free subject, allowing us to break through the limitations of reality. Therefore, it has the self-requirement of "not prescribing fate" and "not allowing ourselves to be tolerated." A moral act of sacrificing one's life for righteousness. Professor Lin's accusation in the above quotation is not only unreasonable but actually contains a self-contradictory statement. On the one hand, it admits that this ontology can transcend the limitations of specific experience and history, but it can also "act on experience and history." If this ontology is only transcendent, formal, or abstract, it has nothing to do with the development of history; if this moral "I" can be developed in history, how can it be just a formal and abstract thing?! The "cognitive self" established by Western philosophers through speculative reason is truly formal and has nothing to do with the practice

of the "self" in real life. Therefore, the intellectual subject can never discuss moral practice, so Kant must transcend the "logical self" of this "intellectual subject" and enter into the "moral self" or free will in practical reason to establish practical principles or morality. This principle leads to free will and opens up the modern democratic political system. If this ontology can influence experience and history, it must be present and used in our natural and specific life processes. How can it be just an abstract form of "I"? Professor Lin has many such contradictions; the above paragraph is just a tiny sample.

For another example, Professor Lin constantly accuses Mr. Mou of establishing that the "self" represented by the moral subjectivity in each of our lives is actually just "the subject of such a person. It is a formal subject, an abstract subject, and an empty subject: such practices are often more practices that belong to the cultivation of mind and less practice in the sense of happening in actual society." (Lin, 2011). This kind of unfounded and obviously contrary to Mr. Mou's clear statement can actually be so blatantly arbitrary and accuse someone who once claimed to be his mentor without any basis for analysis! This passage shows Professor Lin's often self-contradictory statements in his writing without realizing it. If this subject is only abstract, formal, etc., how can it be seen in our "practice of mind cultivation"? The cultivation of the mind always refers to the specific manifestation of daily ethics. There is no Confucian who does not talk about the expression of moral practice of mind, and no Confucian thinks that this is just an abstract thinking or concept (Wang Yangming emphasized the practical significance of the unity of knowledge and action, not to mention), Whether Professor Lin truly understands the true meaning of the Confucian practice of Gongfu every day, the practice of character cultivation is present in daily life. Whether you are in the process of moral self-examination of personal "quiet meditation" or "sitting quietly to preserve the natural principles and eliminate human desires," or when handling cases in court or fighting for people's justice with those in power, in changing the country and in the struggle between the social atmosphere and the system, your life will be implemented in the daily concrete and real situations. This is the actual practical existence activity of life.

Sages merely excel at illuminating and establishing the subjectivity of moral practice and the existence of practical subjects. They can also expand the connections between people, and between humanity and the universe, preventing us from sinking into human desires and corrupt living, or into discourse devoid of righteousness and emptiness. Isn't this the ontology that Confucians or contemporary New Confucians such as Mr. Mou must present in their daily life practice? Since Confucius, has Confucianism less influenced history over the past two thousand years? The ideals of Confucianism are obviously limited by the system and power in history

and cannot be fully expressed. Therefore, there are constant fierce struggles and ruthless destruction by the authoritarian royal power, vassal relatives, and internal prisons! Don't Confucians know all the resistance involved, but they still have no choice but to devote their lives to fighting until they sacrifice their lives? How can there be a moral practice that does not impact social reality? Perhaps what Professor Lin calls "little practice in the sense of real society" is different from Confucian moral practice and the performance required in life and actions represented by Confucian scholars or Mr. Mou. It is not a bloody reality. What he calls "cultivation of mind" is something different, not a "cultivation" that truly exists in history and in the lives of Confucian scholars. I believe that not only the Confucian scholars will oppose the evil deeds of political parties or dictators who dare to use violence to destroy the people, but the people will also rise to resist because this is a violent and evil act that violates human nature and ethics.

3. The Misunderstanding of Chinese and Western Culture and Philosophy Shown in the "Response Article" and the Disregard of Mr. Mou's Philosophy and the Contribution of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism to Culture and Philosophy

As for the "response article" that borrows the term "glocalization" coined by Western environmental ethicists to refer to the philosophical characteristics of Confucianism (which summarizes Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and Mr. Mou Zongsan, etc.), Professor Lin thinks it is useful, and this word can highlight the "universality of truth" that Confucianism talks about. However, this comparison is inappropriate and ill-fitting. It is not known that the way Contemporary Neo-Confucianism expresses its principles is the orientation of "returning to the roots and creating new ones" to show how the inherited principles of ancient sages and sages are truly universal and can be brought into play in the current era. The significance of further innovation is far beyond the meaning and connotation that the word glocalization can express. This serves as another example of An-Wu Lin's tendency to use inappropriate terminology and make unjustified leaps in his comparisons.

As for the "response article" in which Mr. Mou advanced over Song and Ming Confucianism and Wang Chuanshan, citing his "rejection of Buddhism" as an example, this is a highly one-sided and incompatible statement that is inconsistent with Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. The "response article" said that "the theory of rejecting Buddhism" "From the Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming Dynasties, it was already a big step forward to Wang Chuanshan, and from Wang Chuanshan to Xiong Shili, it was another big step forward. From

