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素材：水彩

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題目：心靈故鄉

創作理念：藝術其實是治療人生無常的美好良方，我在畫中呈現同中有異的視覺變化效果，增添觀賞者的欣賞樂趣與想像空間，也呈現寫意繪畫多元豐富的面貌及新感受……，三根電線桿代表光明、希望、溫暖，現在、過去、未來……永無止境

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Author: Xi-He Cai

Material: watercolor

Size: A4

Title: Spiritual Hometown

Creative philosophy: Art is a beautiful remedy for the impermanence of life. In the painting, I present the effect of similar but different visual changes, increasing the viewer's enjoyment and imagination. It also presents the diverse, rich appearance and new feelings of freehand painting. The three utility poles represent brightness, hope, warmth, present, past, future... endless

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 2. Contact us: Editorial Board of Journal of Indigenous Counseling Psychology, Department of Guidance & Counseling, National Changhua University of Education. *Address: No. 1, Jin-De Road, Changhua City, Taiwan. R.O.C. Tel: 04-7232105#2208 Website: jicp.heart.net.tw E-mail: jicpheart@gmail.com

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摘要

本期的專題由探討牟宗三的觀點與當代新儒家的未來發展為起始，旨在探索華人文化現代化的學術活路與本土社會科學的發展方向。本期是由林安梧撰寫「後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王 內聖」問題的一些回應」一文為主題文章，然後由李瑞全、吳美瑤、許明珠、黃漢忠撰寫回應文章，然後再由林安梧撰寫再回應文，五位學者在六篇論文上的論述十分精彩，並有激烈的交鋒。在社會科學領域，當代新儒家可說是最受國內外矚目的重要學派，本文以「中西會通之道：本土社會科學與新儒家的共同志業」為名，即在論述社會科學本土化運動中，「中西會通」是本土社會科學與新儒家對華人文化現代化所關注的關鍵議題，其中必須要跨越「中西文化差異」之障礙。本文以佛教的「苦、集、滅、道四聖諦」為比喻，並以本土社會科學與新儒家的代表性人物黃光國與牟宗三為例，探討兩位引領思潮的學者如何面對「中西文化差異」的難題，以進行「中西會通」的劃時代學術工程，牟宗三一生的志業在於梳理儒家的「道統」，可說是致力於「傳承儒家的哲學進路」；黃光國致力於開創非西方國家的本土社會科學與建立華人本土社會科學的學術傳統，可說是「傳承儒家的科學進路」。在牟宗三與黃光國的感召下，「當代新儒家」與「中華本土社會科學會」都有著承續中華文化道統，投入「中西會通」以推動華人文化現代化，以建立華人學術新學統之共識，透過於2019年所共同發表的「新五四新挑戰：重構文化中國」新五四宣言，以「中西會通」重構「文化中國」作為現代華人社會科學學者的共同使命，可能可以超越政治現實的限制，找出華人文化現代化的學術活路。

關鍵詞：中西會通、本土社會科學、當代新儒家、黃光國、牟宗三

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壹、中西會通四聖諦

本土社會科學之導師黃光國的遺作：超越與實在：牟宗三的科學觀，於 2024 年 9 月 21 日（六）在國立臺灣大學博雅教室舉辦新書發表會，此書是其生前所稱：「中西會通四聖諦」系列書籍之第一本「苦」諦之書，所稱苦，是黃光國認為「中西文明的根本差異」是造成華人社會科學本土化運動難以落實之關鍵所在，也是華人本土社會科學家共業之苦（黃光國，2024），其稱「苦」為如人患病、「集」為生病之因、「滅」為病已痊癒、「道」為治病之方；而「苦」為不知中西文化差異、而「集」是不解西方科學哲學、「滅」需自我反思與自我批判，「道」在將中華文化中具「自性」特色之存在之理轉化為客觀知識與生活智慧。

「四聖諦」又稱「四真諦」、「四諦」（四諦，2024），是佛教修行所重視的四種神聖的真理，包括苦聖諦、苦集聖諦、苦滅聖諦和苦滅道聖諦，簡稱苦諦、集諦、滅諦和道諦，雖是佛教解脫道修行之重要教義，但亦為菩提道修行所必備。解脫道修行已證初果後，名為四聖諦；未證初果前，名為四諦。在《雜阿含經·三七九·轉法輪經》中記載佛陀的教導：「一時，佛住波羅奈鹿野苑中仙人住處。爾時，世尊告五比丘：「此苦聖諦，本所未曾聞法，當正思惟，時，生眼、智、明、覺；此苦集、此苦滅、此苦滅道跡聖諦...苦聖諦智當復知...苦集聖諦已知當斷...此苦滅聖諦已知當作證...苦滅道跡聖諦已知當修」。據《根本說一切有部毘奈耶雜事·卷第三十九》記載，此段經文是在敘說釋迦牟尼佛於菩提伽耶菩提樹下成道之後，到鹿野苑初轉法輪，而為「憍陳如」、「跋提」、「跋波」、「摩訶男」及「阿說示」等五位沙門弟子宣說「四聖諦」，五位弟子因此而各有證悟，「憍陳如」於諸煩惱心得解脫，其餘弟子「離諸塵垢得法眼淨」，於是求出家而成為五比丘僧。修行四聖諦被認為是凡夫斷「三縛結」（身見、戒禁取見、疑見等三種煩惱，此等個人內心意識中潛在的煩惱，對修行人會產生障礙，將人繫縛綑綁在輪迴之中，而不能得到解脫以脫離痛苦（結，2024），而進入聖人之道的關鍵。

「中西會通」是本土社會科學與新儒家對華人文化進行現代化的重要關鍵，若不能跨越「中西文化差異」煩惱之苦，而加以會通，則不能實現本土社會科學與新儒家的道業。黃光國是本土社會科學的代表性人物，而牟宗三則是當代新儒家的代表性人物，兩人皆是中華文化道統之捍衛者，也各自遭遇其學術生涯之「苦」與其畢生追求之「道業」。

貳、三統並建：牟宗三與當代新儒家之「苦」與「道業」

當代新儒家代表人物牟宗三（1909-1995），生於山東棲霞，青年時期在北京大學遭到胡適等「全盤西化」派的排擠，受熊十力「良知是呈現」的觀念啟發，精研中西哲學，

獨力翻譯康德三大批判哲學巨著，並梳理儒家道統以撰寫三巨冊之《心體與性體》（牟宗三，1968a，1968b，1968c），而成當代新儒家「一代宗師」（黃光國，2024），牟宗三遭逢五四運動時期的全盤西化浪潮，當時許多人主張對中華文化的全面揚棄，認為儒家文化造就了「吃人的禮教」，影響了中國的現代化，因此要「打倒孔家店」（儒家文化）以迎接德先生（民主）與賽先生（科學），在儒家文化生死存亡之際，牟宗三力挽狂瀾，「苦」於為儒家尋求現代化的出路，因此全力投入儒家「道統」之梳理工作，以「傳承儒家的哲學進路」（黃光國，2019）而走出儒家現代化之「道」。

牟宗三發現西方的專長是理性的架構與外延的表現，而有科學與民主的成就，而中華文化的專長在理性的運用與內容的表現，核心在內聖之學，內聖的體證有其殊勝之處，外王的開展則有不足之處，所以必須返本開新，通過自我的擴大，以開展寬廣的道路，由此而發展出「三統之說」（劉述先，2000），即是由儒家「道統」之肯定，以肯定道德宗教之價值，而護住孔孟所開闢之人生宇宙之本源，繼而支持「學統」之開出，以轉出知識主體以容納希臘傳統，開出學術之獨立性，並催化「政統」之繼續，以認識政體之發展，而肯定民主政治之必然性，由此而達到道統、學統與政統之「三統並建」（牟宗三，1982，260-262 頁；黃光國，2024）。而為開出「學統」，牟宗三（李瑞全，2007；林安梧，2000；鄭文泉，1997）主張「經驗實在論」，因為惟經驗可轉出知識，並從《大乘起信論》得到啟發，提出從「一心開二門」（一心：現象與物自身；二門：「生滅門」與「真如門」）到「兩層存有論」（「執的存有論」—現象界的存有論：現象界、知識的範疇；「無執的存有論」—本體界的存有論：物自身、睿智界、智的直覺、道德的範疇）是哲學的原型，中國是一心偏真如門，西方是一心偏生滅門，因此，中國哲學欲達到哲學原型之表現，牟宗三以「良知的自我坎陷」之說，亦即透過「道統」之暫時後退，以利「學統」之開出，也就是真如門的道德良知暫時自我設限，而由道德的主體轉化成認知的主體而讓生滅門的知識活動得以先行，以利科學之發展。在這 100 多年來「西風」壓倒「東風」的年代，「中西會通」似乎是一帖解藥，但也讓華人社會科學家嚐到「共業」之「苦」，牟宗三所欲開出有利於知識活動與科學發展的中西會通之自主學術傳統—「學統」，也正是本土社會科學所要努力的方向，此等本土社會科學所抱持的相關主張，可透過代表性人物黃光國的思想脈絡來加以探討。


參、含攝文化的知識論策略：黃光國與本土社會科學之「苦」與「道業」

在與牟宗三所出生的山東，隔著渤海相望的東北，也出生了一位本土社會科學的代表性人物黃光國（1945-2023），其生於吉林長春，受楊國樞的指導在國立台灣大學心理系接受完學士與碩士的訓練之後，負笈美國夏威夷大學，接受 Anthony J. Marsella 的指導而完成社會心理學的博士訓練，自此開始踏上本土心理學的研究道路（Hwang, 2012），

其一生的學術追求也以心理學與社會科學的本土化為其道業，在黃光國的告別式上其好友葉啟政回顧說：「認識光國近半個世紀...學術的基本取捨點上，我們卻始終是分享著一些一致的看法，基本上都是左批實證主義右評現代化背後的意識形態。在我的眼中，光國這一輩子對台灣學術界的最大貢獻，可以說就是在這兩條軸線交會下，淬煉出學術本土化這樣一個課題，並以之作為畢生的志業」（葉啟政，2023）。黃光國認為「中西文明的根本差異」是造成華人社會科學本土化難以推展之關鍵所在，也是華人本土社會科學家「共業」之「苦」（黃光國，2024），其認為社會科學要本土化，需要對西方科學哲學有相應的了解，因此其撰寫完成社會科學的理路一書以介紹西方的科學哲學，並提出多重典範的哲學策略觀點（黃光國，2017，2018），除了以其多年研究所得撰寫《儒家關係主義：哲學反思、理論建構與實徵研究》（黃光國，2009）一書之外，其更主張社會科學本土化必須要建立其哲學基礎—也就是要建立本土化的文化主體策略（黃光國，2017，2018），此即社會本土化研究之研究方法論，其目的在進行本土社會科學的理論建構。黃光國（2004）引用華爾納（Fritz Wallner）在「建構實在論」（constructive realism）之生活世界（life world）與微世界（microworld）的觀點（華爾納、沈清松，2018），而進一步提出可以運用結構主義（Piaget, 2018）的概念進行科學微世界（scientific microworld）的理論建構，來描繪現實中的生活世界（黃光國，2018），並由此主張「建構含攝文化理論的知識論策略（Epistemological strategy for constructing culture-inclusive theories）」（Hwang, 2019）可做社會科學本土化研究理論建構的方法論，如圖 1。

圖 1

建構含攝文化理論的知識論策略（*Epistemological strategy for constructing culture-inclusive theories*）




註：取自 K. K. Hwang, 2019, *Culture-inclusive theories*, p. 13. Cambridge University Press. 王智弘，2023，本土諮商心理學與本土社會科學的可能研究路徑與研究方法論，*本土諮商心理學學刊*，14（4），xii 頁。

黃光國（黃光國，2018；Hwang, 2019）運用「建構實在論」區分了「科學微世界」與「生活世界」，而運用「批判實在論」以提供建構「科學微世界」的哲學基礎，即由此以在「生活世界」中創生各種現象的「機制」，而「結構主義」（Piaget, 1968/2018）則用以連結「科學微世界」的創生「機制」與「生活世界」中行動的關係，其以創生「機制」建構理論與驗證理論的科學哲學關鍵，則是引用巴斯卡（Bhaskar, 2008）所提出「批判實在論」中「科學發現之邏輯」（The Logic of Scientific Discovery）的概念，如圖 2。

圖 2

科學發現之邏輯（*The Logic of Scientific Discovery*）



註：取自 R. Bhaskar, 2008, *A realist theory of science*, p. 135. Routledge. 王智弘，2023，本土諮商心理學與本土社會科學的可能研究路徑與研究方法論，*本土諮商心理學學刊*，14(4)，xiii 頁。

圖 2 所要表達的邏輯如下（王智弘，2023，xi-xii 頁；黃光國，2018，402-408 頁；Hwang, 2019, pp. 17-20; Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 133-138）：不同於古典經驗論所關注對結果產生的規律性之觀察，以及康德先驗理念論對不可得的物自體之虛構性模型建構，先驗實在論所關注的是對事件與序列中的不變性觀察，並由此而得出想像性模型建構，並經批判實在論的經驗驗證以證明其真實性。而其中想像性創生機制理論的建構要含攝文化傳統的創造性詮釋，並需經在地生活經驗的驗證（王智弘，2023），此等建構含攝文化理論的知識論策略，即是黃光國為解華人本土社會科學家共業之「苦」（黃光國，2024）所提出的社會科學本土化之「道」（黃光國，2009，2018；Hwang, 2012）。而正如當代

新儒家延續了牟宗三的道業，黃光國的道業是否有人加以延續，就如葉啟政（2023）對黃光國的回顧：「我們兩人都曾經授業於楊國樞老師，承繼著他對學術研究本土化的基本主張。但是，光國更上層樓，完成了一件楊老師沒有做到的大事：他起而行，實際組織了一個推動、並且是實際從事學術研究本土化的團體，讓這樣的研究取向得以永續下去。」葉啟政所說的學術研究本土化團體指的就是「中華本土社會科學會」。

肆、以「中西會通」重構「文化中國」：本土社會科學與新儒家的共同志業

在牟宗三與黃光國的感召下，新儒家與中華本土社會科學會都有著承續中華文化道統，投入「中西會通」以對華人文化進行現代化學術志業的共識。因此在五四運動一百年之際，經過共同的撰稿與磋商之後，本來此一宣言預定以雙方團體具名，但報社表示需以自然人身分具名而不能以法人名義具名，因此，乃以中華本土社會科學會理事長與東方人文學術研究基金會董事長代表兩個團體共同具名在 2019 年 5 月 3 日於《中國時報》以「新五四新挑戰：重構文化中國」（王智弘、朱建民，2019）為題，發表新五四宣言：「...儘管中國曾經創造豐富的思想，對人類文明的永續發展做出巨大貢獻，但中國的思想如果要再創輝煌的新篇章，重新成為引領人類文明發展的引擎，就需要通過對科學哲學的認識與釐清，創造性展開華人本土社會科學的詮釋工作...我們開創出認真論辯問題的『學統』，針對觀點不針對個人，彼此就事論事討論學術議題，堅持平等對話的精神，實事求是探索真相，體現『君子和而不同』的風格。中國知識分子必須一方面繼承博大精深的中華文化，一方面迎接開放多元的西洋文化，以『中西會通』的方式重新建構『文化中國』...」。

以「中西會通」重構「文化中國」，可說是本土社會科學與新儒家的共同志業，黃光國（2024）認為相較於牟宗三一生的志業在於梳理儒家的「道統」，這也正是「傳承儒家的哲學進路」，而其個人的治學目標則為開創非西方國家的本土社會科學，特別是要建立華人本土社會科學的學術傳統，這是「傳承儒家的科學進路」，其目的在建立牟宗三所主張以「三統並建」復興儒家人文主義所說的「學統」，其並引用傅偉勳（1986，1999）「創造詮釋學」的觀點：唯有「批判的繼承」才有「創造的發展」。

就本期的專題文章而言，長期關心當代新儒家發展的林安梧（2024a）以「後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王—內聖」問題的一些回應」為題，探討「內聖—外王」與「後新儒學」的議題，林安梧為台灣大學哲學系所培育的第一個哲學博士，更是牟宗三所指導的學生，此一論文應是其長期思索之所得，並就其所提出「由外王開內聖」的觀點，提出有別於當代新儒家「由內聖開外王」之主流觀點，其文中對牟宗三的崇敬與批判，頗有透過「批判的繼承」以求「創造的發展」之勢。

林安梧 (2024a) 的論文引來同期新儒家重要學者李瑞全 (2024) 的強烈批判，其在「評：林安梧之「後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於『外王—內聖』問題的一些回應」一文中，不只回應此篇主題論文，並引林安梧在 2021 年發表的「從「外王」到「內聖」：新儒學之後對「內聖外王」的翻轉」一文，以其在 2022 年所發表的「『內聖外王』乎？『外王內聖』乎？—中國文化如何從內聖建構民主體制兼評駁所謂『外王內聖』之謬論」一文的論述為基礎，對林安梧 (2021a) 加以批判，並認為林安梧的觀點頗多對當代新儒家觀點的「誤解和曲解」；而吳美瑤 (2024) 則以「諮商心理學與新儒家實踐哲學的交會：回應林安梧教授『關於外王—內聖』問題一文」為題，以林安梧 (2024a) 的論文為背景，以西方諮商心理學與品德教育的觀點針對新儒家的修養功夫論加以論述；許明珠 (2024) 以「走向公民儒學——回應〈後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王-內聖」問題的一些回應〉」為題，雖肯定林安梧 (2021b) 的多年思考與論述所得，但特別提出在現代公民社會，儒者不宜安於自我修為，而應主動參與社會以行公益；黃漢忠 (2024) 以「〈後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王-內聖」問題的一些回應〉之省察」為題，認為林安梧 (2024a) 忽略了牟宗三對中西文化「本質的機緣」差異的論述，以及對西方文化背後「理性之架構表現」限制所提出的反省，其也引用牟宗三的觀點以回應林安梧 (2024a) 對「方法論上的本質主義」之批評。

針對四位學者的回應文，林安梧 (2024b) 以「林安梧對於『黃漢忠、許明珠、吳美瑤、李瑞全』四位教授評議之回覆」為題撰寫再回應文，對四位學者所提的問題一一加以回應，以依序針對當代新儒家的實踐哲學、道德與政治的關係、中西文化的差異以及政權的合法性等問題進一步加以論述，再次指出牟宗三「良知自我坎陷」觀點過於理想化，只著重詮釋上的理論次序，而忽略社會實踐的真實歷程，並強調應由外王學習過程中調節內聖，以及以「方法論上的約定主義」替代「方法論上的本質主義」。

本期的專題由探討牟宗三的觀點與當代新儒家的未來發展為起始，旨在探索華人文化現代化的學術活路與本土社會科學的發展方向，以「中西會通」重構「文化中國」，可能是華人本土社會科學與新儒家的共同志業，如何能「批判的繼承」以求「創造的發展」，是本土社會科學家的難題，也是必修的課題。

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The Integration of Chinese Culture and the West: The Common Ambition of Indigenous Social Sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism

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Abstract

This issue's special topic starts with discussing Mou Zongsan's views and the future development of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. It aims to explore the academic path forward for modernizing Chinese culture and the development direction of indigenous social sciences. This issue features an article titled "A Side View of Post Neo-Confucian Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood"" written by An-Wu Lin. Then, followed by response articles from Shui-Chuen Lee, Mei-Yao Wu, Ming-Zhu Hsu, and Hon-Chung Wong, and a further response from An-Wu Lin. The five scholars' discussions across six papers were fascinating and featured intense scholarly debates. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is considered the most significant school of thought in social sciences both domestically and internationally. This article titled "The Integration of Chinese Culture and the West: The Common Ambition of Indigenous Social Sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism," discusses how the integration of Chinese and West cultures is a crucial issue that both indigenous social sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism address in modernizing Chinese culture. The barrier of cultural differences must be overcome. Using Buddhism's "Four Noble Truths of Suffering, Origin, Cessation, and Path" as a metaphor, and taking Kwang-Kuo Hwang and Mou Zongsan as representative figures of indigenous social sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism respectively, this article explores how these two leading scholars addressed the challenge of Chinese-Western cultural differences to advance the epoch-making academic project of the integration of Chinese Culture and the West. Mou Zongsan dedicated his life to organize the Confucian "orthodoxy," devoting himself to "inheriting the philosophical approach of Confucianism," while Kwang-Kuo Hwang committed himself to pioneering indigenous social sciences in non-Western countries and establishing the academic tradition of Chinese indigenous social sciences, thus "inheriting the scientific approach of Confucianism." Inspired by Mou Zongsan and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and the Chinese Indigenous Social Sciences Association share the mission

of inheriting Chinese cultural orthodoxy and promoting cultural modernization through integration. Through their jointly issued 2019 "New May Fourth Declaration: New Challenges in Reconstructing Cultural China," they established the common mission of reconstructing "Cultural China" through cultural integration with the West." Transcending political reality's limitations and finding an academic way forward for modernizing Chinese culture may be possible.

Keywords: Integration of Chinese Culture and the West, Indigenous Social Sciences, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Kwang-Kuo Hwang, Mou Zongsan

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I. The Four Noble Truths of the Integration of Chinese Culture and the West

Master of indigenous social sciences, Kwang-Kuo Hwang's posthumous work: "Transcendence and Reality: Mou Zongsan's View of Science," a new book launch event held on September 21, 2024 (Saturday) in the Liberal Arts Classroom of National Taiwan University. This is the first book on the truth of "Suffering" in a series that he called "The Four Noble Truths of The Integration of Chinese Culture the West " during his lifetime. The so-called "Suffering" is because Kwang-Kuo Hwang believes that the "fundamental differences between Chinese and Western civilizations" are the key to the difficulty in implementing the indigenization movement of Chinese social sciences, and it is also the "Suffering" of indigenous Chinese social scientists (Hwang, 2024). It refers to "Suffering" as if a person is sick, "Origin" as the cause of the illness, " Cessation " as the illness has been cured, and "Path" as the way to cure the illness. "Suffering" means ignorance of the differences between Chinese and Western cultures, "Origin" means not understanding Western scientific philosophy, " Cessation " requires self-reflection and self-criticism, and "Path" means transforming the principle of existence with the characteristics of "self-nature" in Chinese culture for objective knowledge and life wisdom.

The "Four Noble Truths," also known as the "Four True Truths" and "Four Truths" (Four Truths, 2024), are the four sacred truths valued in Buddhist practice. Including the Noble Truth of Suffering, the Noble Truth of the Origin of Suffering, and the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering, and the Noble Truth of the Path of the Cessation of Suffering, referred to as the Truth of Suffering, the Truth of Origin, the Truth of Cessation, and the Truth of Path. Although it is an essential teaching in the Buddhist path of liberation, it is also necessary for the practice of Bodhi. After the first fruits of liberation path practice have been achieved, they are called the Four Noble Truths; Before the initial fruition is realized, it is called the Four Truths. The Buddha's teachings are recorded in "Miscellaneous Agama Sutra·379·Turn the Dharma Wheel Sutra": "One time, the Buddha stayed in the sage's residence in Sarnath Park, Parana. At that time, the World-Honored One told the five bhikkhus: "I have never heard this Noble Truth of Suffering. When I think about it, I will have eyesight, wisdom, understanding, and awareness; this Noble Truth of the Origin of Suffering, this Noble Truth of Cessation of Suffering, and the Noble Truth of Path of the Cessation of Suffering...The wisdom of the Noble Truth of Suffering should be known again...The Noble Truth of Origin of Suffering is known and should be

eliminated...This Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering is known and should be witnessed...The Noble Truth of the Path of the Cessation of Suffering is known and should be practiced." According to "The Mulasarvastivada Vinaya Miscellaneous Matter." Volume 39 records. This passage describes how, after Sakyamuni Buddha attained enlightenment under the Bodhi tree in Bodhgaya, he went to Sarnath to turn the wheel of Dharma for the first time and preached the "Four Noble Truths" to the five ascetic disciples, including "Kauchenru," "Badi," "Bababo," "Mahanan" and "Asuoshi." As a result, each of the five disciples achieved enlightenment, and Kauchenru "achieved liberation from all troubles." The remaining disciples "freed themselves from all dust and dirt and obtained a pure Dharma eye," so they sought to become monks and became five monks. Practicing the Four Noble Truths is considered the way for ordinary people to break the "three knots" (Three kinds of troubles, such as the view of the body, the view of abstinence, and the view of doubt. These potential troubles in one's inner consciousness will create obstacles for practitioners, binding people in samsara, and they cannot be liberated from suffering, knot, 2024), and the key to entering the way of saints.

"The Integration of Chinese Culture and The West" is an essential key to the modernization of Chinese culture by Indigenous Social Sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Suppose Indigenous Social Sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism cannot overcome the troubles of "Chinese and Western cultural differences" and integrate them. In that case, they will not be able to achieve "the Noble Truth of Path" mission of Indigenous Social Sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Kwang-Kuo Hwang is a representative figure of Indigenous Social Sciences, while Mou Zongsan represents Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Both are defenders of Chinese cultural orthodoxy, and they have also encountered "Suffering" in their academic careers and have their lifelong pursuit of the mission of "Noble Truth of Path."

II. The Coexistence of the Three Traditions: The Noble Truth of "Suffering" and "Path" of both Mou Zongsan and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism

Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), a representative figure of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, was born in Qixia, Shandong. In his youth, he was marginalized by Hu Shih and other "total Westernization" groups at Peking University. However, inspired by Xiong Shili's concept of "conscience is the manifestation," he later studied Chinese and Western philosophy, single-handedly translated Kant's three major critical philosophical masterpieces, and sorted out Confucianism. He wrote three vast volumes of "Mind Body and Nature Body" (Mou Zongsan, 1968a, 1968b, 1968c), thus becoming the "grand master" of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism

(Hwang, 2024). Mou Zongsan encountered the wave of total Westernization during the May 4th Movement. At that time, many people advocated the complete abandonment of Chinese culture. They believed that Confucian culture created "cannibalistic ethics" and hindered China's modernization. Therefore, they wanted to "overthrow the Confucian shop" (Confucian culture) to welcome Mr. De (democracy) and Mr. Sai (science). When Confucian culture was in danger of survival, Mou Zongsan tried his best to turn the tide. Still, he was "suffering" from finding a way out for modernization for Confucianism, so he devoted himself to sorting out the Confucian "Confucian Orthodoxy" to "inherit the philosophical approach of Confucianism" (Hwang, 2019) and Get out of the "Path" of Confucian modernization.

Mou Zongsan discovered that the West's expertise lies in the expression of rational structure and its extension, with the achievements of science and democracy, while the expertise of Chinese culture lies in the application of rationality and the expression of its content, the core of which lies in the study of Inner Sagehood. The Chinese experience of Inner Sagehood has advantages, but the development of Outer Kinglines has shortcomings. Therefore, it is necessary to return to the roots and create new ones and to develop a broad path through self-expansion, thus developing the "Three Orthodoxy Theory" (Liu, 2000). That is to say, it is affirmed by Confucian Orthodoxy to declare the value of moral religion. And protect the origin of life and the universe opened up by Confucius and Mencius. Then, support the establishment of "Academic Orthodoxy" to shift the subject of knowledge to accommodate the Greek tradition and establish academic independence. And catalyze the continuation of "Political Orthodoxy" to understand the development of political systems and affirm the certainty of democratic politics. This led to the co-construction of the three Confucian Orthodoxy Heritages: Confucian Orthodoxy, Academic Orthodoxy, and Political Orthodoxy (Hwang, 2024). Mou Zongsan (Li, 2007; Lin, 2000; Zheng, 1997) advocated "empirical realism" to establish "academic orthodoxy" because only experience can transfer knowledge. Mou Zongsan was inspired by "The Theory of Belief in the Mahayana" and proposed that "one mind opens two doors" (one mind: phenomena and Thing in itself; two doors: "the door of arising and ceasing" and "the door of true suchness") to "two-level ontology." ("The ontology of attachment" - the ontology of the phenomenal world: the phenomenal world, the category of knowledge; "the ontology of non-attachment" - the ontology of the noumenal world: things themselves, the world of wisdom, intellectual intuition, morality category). These two are the prototypes of philosophy. Chinese culture focuses on the door of true suchness, while the West focuses on the door of arising and ceasing. Therefore, for Chinese philosophy to achieve the expression of the philosophical prototype, Mou Zongsan used the theory of "self-entrapment of conscience," that is, the

temporary retreat of "Confucian Orthodoxy" to facilitate the emergence of "Academic Orthodoxy." That is, the moral conscience of the door of true suchness temporarily limits itself, and the moral subject is transformed into a cognitive subject. The knowledge activities of the door of arising and ceasing to take precedence in facilitating the development of science. In this era where the "West wind" has prevailed over the "East wind" for more than 100 years, the "integration of Chinese culture and the West" seems to be an antidote. Still, it has also given Chinese social scientists a taste of the "Suffering" of "collective karma (consequences that all must suffer)." Mou Zongsan wanted to develop an independent academic tradition of Chinese and Western integration conducive to intellectual activities and scientific development - "Academic Orthodoxy." This was also the direction in which indigenous social sciences should strive. These relevant propositions held by local social sciences can be discussed through the ideological context of the representative figure Kwang-Kuo Hwang.


III. Epistemological Strategy for Constructing Culture-inclusive Theories: Kwang-Kuo Hwang and the Noble Truth of "Suffering" and "Path" of Indigenous Social Sciences

In Shandong, where Mou Zongsan was born, across the Bohai Sea in the northeast, a representative figure in indigenous social sciences, Kwang-Kuo Hwang (1945-2023), was also born. He was born in Changchun, Jilin, and was mentored by Guo-Shu Yang. After receiving bachelor's and master's training in the Department of Psychology at National Taiwan University, he studied at the University of Hawaii in the United States. He completed doctoral training in social psychology under the guidance of Anthony J. Marsella. Since then, he has embarked on the research path of Indigenous psychology (Hwang, 2012), and Kwang-Kuo Hwang's lifelong academic pursuit also focused on the indigenization of psychology and social sciences. At Kwang-Kuo Hwang's farewell ceremony, his friend Chi-Jeng Yeh recalled: "I have known Kwang-Kuo for nearly half a century. Although we are often different or even opposite to many social affairs in reality, especially political stances, we have always shared some basic academic choices: criticism of the ideology behind "modernization" and "positivism," In my eyes, Kwang-Kuo's most significant contribution to Taiwan's academia in his life can be said to be the refinement of the subject of academic "indigenization" under the intersection of these two axes and takes it as his lifelong career. In this regard, he has a strong will a firm and persistent stand, and he always persists in his pursuit." (Ye, 2023). Kwang-Kuo Hwang, who is committed to promoting indigenization research, believes that the "fundamental differences between Chinese and Western civilizations" are the key to the difficulty in promoting the indigenization

of Chinese social sciences, and are also the "Suffering" of the "collective karma" of indigenous Chinese social scientists (Hwang, 2024) , who believes that in order to indigenize social sciences, it is necessary to have a corresponding understanding of Western scientific philosophy, so he wrote the book "Theoretical approaches of social sciences" to introduce Western scientific philosophy and put forward multiple paradigms of philosophical strategies (Hwang, 2017, 2018), in addition to writing "Confucian relationalism: Philosophical reflection, theoretical construction" based on his years of research and empirical research" (Hwang, 2009), it also advocates that the indigenization of social sciences must establish its philosophical foundation—that is, to establish a indigenized cultural subject strategy (Hwang, 2017, 2018), which is social indigenization The research methodology of cultural studies aims at theoretical construction of indigenous social sciences. (2004) quoted Fritz Wallner's views on life world and microworld in "constructive realism" (Wallner & Shen, 2018), and further proposed The concept of structuralism (Piaget, 2018) can be used to theoretically construct a scientific microworld to describe the real life world (Hwang, 2018), and thus advocates "an epistemological strategy for constructing inclusive cultural theory" (Hwang, 2019) can be used as a methodology for theoretical construction of indigenization research in social sciences, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

建構合攝文化理論的知識論策略 (*Epistemological strategy for constructing culture-inclusive theories*)




Note. From *Culture-inclusive theories*, by K. K. Hwang, 2019b, Cambridge University Press, p. 13.; "Possible research paths and methodology for Indigenous Counseling Psychology and Indigenous Social Sciences " by C. H. Wang, 2023, *Journal of Indigenous Counseling Psychology*, 14(4), p. xii.

Kwang-Kuo Hwang (Hwang, 2018, 2019) uses "constructive realism" to distinguish the "scientific microworld" from the "lifeworld" and uses "critical realism" to provide a philosophical basis for constructing "scientific microworld," that is, the "mechanism" that creates various phenomena in the "lifeworld," and "structuralism" is used to connect the creation "mechanism" of the "scientific microworld" and the relationship between actions in the "lifeworld" (Piaget, 1968/2018). The key to the scientific philosophy of constructing theories and verifying theories by creating "mechanisms" is to quote the concept of "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" in "critical realism" proposed by Bhaskar (2008), such as Figure 2.

Figure 2

科學發現之邏輯 (*The Logic of Scientific Discovery*)



Note. From *A realist theory of science* by R. Bhaskar, 2008, Routledge, p. 135.; "Possible research paths and methodology for Indigenous Counseling Psychology and Indigenous Social Sciences " by C. H. Wang, 2023, *Journal of Indigenous Counseling Psychology*, 14(4), p. xiii.

The logic expressed in Figure 2 is as follows (Wang, 2023, pp. xi-xii; Hwang, 2018, pp. 402-408; Hwang, 2019, pp. 17-20; Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 133-138): different from classical empiricism focuses on observing the regularity of results and Kant's transcendental idealism on the imaginary model-building of Things in itself. Transcendental realism focuses on observing invariances in events and sequences and derives from this the imagined model-building. It has

also been empirically tested by critical realism to prove that it is real. Among them, the construction of imagined generative mechanism theories must incorporate the creative hermeneutics of cultural traditions and need to be verified by local life experience (Wang, 2023). This Epistemological strategy for constructing culture-inclusive theories is what Kwang-Kuo Hwang explains as the "Path" of social science indigenization (Huang, 2009, 2018; Hwang, 2012) for the "Suffering" (Huang, 2024) of the "collective karma" of indigenous Chinese social scientists and. And just as Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has continued Mou Zongsan's Taoism, whether anyone will continue Kwang-Kuo Hwang's Taoism is like Chi-Jeng Yeh (2023)'s review of Kwang-Kuo Hwang: "We both studied under Professor Guo- Shu Yang and inherited his basic idea of "indigenization" of academic research. However, Kwang-Kuo went to the next level and accomplished a significant event that Professor Yang failed to do: he organized a group to promote and engage in the "indigenization" of academic research so that the indigenization of social science could be passed on sustainably." The academic research indigenization group that Chi-Jeng Yeh refers to is the "Chinese Indigenous Social Sciences Association."

IV. Reconstructing "Cultural China" Through "Integration of Chinese Culture and the West": The Common Ambition of Indigenous Social Sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism

Inspired by Mou Zongsan and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and the Chinese Indigenous Social Sciences Association share the consensus of inheriting the orthodoxy of Chinese culture and engaging in "integration of China and the West" to modernize Chinese culture in academic pursuits. Therefore, on the 100th anniversary of the May 4th Movement, after joint writing and discussion, the declaration was originally scheduled to be published under the names of both groups, but the newspaper stated that it needed to be published under the signatures of natural persons and not in the name of a legal person (Association). Therefore, the president of the Chinese Social Science Association and the chairman of the Eastern Humanities Foundation were jointly signed on behalf of two groups and published in the China Times on May 3, 2019 under the title "New May Fourth, New Challenges: Reconstructing Cultural China" (Wang & Zhu, 2019), issued the New May Fourth Declaration:

"...Although China has created rich ideas and made great contributions to the sustainable development of human civilization, if Chinese ideas are to create a new chapter of glory and

become the engine that leads the development of human civilization again, they need to pass on "Understand and clarify "Philosophy of Science", and creatively carry out the interpretation work of Chinese indigenous social sciences... We have created "Academic Orthodoxy" to seriously debate issues, and discuss academic issues with each other, adhering to the spirit of equal dialogue, and seeking truth from facts. The truth embodies the style of "a gentleman gets along with others, but not necessarily agrees with them." (Author's note: The Analects of Confucius) Chinese intellectuals must inherit the broad and profound Chinese culture on the one hand, and welcome the open and diverse Western culture on the other, to reconstruct "Cultural China" through the "integration of Chinese Culture and Western"..."

Reconstructing "Cultural China" through "Integration of Chinese Culture and the West" can be said to be the common ambition of indigenous social sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Kwang-Kuo Hwang (2024) believes that Mou Zongsan's lifelong ambition is to sort out Confucianism "Confucian Orthodoxy," which is also "the philosophical approach of inheriting Confucianism," and his personal academic goal is to create Indigenous social sciences in non-Western countries, especially to establish the academic tradition of Chinese indigenous social sciences, which is "the scientific approach of inheriting Confucianism," which aims to establish what Mou Zongsan advocated as "the co-construction of the three Confucian Orthodoxy Heritages" to revive what Confucian humanism calls "Academic Orthodoxy," and quoted Charles Wei-Hsun Fu (1986, 1999) The perspective of "creative hermeneutics": only "critical inheritance" can have "creative development."

As for the special article in this issue, Lin Anwu (2024a), who has long been concerned about the development of contemporary Neo-Confucianism, titled "A Side View of Post Neo-Confucian Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of "Outer Kingliness-Inner Sagehood"". Discuss the issues of "Inner Sagehood - Outer Kingliness" and "Post-Neo-Confucianism". An-Wu Lin was the first PhD in philosophy trained by the Department of Philosophy of National Taiwan University and was a student supervised by Mou Zongsan. This article should be the result of his long-term thinking and his proposed view of "from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood," which is different from the mainstream view of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism of "from Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness," the admiration and criticism of Mou Zongsan in his article, which tends to seek "creative development" through "critical inheritance."

An-Wu Lin's (2024a) paper attracted strong criticism from Shui-Chuen Lee (2024), an important contemporary Neo-Confucian scholar of the same generation, who wrote in "Critical Comments on A. W. Lin's "A Side View of Post Neo-Confucian Practical Philosophy" —

Some Responses to the Issue of 'Outer Kingliness-Inner Sagehood' "" is not only a response to this theme article but also a response to "From "Outer Kingliness" to "Inner Sagehood" published by An-Wu Lin in 2021: The article "The reversal of "Inner Sagehood Outer Kingliness" after Neo-Confucianism". Shui-Chuen Lee also used his article "'Inner Sagehood Outer Kingliness'? 'Outer Kingliness Inner Sagehood'?" published in 2022 - How Chinese culture constructs a democratic system from Inner Sagehood and criticizes the so-called "Outer Kingliness Inner Sagehood" Based on the discussion in the article "The Fallacy", Shui-Chuen Lee criticized An-Wu Lin (2021a). Shui-Chuen Lee believed that An-Wu Lin's views contained many "misunderstandings and distortions" of Contemporary Neo Confucian views. At the same time, Mei-Yao Wu's (2024) is titled "The Intersection of Counseling Psychology and Neo-Confucian Practical Philosophy: In Response to Prof. Anwu Lin's Article "on the Outer-Kingdom and Inner-Sage"", based on An-Wu Lin (2024a) This paper is used as the background to discuss the Neo-Confucian theory of self-cultivation and Kung Fu from the perspectives of Western counseling psychology and moral education; Ming-Zhu Hsu (2024) uses "Towards Civic Confucianism: A Response to "A Side View of Post Neo- Confucian Practical Philosophy ": Some Responses to the Issue of 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood", although it acknowledges An-Wu Lin's (2021b) years of thinking and discussion, it specifically points out that in modern civil society, Confucian scholars should not be content with self-cultivation. We should actively participate in society to perform public welfare. In Hon-Chung Wong's (2024) "A Reflection on Professor An-Wu Lin's" A Side View of Post Neo-Confucian Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood' ", he believed that An-Wu Lin (2024a) ignored Mou Zongsan's discussion of the "essential opportunities" differences between Chinese and Western cultures, as well as his reflection on the limitations of the "rational structural expression" behind the Western culture. He also quoted Mou Zongsan's view responds to An-Wu Lin's (2024a) criticism of "methodological essentialism".

In response to the response articles from four scholars, An-Wu Lin (2024b) wrote a response to the four scholars titled "A Response to the Reviews by Professors Wong Honchung, Hsu MingChu, Wu Meiyao, and Lee ShuiChuen by Lin An-Wu" The questions raised are responded to one by one, and further discussed in sequence on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism practical philosophy, the relationship between morality and politics, the differences between Chinese and Western cultures, and the legitimacy of political power. Mou Zongsan once again pointed out the "self-entrapment of conscience." "The view is too idealistic, focusing only on the theoretical order of interpretation while ignoring the real process of social

practice, and emphasizing that the inner sagehood should be adjusted by the outer kingliness in the learning process, and replacing "methodological essence" with "methodological conventionalism" doctrine."

The special topic of this issue starts by exploring Mou Zongsan's views and the future development of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. It aims to explore the academic path forward for the modernization of Chinese culture and the development direction of Indigenous social sciences and to reconstruct "Cultural China" with the "integration of Chinese Culture and the West." It may be the common ambition of Chinese indigenous social sciences and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. How to "inherit criticism" to pursue the "development of creation" is a complex problem for local social scientists and a required subject.