Xiong Shili to Mou Zongsan, it was another big step forward entry," and so on. Professor Lin seems to have forgotten that Wang Fuzhi also used the rejection of Buddhism to refute the Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties as "Yang Confucianism and Yin Buddhism." Mr. Tang Junyi once commented that it was "the most unreasonable theory" of Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties. This shows that Wang Chuanshan's "rejection of Buddhism" reflects an unreliable understanding of Buddhism and Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. This is because Wang Chuanshan interpreted the meaning of some Song and Ming Confucian scholars as "Yang Confucianism and Yin Buddhism." Not only did he have a severe estrangement from Confucianism, but he also probably fell behind what many Song and Ming Confucian scholars understood about the importance and precise views of rejection of Buddhism and Buddhism. But it is also disappointing that the response article did not explain the characteristics of Wang Fuzhi's "rejection of Buddhism" and how he surpassed other Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming Dynasties. What is more serious is that Wang Chuanshan was brought in under the guise of this one-sided discussion, thinking that it would help to show that the foundation of Wang Chuanshan's studies was reliable and that Wang Chuanshan had his unique insights but ignored them. The topic is "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness," which talks about the basic principles of Confucianism, which are tens of thousands of miles away from the theory of evading Buddhism and have nothing to do with Wang Chuanshan's metaphysics. This is the so-called confusion. Professor Lin just talked nonsense, regarded as a "response." In the Ehu lecture before, he did not face doubts and talked about (in fact, he could not tell) what Wang Fuzhi's "Outer Kingliness" was about. It was just talk nonsense, and I think you have proved your point! I don't know what the "response article" said about Mr. Xiong and Mr. Mou's "rejection of Buddhism." Although Mr. Xiong Shili returned to Confucianism from the Consciousness-Only Sect, he still used Buddhist doctrines to develop discussions on New Confucianism, such as planning to develop the Buddhist "Quantitative Theory" to open up the development of Confucian knowledge theory, which is of positive significance. What Mr. Xiong criticized was mainly those who believed that Mr. Xiong had improperly deviated from the teachings of the Jinling Academy. Mr. Mou is naturally a Confucianist, but he also relies heavily on and appreciates the theory and realm of Buddhism. He is also highly inspiring and forward in elaborating on the principles of Buddhism, and "has made a real contribution to Buddhism" (Mr. Mou's words). Some even criticized Mr. Mou for using Buddhist principles, such as "one mind opens two doors", "knowing the persistence of the mind", affirming the meaning of "Yuanjiao" of Tiantai Sect, etc. This is no longer Confucianism. Of course, this kind of criticism is really out of line and has no academic

rationale. However, Professor An-Wu Lin used the "rejection of the Buddhist theory" to far-fetch Mr. Mou's claim that the "rejection of the Buddhist theory" has made great progress. This is actually far-fetched and has no real meaning. The implication of Wang Fuzhi is even more far-fetched. Such "praise" to Mr. Mou not only cannot fully reflect Mr. Mou's original ideas and contributions to Buddhism, but also only uses it to endorse his own theory of "post-Mou Zongsan".

Professor Lin also made an inexplicable and serious accusation, that is, he believed that the "original mind theory" advocated by Mr. Mou and others in Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, that is, the "philosophy of conscience", is actually related to the "witchcraft" and "spells" in ancient Chinese culture. Inseparable from the monarchy. Professor Lin believes that "the reason why original mind theory has become an important tradition in Chinese philosophy is basically closely related to China's imperial autocracy and the original witchcraft and incantation" (Lin, 2011). He also said, "So we can find that the tradition of conscience studies reached its peak in the Ming Dynasty, and the Ming Dynasty was also the era when China's imperial autocracy reached its peak." (Lin, 2011). I don't know where this accusation comes from. The autocratic imperial rule in Chinese history, whether it was the Ming Dynasty, the Qin Dynasty or the Qing Dynasty, were all imperial autocracies. In the end, they were extremely barbaric and unethical. It was difficult to distinguish between the brutality of the people and the Confucianism. Until death and then stop. The disasters of imperial autocracy were not limited to the Ming Dynasty. Historical records clearly show that the emperors were tyrannical and violent, and it was not limited to the Ming Dynasty. Using this to blame "original mind theory" or Yangming school is actually an opposition to the principles of Yangming mind theory, which is a characteristic of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Implicated in thinking that he was just making excuses for opposing the theory of conscience! However, how Confucianism is inseparably related to the autocratic dictatorship of the emperor, and how the theory of mind is related to the pinnacle of autocracy, are all unfounded accusations and are actually deceptive words. Could it be that all the emperors of the Ming Dynasty were mentalists? Doesn't Professor Lin know that Wang Yangming was also ostracized and persecuted by the imperial court when he was alive? Emperor Yongzheng of the Qing Dynasty was a great dictator who suppressed academia and Confucianism because of his ability to understand "Zen", and his administration was also known for being harsh. I wonder if this is related? But compared to other great emperors, he was not too corrupt or an incompetent dictator.

It is said that the motivation and success of Japan's Meiji Restoration came from scholars and shoguns who studied Wang Yangming's teachings. Does this prove that Professor Lin's

recollection is unreasonable? This is similar to the false accusation that some people in the West believe that the Nazi party's autocratic dictatorship came from the influence of Hegel's philosophy, which is rarely accepted in academic circles. According to rigorous academic and argumentation, it is groundless talk. Returning to Wang Yangming's theory of "illumination conscience," this conscience originates from everyone's inherent mind and body and also connects to nature, heavenly principles, and heavenly ways. Is there any, or only one, theory that can relate to the "mind" of an autocratic emperor? How can it be connected with "witchcraft" and "spell"? Generally speaking, in the development of Chinese philosophy, it is recognized that Confucius transformed the traditional unknowable theory of destiny with the way of heaven and cut off the relationship between virtue and witchcraft. Moreover, Confucius used peace of mind to stabilize human values, making moral rationality the core driving force and support of Chinese culture. As seen in the Wen Gao of the Western Zhou Dynasty before Confucius, there had already been a way of moral practice that responded to the "mandate of heaven" with "respect" and "respect for virtue," which had gradually separated from the Yin people's custom of "respecting ghosts." Moral consciousness shows the "consciousness of worry" characteristic of Chinese culture. Both rulers and people regard moral practice as the first source of all values. It is the basic orientation on which political and cultural development is based.