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後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王—內聖」問題的一些回應

林安梧*

摘要

本論文旨在經由生命實存的為學歷程，回應近三十多年所爭執的「內聖—外王」，以及由「當代新儒學」跨到「後新儒學」的實踐哲學之論題。起先從兩副對聯及一篇短論，開啟對於當代中國思想史的諸多反思，指出「後五四時代」已然來臨。我們應該跨過「方法論的本質主義」的困境，代之以「方法論的約定主義」。正視「自然科學」與「人文學問」其因果性的異同，而正視現代化正朝複數的方式如實而多樣的發展著。我們早該揚棄徹底的反傳統主義，而正視「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」的重要性。當然，我們仍得解開中國政治傳統的根本困結——「道的錯置」，讓「君、父、聖」三者能恰當歸位，並從而確立「天地親君師」所隱含的四個共同體。再者，回溯「內聖外王」的原初結構，並論述其轉化與變遷。最後，則回應「由外王而內聖」的意義何在，這正如同船山所說「無其器則無其道」；當然道器合一、兩端而一致，本體發生學的思維方式是值得重視的。邁入廿一世紀的現代化之後，新儒學之後我們應該跨出主體性哲學的限制，歸返豐富的生活世界，真存實感、啟動參贊，為人類文明的交談盡一份心力。

關鍵詞：儒學、本質主義、約定主義、道的錯置、本體發生學、共同體、兩端而一致

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壹、問題緣起：從兩副對聯說起

業師牟宗三先生於一九九五年辭世，到今年已經廿八年了。這廿八年來，對我影響最大的仍然是牟先生，與我交談最多的仍然是牟先生。有人說牟先生已經過世了怎麼與你交談呢？我想那就是一種神交古人的方式吧！若要認真說來，那不只牟先生，交談最多的可應該是孔子、孟子、荀子、老子、莊子、釋迦牟尼、蘇格拉底、耶穌基督，乃至古往來今的諸多聖賢哲人。當然，有親切感，並且曾經親自受教，從生前到辭世之後，仍然參與著你的學術生活，最多最多的，那還是牟宗三先生。這是無可懷疑的。

我不是乖學生，我是喜歡發問的學生，我也喜歡我的學生發問，甚至喜歡他們與我爭辯。我相信爭辯有助於思想義理的澄清。我自從學以來，一直是這樣的，但我並不是不願意拳拳服膺，而是知道所有的思想都會走樣，所以要拳拳服膺的並不是文字，而是在文字之後，以及文字之上，文字之外的，有甚於文字，優先於文字的「存在」本身。老子講的好，「道可道，非常道」¹，那宇宙造化之源是可表白的，但一旦表白了，就不是原先的道。西方有所謂「吾愛吾師，吾更愛真理」的論法²，東土也有「當仁，不讓於師」的教言³。學生發揚老師的學說，中間免不了會有變化，甚至轉進，也會有批判，還有創造的可能，這都是很自然的事。在我來講，轉益多師，不只是古訓，更是天經地義的事情。我們說「聖人焉不學，聖人無常師」⁴，就連聖人都要如此認真學習，都要無常師，更何況是我們連賢者都夠不及，那更要努力學習，而且也要無常師。

我這些說法，其實是想鋪陳，目前我很多想法與我的老師牟宗三先生有著很大的差別，但這並不妨礙。我還是尊敬我的老師，家裡牆上掛著老師的像，寫著一副嵌名對聯

「宗師仲尼誠通天地，
三教判列道貫古今」。

這對聯寫的並不十分工整，主要能顯其義蘊就是了，要工整起來，又恐怕以辭害義。那就不划算了。這副對聯是牟先生過世時寫的其中一對。這一對是為佛光大學南

¹ 語出老子《道德經》第一章。

² 亞里士多德（Aristotle）這句話，吾愛吾師，吾更愛真理（Plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth.），大家耳熟能詳，也引發不少討論，儘管有些異同，但總的來說，事說明了「追求真理」的優先性。

³ 出自《論語》〈衛靈公〉篇，這說的是「當著仁德，不必謙讓於老師」。這與「吾愛吾師，吾更愛真理」形成對比。他重視的是「仁愛的感通」（前者），後者則重視的是「真理的確定」。請參見林安梧《論語聖經譯解：慧命與心法》，2019，台北：台灣學生書局，頁428。

⁴ 出自《論語》〈子張〉篇「衛公孫朝問於子貢曰：『仲尼焉學？』子貢曰：『文武之道，未墜於地，在人。賢者識其大者，不賢者識其小者，莫不有文武之道焉。夫子焉不學？而亦何常師之有？』」，請參見林安梧[前揭書]，頁520-521。

華管理學院(南華大學)寫的。另一對是以我自己的身分寫的，這對聯是這樣的：

「夫子飄飄來魏晉風骨好為青白眼世俗人皆驚寵辱，
吾師悠悠去宋明義理能過生死關真儒者何畏陰陽。」(林安梧，2003b)⁵

顯然地，前一對聯是就「文化、思想、學術」的公共領域著墨者多，後一對聯是就「從師問學、生命風格」，比較起來是我自己的體會者多。就從這兩副對聯說起吧！

牟宗三先生的確是「宗師仲尼」是儒教（儒家）教化的學問傳承者、創建者，他秉承的學問根柢是「誠」，而這「誠」是通天接地的。牟先生仍然守著華夏「天地人」的老傳統，不過他更強調「人之為人」的主體性，把道德的主體性提到最為優位的地步。這主要是繼承著陸王心學以來的傳統，不過，他又受到西方近代以來啟蒙思想的影響，更加重了這主體性的理性成分，當然它更著重的是道德理性。他經由康德學的全面消化，揉合了西方哲學的傳統，以及中國哲學中儒道佛三教的智慧精華，成就了他自家的哲學思想。《現象與物自身》、《圓善論》⁶可以說是他的學問顛峰之作（金貞姬，2020）。他是把「誠通天地」這實踐的學問，講成了一整套學問，講得最為哲學，而且是與西方哲學可以相比擬的現代哲學家。

「三教判列」，牟先生不只是儒學的學者，他也深通道家、佛教，而且深度、高度，還可能在許多所謂道家、佛家學者之上的⁷。正因如此，他才可能展開宏偉的「判教」（分判教相）的活動。牟先生對儒道佛三教的分判，仍然是以儒家為本位的，這當然在所難免。但他已經早超越了宋明儒者的「闢佛老」的方式。老實說，宋明儒者闢佛老，多有過激的抵斥之言，對於佛老真有深入理解，又心平氣和，願意好好傾聽的，並不是沒有，但還真的不多。據實來說，從宋明諸儒，到王船山已經是一大進境，由王船山到熊十力，又是一大進境。由熊十力到牟宗三，又是一大進境，這一大進境，是更為超邁地，且較為客觀地，並且能用現代哲學的表述方式，以體系性的、較為全面地哲學的建構，展開其分判。

當然，這樣的學問，必然是要求「道貫古今」的，智慧不能自家限制了，不能只是在地的，而且要由在地通向全世界的。不是全球化（globalization），而且更是在地全球化（glocalization）。這些年來，還聽聞到說儒家所說的真理普世性不足，還有人問我看

⁵ 以上這兩副對聯，請參看林安梧〈迎接「後牟宗三時代」的來臨——《牟宗三先生全集》出版紀念〉，《鵝湖月刊》第28卷第11期，總第335期，[社論]，2003年5月。

⁶ 據《現象與物自身》全集本編校說明（金貞姬），《現象與物自身》1975年8月，由台灣學生書局出版。1985年《圓善論》由台灣學生書局出版，完成了牟先生的哲學系統。以上見《牟宗三先生全集》第21冊，也見於第32冊《牟宗三先生著作編年目錄》，頁39、52，2020年12月二版；台北：聯經出版公司。

⁷ 其實，當代新儒家的治學風格是融通統貫的，一方面深於中國哲學儒道佛三家思想，一方面也通過西方哲學，乃至印度哲學，這方面除了牟宗三先生以外，唐君毅先生更是如此。他們之作為哲學家，而不只是哲學的專業從業人員，這與當前的學術客觀研究，專業有餘而通識不足，是大相逕庭的。

法如何。我說，我們之所說當然是要朝向普世來說，但凡是人之所說便有限制，最好是好好地面對我們的限制，而且要相信，我們東方的儒道佛三教當然是朝向普世真理邁進的。儒道佛三教他們之所說是普遍的、是能遍及於天地人我萬物一切的（陳來，2005）⁸。不過，只要一落為文字便有他的限制。正因如此，這三教的經典從來就不宣稱「我就是真理、道路、生命」（林安梧，2020）⁹。「話語的論定」是有限的，唯有跨過話語的論定，回到存在本身，讓存在彰顯其自己，這樣才可能交光互網。

貳、從「迎接『後牟宗三時代』的來臨」說起

《牟宗三全集》總共三十三冊，2003年5月4日出版，在牟先生過世後八年出版，特別挑在五月四日，我想是很有意義的。牟先生是五四之子，卻是反對五四的，這反有幾層：反對的反，反省的反，回返的反，這三層都有。牟先生生長的年代，在北大就學的年代（1929-1933），已經是五四以後了，但中國從一九一九年以後，直到現在仍然身受這次運動的影響。用我的區分方式，有：五四、五四後、後五四，這三個階段。牟先生應該屬於從「五四」到「五四後」，我們則是「五四後」到「後五四」。牟先生並不同意五四的徹底反傳統主義，但無疑地，他的學問主要是回應五四的，他反對五四的徹底反傳統主義，但多少又被這徹底的反傳統主義襲擊到，而且要反對、反省，提出批判，而提出新的轉進方式，進而由此轉進而有了嶄新的創造（林安梧，2020）¹⁰。

前兩代的當代新儒家其實都是在這主要脈絡下進行其思考的。第一代的梁漱溟、馬一浮、熊十力是如此，第二代的唐君毅、牟宗三、徐復觀也是如此。第一代傳統成分多一些，第二代現代成分多一些些。第一代，熊十力、馬一浮的論述方式比較是傳統的表述方式，對西方的學術有些反思，但仍以傳統為主導。梁漱溟比較是建立在自己的生活世界，以及通向全世界文明的總思考，他主要是個實際運用、身體力行的思想家。對於民主、科學理解並不全面，但也不是全盤的接受。第二代唐君毅、牟宗三、徐復觀，因為四九之後轉到了香港與台灣，被稱為港台新儒家。

總的來說，唐、牟、徐，三位先生基本上全盤肯定民主、科學，這樣的現代化方式。他們的主要議題是回應「徹底的反傳統主義者」（totalistic anti-traditionalism）（林毓生，

⁸ 陳來曾有〈儒學的普遍性與地域性〉的討論（刊於《天津社會科學》，2005年第03期），這篇文章寫得小心翼翼，這正反應一百餘年來，我們一直在文化的次殖民地中長育著，這樣所造成的限制。其實廿一世紀應該是跨出這個限制的年代了。

⁹ 語出基督宗教《聖經》新約全書《約翰福音》14:6 CCB，原文為「耶穌說：『我就是道路、真理、生命，若不藉著我，沒有人能到父那裡。』」這與東方儒道佛三教的精神大異其趣，一神論的宗教為「信靠的宗教」，而東土儒道佛三教則為「覺性的宗教」，請參見林安梧〈克服「修昔底德陷阱」：關於學術殖民與本土化問題的一些反思——黃光國〈本土化學術的研究發表與展望〉讀後〉，台北：《本土諮商心理學學刊》，2020年，11卷4期，37-58頁。

¹⁰ 關於此，請參看林安梧〈從「五四後」到「後五四」：基於「存有三態論」思考中華文明在21世紀的角色〉，山東濟南《文史哲》，2020年第2期，頁93-102。

1979)¹¹，但他們與敵對的陣營有一點是一樣的，對於現代化的民主與科學，基本上是全盤接受的，都認為西方是先進的、進步的文明，華族應該努力的學習，要迎頭趕上。所不同的是，徹底的反傳統主義者認為要全盤西化，要迎進來德先生(民主)(democracy)、賽先生(科學)(science)，就得把傳統洗脫淨盡，徹底清除。當代新儒家，後來也稱之為新保守主義者，或文化的保守主義者，新傳統主義者，則以為中國傳統文化並不妨礙現代化，只不過要做一番轉化，由此轉化便能接納現代化，接榫現代化。所謂的「返本開新」，回到傳統的本質裡，在尋求這本質的轉化，讓他能與現代化接軌。他們認為傳統太過於強調內聖了，而忽略了外王，因此要「本內聖而開出新外王」(李明輝，2003；林安梧，2004)。¹²內聖學沒問題，只是外王學還趕不上。內聖學主要強調的是良知本心，由於太強調本心良知了，所以忽略了外王的發展，而新外王的發展是以知識為中心的。內聖學是以本心良知為中心的，新的外王學是以知識系統的為中心的，最大的議題是如何從本心良知轉出知識系統。他們花了許多功夫，終於肯定地說，是可以的開出的，只要經由「良知的自我坎陷」開出「知性主體」就可以與西方的現代化熔接在一起了，中國人就可以開出現代化了。

港台新儒家的學問之轉進與開出，主要就是針對這樣的議題而來，他們主張要由舊內聖，本此舊內聖而開出新外王，用學術的系統語彙來說，就是，由良知的自我坎陷，開出知性主體，由此知性主體而開出民主科學，民主科學就是現代化的內容。他們認為現代化的內容是普世的，西方先進國家是走在前面的，我們要迎頭趕上。他們對於現代化基本上是全盤接受的，偶或有些批評，但仍然是現代性的思維方式。新傳統主義的、徹底反傳統主義的，這兩方陣營看似敵對，但他們都全面肯定了西方現代化的基本內容，所不同的是對於中國傳統文化，一個認為應該保存，並且返本可以開新，可以轉化的創造；一個認為應該徹底揚棄，揚棄了才能真正迎進德先生、賽先生。

不過，他們一樣都採用了方法論上的本質主義，一個說中國文化傳統本質上並不妨礙現代化，另一個說中國文化傳統，其本質上是徹底妨礙現代化的。須知：依著本質主義的方法論來思考，極容易陷入片面性，兩者相較，徹底的反傳統主義的片面性則更為嚴重。因為，他們握有較大的勢頭，須知握有愈大勢頭的，愈會走向片面性、甚至專斷、專制，乃至極權。當代新儒學之作為新傳統主義者，最可貴的是對於這樣的徹底反傳統主義，提出另一個相對反的主張。但方法上，兩者則是同一個對立面的兩端。做個比喻，

¹¹ “totalistic anti-traditionalism”，也有翻譯成「全盤性反傳統主義」，請參見林毓生《中國意識的危機：五四時期激烈的反傳統主義》(The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness)，1979年出版後即引起多方討論，後來也有兩個不同譯本，後來在2020年有個較為完整的「重譯本」，由台北：聯經出版公司出版，譯者為郭亞珮、王遠義、楊芳燕、傅可暢、楊貞德、劉慧娟、劉唐芬，多半為林毓生的弟子，這部重譯本，林毓生也寫了新的中文版序，是更為可信的。

¹² 關於這方面的討論可以說是汗牛充棟了，有代表性的兩端是李明輝與林安梧，請參見李明輝〈由內聖向外王的轉折——現代新儒家的政治哲學〉，2003年9月，《中國文哲研究集刊》第23期，頁337-350，中央研究院中國文哲研究所。林安梧〈後新儒學的新思考：從「外王」到「內聖」——以「社會公義」論為核心的儒學可能〉，2004年8月，《鵝湖月刊》350期，頁16-25。

就像數學上所說的「A」與「非A」，取其絕對值，都是「A」。

參、解開「方法論的本質主義」的困境

從上個世紀九零年代初，我就一再呼籲，我們應該解開方法論的本質主義（methodological essentialism）的困境。我這呼籲並不意味著我忽略了事物本質的認取，而是強調我們不能陷溺成為一種偏至化、教條化、專制化的偏向。要留意到，我們去說這個世界，當然必須經由語言文字圖像來說，但這只是個定位系統，並不是存在本身。因此，任何有所說，都得回到存在自身去檢覈，這檢覈也不是固定的，它是在不斷的檢覈過程中，而趨近於適當而已。顯然地，這樣的方法論並不同於本質主義，他可以姑且稱之為「方法論上的約定主義」（methodological conventionalism）（林安梧，1996/2016）¹³。我們之定位，並不是恆定的，而是約定的，這樣的約定，為的是在展開存在的敘述與定位，必須要不斷地經過檢覈，在檢覈中能更趨近於事實，能取得大家所共識下的定位，不過共識又得不斷的經過循環往復的檢覈。絕對不能夠「一錘定音」，就此了得。即使必要時，一錘定音，那也只是一種權變法門，不能當真。也可能某個階段是真，但另一個階段他就不是那個樣子了。

生命是在生長著的，是變動遷流的，在變動遷流中，我們用語言文字去描述定位，這只是方便我們的敘述與討論而已。在這敘述與討論過程中，讓我們能有更深一層的理解，有更適當的詮釋，也因此可以找尋到較為適當的實踐解方。正因如此，我們的學問必須要時時刻刻能返歸到存在本身，而所謂的返歸是不斷的交互過程，在交互過程中，更為適當的接近而已。這也就是說，我們必須「江山代有才人出」地，時刻去反思過去，去瞻望未來，隨時隨刻，必須做出更為深沉的回返到存在之所依憑。這樣的活動，是必須一代一代，一直做下去，「苟日新、日日新、又日新」¹⁴所說庶幾近之。我們論及《易經》，講「易有三易，簡易、變易，不易也」¹⁵，把這道理講的很是透徹（林安梧，1991）。

「方法論上的本質主義」的思考方式，陷入嚴重的困境，造成極端的專制、以及權力的集中所造成的嚴重的極權，在卡爾·波柏爾（Popper, 1945/2020）的論述裡指出這些都是

¹³ 反對方法論上的本質主義，大體說來是我在上個世紀八零年代在台大碩士班時，於林正弘教授的課堂上，經由卡爾·波柏爾（Karl Popper）的學習而來的，後來在威斯康辛大學做訪問學者時，與林毓生教授時相往來，深受教益，我在一九九四年寫成《儒學與中國傳統社會的哲學省察：以血緣性縱貫軸為核心的展開》一書（此書原來由台北：幼獅文化出版公司，於1996年出版；後來又增版，加了一半內容，更名為《血緣性縱貫軸：解開帝制、重建儒學》，由台北：台灣學生書局，於2016年出版），我可以被定位為是「方法論的本質主義」的反對者。基本上，我是反對教條主義的，特別是那些努力的反教條主義的教條主義者，是我最所警惕，最所揪心的。

¹⁴ 語出《禮記》〈大學〉。

¹⁵ 語出《易緯乾鑿度》：「易一名而含三義，所謂易也，變易也，不易也。」歷代哲學家裡，將天道論、人性論、實踐論，在這易有三義：簡易、變易、不易的思考範疇裡，發揮得最為詳盡的可以說是王船山。特別是他「兩端而一致」的思考，辯證地開啟了一套完整的人性史哲學，請參看林安梧《王船山人性史哲學之研究》，1991年再版，台北：東大圖書公司。

開放社會的敵人¹⁶。他對於邏輯實證論的檢證原則（the principle of verification，或譯為「證成原則」）提出了嚴厲的批評。在他的科學哲學的深層思考裡，提出了「證偽原則」（the principle of falsification，或譯為「否認原則」），來取代原先的檢證原則（林正弘，2007）¹⁷。這檢證原則是關聯到方法論上的本質主義的，而證偽原則則是關連到方法論上的約定主義的。我們可以說是方法論上的本質主義容易墮入封閉性的思考，方法論上的約定主義者則採取的是開放性的思考（林安梧，1997）¹⁸。當然，也會因為太過於開放，而流蕩無所歸。這兩端要都能照顧到，才是比較周全的。

其實，「本質」這個詞，在學問的討論上是不可避免的，但不能將他主張成不可變易的，將它視為永世不遷的，那就不行。名稱只是約定，但這名稱是要指向真實的，儘管這真實不是當下可以認取，但我們總要肯定的，當然這肯定仍然是約定意義下的肯定，不是果真就只是那唯一的被論定。華人自古以來就強調要「實事求是」，所說正是這道理。有實事焉，但人之所是，只是人之所求的是，並不是果真僅只是這樣的是。正因如此，帶有著開放性的思考，要求自己不斷的要檢覈，要日新又新、要精益求精。這樣的「是而非之」，又「非之而是」，不斷檢覈；而不掉入「我是彼非」，是其所是，非其所非，的自我困境裡（錢，2017）¹⁹。因為清楚到所說的「是」是你所「求」的「是」，不就是事實的「是」，因此要對這「是」不斷地提出檢覈，最後才使的那「事實」庶幾近之。

這問題想清楚了，我們就可以對於像胡適之提出的「大膽的假設，小心的求證」這樣的方法論口號，提出反思與批評（林正弘，1991）²⁰。你仔細的思考，這方法論口號是有嚴重缺失的。他的基本思考不出邏輯實證論的檢證原則，這是封閉性的思考。相對於此口號，你如果用的是「小心的假設，大膽的求證偽」，那就形成另一個對比，這樣的對比將有助於你突破原先的封閉性。我且用一則自己親身的經歷，讓這兩端的對比能顯得更清楚。約莫六、七歲時，家居鄉下，剛買了「收音機」，那時收音機不是電晶體的收音機，而是真空管的收音機。鄉下條件較差，買了收音機，那可不得了，整村子的人看這收音機可稀罕得很，可以說是望之如神物，大人更是不讓小孩去動他。父親更是三令五申，要我不能去動它，一動了它，便會遭受嚴重的懲罰。有趣的是，你愈是禁止，小

¹⁶ 《開放社會及其敵人》1945年出版後，旋即轟動西方學界，奠定了波柏爾（另譯為：波普）無論在左派或右派都屹立不搖的劃時代地位。值得注意的是，波柏爾也強調：開放社會的敵人，同樣會打著「開放」旗幟，而行專制之實。只有清晰分辨這種虛偽，肯定理性與自由，才能在政治、社會制度以及種種問題上，求得實際合理的根本解決，並創造出更理想的未來。該書由莊文瑞、李英明翻譯，2020年，台北：商周出版。

¹⁷ 請參見林正弘〈卡爾·波柏與當代科學哲學的蛻變〉，臺北市（1985.11），國立臺灣大學創校四十周年國際中國哲學研討會論文集，p.403-420，後收錄於2007年出版的書《伽利略·波柏·科學說明》。

¹⁸ 關於此，請參看林安梧《契約、自由與歷史性思維》第九章〈論歷史主義與歷史定論主義：波柏爾《歷史定論主義的窮困》之理解與詮釋〉一文，頁167-182，1997年再版，台北：黎明文化事業公司印行。

¹⁹ 早在《莊子》的〈齊物論〉於此又有深刻的洞見。請參見錢穆《莊子纂箋》，頁6-23，2017年六版七刷，台北：東大圖書公司。

²⁰ 請參見林正弘〈胡適的科學主義〉頁197-211，收在周策縱 / 唐德剛等《胡適與近代中國》，1991年，台北：時報文化。

孩愈是孽，就想去動。想去動，就會看大人怎麼打開電源的，記起來，準備適當時機時行動。我挑了一個父母都不在時，去動它。起先我扭了第一個鈕，那是管電源的。電源打開，奇怪，怎麼聲音不響，我急得扭動另外一個鈕，那扭驅動了指針，是選台的指針。扭著、扭著，指針到了 5、6 的地方，聲音居然響起來了。我於是「大膽的假設」開收音機的方法，是扭開了電源之後，要在扭動另外一個扭，那是選台的扭，扭到 5、6 的地方，聲音就會響了，這是完善的開機啟動方法。就這樣，我做了「大膽的假設」之後，我真是「小心的求證」，正因為我都仔細而小心翼翼的求證，果真每次開機都成功。又因為這樣的成功，讓我不疑有它的認定為開機就這樣動作的。

約莫過了一、兩年，我都偷偷地這樣去開啟這收音機，每次都屢試不爽，準確無誤。直到有一次，我正偷偷開啟這收音機的電源，聽到遠方傳來父親的呼喊聲，父親的威嚴一向令我驚駭，這呼喊頗為急切，我就愈發害怕，便立馬朝父親的呼喊聲衝過去。原來一群小雞小鴨跑進了剛播好秧苗的水田，會踩踏到秧苗，讓秧苗損傷，須得有人趕忙去把這群小雞小鴨趕上來。喊了我去，趕雞趕鴨，火速緊急，過一會兒工夫，雞鴨回圈子去了，我又趕回客廳，要完成還沒完成的收音機開機動作。趕了回來，見到收音機，它竟然已經響了起來；我整個人愣在那裏，被那情景驚住了。原來，以前我仔仔細細的開機動作，打開電源，扭動轉台指針到 5、6 之間，這樣的完美動作卻是有問題的。其實，只要打開電源，等一下子，後來知道，要讓它真空管熱了，才能傳導，便能發出聲音來。我說的故事，正是「大膽的假設，小心的求證」這方法論口號的可能嚴重錯誤。從這方法論的誤用，深入來看，就可以了解到台灣胡適之以降的一派史學其成就如何了（楊貞德，1994）²¹。

相對來說，我若是「小心的假設」，想說：這收音機的開機方式，有可能是這樣，打開電源，扭動轉台指針到 5、6 之間，但這只是暫時姑且的認定，它有可能不是這樣，我可以試試看，而且要打膽地想，有可能不是這樣。不只大膽地想，而且大膽嘗試，不照原先的假設，哈！可能就找到了別的開機方式，最後多方檢覈，找到了。原來，只需要把電源打開就可以了。這過程便是「小心的假設，大膽的求證偽」。「大膽的假設，小心的求證」，在方法論上的本質主義的驅策下，會走向封閉。相較說來，「小心的假設，大膽的求證偽」，在方法論上的約定主義的驅動下，才會去思考更多可能。也才能找到更適合的方式。「實事求是」是必要的。

肆、「自然科學的因果性」與「人文學問的因果性」

自然科學上的實事求是，並不同於人文學問的實事求是。前者，可以把人與情境的

²¹ 關於此，請參見楊貞德：〈胡適科學方法觀論析〉，1994 年，中央研究院《中國文哲研究集刊》，5 期，頁 129-154。

因素排除，而且可以反覆的驗證。後者，人與情境的因素，乃至其他涉及於人的、時間的、空間的，種種因素都會介入，而且這樣的介入與發展，無法反覆驗證。簡單的區分，前者是不涉及於人這個主體的，後者則涉及於人這個主體的。前者可以排出時空因素，後者是無法排除時空因素的。前者可以反覆驗證，後者不能反覆驗證。這樣便出現了兩種因果性，前者，姑且名之為「自然科學的因果性」；後者，姑且名之為「人文科學的因果性」(林安梧，2009)²²。前者，自然科學的因果性，我們說他是一種外延的因果性，可以稱之為「科學的驗證」，科學的驗證包括了經驗的驗證，以及理論的論證。後者，人文科學的因果性，則是內容的因果性，他的驗證是不能重複的，所謂「時不再來」便是，他不是共時性的，他是歷時性的，他不叫驗證，他只能叫證據。這證據用來做成的是「人文的詮釋」(humanistic interpretation)，而不是「科學的說明」(scientific explanation)。

人文的詮釋在歷時性下展開，由於他不能像自然科學一樣重複驗證，但人們還是習慣於一種因果性的把握，我們會說「後之視今，如今之視昔」²³。今之所受，是由前之所作而來；今之所作，當會有後之所受。這「作—受」的邏輯是很重要的。我們講到人文的詮釋，講到歷史的發展，都離不開這「作—受」的邏輯。關於「作—受」的邏輯，你又如何要展開這樣的行動呢？因為，後之視今，如今之視昔，以前所造成的，現在結果，這樣的「作—受」已經讓我有所警惕，有所借鏡，我從這裡得到了教訓，我總結了一些理解與詮釋，因此，在「作—受」的邏輯下，我思慮抉擇了在未來的「作—受」下，我將可能如何達到所確立的「終點」，由這「終點」啟動我現在該有的「起點」方向。總的來說，我們希望的是現在好好作，以後就會有好受的；若現在作不好，或不好好作，或是方向錯了，以後就沒得好受。再者，人文的學問與自然科學的學問，並不是截然分開的，人文學問必然涉及於自然科學，只是他是用人文的方式來涉及於自然科學的。

因為自然科學必須置放在人文的實踐歷程中展開，才会有發生巨大的人文影響。比如說，如何發展出核子電能，這可真是自然科學，但要不要發展核子電能，這要不要就是人文學問。有了核子電能，如何運作，要如何管理，這一樣是人文學問。要發展核子電能，有沒有些文化的特殊因素，會讓他發展得更快，或者更慢，甚至是反對他的發展，這當然也是人文的學問。人文學問簡單的說，涉及到生命的，活生生的，不可避免的；而自然科學簡單的說，是要把這些涉及，極力地撇清，或者用非生命的、攝質歸量的方式來處理。

這些問題作了適度的釐清，之後，我們可以進一步來想想，一個多世紀以來，清末民初，以至現在，這段近現代歷史的發展軌跡如何。尤其我們最常聽到的是中國傳統文化與現代化的論題：中國傳統文化果真妨礙現代化嗎？如果是妨礙了那該如何，如果不

²² 關於此，請參看林安梧《中國人文詮釋學》第一章〈人文學、社會科學與自然科學之異同〉，頁 1-38，2009 年，台北：台灣學生書局。

²³ 原文出自王羲之的《蘭亭集序》(西元 353 年)，原文「後之視今，亦猶今之視昔」，這話常被引用，它帶有深刻的歷史哲學的意味。

妨礙，那又該如何解釋，我們怎麼落後於西方的現代化呢？中國文化沒有發展出西方的現代化思維，是我們整個文化的必然結果嗎？是本質上就發展不出來的嗎？還是只是某些歷史因素造成的，排出了這些歷史因素，也就可以發展了。那又如何排除呢？是逐漸的演進呢？還是需要徹底的革命呢？這些問題，從十九世紀末，二十世紀初，就一直被提到檯面上來討論、爭議、辯論，甚至在政治實踐上大打出手，不顧天下蒼生、血流成河。跌跌撞撞，坎坎坷坷，終於度過了百餘年，進到二十一世紀了，時局儘管還詭譎萬分，但雲霧漸開，我們已經有機會重新來反思這一大段歷史了。這便涉及到幾個關鍵詞：中國文化、內聖、現代化、外王、本心、良知、知識、合理性。

顯然地，自然科學的因果性與人文學問的因果性，大相逕庭，最大的不同是人文學問必然涉及於人的「自由意志」的問題，這是自然科學所沒有的（林安梧，2009）²⁴。一涉及於自由意志，那許多參數便無法用計量的方式去算計出來。就因為人文學問無法像自然科學那樣的「攝質歸量」，儘管某些層面仍然可以「攝質歸量」，但終極處是無法這樣執行的。這問題講明了，我們就可以知道，一種科學主義式的思考，誤以為一切可以銷歸於量來處理，一切都可以很科學的來處理，這是不可能。科學這「賽先生」其實終極來說，是不可能「賽」過「先生」的，「先生」必定要「賽」過他的，畢竟「先生」才是真正的主人。民主這「德先生」，終其極來說，不能只是選舉、罷免就可了事的，並不是制約平衡（checks and balances），就可了事的（Montesquieu, 1748/1998）²⁵。因為如果沒有「德性」作為先行者，那制約平衡到頭來仍然只是權力的傾軋而已。看來，「德先生」果真還是要「德」「先生」。原來，政治是要講道德的。孔老夫子所說的「為政以德，譬如北辰，居其所而眾星共之」，「導之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；導之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格」（林安梧，2017）²⁶。《尚書》說的「正德、利用、厚生，惟和」，把正德放在最前頭仍然是千古常新的道理²⁷。

伍、如何實踐「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」

這些道理講明了，就可以知道民國以來「徹底的反傳統主義者」，以及作為其對立面的「文化保守主義者」「新傳統主義者」，在那些地方出了嚴重差失了。一直爭議著，中國文化是否妨礙現代化，這根本是毫無意義的。但這論題居然到現在在人文社會科學裡，仍然起著陣陣漣漪，就知道一種錯誤的方法論上的本質主義的思維，這幽魂仍然在天空

²⁴ 請參見同註 22，林安梧前揭書，第一章第十一節，頁 16-18。

²⁵ 早在孟德斯鳩的《法意》（一譯作：論法的精神），就提出行政、立法、司法，三權分立的精神。這本書有多種翻譯，現在以張雁深翻譯的《論法的精神》最為通行，該書於 1998 年，由台北：商務印書館印行。

²⁶ 以上出自《論語》〈為政〉篇，請參見林安梧《論語聖經譯解：慧命與心法》，頁 19-21，2017 年，台北：台灣學生書局。

²⁷ 出自《尚書》〈大禹謨〉，原文為「禹曰：『於！帝念哉！德惟善政，政在養民。火、水、金、木、土、穀，惟修；正德、利用、厚生，惟和；九功惟敘，九敘惟歌。戒之用休，董之用威，勸之以九歌，俾勿壞。』」

中盤旋著、遊蕩著。老實說，從一百多年來的華人發展史，我們可以清楚地看到，追問：中國傳統文化是否妨礙現代化，這根本無意義。所幸的是，並不是所有的人都陷入這爭論之中；在這些爭論看似極端熱鬧的時候，一直有著一批人默默地在進行著全民族拯救的點滴工程，他們有著高卓的志向，有著寬廣的胸襟，有著長遠的眼光，也有著細緻的手路，一直在努力著。他們高舉著實業救國，高舉著興學校、育子弟、喚醒民智、振興民德，在花果飄零下，尋求靈根自植。實事求是，一直是華夏民族非常重要的一個傳統，我常說「孝、悌、慈」這三個字，是華夏民族永生的奧秘（林安梧，2021）²⁸。

這樣子說來，誤以為政治就只是權力的制約平衡，以為能夠通過制度的設計，就可以使得政治免於專制極權，這想得太容易了。特別是到了廿一世紀已經快過了四分之一世紀的現在，我們發現到原先的民主政治的設計，在資本主義的催化下，已經成為高耗能而低產值的一種制度，已經成為有錢的人愈有錢、有勢的人愈有勢，權力名位這些浮於外表的東西成為文化的主流，這傾向隨著網絡的發達，讓這世界簡直是擾攘喧囂，而永無寧日，文化低落、人性頹靡，可以說是到了令人難以置信的地步。當一切都可以商品化，而極力地再經由消費的吹捧，慾望的高張，又將慾望商品化，也讓商品與慾望結成一不可解的牢結，就這樣人們在慾望橫流的商品潮中，自我追逐、自我迷失、自我放逐，往而不復，伊于胡底！

華夏傳統的「人倫」當然不同於近現代西方的「人權」，以前我們的人倫，講的是孝悌，而兩千多年來的孝悌又深深地裹在「君主專制、父權高壓、男性中心」的思考裡，因此我們誤認為「人倫」是專制的、是高壓的、是男性中心的、是父權主義的、是君權至上的，誤以為只要打擊了、打倒了人倫，就可以迎來人權。想想民國以來，有多少所謂啟蒙救亡的知識份子誤認為「孝道」就是「父權」，就是專制，以為打倒孝道，就可以解放了，就可以從父權、專制、極權裡，解放出來了。這想法，著實可笑。打倒了儒家所強調的孝悌人倫，結果是專制還是專制，而且還更專制；極權還是極權，而且更極權。好不容易，熬到今日，終於有個盼頭，這世界果真不是這樣的，原來有了「人倫」，才不會讓「人權」過頭，才能讓人權終有個歸依與念想，原來沒有孝悌人倫的人權會淪落為只是權利的爭奪而已（曾春海，1990）²⁹。

同樣的，如：以賽亞·伯林（Isaiah Berlin）之強調「消極的自由」與「積極的自由」的區別，他強調「消極的自由」在政治社會共同體的建置上是基本而不可或缺的，這樣的自由是不容許被省略的³⁰。相對來說，「積極自由」在政治上是危險的，因為它誘使統

²⁸ 在多次訪談裡，我提到這樣的觀點。最接近的一次是 2021 年 1 月 7 日《博鰲論壇》「新儒商與陽明心學：當代新儒學與新儒商的巔峰對話」，由博鰲儒商論壇理事長、中山大學黎紅雷教授，與臺灣清華大學通識教育中心原主任林安梧教授對話《新儒商與陽明心學》，請參見〈黎紅雷對話林安梧〉，博鰲儒商論壇發佈：2021-06-01。 <https://baike.baidu.com/tashuo/browse/content?id=625561342d44a54116010eed>。

²⁹ 請參見曾春海〈變遷社會中的人倫與人權〉，台北：《哲學與文化》17 卷 9 期（1990/09），頁 846-852

³⁰ 請參見 Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 再者，許國賢〈三種自由觀再探〉，台北：東吳政治學報，30(2)，2012，頁 169-219。

治者「為了自身利益」而削弱人們的消極自由。這些論點使得研究者誤解華夏文化傳統儒道佛三教所說的自由是「積極的自由」，而這是會使得人之作為一個人參與於政治社會共同體的「消極的自由」受到限制，甚至為專制者所利用。當然，專制者、極權者之利用思想、操作思想，那是不在話下的，但果真儒道佛所強調的人的教養與自覺，這自覺就可以理解成所謂的積極的自由嗎？而這樣的積極的自由就會導致統治者的利用嗎？這都不無疑問。再說，如果好好讀清楚了孟子所說的「徒善不足以為政，徒法不能以自行」³¹，知道儒家所強調的「禮、樂、刑、政」³²，大概可以肯定的，有自覺的自由，應該會比沒有自覺的自由，還來得好，而且還來得重要。至於會不會因為太強調積極的自由，而被當權者利用，而使得連「消極性的自由」都被忽略了，那是另外的問題。換言之，不是你把儒道佛三教所說的「自覺」，你以為的積極的自由，打了下去，就可以真正實現了你以為的消極的自由。「自由」是要追求的，但若沒有自覺，那追求到的自由，有可能只是權力的鬥爭下的樣態而已，那是無法穩定而如實的生長的。

當然，「民本」並不同於「民主」，這是顯而易見的，華夏文明中的儒家政治思想，如孟子者，可以說是把民本思想發揮到了極致，但畢竟那還不是民主，不過，如果在這個世代，孟子把民本思想發揮於民主政治之中，可能這樣的民主會是一較為健康的民主（陳運星，2004）³³。很明顯地，以前專制政體可以利用民本思想，也可以依著民本思想，讓人民百姓免於水火，讓老百姓能安居樂業；同樣地，現在的民主政體也可以利用民本思想，當然也可以依著民本思想，讓老百姓真正能當家做主，能國泰民安。當然，在民主憲政時代，要利用民本思想，那比起專制時代可要難得些，但要積極的去運用民本，那可真是便利得多了。這也可看出，儒家原先所強調的「民本」，在民主時代，那可真是「長江出三峽」，從此可以江面寬闊，行船安穩。當然因為緩行從容，也可會鬧出泥沙淤塞的問題來。民本是為政的態度，而民主則是制度，有民本的態度，結合著民主的制度，這會是更好的。若是沒有民本，只強調民主，極可能墮入民粹的境域。誤認為儒家的民本是與專制政體緊密結合在一起的，所以把民本思想瓦解了，就可以把專制政體也瓦解了，這思想是極為荒謬的。

到了廿一世紀的現在，我們可以確然無疑地宣稱，不可摒棄人倫談人權，不可摒棄自覺談自由，不可摒棄民本談民主，而要努力地去實踐「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」（林安梧，2018）³⁴。

³¹ 語出《孟子》〈離婁章句上〉，孟子曰：「今有仁心仁聞，而民不被其澤，不可法於後世者，不行先王之道也。故曰：徒善不足以為政，徒法不能以自行。」

³² 語出《禮記》〈樂記〉：「禮節民心，樂和民聲，政以行之，刑以防之，禮樂刑政，四達而不悖，則王道備矣！」

³³ 請參見陳運星〈從民本到民主：儒家政治文化的再生〉，台北：中山人文社會科學期刊，民93年12月，第十二卷第二期，頁87-112。

³⁴ 我在多次的講座中提到這些理念，2018年參加尼山世界文明論壇時，接受訪問也做了此論。人物林安梧：人人都能成為傳統文化傳播的使者（2018/12/25）來源：中國孔子基金會。網址：<https://read01.com/gg2nDyA.html>。

陸、解開「道的錯置」：讓「君、父、聖」三者恰當歸位

這些觀念釐清了，隨著世代的變遷，逐漸被時間澄清了。這時候，我們可能需要去回顧一下，上個世紀七零年代余英時先生提出了「反智論與中國政治傳統」（余英時，1976）³⁵，一時膾炙人口，不過當時就有胡秋原先生提出疑義，他在〈評余英時院士的「反智論與中國政治傳統」〉一文中，指出余先生所說的「反智論」由於誤解英文並作羅織³⁶。這篇文章刊出之後，余先生並沒有回應。我當時初生之犢不畏虎，大學四年級時，給戴璉璋先生的「中國哲學史」期末報告裡，寫了一篇《中國政治傳統中主智、超智與反智的糾結》，這篇文章先在台灣師大的《文風》發表，後來又增修了，刊載在《鵝湖》（林安梧，1979）³⁷。後來，也聽從了高友功先生的話，說余先生很喜歡後輩對他的思想有所批評，也寄給了他，但沒有得到余先生的回應。我想現在重新看胡秋原先生的文章，也重新反思了一下自己的論點，果真還是想說，余英時先生應該可以做個回應，當然余先生已經作古歸天了，無法回應。但是，歷史的發展卻給了回應，很明顯地，胡秋原先生的文章是有道理的。

我重新回想了一下，余先生「反智論與中國政治傳統」的論述，的確給我不少啟發，只是喜好哲學思考的我，認為余先生的論述說得太簡略，而且要說「反智論」的話，並不是說儒家主智論、道家反智論、法家反智論，儒學法家化，之後，也就漆黑一片了，都是「反智論」為主導了。當然，把道家理解成「反智論」，很難論證成功的。道家基本上是「超智」，他強調跨過理智，回到存在本身。道家由於強調「超智」而會有反智的可能導向。儒家雖主智，但仍然有超智一面，也因為如此，才會有反智的可能。當然，最重要的是由周朝的「宗法封建」跨到秦漢的「君主專制」，這是歷史飛躍的進步，卻也墮入了難以拔脫的深淵之中。

反智論是中國傳統政治的一個面向，但不是本質如此。秦漢帝制以下，儒家「聖王」的理想，轉而成了「王聖」的現實。儒家本來主張「聖者為王」，有德行、有智慧、有能力的聖者，應該成為政治社會共同體的統治者，這有點像柏拉圖的哲學王的意思。結果適巧相反，一旦登上了權力的高峰，作為政治社會共同體的最高統治者，就宣稱自己是有德行、有智慧、有能力的聖者了。「聖者當王」的「聖王」，現在異化、扭曲、倒反，

³⁵ 〈反智論與中國政治傳統——論儒、道、法三家政治思想的分野〉一文出自：余英時，《歷史與思想》（台北：聯經出版，1976）。

³⁶ 〈評余英時院士的「反智論與中國政治傳統」：論余先生所說的「反智論」由於誤解英文並作羅織〉此文原刊《中華雜誌》第17卷第191期（1979年6月），係《中華雜誌》發行人胡秋原先生以「編輯部」名義發表。

³⁷ 林安梧〈中國政治傳統中主智、超智與反智的糾結—環繞先秦儒道二家政治思想的試探與考察〉，台北：鵝湖月刊 51期（1979/09），頁2-11。此文後來收入林安梧《道的錯置：中國政治傳統的根本困結》附錄一，頁315-340，2003年8月，台北：台灣學生書局印行。

成了「我為王，我就是聖」，這樣的「王聖」。這我稱之為「道的錯置」(misplaced Dao)。我認為這是中國政治傳統的最大困結，我也為此寫了兩本書。一本是《道的錯置：中國政治傳統的根本困結》、另一本是《血緣性縱貫軸：解開帝制 重建儒學》(林安梧，2003c，2016)³⁸。

解開「道的錯置」才有可能真切地跨出兩千年專制的泥淖，我經由系統脈絡的總體結構分析闡釋，指出「君、父、聖」這三個核心性的概念必須深化理解與詮釋。在君主專制的兩千年傳統裡，「君」是做為政治社會共同體最高階位的頂點，「父」是做為家庭人倫共同體最高階位的頂點，「聖」是做為文化教養共同體最高階位的頂點。這三個共同體必須有其一定的獨立性，也必須有著恰當的關係，如若不然，將會有錯置的問題。兩千年的帝皇專制傳統一切以「君」為核心，把君說成了聖君，把君說成了君父。我們要將「君」，還其為「君」，在民主憲政、公民社會體系下，讓「君」真切的成為「公僕」，總統、總理，都只是個約定的名稱而已。他是接受人民的囑託而有著該盡的責任與義務，他們是有任期的，他們不是永世不遷的。「父」真切的成為父，父慈子孝，能夠把血緣人倫的共同體處理好，因而讓他成為良善的社會政治共同體的基石。「聖」真切的成為聖，道統延續，生生不息，能夠把文化教養共同體處理的日臻完善，日日新、又日新，讓文化綿延、永續流傳。

「君、父、聖」回歸於正位，這三個共同體，政治社會共同體、血緣人倫共同體、文化教養共同體，真切的受到了如實的重視，當然這一切都得回歸到天地自然的共同體。天地自然的共同體、血緣人倫的共同體、政治社會的共同體、文化教養的共同體，這便是我們常說的「天地親君師」五倫(林安梧，2022)³⁹。這四個共同體共同撫育著每一個人的「身心共同體」。把這些關聯起來，則是正心、修身、齊家、治國、平天下。正心之本在誠意，誠意之本在致知，致知之本在格物。這便是《大學》所說的「八目」。在這八條目前，還有五階次(定、靜、安、慮、得)，及三綱領(明明德，親民，止於至善)。其實，大學之教果真是學為大人之學也，是一部非常了不得的政治哲學，是「內聖外王」充實圓滿之教。

柒、「內聖外王」的原初結構及其轉化

既然「內聖外王」是充實圓滿之教，那為什麼我從上個世紀末，要刻意的提出「由外王而內聖」呢？這當然是針對著過度的強調「內聖」學，而要由內聖學開出外王學，

³⁸ 林安梧《道的錯置：中國政治思想的根本困結》，2003年8月，臺北：台灣學生書局。

林安梧《血緣性縱貫軸：解開帝制·重建儒學》，2016年1月，臺北：台灣學生書局。

³⁹ 這些年來，我提及儒學時多從「天地親君師」做「四個共同體」來加以闡釋。最近林安梧〈關於先秦儒學「人性論」的一些討論——以孟子和荀子為核心的展開〉，《齊魯學刊》2022年第1期，第五節「儒家重視的四個共同體——人性論不離「天地親君師」」。