Mr. Xu Fuguan's careful study of documents from the Western Zhou Dynasty to the Spring and Autumn Period shows that Chinese culture has gradually shifted from how individuals or families monopolize "destiny" to how destiny has come to everyone's inherent nature and value. (Xu Fuguan, 1969). Then Confucius fixed the value of human beings with "benevolence" and combined "mandate of destiny" with "human nature". Therefore, the first sentence of "The Doctrine of the Mean" written nearly a thousand years after the Zhou Dynasty: "The destiny of heaven is called nature." It became the basic tenet of China's theory of human nature. This is the Confucian tradition of transforming the ancient religious beliefs of destiny in terms of doctrine. Culture has become the embodiment of practical rationality. I don't know how this relates to witchcraft or incantation! As for the theory that the relationship between rituals and witchcraft is limited by the ancient relationship between rituals and sacrifices, the presiding priest of the rituals, the talismans used in sacrifices, and the relationship between sacrifices and ghosts and gods shown in ancient texts, the relationship between ritual texts and shamanistic blessings is limited to the relationship between sacrifices and ghosts and gods shown in ancient texts. It is useless to limit the inseparable relationship between rituals and mantras and ignore the development of history and culture and the creation, transformation, and improvement of

sages in the past. Just as Mr. Xu Fuguan has severely criticized the school of antiquity or the school of historical linguistics since the late Qing Dynasty for blindly limiting and misinterpreting the expression of human historical and cultural innovation by using the original meaning of words, inexplicably, ancient sages or philosophers were not allowed to create new ideas, new concepts, and new world views, such as saying that "Yu was just a big worm" and "Benevolence is a pair of two people." I don't know how to understand Zhou Wen's subsequent historical development from this point of view. Regarding the interpretation of sacrifice and governance, Xunzi has already said: "The people think of gods, and the gentlemen think of literature." This is Confucianism's most rational understanding and interpretation on sacrifice and governance, which is enough to refute this "cultural primitive theory". Limiting human culture and Chinese culture to ancient witchcraft culture, and as a result, some people such as Professor Lin are still firmly bound to witchcraft and incantation with conscience or morality and are even more innocently bound to support the pillar of imperial despotism! This is too much to slander Confucianism! They also falsely accuse Chinese culture of going too far! The great sacrifices to heaven and earth and other major sacrifices held in various dynasties in China were indeed presided over by the emperor simply because the emperor represented the entire people. How can it be understood that the emperor plays the role of witchcraft, thus combining the Confucian concept of pursuing a holy king with witchcraft to support autocratic dictatorship? This is a ridiculous and unreasonable idea.

As human history progresses, language and culture innovations are constantly transforming and improving, and new discourses are created and developed unlimited. Both "The Doctrine of the Mean" and "The Great Learning" constantly refer to the practice of morality as "being cautious about independence," the depth of "what others don't know but what one knows alone," and the judgment of each person's "conscience and ability" based on his or her nature, and go with the action. This is exactly what Confucianism requires from Gongfu theory: the deepest moral practice of self-reflection and moral practice, thus achieving true moral behavior and connecting the family, country, and world into a clear moral world. If we say that after the Western Zhou Dynasty, it was thought that the Confucian theory of benevolence and conscience was still combined with the autocracy of witchcraft, incantation, etc. This statement distorts Chinese culture and slanders Confucianism. It is also a statement that contributes to the authoritarian rule. As for what he said next, "What I say is not to say that the study of conscience is the study of imperial autocracy, but that the study of conscience is under the high-pressure rule of an extremely unreasonable imperial autocracy. To fight against that imperial autocracy, intellectuals "Thinking about another opposite" (Lin, 2011). This seems

to mean that the science of conscience not only has nothing to do with imperial autocracy but is also the opposite and a real struggle against it. If these sentences are taken seriously, then Professor Lin should be said to support the theory of conscience or conscience, and even think that Confucianism's emphasis on conscience is not the same as imperial autocracy, but is in constant opposition. But Professor Lin's next sentence states that "the two are structurally consistent, that is, the inner essential structures of conscience theory and imperial autocratic thinking are often the same" (Lin, 2011)! This is really self-contradictory nonsense and confusing "linguistics!"

4. "Response" to the Blind Spots of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism's Pursuit of Modernization

Professor An-Wu Lin always likes to claim that he has entered the so-called "post-May Fourth movement" and calls himself "post-Mou Zongsan". But what he meant by "post-May Fourth" and "post-Mou Zongsan" is incomprehensible. An-Wu Lin believed that Mr. Mou Zongsan and others were only in the "late stage of May Fourth"; that is, they had not yet surpassed the stage of May Fourth, while he himself was a "post-May Fourth" and so on. The "response article" begins by stating that Mr. Mou and others' response to the May Fourth Movement was a conservative approach to returning to the roots and innovating. It also goes so far as to say that the second generation of Contemporary Neo-Confucianists "have one thing in common with the hostile camps: they are interested in modern democracy and science, they basically accept it in full, and they all believe that the West is an advanced and progressive civilization, and the Chinese should study hard and catch up." It all sounds like "total westernization" or later "communization". Completely unaware of the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism criticism of the May Fourth Movement, that is, they accept the affirmation of democracy and science contained in it, and believe that this is exactly what Confucianism pursues but fails to achieve in the ideal pursuit of outer kingliness in terms of knowledge and career, but has never believed that Western culture is comprehensively advanced and superior to traditional Chinese culture and philosophy. Contemporary Neo-Confucians do not think that traditional Confucians have ignored the practice of outer kingliness but believe that the traditional Confucian method of directly developing outer kingliness from inner sagehood was unsuccessful. This is a historical fact and reflection on how to develop modern democracy and science. Therefore, there is the theory of "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," which creates intellectual and political subjects from moral and practical reasons to create modern democracy

and science. This is an attempt to reconstruct the Confucian theory of inner sagehood and outer kingliness from the functional difference between human speculative rationality and practical rationality. On the one hand, this is reinterpreting and developing the basic principles of Confucianism (returning to the roots) and thereby opening up new ideas. The development of democracy and science (breaking new ground) is not conservatism as the "response article" arbitrarily refers to, let alone being a "comprehensive acceptance" of Western modernization.