這樣的思路而發的。

其實，把儒家誤解成只是內聖學，而不注重外王學，這根本是錯誤的。甚至有學者還說儒家之所論不及於「公共領域」，而只有涉及於「私自領域」。這真是天大的誤解。《禮記》〈禮運〉所說的「大道之行也，天下為公」，這不是很清楚嗎？當然，論者以為宋明理學有嚴重的內傾，這往內的傾向的確有些因子在，但並不是全然如此。較為嚴重的是，我們將這一大段的思想史都理解成往內傾的向度，這才是更大的問題。

須知：理解與詮釋的活動，與理解者、詮釋者其思想的視域、存在的境遇，有著密切的關聯。清末民初以來，由於中國的積弱不振，急於救亡的啟蒙者，一棒打翻船的，依據著方法論的本質主義思維方式，看到了中國國民性之一斑，以為魯迅筆下的阿 Q，便是中國人的本質樣貌，認為這種樣貌是因為思想之內傾而造成的，而往上一追，發現宋明理學深深的染上了佛教禪宗的色調，說這是陽儒陰釋，說佛法弱了中國，說宋明理學特別是心學一派，常常是「無事袖手談心性，臨危一死報君王」⁴⁰，說他們只強調「心法」，但卻一點「辦法」也沒有。這些論說評點，一再地被擴大，大家慢慢誤解中國文化整個來講是內傾的、早熟的，整個歷史是停滯的，兩三千年來如一日。其實，這些講法並不準確，但這擴大了的說法，已經瀰天蓋地，無處不然。

這麼一來，儒學的知識被說成只是地方型的知識，沒達到普世真理的層次，儒學所說的都只是私領域，不及於公領域。依據這說法看來，儒學十足是上不了檯面的，儒學尚且如此，中國其他的小傳統，那更是迷信、落後、茫昧、荒謬。徹底的反傳統主義者認為既然如此，那整個傳統應該全面予以揚棄，中國文明才有新生之可能。其實，只要你翻閱儒家經典，不論四書或五經，或者廿五史，明顯的，以上種種對儒家文明的誤解，那是顯而易見的。但是一百多年來，幾乎所謂進步的啟蒙者，都誤將中國的積弱不振，專制茫昧，都甩鍋給儒家。我認為這便是在所謂的中國近現代的文化意識之危機，是中國人的存在危機，自己的身家性命，存在根基全然被撼動了的狀況下，恍恍然莫知所之的狀況下的錯誤理解（張灝，1978）⁴¹。

這樣的理解視域、存在境域蓋過了一切，這使得急於救亡的啟蒙者，誤以為只要引進了德先生、賽先生，一切就得救了。洋文化是足以救贖整個中國的。在極端的不自信底下，又加上了內憂外患，兵災戰禍，對日抗戰最後雖成了戰勝國，但中華神州卻已經遍地焦土、滿目瘡痍。緊接著國共內戰，一九四九之後，避居香港的當代新儒家們，不免感嘆花果飄零。在「手空空，無一物」的艱難困苦中，「路遙遙，無止境」，在「亂離中，流浪裏」，「餓我體膚勞我精」，儘管如此，「艱險我奮進，困乏我多情」，「千斤擔子兩肩挑，趁青春，結隊向前行」。錢賓四先生所寫的新亞校歌，可見當時之一斑。在這情

⁴⁰ 「無事袖手談心性，臨危一死報君王」語出顏習齋《存學編》，「宋、元來儒者卻習成婦女態，甚可羞。無事袖手談心性，臨危一死報君王，即為上品矣。豈若真學一復，戶有經濟，使乾坤中永享治安之澤乎！」

⁴¹ 張灝在〈新儒家與當代中國的思想危機〉一文（林鎮國翻譯），有著深切的反思，請參見台北：鵝湖月刊 35 期（1978/05），頁 2-13。

境下，要尋求「靈根自植」何等不容易。

強調「靈根自植」的優先性，上個世紀是確然必要的。不只靈根自植，而且這靈根必須植於天壤之間，必須要有雨露之滋潤，日月光華之輝耀，才得生長。要救亡圖存、要啟明民智、育養民德，都必須得從這靈根自植做起。正如同錢穆所說的，「山巖巖，海深深，地博厚，天高明，人之尊，心之靈。廣大出胸襟，悠久見生成。」⁴²「十萬里，上下四方，俯仰錦繡。五千載今來古往，一片光明，十萬萬神明子孫，東海西海南海北海有聖人。珍重，珍重，這是我新亞精神。」⁴²錢穆、唐君毅、牟宗三、張丕介、徐復觀，等經營的新亞精神，真切的起了「靈根自植」的工作成果。

我以為「天地，山海，人心」這正是中國文化三才者，天地人的傳統，是「天高明、地博厚，人悠久」的傳統⁴³。這是「內聖外王交與參贊而成」的傳統。這傳統早在《莊子》〈天下〉篇，已經暢發其義理（錢穆，2017）⁴⁴。我以為儒道本為同源，後來雖各有所別的發展，但畢竟兩者是同源而互補的（林安梧，2003a）⁴⁵。這內聖外王的結構，是充足而飽滿的。

由於整個近現代中國陷入嚴重的存在意義危機之中，花果飄零，信心的確立是最嚴重的問題。當代新儒學面對著震天嘎響的徹底反傳統主義者的喧囂，他們極力地從宋明儒學的心性本體中，找尋到了儒學的魂魄，努力地重新確立起這民族精神的象徵，思有以「靈根自植」也。當代新儒家由於太強調靈根自植，這「靈根」經由哲學的深度詮釋，它成了形而上的本體，這樣的哲學深度詮釋工作，我名之為「形而上的保存」。既為「形而上的保存」當然也就必要有「形而下的開啟」（林安梧，1995）⁴⁶，本內聖以開出新外王，也就這樣成了一個必然要啟動的實踐力量。

「形而上保存」的是「道德」，而「形而下開啟」的是「知識」，如何以「德」開「智」，如何由「道德」開出「知識」，成了最重要的問題。就這樣如何「本內聖開出新外王」，轉手而為如何由道德開出知識，因此「良知的自我坎陷，以開出知性主體，開出民主科學」，這樣的理論也就應運而生了。牟宗三先生也就在這思考裡，融通三教、會通中西，而締構了他兩層存有論的系統。也在這系統下，提出了「良知的自我坎陷」這膾炙人口的理論（林安梧，1999）⁴⁷，以作為「本內聖以開出新外王」，以完成由形而上的保存到形而下的開啟的歷程。

⁴² 以上所引為錢賓四先生為《新亞校歌》所作歌詞，大約作於1949年，由黃友棣譜曲。

⁴³ 「三才者，天地人」語出《三字經》，而《禮記》〈中庸〉第廿六章「博厚，所以載物也；高明，所以覆物也；悠久，所以成物也。博厚配地，高明配天，悠久無疆。如此者，不見而章，不動而變，無為而成。」

⁴⁴ 請參見錢穆《莊子纂箋》〈天下〉篇，頁274-285。

⁴⁵ 請參見林安梧〈「道」「德」釋義：儒道同源互補的義理闡述—以《老子道德經》「道生之、德蓄之」暨《論語》「志於道、據於德」為核心的展開〉，台北：《鵝湖月刊》334期（2003/04），23-29。

⁴⁶ 請參見林安梧〈無盡的哀思：悼念牟宗三先生兼論「形而上的保存與實踐之開啟」〉，台北：中國文哲研究通訊 5卷2期（1995/06），178-180。

⁴⁷ 請參見林安梧〈解開「道的錯置」——兼及于「良知的自我坎陷」的一些思考〉，《孔子研究季刊》總第53期，1999年第一季，頁14-26，中國孔子基金會主辦，齊魯書社，山東濟南。

捌、提出「由外王而內聖」的意義何在？船山所說「無其器則無其道」的啟發

「形而上保存」的是「道德」，而「形而下開啟」的是「知識」，以「德」開「智」，由「道德」開出「知識」，這樣說著說著，我們開始有一種理解，誤認為我們以前所「強」的是「道德」，所「弱」的是「知識」。更且重要的是，這「道德」可是萬世不遷的形而上的本體，他是確然無疑的。問題出在於我們太道德了，太形而上了，我們整個心都被道德包住了，都被包在形而上之體裡，因此知識才會落後，才會忽略了知識系統，我們現在就是要努力地從這形而上的道體所裹住的道德，重新開啟知識系統。

問題果真就在這裡，我們果真是太道德、太形而上嗎？我們必須要「坎陷」一下，才能不要太道德，而讓「知識」有喘息的機會，而開啟知識系統嗎？我們不要那麼地形而上，而要落實接地氣而開啟形而下嗎？太道德當然不好，因為太道德一定變成了假的，所以要趕快轉出來才好。太形而上會變得太掛空，那也不好，所以要快些落實為形而下；這樣才好。這呼籲是很有道理的，但問題是怎樣叫做「太道德」、「太形而上」，又他又是如何造成的呢？是甚麼因素讓那道德變得太道德，那形而上變得太形而上。這其中有的是難以解開的魅惑，問題是在這魅惑如何解開。呼籲應該解開是對的，而誤認為是「太道德」、「太形而上」造成了，這恐怕就有問題了。

「內聖—外王」，內修外行，本來應該充實而飽滿，然而何以轉為內傾，太過強調內修，而甚至以內聖作為主要的實踐向度，這必須回溯整個歷史發展的起伏升降的問題，而不是把中國歷史的發展，特別是儒學的發展定位為以內聖為主，而外王本是由此內聖發展出來的、衍生出來的產物。當前，錯誤的認為儒學是以內聖為主的，甚至說儒學只是涉及於「私領域」的，而未能及於「公領域」，儒學只配作為「地方知識」的，雖然彼此有所不同，但都是被看小了，看內傾了。這其實是在一封閉心態下，被對比出來的，是處在嚴重的意識危機下，被對比出來的。這是在文化的次殖民地，被意識形態化後對比出來的。呼籲由私領域轉進到公領域，由地方知識轉進到普世知識，這當然不會有人反對，同樣的要求能由德轉智，由內聖開出外王，這當然也是正確的。問題是怎麼開出？

如果我們沒有對整個歷史的浮沉升降，好自理解，只是誤認為我們以前是一片漆黑，現在要把漆黑去掉，迎來光明。或者誤認為我們以前是一片光明，只是光明的灼人眼睛，難以看清楚，恐怕要遮蔭一下，坎陷一下才能開啟真正的清楚分別。這些呼籲，必須落實，而所謂的落實，是實事求是地去理解，我們之所以會往內傾，而忽略了外在結構，這與我們兩千年來的父權高壓、君主專制、男權中心，是有密切關係的。就是這三者所構成的「血緣性縱貫軸」再加上科舉制度、八股取士，教條化、刻板化了人的培育與構成。這麼一來，就使得這「血緣性縱貫軸」固結成難以解開的專制集權結構。正是這樣

的結構，讓我們的道德成為太道德了，讓我們的人性成為太人性了，讓我們的內聖成為太內聖了。這一「太」就走向了「封閉」。

我們若只理解為「太道德」了，「太形而上」了，我們當該從此坎陷開出「知識」系統，開啟「形而下」，這便忽略了真切的歷史事實，而只將我們思想成的形而上的真實，誤認為它就果真是乾坤萬有之基，希望能由此乾坤萬有之基開啟一切。其實，這樣的說法只是某種詮釋下的哲學構造，並不是真正的歷史事實。在這樣的哲學構造系統下呼籲著到如何開啟形而下，儘管也給出一個真正進程，良知的自我坎陷以開出知性主體，由此知性主體而開啟對列之局，開啟新的外王學。這其實只是詮釋學意義下的哲學上的理論邏輯次序，它並不是歷史的發生次序，也不是實踐的學習次序（林安梧，1994）⁴⁸。

我在許多地方曾經論述到了這三種次序的異同，就我們東亞的現代化來說，不是原生地的現代化，而是被衍生出來的現代化。我們可能做的不是照原來原生地的現代化那般歷史的發生次序，重來一遍；因為這並不切實際。我們也不是經由哲學理論構造的釐清，就可以依循著在詮釋學意義下的理論邏輯次序，而去推導出實踐的學習次序。當然，同樣的，這也不切實際。還有值得注意的是，「內修—外行」、「內聖—外王」，彼此相互影響，兩端而一致，內在修為的內聖之學並不是永世不遷的，隨著世代的變遷，有著不同的外王結構、組織制度，以及生活場域，也就會有不同的內聖學。特別是在解開了帝制、父權、男權以後的世代，這是民主憲政、公民社會，在這樣的生活世界、歷史社會總體之下，所陶鑄出來的內聖之學也自然會有不同。

用王船山的話來說，「道器合一」，而且特別重視「無其器則無其道」，具體的、實存的、生活世界優先於形而上的普遍的、抽象的原理原則。船山又說當器未形著之前，形而上隱然未現之則，早已經是存在的。就本體論來說，「道」為優先，就發生學來說，「器」為優先。船山主張這兩面都值得重視，我以此為「本體的發生學」（*ontogenetic method*）方式來稱謂它（林安梧，1987）⁴⁹。「道」與「器」兩者，互藏以為宅，交發以為用，「形而上者謂之道，形而下者謂之器」，「道」是「器」的形而上之「家鄉」，而「器」是「道」具體落實的「安宅」（林安梧，2009，2012a，2012b）⁵⁰。

為何我在「本內聖以開新外王」之說以外，一定要說出個「外王—內聖」，為的是在船山學式的「本體發生學」的思考下，特別要強調新外王的學習過程裡，重新調節內聖，

⁴⁸ 關於此三種不同次序的釐清，最早在林安梧〈「當代新儒學」及其相關問題之理解與反省（上）〉，台北：鵝湖月刊，223期（1994/01），10-20。後來此文收入林安梧《儒學革命論：後新儒家的問題向度》，第一章，頁3-28，1998年，台北：台灣學生書局。

⁴⁹ 一方面肯定形器的首出性，並從而就此形器而溯源說道之存在這樣的方法，我們姑且名之為「存有發生學的方法」（*ontogenetic method*）請參見林安梧《王船山人性史哲學研究》第三章，頁69，1987，台北：東大圖書公司。現在我將此更譯為「本體發生學的方法」。

⁵⁰ 船山學的「兩端而一致」，處處可見，後來我將它運用於「中國人文詮釋學」的建構中，請參見林安梧《中國人文詮釋學》第四章〈語言：存有之道落實於人間世的居宅〉，第五章〈道（存有）：語言調適而上遂的本源〉，2009年學生書局出版。又請參見林安梧《王船山「經典詮釋學」衍申的一些思考—兼論「本體」與「方法」的辯證（上、下）》，2012年5、6月《鵝湖》，443-444期，頁22-28以及頁17-22。

主張內聖也當有新內聖。這是王船山所說的「無其器則無其道」的提法。當然內聖外王兩者「互藏以為宅，交發以為用」。其實，內聖與外王兩者是交與參贊為一體的，兩者是互為體用的。

玖、結語：學問傳承，綿綿若存，生生不息

中國文化傳統能否現代化，這本不應該是問題，做出來就是了。做出來就能，做不出來，不認真做，那就不可能。它不是本質上可以不可以，而是人的實踐上有否做得出來。再說，現代化只是人類的歷史發展的一個階段，它在不同地域、不同的傳統、不同的族群有就會有不同的可能表現。現代化不就等同於西方化，現代化不是單數，而是複數，它是多元的、差異的、各有區別的，因地域、人種、文化、傳統，而會有其不同。雖不同，而又可以匯通起來理解。

「內聖、外王」「內修、外行」，本為一體。中國政治傳統中，何以偏向「內聖」，特別是宋明儒學以來以內聖為重，這偏向「內聖」；並不完全忽略「外王」，更不是沒有外王學。當代新儒家在花果飄零下，尋求靈根自植，主張「本內聖」而開「新外王」有其苦心孤詣，也有其思維的基本限制。我們應該正視這個限制，並尋求轉進與創造的嶄新可能。

我們應該跨出主體性哲學的限制，歸返到豐富的生活世界中尋求一真存實感的啟動處，參贊處。屏棄方法論上的本質主義，而代之以方法論上的約定主義。「天命之謂性」的道德不能只是先驗的，須知：命日降、性日生日成，未成可成，已成可革；道德是發展的，是變動的，是人文化成的。

我記起從一九九四年二月，我提出「後新儒學論綱」以來，後來又提出了「外王—內聖」的說法，引發了許多師友同道的討論。甚至，也引來了「背叛師門」的謠言，「路遙知馬力，日久見人心」，我秉持著學術的良知，「吾愛吾師，吾更愛真理」，「當仁，不讓於師」，我只是繼續我的馬力，努力地往前邁進。我這篇文章，可以用來回應這些年來對我殷殷督促的師友同道。

在哲學系統上，我建構了「存有三態論」（林安梧，1993；程志華，2011；張旭愷，2012）⁵¹；基於儒道佛三教，我進一步開發其意義治療學的思維。在政治哲學裡，我對「道的錯置」提出了批判，進而指出應該由「血緣性縱貫軸」轉折邁進到「人際性互動

⁵¹ 「存有三態論」是從熊十力的《新唯識論》所隱含的「體用論」所轉化出來的，首發於林安梧《存有、意識與實踐：熊十力體用論之詮釋與重建》第五章〈存有的根源的開顯〉，第二節「論存有的三態」，後來我繼續擴大這思考，廣泛的寫了不少文章。河北大學程志華教授於《哲學動態》2011年第6期發表《由「一心開二門」到「存有三態論」：儒學之一個新的發展向度》，討論了林安梧所提出的「存有三態論」。另外，河北大學哲學系張旭愷，於2012年6月，提出其碩士論文《林安梧存有三態論思想之研究》（程志華教授指導）。「存有三態論」可以說是繼續著牟宗三先生「兩層存有論」之後的理論新發展。

軸」，如此才可能解開帝制、重建儒學（楊生照，2006a，2006b，2006c）⁵²。在方法論上我主張要揚棄本質主義（或唯實論），代之以「約定主義（或者唯名論）。在中國人文詮釋學上，我提出了「道、意、象、構、言」的五階結構。主張經典的詮釋不離生活世界，不離心性體認、不離天地人我萬物所歸趨的道，道是存在本源。再者，我發現在中國哲學傳統裡，我們主張的存在的連續觀，這不同於西方哲學是已存在的斷裂觀為主導，「存在與價值的和合性」優先於「思維與存在的一致性」的原理。

四十年餘來的努力，我的發展以及所做成的哲學，與我的老師牟宗三先生有許多差異。當代新儒學是立基於陽明學的，顯然地，我是立基於船山學的。陽明、船山雖有不同，但都歸本於孔子。回眸凝視書房牆上牟先生照相，「宗師仲尼誠通天地，三教判列道貫古今」的對聯，不免俯首長嘆：感恩先生的教導，感恩老師讓我有充分的思維天地，我可以在哲學天地間起舞弄劍，從先生所教給我的招式，在努力研習中有了些轉化、有了些發展。當然，要創造性的轉化與創新性的發展，那還得更努力。學問傳承，綿綿若存，生生不息。

— 癸卯之夏（2023）陽曆 6 月 26 日 完稿於台中元亨書院

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⁵² 請參見楊生照〈從「血緣性縱貫軸」到「道的錯置」(上、中、下): 林安梧「後新儒學」的切入點〉, 台北: 鵝湖月刊 370、371、372 期 (2006 年 4、5、6 月)。此文後來修訂刊登於《後新儒家與現代之後: 林安梧教授回甲誌慶學術論文集》, 頁 1-36, 2017 年, 廖崇斐主編, 台北: 台灣學生書局、元亨書院聯合發行。

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A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of “Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood”

An-Wu Lin*

Abstract

This paper aims to address the contentious issue of "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness" over the past three decades and the transition from "Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" to "Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" in practical philosophy, through the process of life's practical learning. It begins with two couplets and a short essay, initiating reflections on the history of contemporary Chinese thought, indicating that the "Post-May Fourth Era" has arrived. We should transcend the predicament of "methodological essentialism" and replace it with "methodological conventionalism." Acknowledging the similarities and differences in causality between "natural science" and "humanities," we must recognize that modernization is developing in plural forms and diversely. It is high time we abandoned radical anti-traditionalism and acknowledged the importance of "human rights grounded in ethics, self-aware freedom, and people-oriented democracy." Certainly, we must untangle the fundamental knot of China's political tradition—the "Misplacement of the Dao," allowing "the ruler, the father, and the sage" to appropriately take their places and thereby establish the four communities implied by "Heaven, Earth, Ruler, and Teacher." Furthermore, tracing back to the original structure of "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness," and discussing its transformation and changes. Finally, it responds to the significance of "from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood," which is akin to what Wang Fuzhi said, "Without its vessel, there is no its Way." Of course, the unity of Way and vessel, the consistency of both ends, and the ontogenetic way of thinking are worthy of attention. Entering the 21st century's modernization, after Neo-Confucianism, we should transcend the limitations of subjective philosophy, return to the rich lifeworld, truly exist and feel, initiate participation and contribution, and contribute to the dialogue of human civilization.

Keywords: Confucianism, Essentialism, Conventionalism, Misplacement of the Dao, Ontogenetic, Community, Consistency of Both Ends

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I. The Origin of the Problem: Starting from Two Couplets

My teacher, Mr. Mou Zongsan, passed away in 1995, so it has been twenty-eight years this year. In the past 28 years, Mr. Mou Zongsan has had the most significant influence on me, and the one I talk to the most is still Mr. Mou Zongsan. Some people say that Mr. Mou has passed away. How can he talk to you? That is a way of "interacting with the ancients at a spiritual level"! From the perspective of this kind of conversation, it is not only Mr. Mou who has the most conversations with Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Sakyamuni, Socrates, Jesus Christ, and even many sages and philosophers throughout the ages. Of course, Mr. Mou Zongsan is most affectionate to me and has personally taught me. From his lifetime to his death, the person who still influences my academic life the most is Mr. Mou Zongsan. There is no doubt about this.

I am not a quiet and well-behaved student. I am a student who likes to ask questions. I also want my students to ask questions and even like them to argue with me. I believe that debate helps clarify ideas and principles. I've always been like this since I started studying, but it's not that I don't want to keep it in mind but I know that all thoughts will go out of shape, so it's not the words that need to be kept in mind, but what's behind the words, on top of the words, and between the words. There is something external, more than words, and priority over the "existence" of words itself. Lao Tzu said it well, "Dao that can be described is not universal and eternal Dao." The source of the creation of the universe can be expressed, but once it is expressed, it is no longer the original Dao. In the West, there is a saying, "I love my teacher, and I love the truth even more." In the East, there is also a teaching that "in the face of benevolence, there is no need to be humble to the teacher." When students carry forward the teacher's teachings, there will inevitably be changes, transitions, criticism, and the possibility of creation. This is all natural. For me, asking for help from many teachers is not just an ancient rule but also a matter of course. It is said, "There is no sage who has stopped learning, and there is no specific teacher for the sage." Even the sages must study so seriously and learn from multiple teachers. What's more, we can't even reach the level of the sage. We must study hard, and not just from a single teacher.

These remarks are actually to clarify that many of my current ideas are very different from those of my teacher, Mr. Mou Zongsan, but this does not prevent me from respecting my teacher. There is a portrait of my teacher on the wall at home, with a couplet of words nested with Mr. Mou Zongsan's name " Inherited from Confucius, his sincerity reaches heaven and earth. His comments of the three religions can be traced back to ancient times and the

present."

The rhetorical technique of this couplet is not very neat. It is mainly used to express its meaning. If it were to be tidy, I would be afraid of harming the meaning of words. That's not a good deal. This couplet is one of the couplets I wrote when Mr. Mou passed away. This pair was written for Fo Guang University Nanhua School of Management (Nanhua University). Another couplet, written in my capacity, goes like this:

"The Master came here wandering with the character of the Wei and Jin Dynasties to make comments. Ordinary people were shocked, flattered, and humiliated when they heard about it.

My master has been away for a long time. The principles of Song and Ming Dynasties can pass the test of time. How can true Confucians fear yin and yang?"
(Lin, 2003b)

Obviously, the former couplet is about "culture, thought, and academics" in the public domain, and the latter couplet is about "learning from teachers and lifestyle." In comparison, more have written about my own experience. Let's start with these two couplets!

Mr. Mou Zongsan is indeed "inherited from Confucius" and is the cultural inheritor and founder of Confucianism (Confucianism). The foundation of the knowledge he inherits is "sincerity," and this "sincerity" is universal. Mr. Mou still adheres to the old Chinese tradition of "heaven, earth and man", but he emphasizes the subjectivity of "human beings" and elevates the subjectivity of morality to the highest priority. This is mainly a tradition inherited from Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming's theory of mind. However, he was also influenced by Western Enlightenment thought in modern times and emphasized the rational component of subjectivity more. Of course, it focused more on moral rationality. After a comprehensive digestion of Kantian studies, he combined the tradition of Western philosophy with the wisdom essence of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism in Chinese philosophy, and achieved his own philosophical thought. (Transcendental Distinction between Appearances and Things-in-themselves) and (A Treatise on the Perfect Good) can be said to be the pinnacle of his knowledge (Jin, 2020). He taught the practical understanding of "sincerity to connect the world" into a whole set of expertise. He was the most philosophical and modern philosopher comparable to Western philosophy.

In "Identification and Classification of the Three Religions," Mr. Mou is not only a scholar of Confucianism but also profoundly familiar with Daoism and Buddhism, and his depth and height may be higher than many so-called Daoist and Buddhist scholars. Because of this, he

launched the magnificent activity of "discriminating religions" (distinguishing religions and teachings). Mr. Mou's classification of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism is still based on Confucianism, which is inevitable. However, he has already surpassed the "Buddha and Lao" method of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. The Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties often made extreme remarks against Buddha and Elders. It is not that there are not many who understand Buddha and Elders deeply, are calm-minded, and are willing to listen well, but there are not many. From the scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties to Wang Chuanshan, it was already a big step, and from Wang Chuanshan to Xiong Shili was another big step. From Xiong Shili to Mou Zongsan, there is another big step forward. This significant step is more advanced and objective and can be expressed systematically and comprehensively using modern philosophical methods. Construct and unfold its identification and classification.

Of course, this knowledge must require "the Dao reaches through the past and present." Wisdom cannot be limited to oneself. It cannot be limited to the local area but must lead from the local area to the whole world. It's not globalization but glocalization. Over the years, I have heard people say that the truth taught by Confucianism is not universal enough, and some people have asked me what I think. I said that what we say is meant to be universal, but what people say has limitations. It is best to face our limitations well, and we must believe that our Eastern Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism are moving toward universal truth. What the three teachings of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism say is universal and can pervade heaven, earth, people, me, and all living things (Chen, 2005). However, once it is turned into words, it has its limitations. Because of this, the classics of these three religions have never claimed that "I am the truth, the way, and the life" (Lin, 2020). "The conclusion of discourse" is limited. Only by transcending the conclusion of discourse, returning to existence itself, and letting existence reveal itself can communication and connection be possible.

II. Let's Start with "Welcoming the Advent of the 'Post Mou Zongsan Era'"

"The Complete Works of Mou Zongsan" has thirty-three volumes and was published on May fourth, 2003. It was published eight years after Mr. Mou's death. I think it is significant to choose May fourth specifically. Mr. Mou was the son of the May Fourth Movement, but he opposed it. There are several levels of opposition: opposition, reflection, and return. These three levels are present. The era when Mr. Mou grew up and studied at Peking University (1929-1933) was already after the May Fourth Movement, but China has been affected by this Movement from 1919 until now. In my way of distinguishing, there are three stages: May Fourth, May Fourth-After, and Post-May Fourth. Mr. Mou should belong to the group from "May Fourth" to

"May Fourth-After," while we are from "May Fourth-After" to "Post-May Fourth." Mr. Mou disagreed with the thorough anti-traditionalism of the May Fourth Movement, but undoubtedly, his knowledge was mainly in response to the May Fourth Movement. He opposed the thorough anti-traditionalism of the May Fourth Movement but was more or less attacked by this thorough anti-traditionalism. Moreover, we must oppose, reflect, criticize, and propose new ways of transformation and create new creations from this transformation (Lin, 2020)

The first two generations of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism all think within this main context. This was true for Liang Shuming, Ma Yifu, and Xiong Shili of the first generation, as well as for Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan of the second generation. The first generation has more traditional ingredients, while the second generation has more modern ingredients. Xiong Shili and Ma Yifu's discussion methods were relatively traditional in the first generation. They had some reflections on Western academics, but they were still dominated by tradition. Liang Shuming was more based on his own life world and general thinking leading to the world's civilization. He was mainly a practical and practical thinker. His understanding of democracy and science is incomplete, but he has not entirely accepted them. The second generation of Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan are called Hong Kong and Taiwan New Confucians because they moved to Hong Kong and Taiwan after the 1949 Movement.

Generally speaking, Tang, Mou, and Xu basically fully affirmed democracy, science, and this modern approach. Their main issue is to respond to "totalistic anti-traditionalism" (Lin, 1979), but they have one thing in common with the hostile camp. They basically accept modern democracy and science. They all believed that the West was an advanced and progressive civilization and that the Chinese should study hard and catch up. The difference is that thorough anti-traditionalists believe that to fully westernize and welcome Mr. De (democracy) and Mr. Sai (science), tradition must be washed away and ultimately eliminated. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, later known as neo-conservatives, cultural conservatism, and neo-traditionalism, believes that traditional Chinese culture does not hinder modernization but only requires some transformation, and through transformation, it can be accepted modernization, then connected to modernization.

The so-called "returning to the roots and creating new things" refers to returning to the essence of tradition and seeking to transform this essence so that it can integrate with modernization. They believe that the tradition places too much emphasis on the inner sagehood and neglects the outer kingliness, so they want to "create new outer kingliness based on the inner sagehood" (Li, 2003; Lin, 2004). There is no problem with the inner sagehood studies, but the outer kingliness studies cannot catch up. The inner sagehood mainly emphasizes the

conscience and the original heart. Because it emphasizes the original heart and conscience, it ignores the development of the outer kingliness. The development of the new outer kingliness is centered on knowledge. The inner sagehood is centered on the original heart and conscience, while the new outer kingliness is centered on the knowledge system. The biggest issue is transferring the knowledge system from the original heart and conscience. They put a lot of effort into it and finally said with certainty that it could be prescribed. As long as the "intellectual subject" is developed through the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," it can be integrated with Western modernization, and the Chinese can take into modernization.

The transformation and development of New Confucianism in Hong Kong and Taiwan is mainly aimed at such issues. They advocate that the old inner sagehood should be used to create a new outer king based on the old inner sagehood. To use a systematic academic vocabulary, from the Self-Entrapment of Conscience, the intellectual subject emerges, and from this intellectual subject comes democratic science, which is the content of modernization. They believe that the content of modernization is universal, that advanced Western countries are ahead, and that we must catch up. They fully accept modernization and occasionally criticize it, but it is still a modern way of thinking. The two camps, the neo-traditionalist and the thoroughly anti-traditionalist seem to be hostile, but they both fully affirm the primary content of Western modernization. The difference is that in traditional Chinese culture, one believes it should be preserved and returned to its roots to create a new one, a creation that can be transformed; one thinks it should be completely abandoned. Only by abandoning can we genuinely welcome Mr. De and Mr. Sai.

However, they both adopted methodological essentialism. One said that Chinese cultural tradition does not essentially hinder modernization, and the other said that Chinese cultural tradition essentially ultimately hinders modernization. Note: It is easy to fall into one-sidedness when thinking based on essentialist methodology. Compared with the two, the one-sidedness of thorough anti-traditionalism is even more severe because they have more incredible momentum. It should be noted that the greater the momentum, the more one-sided, even arbitrary, autocratic, and even totalitarian. As a neo-traditionalist, the most valuable thing about Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is that it puts forward another opposing proposition to such thorough anti-traditionalism. However, methodologically, the two are opposite ends of the same spectrum. To make an analogy, just like "A" and "not A" in mathematics, taking their absolute values, they are both "A".

III. Participate in and Solve the Dilemma of "Methodological Essentialism"

Since the early 1990s, I have repeatedly called for us to resolve the dilemma of methodological essentialism. My appeal does not mean that I have ignored the recognition of the essence of things. Still, it emphasizes that we cannot indulge in a biased, dogmatic, and authoritarian tendency. It should be noted that when we talk about this world, we must speak through language, words, and images, but this is just a positioning system, not the existence itself. Therefore, anything you say must be reviewed by the existence itself. This review is not fixed. It is in the process of constant review and tends to be appropriate. This methodology differs from essentialism and can be called "methodological conventionalism" (Lin, 1996/2016). Our positioning is not constant but is agreed upon. To unfold the narrative and positioning of existence, such an agreement must be constantly reviewed. During the review, we can get closer to the facts and obtain the positioning based on everyone's consensus, but the consensus must be continuously reviewed repeatedly. There is no "final word," and that's it. Even if a final decision is made when necessary, it is only a contingency method and cannot be taken seriously. It may be confirmed at a particular stage, but not like that at another stage.

Life is growing, changing, and flowing. In the changing and flowing, we use language to describe the position. This is to facilitate our narrative and discussion. In the process of narration and discussion, we can have a deeper understanding and a more appropriate interpretation, and therefore, we can find a more suitable practical solution. Because of this, our knowledge must return to existence itself at all times, and the so-called return is a continuous interactive process. In the interactive process, it is just a more appropriate approach. This means that we must always reflect on the past, look forward to the future, and make a more profound return to the basis of existence at any time. This kind of activity must be carried out from generation to generation. "New every day, new every day, and new again every day" is very close to what I said. When we talk about the "Book of Changes," we say, "The Book of Changes has three types of changes: simplicity, changeability, and non-changeability." This truth is explained very thoroughly (Lin, 1991). The way of thinking of "methodological essentialism" has fallen into a severe dilemma, resulting in extreme autocracy and serious totalitarianism caused by the concentration of power.

Karl Popper (1945/2020) pointed out these in his discussion, saying they are all enemies of an open society. He severely criticized the principle of verification (the principle of verification, or translated as "justification principle") of logical positivism. In his deep thinking on the philosophy of science, he proposed the "principle of falsification" (the principle of falsification or translated as "the principle of negative proof") to replace the original verification principle (Lin, 2007). This principle of verification is related to methodological essentialism,

while the principle of falsification is related to methodological conventionalism. We can say that methodological essentialists tend to fall into closed thinking, while methodological conventionalists adopt open thinking (Lin, 1997). Of course, you will also wander around because you are too open. It is more comprehensive if both ends are taken care of.

In fact, the word "essence" is inevitable in academic discussions, but it cannot be advocated as immutable or eternal. That would not work. The name is just an agreement, but this name points to the reality. Although this reality cannot be recognized now, we must constantly affirm it. Of course, this affirmation is still affirmation in the sense of agreement. It is not just the only one that is judged. The Chinese have emphasized the need to "seek truth from facts" since ancient times, and this is precisely what they say. There are facts, but people are only what they want, not what they are. Because of this, with open thinking, you must constantly review, renew, and strive for excellence every day. This kind of "question the right" and "affirm the questioned" continually checks and does not fall into the self-predicament of "I am, and the other is not," what is what it is and what is not what it is (Qian, 2017). Because you know clearly that the "yes" you are "seeking" is not the "yes" of the fact, so you have to check this "yes constantly" and finally get closer to the "fact" reality.

Once we have thought this issue through clearly, we can reflect and criticize the methodological slogan of "bold assumptions, careful verification" put forward by Hu Shizhi (Lin, 1991). If you think about it carefully, there are severe flaws in this methodology slogan. His essential thinking cannot lead to the verification principle of logical positivism, which is closed thinking. Compared with this slogan, if you use "careful assumptions and bold falsifications", then another contrast will be formed. Such a contrast will help you break through the original closedness. Let me use my experience to make the comparison between the two ends clearer. When I was about six or seven, I lived in the countryside and bought a "radio." At that time, the radio was not a transistor radio but a vacuum tube radio. The conditions in the countryside are poor, so buying a radio is a big deal. People in the whole village see this radio as a rare thing. It can be said that they look up to it like a sacred object, and the adults don't let their children touch it. My father gave me repeated orders not to touch it. If I did, I would be severely punished.

Interestingly, the more you forbid it, the more naughty the child becomes and wants to move. If you're going to move, you will watch how the adults turn on the power, remember it, and prepare to act when the time is right. I picked one to touch when my parents were away. First, I turned the first button, which was the power button. When the power was turned on, it was strange that there was no sound. I was so anxious that I twisted another button, which drove

the pointer, which was the pointer for channel selection. After twisting and twisting, the pointer reached the 5 or 6 position, and the sound sounded. So I made a "bold assumption" that the way to turn on the radio is to turn on the power and then twist another twist, which is the twist to select the station. When you twist it to 5 or 6, the sound will sound. This is the Perfect startup method. In this way, after I made a "bold hypothesis", I really "carefully verified". I verified it carefully, and it was successful every time I turned it on. And because of such success, I do not doubt that it behaves like this when turned on.

After about a year or two, I secretly turned on the radio in this way, and it worked every time without fail. Until one time, I was secretly turning on the power of the radio and heard my father's shouting from the distance. My father's majesty always frightened me. Rush over. It turns out that a group of chickens and ducks ran into the paddy field where the seedlings had just been sown. They would trample the seedlings and damage them. Someone had to rush to catch these chickens and ducks. He called me to chase the chickens and ducks, and it was urgent. After a while, the chickens and ducks went back to the circle, and I rushed back to the living room to complete the unfinished operation of turning on the radio. When I came back, I saw the radio and it was already ringing. I was stunned and shocked by the scene. It turns out that in the past, I carefully turned on the computer, turned on the power, and twisted the turntable pointer to between 5 and 6. However, there was something wrong with such a perfect action. In fact, I just need to turn on the power and wait for a while. Later I found out that the vacuum tube needs to be heated so that it can conduct conduction and make sound. The story I am telling is exactly the possible serious error of the methodology slogan "Bold assumptions, careful verification". From the misuse of this methodology, if we take a closer look, we can understand the achievements of the Taiwanese historiography since Hu Shizhi (Yang, 1994).

Relatively speaking, if I am making a "cautious assumption," I would like to say: The way to turn on this radio may be like this: turn on the power, twist the turntable pointer to between 5 and 6, but this is only a temporary assumption, it has It may not be the case, I can give it a try, and be brave enough to think that it may not be the case. Not only do I think boldly, but I also try boldly and do not follow the original assumptions. Ha! Maybe I found another way to boot, and finally, I checked with many parties and found it. It turns out that all you need to do is turn on the power. This process is "carefully assuming and boldly seeking falsification." "Bold assumptions, careful verification," driven by methodological essentialism, will lead to closure. In comparison, "careful assumptions and bold falsifications" are driven by methodological conventionalism, which encourages us to consider more possibilities. Only then can we find a more suitable way. Seeking truth from facts is

IV "The Causality of Natural Sciences" and "The Causality of Humanities Knowledge"

Seeking truth from facts in natural science differs from seeking truth from facts in humanities knowledge. The former can eliminate human and situational factors and can be verified repeatedly. In the latter, human and situational factors, and even other factors involving people, time, and space, will intervene, and such intervention and development cannot be verified repeatedly. To make a simple distinction, the former does not involve the human subject, while the latter involves the human subject. The former can exclude time and space factors, but the latter cannot exclude time and space factors. The former can be verified repeatedly, while the latter cannot. In this way, two kinds of causality emerge. The former is tentatively called "the causality of natural science"; the latter is tentatively called "the causality of humanities knowledge" (Lin, 2009). The former, the causality of natural science, is an extended causality, which can be called "scientific verification." Scientific verification includes empirical verification and theoretical demonstration. The causality of human sciences is the causality of content, and its verification cannot be repeated. The so-called "time will never come again" means that it is not synchronic, it is diachronic, and it is not called verification, he could only call for evidence. This evidence is used for a "humanistic interpretation" rather than a "scientific explanation."

Humanistic interpretation unfolds diachronically. Since it cannot be repeatedly verified like natural science, people are still accustomed to a causal grasp. We will say, "Look at the present in the future, and look at the past in the present." What you receive now comes from what you did before; what you do now will result in what you will receive later. This logic of "doing-receiving" is very important. When we talk about humanistic interpretation and historical development, we cannot do without this logic of "making and receiving." Regarding the logic of "doing-receiving," how can you carry out such an action? Because the present is viewed in the future, and the past is viewed now. What was caused in the past will be the result now. This kind of "doing and receiving" has made me wary and used as a reference. I have learned lessons from this and summarized some understandings and interpretations. Therefore, under the logic of "doing-feeling", I considered and decided how I might reach the established "end" under the future "action-feeling". From this "end," I started my present life—the proper "starting point" direction. Generally speaking, we hope that if we do well now, we will have better outcomes in the future; if we do not do well now, or if we do not do it well or in the

wrong direction, we will not have good outcomes. Furthermore, the knowledge of the humanities and the knowledge of the natural sciences are not entirely separate. The humanities knowledge must involve the natural sciences, but it involves the natural sciences in a humanistic way.

Because natural science must be placed in the practical process of the humanities to develop, it will have a vast humanistic impact. For example, how to develop nuclear electric energy is a natural science, but whether to develop nuclear electric energy or not is humanistic knowledge. With nuclear power, how to operate and manage it is also humanities knowledge. To develop nuclear power, are there any particularly cultural factors that will make it develop faster, slower, or even oppose its development? This is, of course, also a matter of humanities. To put it simply, the knowledge of the humanities involves life-like things, living and inevitable, while the natural sciences, to put it simply, try to keep these references away or use non-life, qualitative, or quantitative methods to deal with them.

After these issues have been adequately clarified, we can further think about the development trajectory of this period of modern history for more than a century, from the late Qing Dynasty to the early Republic of China and even now. Particularly, we often hear the topic of Chinese traditional culture and modernization: Does Chinese traditional culture hinder modernization? If it is a hindrance, what should we do? If not, how can we explain why we lag behind Western modernization? Is it the inevitable result of our entire culture that Chinese culture has not developed Western modern thinking? Is it essentially impossible to develop? Or is it just caused by certain historical factors? If these historical factors are eliminated, development can be achieved. So, how do we rule it out? Is it a gradual evolution? Or is a complete revolution needed? Since the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, these issues have been brought to the table for discussion, controversy, debate, and even violent fights in political practice, regardless of the lives of the people in the world and the bloodshed. After over a hundred years of stumbling and ups and downs, we have finally entered the 21st century. Although the current situation is still bizarre, the clouds are gradually opening, and we have the opportunity to reflect on this large period of history again. This involves several keywords: Chinese culture, inner sagehood, modernization, outer kingliness, original heart, conscience, knowledge, and rationality.

Obviously, the causality of natural science is very different from the causality of humanistic knowledge. The most significant difference is that humanistic knowledge must involve the issue of human "free will," which is not found in natural science (Lin, 2009). Many parameters cannot be calculated quantitatively when it comes to free will. Just because

humanistic knowledge cannot "take qualitative or quantitative methods to deal with," like the natural sciences, although it is still possible to "take qualitative or quantitative methods to deal with" at some levels, it cannot be implemented this way at all levels. Once this question is clarified, we can see that scientific thinking mistakenly believes that everything can be reduced to quantity and that everything can be handled scientifically. This is impossible. Science Mr. Sai (science), in the end, it is impossible to "win" against "people." "People" must "win" against science. After all, "people" are the real masters. Mr. De (democracy), in the final analysis, cannot just be elections and removals, and it cannot just be checks and balances too (Montesquieu, 1748/1998). Because if there is no "virtue" as the prerequisite, the restriction and balance will still be just a struggle for power in the end. It seems that Mr. De (democracy) still wants to prioritize "Virtue." It turns out that politics is about Virtue. Confucius said, "For government, use Virtue, like the North Star, which resides in its place and is surrounded by stars." "Use management to guide the people, use punishment to demand the people, and the people want to escape punishment without shame; use Virtue to Guide the people and demand them with etiquette. The people have a sense of shame and character" (Lin, 2017). "Shangshu" says, "Virtue, utilization, welfare, and harmony," putting Virtue in the most critical position is still a time-honored truth.