It can be said that those who think that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism's acceptance of democracy and science means a complete acceptance of Western culture and politics do not know the principles of Confucianism or what Contemporary Neo-Confucianism says. It can also be noted that they do not know the advantages and disadvantages of Western modernization. Professor An-Wu Lin seems utterly unaware that Mr. Mou (and Mr. Tang Junyi and Xu Fuguan) also have many pertinent criticisms of Western politics and society. Mr. Mou has laid out the basic principles of the social entity that Chinese cultural modernization should have: using Confucian ethical values to promote family and social construction in modernization. Mr. Tang's criticism of Western society and culture is more based on the reflection and development of humanism. It is neither a blind acceptance nor a one-sided denial or opposition. Mr. Xu Fuguan also made similar criticisms. Various extreme and unreasonable manifestations in Western culture and philosophy, especially fascism and the organizations and systems of the Communist Party that have evolved into dictatorships, are all seen by contemporary New Confucians and are also the target of Confucian criticism. Therefore, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is truly an attitude and method of "critical acceptance" of Western philosophy and culture. From this we can see that the contemporary New Confucian orientation of "returning to the roots and creating new ones" is completely different from "Chinese learning as the body and Western learning as the application" and "total Westernization". It is also different from the "total Marxist" or "communist" orientations. The modernization promoted by Contemporary Neo-Confucianism by assimilating democracy and science is not "the modernization of Western culture", but rather absorbs and digests the advantages of Western culture and criticizes its shortcomings based on the core principles of traditional Chinese culture. The "breaking new ground" here is actually developing the function of our speculative reason to develop the democratic and scientific construction we need now, but never giving up or belittling the lofty status of practical or moral reason. Moreover, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is not like the common vulgar and unintelligible doctrines and ignorance of the complexity and long-term nature of cultural development reflected in the "response essays." Confucians are believed to believe that by changing their mentality in this way, modernization

can be achieved overnight, let alone that Philosophers can do the work of modernization. Of course, contemporary New Confucians hope to witness the successful and true "modernization" of Chinese culture, but they are by no means pretentious about their belief that they have successfully modernized. China still has a long way to go regarding its democratic political system and scientific thinking spirit, and there are endless twists and turns. How can the ideas of one or two philosophers accomplish this?

Professor Lin's views are often confusing. He often applies the views of extreme Westernizers to Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and slanders them. Professor Lin has been using Westernizer or Communism to describe Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. For example, referring to Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as "neoconservatism," "cultural conservatism," "Neo-traditionalists," "neo-traditionalists, and thoroughly anti-traditionalists. These two camps seem to be right, but they both fully affirm the basic content of Western modernization", "Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as neo-traditionalism," and so on. In fact, he is using language to "disguise reality" by confusing many truly traditional conservatives and traditionalists with Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and especially labeling Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as "neoconservatism." The name is the same as the Westernization school. Therefore, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism can be criticized on various charges that are entirely unrelated to it. Just as communism always accuses Contemporary Neo-Confucianism of opposing communism as being "anti-communist and anti-China". Therefore, the "response article" makes people read that it is not an academic discussion but a declaration to pull people on one's own side, and I don't know what academic significance it has. Professor An-Wu Lin's confusing and contradictory statements make it even clear that readers feel "dazzled"!

Before severely criticizing the fallacy called "methodological essentialism" shared by Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and outright anti-traditionalism, I would like to give one more example to illustrate this slanderous, self-contradictory, and inexplicable statement. Professor Lam pointed out, "After 1949, contemporary New Confucians who fled to Hong Kong can't help but lament that the flowers and fruits are scattered... Under this situation, it is not easy to seek "self-plantation of spiritual roots" (Lin, 2024). He also said: "Qian Mu, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Zhang Pijie," and the New Asia spirit managed by Xu Fuguan and others have indeed started the work of "self-plantation of spiritual roots"" (Lin, 2024). He also said, "Not only are spiritual roots self-planting, but these spiritual roots must be planted between the sky and the earth. They must be moistened by rain and dew and illuminated by the sun and moon." However, he also said, "Contemporary Neo-Confucianism places too much emphasis on the self-planting of spiritual roots. This "spiritual root" after deep philosophical

interpretation, becomes a metaphysical ontology” (Lin, 2024). "Contemporary Neo-Confucianism places too much emphasis on the self-plantation of spiritual roots. After deep philosophical interpretation, this 'spiritual root' becomes a metaphysical ontology. To achieve 'metaphysical preservation,' of course, there is also a need for 'metaphysical enlightenment.' In this book, Shengyi created a new outer kingliness and thus became a practical force that must be activated” (Lin, 2024) and so on. The problem is that I don't know how Professor Lin understands “why spiritual roots need to be self-established.” What is a "spiritual root"? As we all know, Mr. Tang's idea of “self-plantation of spiritual roots” is to pray for the Chinese nation to be dispersed in foreign countries, living under the fence of foreigners, and suffering all kinds of hardships and persecutions (such as anti-Chinese in Southeast Asian countries, the robbery, rape and murder of countless overseas Chinese women during the Indonesian riots, etc.) in their lives, they can be physically and mentally healthy and be able to settle down and live in a foreign land. This is to hope that the Chinese people can integrate with foreign races and foreign countries in their lives and feel at ease. Of course, this is extremely difficult. However, Mr. Tang, who is rooted in the Confucian spirit of Chinese culture, still faces it with an optimistic attitude. This is a real problem planted in foreign soil. How can it be "metaphysical preservation"! This is a matter of human life in this generation, stained with blood and tears! Then Professor Lin believed that “what is ‘metaphysically preserved’ is ‘morality’, while what is ‘metaphysically opened’ is ‘knowledge’” and so on. Morality is the metaphysical preservation of spiritual roots. This is an inexplicable dream. Morality is real and can be seen in practice. I don't know how to preserve spiritual roots metaphysically. Don't you even know what the term “metaphysical preservation” means? I really don't know that Professor Lin came up with such absurd and boring arguments based on that kind of metaphysical thinking and regarded the current disasters suffered by the Chinese nation in a foreign place as a language trick!