V. How to Practice "Human Rights with Ethics, Freedom with Conscious, and Democracy with People-Oriented "

Once these principles are explained clearly, we can see that the "thorough anti-traditionalists" since the founding of the Republic of China, as well as the "cultural conservatives" and "neo-traditionalists" who are their opposites, have made severe mistakes in those areas. There has been controversy over whether Chinese culture hinders modernization, which is entirely meaningless. However, the fact that this topic is still causing ripples in the humanities and social sciences shows that the ghost of wrong methodological essentialist thinking is still hovering and wandering in the sky. To be honest, from the history of Chinese development over a hundred years, we can see that it is meaningless to ask whether Chinese traditional culture hinders modernization. Fortunately, not everyone is caught up in this controversy; even when these debates seem to be extremely lively, a group of people have been silently carrying out projects to save the entire nation. They have lofty ambitions, and He has a broad mind, a long-term vision, and a meticulous approach and has been working hard. They aim to save the country through industry, building schools, educating children, awakening

people's wisdom, and revitalizing people's morality. They seek to plant their spiritual roots under the scattered flowers and fruits. Seeking truth from facts has always been a critical tradition of the Chinese nation. I often say that the three words "filial piety, brotherhood, and kindness" are the secret to the eternal life of the Chinese nation (Lin, 2021).

In this way, it is too easy to mistakenly believe that politics is just the restriction and balance of power and that politics can be protected from autocratic totalitarianism through system design. Especially now that we are almost a quarter of a century into the 21st century, we have discovered that the original design of democratic politics, catalyzed by capitalism, has become a system with high energy consumption and low output value. Rich people get richer, and powerful people become more powerful. Superficial things such as power and status have become the mainstream of culture. With the development of the Internet, this tendency has made the world noisy and noisy with no peace, the culture is low and humanity is decadent, it can be said that it has reached an unbelievable level. When everything can be commercialized, and through the promotion of consumption and the exaggeration of desire, desire is commodified, and commodities and desires form an indestructible knot. In this way, people are in the commodity tide of desire, self-chasing, self-lost, self-exile, never to return, unable to stop!

The traditional Chinese "human ethics" are different from the modern Western "human rights." In the past, our human ethics talked about filial piety and brotherhood, and the filial piety and brotherhood for more than two thousand years were deeply wrapped up in "monarchy, patriarchal oppression, and male-centered." we mistakenly believe that "human ethics" is authoritarian, oppressive, male-centered, patriarchal, and monarchical. We mistakenly believe that as long as we attack and overthrow human ethics, human rights can be ushered in. Think about how many so-called enlightenment and national salvation intellectuals since the founding of the Republic of China mistakenly believe that "filial piety" means "patriarchy" and autocracy. They think that by overthrowing filial piety, they can be liberated from patriarchy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. This idea is really ridiculous. Overthrowing the filial piety ethics emphasized by Confucianism, the result is still autocracy and more authoritarian; totalitarianism is still totalitarian and more totalitarian. After a lot of hard work, I finally have hope today. The world is not like this. It turns out that with "human ethics," "human rights" will not be allowed to go too far, and only then can human rights finally have a refuge and consideration. It turns out that human rights without the ethics of filial piety will be reduced to just a struggle for rights (Zeng, 1990).

Similarly, for example, Isaiah Berlin emphasized the difference between "negative freedom" and "positive freedom." He noted that "negative freedom" is essential and

indispensable in establishing a political and social community. Indispensable, such freedom cannot be omitted (Berlin, 1969; Xu, 2012). Relatively speaking, "positive freedom" is politically dangerous because it induces rulers to weaken people's negative freedom "for their benefit." These arguments have led researchers to misunderstand that freedom in the Chinese cultural tradition of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism is "positive freedom," which will limit the "negative freedom" of a person's participation in the political and social community and is even used by dictators. Of course, it is not trivial for autocrats and totalitarians to use their thoughts and manipulate their thoughts, but indeed, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism emphasize human cultivation and self-consciousness. This self-consciousness can be understood as the so-called positive freedom? And will such positive freedom lead to exploitation by rulers? There is no doubt about this. Besides, if you read clearly what Mencius said: "Benevolence alone is not enough to govern a country, and governance alone cannot implement benevolent government." Knowing the "ritual, music, punishment, and management" emphasized by Confucianism, it is probably certain that freedom with self-consciousness should be better than freedom without self-consciousness and is also more important. As for whether the emphasis on positive freedom will be exploited by those in power and even "negative freedom" will be ignored, that is another question. In other words, you don't have to eliminate what Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism call "self-conscious," which you think of as positive freedom, to realize what you think of as negative freedom honestly.

"Freedom" must be pursued, but without self-consciousness, the freedom pursued maybe just a form of power struggle, and it cannot grow stably and truthfully.

Of course, "people-oriented" is not different from "democracy." This is obvious. Confucian political thought in Chinese civilization, such as Mencius, can be said to have taken people-oriented thought to the extreme, but after all, it is not democracy. However, if Mencius applied people-oriented ideas to democratic politics in this era, perhaps such a democracy would be a healthier democracy (Chen, 2004). Obviously, in the past, the autocratic regime could use people-oriented thinking, and it could also rely on people-oriented thinking to save the people from disaster and enable the people to live and work in peace and contentment; similarly, the current democratic government can also use people-oriented thinking. Of course, we can also rely on people-oriented thinking to allow ordinary people to truly take charge of their affairs and ensure peace and prosperity for the country and the people. Of course, in the era of democratic constitutionalism, it is more challenging to use people-oriented thinking than in the era of autocracy. Still, it is much more convenient to use people-oriented thinking actively. It can also be seen that the "people-oriented" initially emphasized by Confucianism in the

democratic era was "the Yangtze River emerges from the Three Gorges." From then on, the river surface can be vast, and ships can sail safely. Of course, because of the slow and leisurely pace, there may also be problems with siltation. People-oriented is a political attitude, and democracy is a system. It will be better to have a people-oriented attitude and a democratic system. If there is no people-oriented approach and only democracy is emphasized, it will likely fall into the realm of populism. Mistakenly believe that Confucian people-oriented is closely integrated with authoritarian government. Therefore, if people-oriented thinking is disintegrated, the authoritarian government can also be disintegrated. This idea is highly absurd.

Now, in the 21st century, we can declare with certainty that we must not abandon human ethics when talking about human rights, we must not abandon self-consciousness when talking about freedom, and we must not abandon people-oriented talking about democracy. Instead, we must work hard to practice "human rights with human ethics and have freedom of self-consciousness, people-oriented democracy" (Lin, 2018).

VI. Solve the "Misplacement of Dao": Let the Three "Kings, Fathers and Sages" Return to Their Proper Places

These concepts were clarified and gradually clarified over time with the changes of generations. At this time, we may need to review that in the 1970s, Mr. Yu Yingshi proposed "Anti-Intellectualism and Chinese Political Tradition" (Yu, 1976), which was very popular for a while. However, at that time, Mr. Hu Qiuyuan raised doubts. In the article "Comment on Academician Yu Yingshi's "Anti-intellectualism and Chinese Political Tradition," it was pointed out that Mr. Yu's "anti-intellectualism" was due to a misunderstanding of English and was garbled. After this article was published, Mr. Yu did not respond. I was a newborn calf who was not afraid of tigers. As a fourth-year college student, I wrote an article on "The Tangle of Intellect, Super-Intellect and Anti-Intellect in Chinese Political Tradition" for Mr. Dai Lianzhang's "History of Chinese Philosophy" final report. The article was first published in "Wenfeng" of the National Taiwan Normal University and later revised and published in "Legein Monthly" (Lin, 1979). Later, I also listened to Mr. Gao Yougong's words, saying that Mr. Yu liked the criticism of his thoughts by younger generations and sent it to him, but received no response from Mr. Yu. I have re-read Mr. Hu Qiuyuan's article and am rethinking my arguments. I still want to say that Mr. Yu Yingshi should be able to respond. Of course, Mr. Yu has passed away and cannot respond. However, the development of history has given a response. Mr. Hu Qiuyuan's article is reasonable.

I thought about it again and found that Mr. Yu's discussion on "Anti-Intellectualism and Chinese Political Tradition" greatly inspired me. However, as someone who likes philosophical thinking, I thought Mr. Yu's discussion was too brief. And to say "anti-intellectualism", this does not mean Confucianism is anti-intellectualism, Daoism is anti-intellectualism, Legalism is anti-intellectualism, or Confucianism is legalistic. After that, it was pitch black, it's all "anti-intellectualism" that dominates. Of course, it is difficult to demonstrate that Daoism is understood as "anti-intellectualism." Daoism is basically "super wisdom". He emphasizes transcending reason and returning to existence itself. Because Daoism emphasizes "super-intelligence", it may lead to anti-intellectualism. Although Confucianism advocates wisdom, it still has a super-intellectual side, and because of this, it is possible to be anti-intellectual. Of course, the most important thing is the transition from the "patriarchal feudalism" of the Zhou Dynasty to the "monarchy" of the Qin and Han Dynasties. This is a historical leap forward, but it has also fallen into an abyss that is difficult to escape.

Anti-intellectualism is an aspect of traditional Chinese politics, but it is not its essence. After the Qin and Han emperors, the Confucian ideal of "sage as king" became the reality of "king as sage." Confucianism initially advocated the principle of "the sage as king." An individual with virtue, wisdom, and ability should become the ruler of the political and social community, akin to Plato's philosophy king. However, the historical result was precisely the opposite. Once they reach the peak of power, as the political and social community's supreme ruler, those in authority would declare themselves virtuous, wise, and capable sages. The "holy king" whose "sages are kings" has now become alienated, distorted, and reversed, and has become a "king is sage" like "I am the king, I am the sage." This I call "misplaced Dao". I think this is the biggest obstacle in China's political tradition, and I have written two books about it. One is "The Misplacement of Dao: The Fundamental Knot of Chinese Political Tradition," and the other is "The Longitudinal Axis of Bloodline: Unraveling the Imperial System and Reconstructing Confucianism" (Lin, 2003, 2016).

Only by solving the "misplacement of Dao" can we truly break out of the dilemma of two thousand years of autocracy. Through the analysis and explanation of the system's overall structure, I pointed out that the three core concepts of "king, father, and sage" must be deeply understood and interpreted. In the two-thousand-year tradition of monarchy, "king" is the highest level of the political and social community, "father" is the highest level of the family and human ethics community, and "sage" is the highest level of the cultural and educational community. The vertex of the bit. These three communities must have certain independence and appropriate relationships. Otherwise, there will be problems of misplacement. The two-

thousand-year-old tradition of imperial autocracy centers on "king," referring to you as a holy king and your father as a king. We must restore the concept of "ruler" to its authentic meaning. Under the democratic constitutional government and civil society system, the "king" should genuinely embody the role of a "public servant." Titles such as president or prime minister are merely conventional designations in this context. He accepts the entrustment of the people and has the responsibilities and obligations he should fulfill. They have a term of office, and they are not eternal. "Father" truly becomes a father; a father is kind, and his son is filial, and he can handle the community of blood and human relations well, thus making him the cornerstone of an excellent social and political community. The "sage" truly becomes a sage, and the Daoism continues and is endless. It can improve the cultural and educational community, renew it daily, and allow the culture to continue and spread forever.

"King, Father, and Sage" have returned to their proper positions. These three communities, the political and social community, the blood and human community, and the cultural and educational community, have been truly valued. Of course, these must return to the natural community of heaven, earth, and nature. The natural community of heaven and earth, the community of blood and human relations, the community of politics and society, and the community of culture and education are what we often call the five ethics of "heaven, earth, parent, king, and teacher" (Lin, 2022). These four communities jointly nurture each person's "body and mind community." When related, it means rectifying the mind, cultivating oneself, regulating the family, managing the state, and bringing peace to the world. The foundation of a correct mind is sincerity, the foundation of sincerity is knowledge, and the foundation of knowledge is an investigation of things. This is the "eight virtues" mentioned in "The Great Learning". In addition to these eight points, there are five levels (sedation, tranquility, tranquility, consideration, and attainment) and three principles (explicit virtue, kindness to the people, and the pursuit of perfection). The teachings of "The Great Learning" are really for adults. It is a very remarkable political philosophy, and it is the teaching of enrichment and perfection of "the Inner Sagehood and the Outer Kingliness".

VII. The Original Structure and Transformation of "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness"

Since "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness" is a teaching of enrichment and perfection, why did I deliberately propose "from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood" at the end of the last century? This is, of course, directed at the over-emphasis on the "Inner Sagehood" study and

the need to develop the outer kingliness study from the inner sagehood study.

In fact, it is fundamentally wrong to misunderstand Confucianism as only the inner sagehood study and not pay attention to the outer kingliness study. Some scholars even say Confucianism does not address the "public sphere" but only the "private sphere." This is a huge misunderstanding. Isn't it obvious what the Book of Rites "Liyun" says, "The journey of the great road, the world is for the common good"? Of course, commentators believe Confucianism was severely introverted in the Song and Ming Dynasties. This inward tendency is somewhat present, but it is not entirely the case. What is more serious is that we understand this significant period of intellectual history as an inward direction. This is a bigger problem.

Note: The activities of understanding and interpretation are closely related to the understander and interpreter's intellectual horizon and existential situation. Since the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China, due to China's weakness, the enlightened people eager to save the nation could overturn the boat with one stick. Based on the methodological essentialist way of thinking, they saw the Chinese national character and believed that Lu Xun's Ah Q was the Chinese character. I think this appearance is caused by introversion in thinking about the essential appearance of Chinese people. When I looked up, I found that the Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties was deeply tainted with the tone of Zen Buddhism, saying that this was Yang Confucianism and Yin Buddhism. It is said that Buddhism has weakened China. It is noted that Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties, especially the school of mind, often "sit back and talk about the nature of mind when there is nothing to do, and die to repay the king when in danger." It is said that they only emphasize the "mind method," but there is no "method" at all. These arguments and comments have been expanded repeatedly, and people gradually misunderstand that Chinese culture as a whole is introverted and precocious and that the entire history is stagnant, as it has been for two or three thousand years. These statements are not accurate, but this expanded statement is everywhere.

In this way, Confucian knowledge is said to be only local knowledge and has not reached the level of universal truth. What Confucianism talks about is only in the private domain and is inferior to the public domain. According to this statement, Confucianism cannot be put on the stage. If Confucianism is like this, other small traditions in China are even more superstitious, backward, ignorant, and absurd. Thorough anti-traditionalists believe that if this is the case, then the entire tradition should be abandoned entirely so that Chinese civilization can be reborn. As long as you read the Confucian classics, whether it is the Four Books, the Five Classics, or the Twenty-Five Histories, it is evident that all the above misunderstandings about Confucian

civilization are apparent. However, for more than a hundred years, almost all the so-called progressive enlighteners have mistakenly blamed Confucianism for China's weakness, authoritarianism, and ignorance. I think this is the misunderstanding of Chinese culture in the so-called crisis of cultural consciousness in modern China, the existential crisis of the Chinese people, when the foundation of their wealth and life has been completely shaken and suddenly don't know what to do. (Zhang, 1978).

This understanding of the horizon and realm of existence overshadows everything else, making the enlightened people who are eager to save the nation mistakenly think that everything will be saved as long as they introduce Mr. De and Mr. Sai. Foreign culture is enough to redeem China. Under the extreme lack of self-confidence, there were internal and external troubles, military disasters, and wars. Although the Anti-Japanese War finally became a victorious country, the land of China was already scorched and devastated. Immediately after the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and after 1949, contemporary New Confucianists who took refuge in Hong Kong could not help but lament that the flowers and fruits had disappeared. In the hardships of "empty hands and nothing," "the road is long and endless," in "the chaos and wandering," "my body and skin are hungry, and my spirit is exhausted," despite this, "I press forward despite hardships and dangers." "I am passionate," "Two shoulders carry a heavy burden, take advantage of youth, and move forward in a team." The New Asia school song by Mr. Qian Binsi can be seen then. In this situation, seeking "self-plantation of spiritual roots" is not easy.

Emphasizing the priority of "self-plantation of spiritual roots" was necessary in the last century. Not only do spiritual roots self-root, but they must be planted between the sky and the earth. They must be moistened by rain and dew and illuminated by the brilliance of the sun and moon before they can grow. To save the nation and survive, to enlighten the people's wisdom and cultivate their morality, we must start from the self-plantation of this spiritual root. Just as Qian Mu said, "The mountains are rocky, the sea is deep, the earth is vast, the sky is high, the people are noble, and the soul is the soul. A broad mind comes from a long time." "A hundred thousand miles, up and down, in all directions, overlooking the beauty. There has been a bright future for five thousand years, and there are hundreds of thousands of descendants of gods. There are sages in the East China Sea, the West China Sea, the South China Sea, and the North China Sea. Cherish it and cherish it. This is my Xinya spirit." Qian Mu, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Zhang Pijie, Xu Fuguan, etc. The New Asia spirit has genuinely produced the results of the work of "self-plantation of spiritual roots."

I think that "heaven and earth, mountains and seas, and people's hearts" are exactly the

three talents of Chinese culture. The tradition of heaven, earth and people is the tradition of "the sky is bright, the earth is rich, and the people are long-lasting". This is the tradition of "the Inner Sagehood and the Outer Kingliness interacting and influencing each other to give birth to each other". This tradition has already developed its meaning as early as in the "World" chapter of "Zhuangzi" (Qian, 2017). I think that Confucianism and Daoism originally had the same origin, and although they developed differently later, after all, they have the same origin and are complementary (Lin, 2003a). This structure of inner sagehood and the outer kingliness is sufficient and full.

As the entire modern China is in a serious crisis of existential meaning, with flowers and fruits scattered (talented people scattered everywhere), the establishment of confidence is the most serious problem. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is facing the loud clamor of radical anti-traditionalists. They try their best to find the soul of Confucianism from the mind-nature essence of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, work hard to re-establish this symbol of the national spirit and hope to "self-plant the spiritual roots". Contemporary Neo-Confucianism places too much emphasis on the self-plantation of spiritual roots. This "spiritual root" becomes a metaphysical ontology through in-depth philosophical interpretation. I call this in-depth philosophical interpretation work "metaphysical preservation." For "metaphysical preservation", of course there is also a need for "metaphysical enlightenment" (Lin, 1995). The inner sagehood can create a new outer king, and thus it has become a practical force that must be activated.

What is "metaphysically preserved" is "morality", and what is "metaphysically opened up" is "knowledge." How to use "morality" to open up "wisdom" and how to open up "knowledge" from "morality" have become the most important issues. In this way, "the inner sage creates a new outer king", and how to create knowledge from morality, so "Self-Entrapment of Conscience, to create the intellectual subject, and create democratic science", this kind of theory was born. It was in this thinking that Mr. Mou Zongsan integrated the three religions, the Chinese and the Western, and constructed his two-level ontological system. Under this system, the popular theory of "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" was put forward (Lin, 1999), as "the inner sagehood can create a new outer king" to complete the process from metaphysical preservation to metaphysical opening. course.

VIII. What Is the Significance of Proposing "from the Outer Kingliness to the Inner Sagehood"? Inspiration from What Wang Chuanshan Said: "Without Tools, There Is No Way."

What is "metaphysically preserved" is "morality," and what is "physically opened up" is "knowledge." "Wisdom" is opened up with "virtue," and "knowledge" is opened up from "morality." With this saying, we begin to have a sense of understanding, mistakenly believing that what we were "strong" was "morality" and that what we were "weak" was "knowledge" in the past. More importantly, this "morality" is an eternal metaphysical entity, which is no doubt. The problem is that we are too moral and too esoteric. Our whole hearts are wrapped up in morality and a metaphysical body. Therefore, our knowledge lags, and we ignore the knowledge system. We must work hard now. The knowledge system can be re-opened from the morality wrapped in this metaphysical Dao.

The problem lies here: are we really too moral and metaphysical? Do we need to "get stuck" so that we can not be too moral and give "knowledge" a chance to breathe and open up the knowledge system? Instead of being so top-notch, should we implement down-to-earth principles and open up the bottom-up? Of course, it is not good to be too moral because being too moral will turn it into fake, so it is best to change it as soon as possible. If it is too metaphysical, it will become too empty, which is not good, so it is better to implement it into the physical as soon as possible; this is the best. This appeal is very reasonable, but the problem is why it is called "too moral" and "too metaphysical" and how it causes the problem. What factors make the moral too moral and the metaphysical become too metaphysical? Some of these are charms that are difficult to unlock. The question is how to unlock these charms. It is right to call for detachment, but it may be a problem to mistakenly believe that it is "too moral" or "too metaphysical."

"Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness," internal cultivation and external practice should be complete and total, but why did it turn introverted, place too much emphasis on internal cultivation, and even use inner sagehood as the leading practical dimension? This requires looking back at the ups and downs of the entire historical development rather than positioning the development of Chinese history, especially the development of Confucianism, as focusing on the inner sagehood, and the outer kingliness was initially developed and derived from the inner sagehood."

At present, it is mistakenly believed that Confucianism is mainly based on inner sagehood. It is even said that Confucianism only involves the "private domain" and fails to reach the "public domain." Confucianism is only worthy of being regarded as "local knowledge." Although these opinions are different, Confucianism is underestimated and thought to be

introverted. This is a view of comparison by a closed mentality and under a severe crisis of consciousness. This is viewed by ideologicalization under the sub-colonial culture. Of course, no one will object to the call to move from the private sphere to the public sphere, from local knowledge to universal knowledge. The same request can be made to move from virtue to wisdom and from the inner sagehood to the outer kingliness. This is, of course, also correct. The question is how to make it happen.