This is just to show that most of the "response articles" are just talking to themselves in a sleep-like manner, which makes it impossible for people to test and verify them seriously with academic documents or historical facts. It is just a bunch of language I don't know and has no academic or objective meaning.

5. "Response Article" criticizes the methodology of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and radical anti-traditionalists

An-Wu Lin not only misunderstood and failed to understand the achievements of

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism in reconstructing Confucianism and the existing inner sage and outer kingliness through the method of "returning to the roots and creating a new one." He also believes that although Contemporary Neo-Confucianism opposes the "thoroughly anti-traditional" Westernization school, the two are fellow travelers who adopt the same methodological essentialism. In his "response article," Professor Lin also borrowed Popper's anti-dictatorship terminology to express the most crucial rationale for opening the inner sagehood from the outer kingliness. Therefore, both Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and Westernizers have made the same mistake: "methodological essentialism." Contemporary Neo-Confucians have become supporters of Westernizers and autocracy, so "post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" can have a role. On the surface, this seems to be the only academically significant argument raised in the "response article" compared to the "reversal article" (Lin, 2024). Although it is still just a self-righteous argument from before, using a long list of discussions that are not Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, as well as the alleged concepts and history that do not exist, to fabricate one's own "post-'Mou Zongsan'" and "post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" discussion as a comparison. Given that this clear accusation appears to have reasonable academic arguments, it is worth taking this opportunity to seriously refute its fallacies.

Anti-essentialism was originally an existential criticism of the mistake of traditional Western philosophy since Plato, in which "essence precedes existence." Existentialism believes that the actual existence of human beings is more important and has priority, so it advocates that "existence precedes essence" to relieve the pain of alienation and alienation of modern people. Existentialism returns from the thinking of abstract universal ideas or concepts in traditional Western philosophy to the many real existential feelings everyone has, such as anxiety, fear, terror, alienation, etc., which have their rationality. But the most powerful anti-essentialism, which comes from the Western philosophical tradition, is to criticize the fallacies of traditional Western metaphysics through speculative reason. For example, Kant said that judgments such as traditional philosophical arguments for the existence of God, whether the world has a beginning or not, whether there is the most straightforward unit, etc., all go beyond the limitations of perceptuality and intelligence, and produce only specious "dialectical illusions." This is a self-criticism of the fictitious concepts constructed by Western traditional metaphysics, which have no empirical or cognitive basis and come from speculative reasons. Modern development comes from Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis, which points out that metaphysics is a misuse of language, that is, using language that is only suitable for describing the world for fictitious and non-existent things, such as souls, entities, etc., and even think that

this terminology refers to a metaphysical existence as the "essence" of human beings and the universe. Still, it is all fiction. Wittgenstein's "Critique of Language" ushered in the subsequent "anti-metaphysics" trend of logical positivism, which became the mainstream of Western philosophy in the last century, that is, in British and American philosophy after the 1920s, and continues to this day. However, this anti-metaphysical proposition in the West is not so-called "methodological" but refers to various philosophical realist, essentialist, or metaphysical erroneous claims in the Western tradition. Wittgenstein's later analysis of everyday language even pointed out that many nouns, such as the word "religion," are used in various religions, such as Catholicism, Buddhism, Islam, etc. Still, they only have "family resemblance" (family resemblance) and have no meaning. Definite designation or actual designation. This analysis has become a fundamental dogma of contemporary British and American philosophy. When applied to scientific research, logical positivists use confirmation theory as the empirical basis of science and thus point out that discussions based on important metaphysical "concepts" cannot verify them. Judgments of true and false or real existence, such as "absolute god", "substance", etc. Because nouns cannot be verified by experience, nor can their truth be obtained through logical analysis, they are all "meaningless" words.

Popper's falsification theory also relies on whether an assertion or statement can be falsified as the "demarcation line" between science and metaphysics. In anti-metaphysical terms, Popper is no different from the logical positivists. Popper's opposition to logical positivism was a dispute over the understanding of scientific methods. Popper did not think that logical positivism was what he called "methodological essentialism"! This can be said to be Professor Lin's "wrong interpretation." If this accusation can be made, I don't know how Professor Lin analyzes or understands the phenomenon that logical positivism has vigorously opposed essentialism and metaphysics for decades in the last century, including serious criticisms and assertions of Hegel's philosophy. Why does logical positivism still exist? Is it what Popper calls "methodological essentialism"? This shows that Professor Lin's understanding of scientific methods is seriously flawed. He uses them indiscriminately without an academic and theoretical basis. Professor Lin thus applied Chinese philosophy, such as Confucianism, to the philosophy of practice, which was simply a misleading method. He only borrowed Popper's words and used contemporary new ideas from total Westernizers. The false accusations made by Confucians are justified by their so-called "post-Mou Zongsan" and "post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism!" I wonder if Wang Chuanshan, whom Professor Lin is familiar with, believes that traditional Confucianism is a supporter of imperial autocracy, or is it just the selfish motives of emperors who borrowed Yang Confucianism and Yin Law (plus the so-called "Yang

Confucian Yin Shi") to cause autocracy and corruption in Chinese politics?

This one-sided adoption of the framework of Western speculative philosophy imposed on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is worse than many people who think that China has no philosophy because Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has actually highly digested mainstream Western philosophy and discourse and formed a structure that is different from Western philosophy. A huge system that everyone can compare with (as the "response article" also admits in the text). It also shows the significant progress made by the modernization of Chinese philosophy. It can be seen that Professor Lin's so-called accusation of "methodological essentialism" against Confucianism, Mencius, Song, and Ming Confucianism, as well as Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, is unreasonable. As the culprit of "extreme dictatorship." Judging from China's political development after the May Fourth Movement, the "response article" is based on the establishment's historical materialism and total Westernization. It unreasonably accuses Confucianism of being the root of all corruption and dictatorship in Chinese culture and social politics. Come against Chinese cultural dogma. This shows his so-called conception of transcending Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is a superb fantasy.

As for the "response article" criticizing Hu Shi's "bold assumptions and careful verification" type of essentialism. Not only do they not know that Hu Shih's theory is close to Popper's "falsification theory," but that its fundamental concept comes from Dewey's "pragmatism" and "scientific method," and it does not have any essentialist implications. This kind of accusation is actually based on people who have no evidence to back it up. They can make random criticisms to show their own cleverness and self-deception. As for Professor Lin's self-correction based on an inexplicable "wrong experience" he had as a child, he thought it could be compared to the "scientific method" of Popper and logical positivism. I don't know that this kind of pediatric learning and correction behavior, even if it improves. The "trial-and-error method" is thousands of miles from the modern scientific method. Fundamentally, it is a different type of primitive experiential learning expression from the contemporary scientific method. Modern Western science also experienced thousands of years of speculative and rational development, especially the breakthroughs of several great scientists in the 16th and 17th centuries. It gradually broke through the control and persecution of religion and theocracy, leading to the rapid development of science and technology. Professor Lin's errors and loose associations, etc., are not worthy of further discussion. As for the next section of the "response," the terminology of the so-called "causality of natural sciences" and "causality of humanities" is discussed. It is a return to the fantasy of the "scientific method" of the 19th century or earlier in the West. Modern science and humanities no longer discuss "causality." I don't know how we

can have the 21st century or have entered the "post-modernization" period. Is there any progress in philosophy and culture? It is no wonder that Professor Lin's insistence on "creating inner sagehood from outer kingliness" is the proposition of pre-modern imperial totalitarianism. It cannot be said to be liberation and progress.

6. General Comments on the Fallacy of "From Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood"

After clarifying the critical points of the so-called methodological judgment above, it is only necessary to briefly point out the entangled historical and realistic content of the "response article" to see its falsity. First of all, the "response article" on one hand believes that traditional Chinese culture and philosophy are only the basis for imperial autocracy and the source of China's backwardness compared to Western culture, while on the other hand it argues that the ethics, self-awareness, and people-oriented principles in traditional culture are not backward or corrupt ideas and should be promoted in the modern world. The "response article" advocates that in modern times, we should have "ethical human rights, conscious freedom, and people-oriented democracy." However, we do not know the so-called human ethics, consciousness (in practice, conscious and autonomous actions with self-discipline and freedom), and people-oriented democracy. How can I learn from practice? Why, for more than two thousand years, have modern human rights, freedoms, and democracy not been objectively implemented, such as in the social and political institutional arrangements, so that human rights, freedoms, and democracy can take root in China? As for the imperial dictatorship in real politics, it is not the foreign king of benevolent kingship according to Confucianism. There is no legal system of liberal democratic regimes in Chinese history. It is obviously what the legalist autocratic orientation advocates, which combines the occupation of state power and the formation of the emperor of force. Confucian scholars of all ages have been deeply uneasy and helpless in these areas. Therefore, Confucian scholars in the late Ming Dynasty prayed for the emergence of "the most benevolent and righteous saint" to realize the Confucian benevolent kingship and relieve the people's insecurities. As for the democratic concept accepted by Confucianism that "Heaven sees itself and the people see it, and Heaven hears it, and the people listen," as well as the democratic concept that the supreme sovereignty of the world lies in the people, as Mencius said, "the emperor cannot treat the world with people," "response Wen" basically turns a blind eye, or does not understand the meaning of "democracy" in this theory. This concept was ignored and suppressed by the traditional emperors. Obviously, the Confucian tradition had the basic concepts of democracy, human rights, and freedom, but the Legalist dictatorship banned

them. Not only could it not be put into action, it could even be spoken. All three clans were implicated to death. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism sees that traditional culture and philosophy cannot directly develop a modern political system of democracy and freedom based on moral rationality. Therefore, it is necessary to absorb the elements of science and democracy in Western culture to produce human rights and freedom in modern China—and democratic government to establish an objective social and political system in the contemporary world.

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freedom based on moral rationality. Therefore, it is necessary to absorb the elements of science and democracy in Western culture to produce human rights and freedom in modern China—and democratic government to establish an objective social and political system in the contemporary world.

The "misplacement of Tao" mentioned later in the "response article" and the "bloodline system" of "king, father, and sage" in Chinese history are actually just Professor Lin's own inventions and do not correspond to Chinese history. They have nothing to do with Confucianism's discussion of foreign kings. There has never been any "misplacement of Tao" in Confucianism, and Taoism has always been placed above political power. In history, countless Confucians have used Taoism to resist unjust political systems. Naturally, numerous Confucian scholars were massacred, and tragedies involving three or even ten clans were implicated. Such a blood-stained history is a historical fact of the peaceful struggle left by Confucianists and Confucian students, which is rare in Western history. The human ethics advocated by Confucianism are also reciprocal relations of ethical obligations. They clearly oppose the immoral and unethical behavior of one-sided obedience to the emperor and father. How can we say that this is a basic mistake in Chinese history and culture? How can it be imposed on Confucians? Human history develops from barbarism to civilization. Leaders who command tribal or national forces are often dictators. Confucians have long known that this political violence is the root of evil in the human world and is also reflected in collective governance. Therefore, they all fully support taking benevolence as the core, governing according to etiquette and music, and practicing benevolent government; if a dictator commits violence, the people can make a revolution (Mencius's proposition). This shows that the interpretation of Confucianism and Chinese culture and history represented by the "response article" is incorrect and unsupported by historical documents.

Professor Lin calls the political structures in Chinese history, such as "King, Father and Sage," "Dislocation of Tao," etc., the closest to the legalist propositions and the actual situation of imperial autocratic rule. As a result, it distorted the benevolent kingship advocated by Confucianism and transformed the great emperor who obtained the king's status through force into a "sage who received destiny." However, this view is not only a one-sided view of the distorted authoritarian side of traditional Chinese culture but also completely misses the more important cultural and historical mission and practice of traditional Chinese scholars' efforts to "advocate democracy and rationality." The autocratic imperial system in Chinese history and the system of one family and one surname monopolizing national sovereignty have become history after the Republic of China overthrew the Manchu Qing Dynasty. The idea of " from

outer kingliness to inner sagehood " can be a return to the negative and more inverted political power controlling morality in Chinese culture, that is, the emperor's autocratic control of Taoism and academic tradition. This shows that Professor Lin's ideas are not "post-May Fourth" progress and are even more contrary to contemporary New Confucian ideas of opening up a new world. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has never supported the restoration of emperors, let alone the so-called "king, father, sage" blood-line despotism and autocratic relationship. As for the "response article", it ends by saying that most people misunderstand the requirements of Confucian morality as "too moral". Thinking that this is one reason why Confucianism should be changed to "from the outer king to the inner sage" is actually a populist statement that is inexplicable and unfounded.

As for what the "response article" mentioned, for Chinese culture to successfully develop democracy and science, it must start with education and learning about Western liberal democracy. However, what Contemporary Neo-Confucianism advocates is only an explanation of "theoretical logical order" and is not "The order of occurrence of historical order" and so on. These are not the theories and statements of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. The Contemporary Neo-Confucian reconstruction of "the inner sagehood and the outer kingliness" is based on the level of value, which naturally prioritizes moral principles and judgments and develops social and political systems based on morality. Naturally, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism does not discuss the New Foreign Kings according to the order of historical occurrence because traditional Chinese society has not been able to develop a modern democratic and free political system in the past two thousand years. There is no such thing as the order of historical development. However, Contemporary Neo-Confucians know it is difficult to realize a democratic political system, and the people must practice it long before it can be achieved. A democratic system requires corresponding education and social development step by step. However, to achieve the success of a modern democratic system, this kind of learning and development must be based on the orientation that "the inner sage opens up the outer king." Learning and practice must be based on the inner sage, and what is learned is democracy and science. If what we study and educate is to ask the people to obey the authority and power of the political dictator, it is carried out in the way of "outer kingliness and inner sagehood," which is fundamentally a heteronomous moral direction that runs counter to democratic science and will only make the people more anti-democratic. And anti-liberal, anti-intellectual and anti-human rights developments. Living and being educated by the subjective and cruel actions of dictators and violent and oppressive methods are just domesticated slaves, ignorant people who cannot think independently. I don't know how to succeed in a modern

democratic system and enable science to develop independently. Professor Lin regards people's education and learning as complying with political power. It goes against the direction of thriving democracy and science. It only restores the political system and closed society of enslaved and submissive people who are no longer acceptable to today's human beings. How can this be considered a reasonable and effective concept for developing a democratic and free society and achieving corresponding scientific and technological development?

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Song and Ming Confucianism, and Pre-Qin Confucianism come from real moral experience and practice. Philosophies are all based on life experiences and experiences in life practice, called practical approaches. They differ from Western philosophy and long-term metaphysical struggles that come from speculative or pure cognitive reason. Both Confucius, Mencius, and Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties clearly showed the true meaning of heart, nature, nature, destiny, reason, and Tao from moral practice and Gongfu. Confucius used the practice of ritual and music life to guide benevolence as the source of moral value and the direct and immediate significance of the life of benevolence, and then proceeded to the interpretation of destiny, human nature, and the way of heaven, and state the advancement of his practice: It consists of six moral realms: determination, etiquette, no confusion, understanding destiny, obedience, and following the heart's desires without exceeding the rules; Mencius witnessed the unbearable heart or the original intention of morality through daily moral experiences such as seeing a child about to fall into a well. From this, he demonstrated the moral metaphysics of "knowing heaven with all your heart and soul," which is based on knowing words and cultivating the awe-inspiring spirit. Work hard to establish the six moral levels of "Good Faith, Beautiful Holy Spirit." Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties practiced moral skills daily, preserving nature's principles to suppress human desires. They cared about and discussed how to embody the principles of nature in practice to achieve virtue. They were all seen in the development of moral subjects in daily life, and they all cared about and practiced in major national affairs worldwide. Wang Yangming's caution, fear in the court, and the Donglin Party's resistance are bloody historical facts of Confucianism's persistence in conscience and confrontation with imperial autocracy. The Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties not only closed their doors and became sages, but they also criticized improper government affairs with words and writings, sacrificed their lives for righteousness, and did not hesitate to shed their blood and heads for justice in the world. Even under the terrifying pressure of the huge royal power and the royal guards, there was never any fear of being too "introverted", "lying flat", or "involving".

Three Contemporary Neo-Confucians, Tang, Mou, and Xu, resisted the rule of

authoritarianism and went into exile overseas. Not only did they endure hardships in academic and cultural reflection and promotion, but they were still highly knowledgeable. They were also subjected to crazy attacks by the CCP and leftists, as well as Westernization in Taiwan. Despite the sect's exclusion and suppression, he still stands proudly between heaven and earth. Issue severe criticism and condemnation of improper political policies and actions, such as Mr. Mou's remarks criticizing Mao Zedong, the birdcage economy in mainland China, and Mr. Xu's impeachment of Deng Xiaoping's remarks about thanking the Japanese for invading China, Mr. Tang was saddened to see the portraits of four foreigners hanging on Tiananmen Square, which powerfully symbolized China becoming a cultural colony of Marxism-Leninism, etc. All of this shows that Confucian scholars dare to rise and fight against the humiliation of Chinese culture by the Chinese nation. I wonder if Professor Lin thinks this is insufficient to describe living actions. Professor Lin may have some critical remarks and social practices that are more relevant to current affairs? Contemporary Neo-Confucians are admired not only because they can promote real and grand cultural construction of Chinese culture but also because they do not bow to real political power and do not hesitate to sacrifice their own private interests and even the happiness of their families and dare to Strongly criticize these people in power, support them with all their lives, and maintain righteousness and justice in the world. Is this something that can be surpassed by those "intelligent people" who play around with philosophical terms and boast without actually having any responsibility or contribution? Those who hide their heads and tails and are willing to be subordinates of power or are called "useful" by those in power in mainland China. "Idiot" experts and scholars in various fields can achieve one or two!

II. Conclusion: Contemporary Neo-Confucianism moves towards becoming a common ideal world for all mankind

Taking Mr. Mou's "two-level ontology" as the Contemporary Neo-Confucian efforts to modernize Chinese philosophy and culture through a genuine and profound "return to the roots" of the study of Chinese history, culture, and classics and the elucidation of the principles and insights therein, the achievements of the modernization of Chinese philosophy achieved thereby have integrated the profound expositions of Western philosophy and culture, and become the grand system of contemporary Confucianism. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is based on the manifestations of various rationalities and values in daily human experience and establishes the common principles that lead to the principles of nature, the noble values, and the contribution of human beings. It creates the value of human beings and the inalienable rights of

human existence. The dignity of life and the new outer kings who can hope to develop modern rationality from Chinese culture forever get rid of the corruption of political power and the bad governance that suppresses people's livelihood so that everyone's life can truly "settle down and live in peace", and each person can develop their moral character and talents to maintain health and die without regrets indeed. The Perfect Teaching and pluralistic world advocated by Neo-Confucianism, the expression of diverse personalities and realms, are enough to enable mankind to move into a truly harmonious world of harmony and achieve permanent peace and shared prosperity. This is not a world that Western culture, which is dominated by speculative rationality, can accomplish alone, nor is it a harmonious world with the highest political, social, and people's livelihood that an autocratic and violent communist regime can achieve. Chinese culture and Confucianism imply an orderly and harmonious world that combines human ethics and social politics with the idea that "the inner sagehood opens up the outer kingliness." This world naturally has human ethics, democracy, human rights, and politics to serve the people's livelihood and an independent judiciary to ensure the people's life, property, and safety. The social and political structure is designed to enable the development and creation of values in all aspects of the humanities. In this way, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is moving towards a world where the world is one family, where benevolent people and all things in heaven and earth are one.

In the "reversal article," Professor Lin once believed that Southeast Asian countries could be considered examples of what he envisioned as "from the outer kingliness to the inner sagehood" through learning. In my "critique of fallacy," based on the political realities and developments in Southeast Asia, I pointed out that the so-called "Asian values" used by those in power in Southeast Asia to resist modern democracy and human rights advocate a system of authoritarian rule. Religious discrimination exists in Southeast Asian countries, such as Islam as the only state religion, Malaysia's regulations that Chinese business systems must account for more than 50% of Malays, and Malays must hold the highest positions, etc. They are all systems of religious discrimination and racial discrimination that violate democracy and human rights. The resulting abuses and harm to the people, especially overseas Chinese, have been seen in the tragic "anti-Chinese" riots over the years! However, the "response" did not mention this powerful rebuttal and facts, nor did it admit its mistakes. If we take a national system that is closest to what Professor Lin calls "ethical human rights, conscious freedom, and democratic people-oriented", then the society in Taiwan formed by the Republic of China can be said to have ethical family life. In a fair democratic human rights society, the political parties in charge of political power must be based on the people's happiness and govern according to their needs.

Otherwise, they will be peacefully ousted by the people with peaceful and effective political power, open and fair voting, etc. Isn't this the "ideal society" that Professor Lin hopes to succeed? Such an ideal can only be achieved by Confucianism's "inner sage and outer king," that is, when everyone is a moral subject with moral consciousness and exercises the power of citizens morally so that the power of the government is subject to ethical principles, that is, The control and regulation of the principle of justice. All political parties and institutions are controlled by the votes of the people, who represent sovereignty. No political power (including the constitution, laws, and policies) can violate morality and human nature. All administration must be implemented in accordance with the supreme constitution and laws formulated by moral principles. The balanced method of political decentralization forms a democratic system of checks and balances with real objective effectiveness. The humanistic society thus formed is precisely the ideal and goal of Confucianism: "the inner sagehood creates the outer kingliness."

In the past, the master Confucius taught his disciples: "Be knowledgeable and determined, ask questions carefully and think deeply, and benevolence lies in it." Mencius also regarded "knowing words" and "nourishing Qi" as his skills. "knowing words" can discern all kinds of rhetoric, obscenity, evil rhetoric, and evasive rhetoric that confuses the public and the public without being confused by it. Nurturing Qi means cultivating one's sense of justice and moral courage and treating all external pressures, such as wealth, power, poverty, etc., as nothing to remain unmoved and achieve moral indifference. When Wang Fuzhi reviewed and reflected on the rise and fall of the past dynasties, he felt deeply that the ignorant opinions of scholars had misled the country and the people. He once lamented that "nothing is more harmful than superficiality." Mr. Mou also quoted this statement many times, which is relevant today. Marxists intentionally use vocabulary to spread the harmful effects of anti-human ideology, making people trapped in their consciousness and unable to extricate themselves. This is the cautious and fearful attitude we should adopt when we discern false accusations and return to justice today. As Mencius said, if there is any argument in this article, it is really a last resort.

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