If we don't understand the ups and downs of history, we mistakenly believe that we were in darkness before and that we need to remove the darkness and usher in the light. Or we mistakenly believe that we were once bright, but the brightness burned our eyes and made it difficult to see clearly. I am afraid that we need to be shaded and sunk to open up the real clear distinction. These calls must be implemented; the so-called implementation means understanding it realistically. The reason why we turn inward and ignore the external structure is. This is closely related to our two thousand years of high-pressure patriarchy, autocratic monarchy, and male-centeredness. It is the "vertical axis of kinship" composed of these three, coupled with the imperial examination system and the eight-legged essay to select scholars, which dogmatized and stereotyped the cultivation and formation of talents. This "vertical axis of kinship" is consolidated into an authoritarian and centralized structure that is difficult to unravel. This structure has led to an overemphasis: our morality too moralistic, our humanity overly humanistic, and our inner sagehood too internatlized. This "too much" leads to a state of "closure."

If we only understand it as "too moral" and "too metaphysical," we should start from the "knowledge" system and open up the "not metaphysical," which will ignore the actual historical facts. However, we only think of metaphysical reality and mistakenly believe that it is the foundation of everything in the universe, hoping that this foundation can open up everything. Such a statement is just a philosophical construct, a particular interpretation, not an actual historical fact. Under the philosophical structure system, we call for metaphysical opening. Although it also gives a natural process, the Self-Entrapment of Conscience opens up the intellectual subject. This intellectual subject opens the situation of opposition, and a new external kingship is opened. This statement is just a philosophical, theoretical, logical order in the hermeneutic sense. It is not the historical order of occurrence nor the practical learning order (Lin, 1994).

I have discussed the similarities and differences between these three orders in many places. As far as our modernization in East Asia is concerned, it is not the modernization of the original place but the modernization derived from it. We may not repeat the historical modernization

sequence in the original place of origin because this is unrealistic. Nor can we deduce the practical learning order by clarifying the theoretical structure of philosophy and following the theoretical logical order in the hermeneutic sense. Of course, again, this is unrealistic. It is also worth noting that "internal cultivation - external practice" and "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness" influence each other, and the two ends are consistent. The inner sage's study of inner cultivation is not eternal and will change with the passage of generations. With changes, there will be different outer king structures, organizational systems, and living fields, and there will also be different inner sagehood studies. Especially in the generation after the separation of monarchy, patriarchy, and male dominance, this is a democratic constitutional government and a civil society. In this life world and historical society, the inner sagehood studies cultivated will naturally be different.

In Wang Chuanshan's words, "the material unity of Dao," and particular emphasis on "without its material, there is no Dao," the concrete, existing, living world takes precedence over metaphysical universal, abstract principles. Wang Chuanshan also said that before the material was formed, the principle of metaphysical hiddenness and unrevealing already existed. In terms of ontology, "Dao" is the priority, and in terms of genetics, "material" is the priority. Wang Chuanshan advocates that both aspects deserve attention, and I call it the "ontogenetic method" (Lin, 1987). "Dao" and "material" are hidden in each other as a house and intertwined for use. "The metaphysical one is called the Dao, and the physical thing is called the material." "Dao" is the metaphysical "hometown" of "material," and "Material" is the concrete implementation of "Dao" (Lin, 2009, 2012a, 2012b).

Why do I say "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood" in addition to "the original inner sage creates a new outer king"? This is because, under the thinking of Wang Chuanshan's "ontogenesis," it is essential to It emphasizes the re-adjustment of the inner sagehood in the learning process of the new outer kingliness and advocates that the inner sagehood should also have a new inner sage. This is what Wang Chuanshan said: "Without material, there is no Dao." Of course, the inner sagehood and the outer kingliness "hide each other as a home and hand each other around for use." In fact, Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness are communicating and cooperating as one body and complementary to each other.

IX. Conclusion: The Inheritance of Knowledge Is as Long and Lasting as Ever.

Whether China's cultural traditions can be modernized should not be a question. It just needs to be done. If you can do it, you can do it. If you can't do it, it will be impossible if you

don't do it seriously. It's not about whether it's possible but whether people can do it. Furthermore, modernization is only a stage in humanity's historical development. It may manifest differently in different regions, traditions, and ethnic groups. Modernization is not the same as Westernization. Modernization is not a singular number but a plural number. It is plural, differentiated, and will vary depending on region, race, culture, and tradition. Although they are different, they can be understood together.

"Inner Sagehood, Outer Kingliness," "Inner Cultivation, and Outer Practice" are essentially one. Why is there a preference for "Inner Sagehood" in the Chinese political tradition? Especially since Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties has prioritized the inner sagehood, this bias toward the "Inner Sagehood" does not entirely ignore "Outer Kingliness," nor does it mean that there is no study of outer kingliness. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism seeks to establish its spiritual roots amidst the falling flowers and fruits. It advocates the "original Inner Sagehood" and the creation of the "new Outer Kingliness." This is due to its painstaking efforts and the fundamental limitations of its thinking. We should face this limitation and seek new possibilities for transformation and creation.

We should step beyond the limitations of subjective philosophy and return to the rich world of life to seek the starting point and intersection of a sense of reality. Abandon methodological essentialism and replace it with methodological conventionalism. The morality of "Destiny is nature" cannot be just a priori. It should be noted that after the birth of a life, personality is slowly formed day by day. What is not formed can be formed, and what has been formed can be changed. Morality is developing and changing. It is formed by human culture.

In February 1994, I proposed the "Outline of Post Neo-Confucianism" and later put forward the concept of "Outer kingliness and Inner Sagehood," which triggered discussions among many teachers, friends, and colleagues. It even led to rumors of "betraying the teacher." "A journey can tell a horse's power, and time can tell a person's heart." I uphold my academic conscience, "I love my teacher, and I love the truth even more." "Leave it to the teacher." I just continued my momentum and moved forward hard. This article can be used to respond to my mentors and friends who have urged me over the years.

Regarding the philosophical system, I constructed the "Three States of Existence Theory" (Cheng, 2011; Lin, 1993; Zhang, 2012); based on the three teachings of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, I further developed its logotherapy thinking. In political philosophy, I criticized the "misplacement of Dao." Further, I pointed out that we should move from the "bloodline vertical axis" to the "interpersonal interaction axis" so that it is possible to unravel the imperial system and rebuild Confucianism (Yang, 2006). In terms of methodology, I advocate

abandoning essentialism (or realism) and replacing it with "conventionalism (or nominalism). In terms of Chinese humanistic hermeneutics. I propose "Dao, intention, imagination, structure, and sentence" fifth-order structure. It is advocated that the interpretation of classics should not be separated from the world of life, the understanding of mind, and the Dao to which heaven, earth, people, me, and all things go. Dao is the origin of existence. Furthermore, I found that in the Chinese philosophical tradition, we advocate a continuous view of existence, which is different from Western philosophy, which is dominated by the existing view of rupture. "The harmony of existence and value" takes precedence over "the consistency of thinking and existence" principle.

Over the past forty years of hard work, my development and philosophy are very different from those of my teacher, Mr. Mou Zongsan. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is based on Wang Yangming's studies. Obviously, I am based on Wang Chuanshan's studies. Although Wang Yangming and Wang Chuanshan are different, they both owe their roots to Confucius. Looking back at Mr. Mou Zongsan's photo on the study wall, "Inherited from Confucius, his sincerity reaches heaven and earth. His comments of the three religions can be traced back to ancient times and the present." I can't help but bow my head and sigh: I am grateful to Mr. Mou Zongsan for his teaching. I want to thank Mr. Mou Zongsan for giving me a sufficient world of thinking. I can dance and wield swords in the world of philosophy. From the moves taught to me by Mr. Mou Zongsan, I am studying hard. There have been some transformations and developments. Of course, if we want creative transformation and innovative development, we must work harder. The inheritance of knowledge is as long as it lasts and will never end.

— The Summer of Guimao (2023) June 26th in the Gregorian calendar, completed at Yuanheng Academy, Taichung

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評：林安梧之「後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面—— 關於『外王—內聖』問題的一些回應」

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摘要

本文可說是 2022 年李瑞全在「『內聖外王』乎？『外王內聖』乎？——中國文化如何從內聖建構民主體制兼評駁所謂『外王內聖』之謬論」（以下簡稱「批謬文」）一文對林安梧在 2021 年發表的「從「外王」到「內聖」：新儒學之後對「內聖外王」的翻轉」（以下簡稱「翻轉文」）一文進一步的擴充版而寫的批評。因此本文主要只就此擴充版的部份作進一步的批判。本文首先是指出林安梧自以為超越牟宗三先生和當代新儒家而自稱為「後新儒學」的發展實是無理和無論證的自我認定。此中包括幾個誤解和曲解。首先，林安梧沿襲一般對儒家的批評，指「當代新儒家」為「保守主義」或「傳統主義」是為不了解、以至曲解當代新儒學以「返本開新」之重建和開創新儒學現代化哲學發展的貢獻和創造所在，包含牟宗三先生的「兩層存有論」、「道德的形上學」等之學術上創造所成的龐大中國哲學體系。其次，林安梧在文中更隨意指控牟宗三與當代新儒家的「心學」實與反儒學的「西化派」在結構上實同為波柏所批判的「方法論上的本質主義」。本文指出這種曲解當代新儒學的義理實為無據和無理的誣衊，既不知波柏對西方傳統思辨形上學之為獨斷之實義，亦不解當代新儒學之由道德實踐進路所成的道德形上學實為不同層次的論述。林安梧以為把方法論本質主義的批評扣於儒學頭上，即對當代新儒學作了成功的批判，此實為無理和不知義的說法，可謂西方現代哲學所謂錯置「範疇之謬誤」。至於林安梧引用一般攻擊傳統儒家之禮祭和禮樂之治乃上古的巫祝咒術轉變而來，而認為當代新儒學之「本心論」與「良知學」與此類古代巫術傳統有「密切的關連」，同是擁護帝王專制的迷信學說，是林安梧自創的中國傳統政治和歷史中「君父聖」之「血緣縱貫系統」表現，更是無稽之談。因為，這種說法根本上違反孔孟之由《書經》「天視自我民視，天聽自我民聽」所具有的以民為本為主，根據人民的自主決定而擁立天子之初步的民主觀念，以內聖開出外王的禮樂之治即仁政王道為根本的政治理想等，罔顧儒家自孔子以來已完全擺脫古代巫術的神權式的政治安排。而且，林安梧的論斷完全漠視當代新儒學所全力發揚的「新外王」之民主與科學的主張，所建立的重要學理發展，推進儒學現代化的論述和努力。至於林安梧更荒誕地把當代新儒家最感慨的「中華民族花果飄零」

的血淋淋事實和祈求能「靈根自植」的艱苦視為一種「形而上保存」的不知所謂的胡扯，無足論矣。由此可見，林安梧的「由外王開內聖」的說法實不是儒家的義理，而是法家式的現代集體主義或一黨專政的國家主義，內聖之優先性與獨立性已蕩然無存。

本文最後強力批判林安梧不知實況而妄把六十年代以來，東南亞國家的一些領袖主張之「亞洲價值」發展，視為他所主張的「由內聖開外王」學習成果的優良表現，而不知這種主張實是否定人民的主權，走上反民主反科學的帝王或一黨專制的舊路。這種反民主反人權的政治價值正與現代開放社會的發展背道而馳。東南亞國家之在具體政治制度和表現上，如排華和壓制華人在政治上的權利等，明顯表現為違反現代文明的種族和宗教歧視的現象，足以證明林安梧之由外王改變內聖實是依政治上的權力，改造人性和宰制人民的極權組織。這種政治發展正與當代新儒學追求民主與科學的理想背道而馳，更不是林安梧所謂「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民主的民本」的表現。在一個意義之下，中華民國基於傳統文化所實現的民主憲政才是儒家的「由內聖開外王」的一個現代版本。

關鍵詞：當化新儒家、牟宗三、後新儒學、李瑞全、林安梧

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壹、引言：內聖外王之辯是人禽義利之辨

自十九世紀中葉，晚清的中國和中國文化受到西方列強的武力和文化入侵。由此揭開中國文化近二百年的抵抗與發展求存的歷史，至此尚未能成功。而其中牽動中國文化最核心的是進行現代化以回應西方文化的強力挑戰。中國士人在滿清王朝二百多年的壓抑之下，不但在政治上受到全面的獨裁統治，和抄家滅族的「文字獄」的思想言論的強力壓制，加上滿清王權霸佔了道統，傳統知識分子不敢妄議朝政，不敢為民請命，更自矮化為奴婢。士人或知識分子完全缺乏自主自發的心靈，被禁錮在文字考據的囚牢中，喪失了回應時代挑戰的能力。因此，在十九世紀的上半頁，不斷受列強之侵凌，但節節敗退，瀕臨被瓜分的局面。腐敗的滿清王朝無力對抗外侮，引生知識分子的革命和對自身的政治和文化的全盤否定。辛亥革命是一個高峰，革掉了專制的王朝，邁向現代的民主政治，也開始了現代化的進程。「五四運動」是文化改革的一個高峰。但此高峰卻從自卑屈辱中自棄求存。知識分子之盲目和狂熱，反而造成中國與中國文化更大的挫折與屈辱。日本挾西化成功之力，開始吞食中國和亞洲，使中國不但在接受現代化的過程被中斷，人民受的苦難實讓人痛不忍言。日本之侵華實無疑是西方列強的代表，但中國傳統士人與人民卻仍然有力對抗這種堅船利砲的鋪天蓋地而來的強勢武力，中國並未應聲而倒，不致淪為日本的殖民地。但在文化上，五四所興起的「全盤西化」卻擴展為全盤共產主義化，中國文化實遭受更嚴厲的內部的壓迫和任意的誣蔑。儒家在四九年後一直被牽入各種運動中為陪葬品。中國大地沒有被外族統治，中國卻淪落為西方極端的共產主義意識形態的文化殖民地。「五四」高舉「科學與民主」似是啟蒙，卻只是口號，反而變形成為極端的西方文化的政黨意識形態的大山，壓在中國文化，中華民族頭上。因為中國文化的主體性已被摧殘殆盡，無力作主，真的只能如奴如婢，任人宰割！此可借用李澤厚所標榜的「西學為體，中學為用」一詞來描述中國成為西方文化殖民地的局面。主客易位，中國人只是西方文化的極端的一面的載體！此中，內聖與外王是文化中兩大課題，即，道德倫理與社會政治之主從關係的價值次序與現實的制度。中國傳統文化是「內聖開外王」，以道德為政治的依據，反之，主張中國文化要改換成「外王開內聖」，實是在理念上要完全取代儒家和中國文化的主體性。這不是儒者冥頑不靈，腐敗無能，而是政治獨裁者所施的無限的暴力和宰制的控制，以及一眾所謂「知識分子」之為虎作倀，所成的結果。因此，返本重建儒家的「內聖外王」之道，批判所謂「外王內聖」之謬誤，徹底批判和去除共產主義的核心原則，即，人沒有人性，只有階級性的主張，是當代新儒家所不能豁免的時代課題。由「外王開內聖」的主張可以使當權者以各種不人道的手段去對付與專制獨裁者的政治敵對者。這就是今天這個課題所謂由「外王開內聖」在現實上的表現。誠如牟先生已多次指出，若共產主義原則不變，則中國文化自必被根除為止，中華民族也永遠只是被文化殖民的奴隸。中國傳統文化的「內聖開外王」主張，是

表示儒家堅持每個人都具有人性，即具有「人之為人的不可被剝奪的本有價值」，每個人自身是目的，具有人格尊嚴，不可被當作純然的工具來利用。由此所指向的最終的政治制度是能保障人民生命尊嚴和財產的是民主制度。所以，這仍然是當今儒學所不能逃的時代課題。此本文之作仍有重要的哲學與文化的意義，也是指向完成儒者之「為生民立命」志業的必要之人禽與義利之辨。

儒家的「內聖開外王」之說自有許多義理內涵和必須釐清和澄清的重要關節，而由此所指向的中國文化的現代化（不是西化）課題更必須深論和辨正。但林安梧之「後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於『外王—內聖』問題的一些回應」（以下簡稱「回應文」）一文實只是把個人自己近二十多年所自以為是的論述作一簡要的綜述。此文用了「回應」一詞，似有回應他人的批評以辯護自己的觀點，或重建自己的論述之意，但細看本文實沒有任何新意，只是擇要地重述之前已在多篇相關文章或專書所已陳述過的觀點，也沒有真正和明確地回應已有的嚴正批評。這在下文會詳細以文獻和論據展示出此一「回應文」的內容如何地空洞和自我封閉，如何曲解當代新儒家的論述，和中國文化的表現與方向。對於此文的核心主題，先作一綜述式的批判，以為下文的詳論作一基本的起點。

自牟師宗三先生辭世之後，林安梧教授開始宣揚所謂「後牟宗三時代」已來臨，更一貫地以為自己的思考已超越牟先生以至當代新儒學之學理與義理而自稱為「後新儒學」的主張。其不實的觀點與論述，本人在多次參加相關的當代新儒家的國內國際會議中指出其所含的各種謬誤，但在會議上或之外都完全沒有得到任何回應，而林教授自以為是如故。而且，林教授更反指當代新儒學諸師友的論述為「護法的儒家」，好像唐、牟二師的眾多門人和師友都只是重覆當代新儒家大師的說法，無理地為當代新儒學辯護。林教授在不少論述中，更進一步主張與馬克斯主義的結合（或如一些大陸搞儒學研究者所說，自美其名為馬克斯哲學之儒學化），但實質卻是以儒學為馬克斯主義或共產主義之附庸⁵³，扭曲或矮化儒學的基本義理以迎合共產主義的說法，實是「儒學之馬克斯主義化」。一切主張由外王決定內聖（即由政治權力決定道德）的說法即是這種「馬克斯主義化之儒學」。這種說法實是中國傳統法家之以帝王獨霸所有政治權力來統治臣民的一種理論，明顯反對儒家的仁政王道的外王政治理論。

⁵³ 馬克斯認為人只有階級性，沒有所謂人性。而由下層的經濟結構決定上層的政治制度，所以傳統的經濟模式即決定國家社會的性質。因此，從封建階級而來的一切都是封建腐敗的，道德也如是。而在共產主義社會中，不但經濟是共產主義式的，主掌權力的是共產黨，因此，即以共產黨的意識形態為主導，以掌權力的政府去決定人民應有何種道德表現，其中一個現實的實況，就是人民都必須絕對服從黨的指揮來行動，否則即是反黨反國的罪行。這其實就是政治權力決定對錯，決定道德是非。此即所謂「外王開出道德」的基本意思，這也是與西方傳統哲學與文化所極力批判和反對的「權力即(道德上)正確」(might is right) 變形，由此可見此說不但有違社會基本原則，也有違西方政治傳統，即現代的民主人權理論。西方現代化的政治和社會的基本則仍然是以「公義原則」(principle of justice) 為國社會的基礎，如羅爾斯所建立的民主理論。詳見後文。究極言之，馬克斯的觀點才真正是波伯(Karl Popper)所批判的一種「方法論上的本質主義」，即認為人類「本質上只有階級性」而來的極權思想！此詞之所指，詳論請見下第5節。

歷來儒者也全力批判法家這種只為一人一家服務的私天下的觀點。但目前這種說法比傳統法家更壞的是扭曲儒學的義理和西方民主人權的政治哲學來支持專制獨裁政治的說法，魚目混珠地污衊儒家的基本義理。在道德與政治的關係上，儒家一貫是由內聖開外王的正道，或由道德以確立政治制度之結構與方向。此如孔孟之由仁心或不忍人之心為禮樂（即社會政治制度）之根據，用以建立仁政王道；荀子亦以人之有「義」有「辨」結合各個個人之力量，組成禮義群體，合力以征服牛馬猛獸，基本上亦是以義、辨而立客觀禮制的義理。荀子雖非儒家的主流思想，仍是儒家由「內聖開外王」之道的一途。縱使在西方之現代化中，西方哲人亦依道德以立政治體制，也是一義的由「內聖開外王」的表現。如休謨已指出西方哲學傳統是以公義原則為社會的第一原則。又如康德之由自由意志之自由法則以建立政治體制，即直接由意志之自由法則以開「公民社會」（civic society）（Kant, 1965/1999）⁵⁴。當今西方政治哲學的經典說法，如羅爾斯（Rawls, 1999）之 *A Theory of Justice*⁵⁵ 也是由公義原則建構現代民主政體的典型論述。公義原則基本上是道德原則。由此可見，西方政治哲學的理論和實踐，都是由道德法則建構政治制度，都是由道德開政治的理論。這是民主政體建構的基本原理，也就是由「內聖開外王」的基本方式。⁵⁶此亦可見出，儒家由道德所建構的政治理論不可能與自由民主不相容。反之，也由此可見由「外王開內聖」明顯是違反儒家的基本原則，是以當權者的權力為依歸的反儒學的政治論述。

傳統法家獨尊專權的大皇帝，實是儒者所鄙視的妾婦之道。法家式的以「外王開內聖」的主張正是把「道」寄托在個人或政黨之權力上，寄托在帝主君父身上，直是依政治之獨裁權力反過來規範道德與控制臣下和人民，方真正是「道之錯置」。這種說法基本上是諂媚取悅手握權力的獨裁者的說法，豈能是儒者的主張。由此也可見，這種由外王規定內聖的理論，明顯違反儒家之核心義理，而當代新儒家已不斷和明確地表明擁護現代民主自由政治制度的新外王，斬斷獨裁專制的惡根。這種由外王決定內聖的主張甚至比傳統帝王專制對儒家的消極的運用和壓制更為囂張！傳統儒者雖不能以行動推翻和反抗獨裁的大皇帝，因為儒者一方面反對在政治上結黨營私，也沒有相對的武裝力量可

⁵⁴ 參見Kant, I. (1999), *The Metaphysics of Morals, Part I The Metaphysical Elements of Justice* (pp.51-81) (J.

Ladd, Trans.). The Bobbs-Merrill Company. (Original work published 1965)

⁵⁵ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1st ed., 1971, 2nd ed.1999).

⁵⁶ 如上所述，17 世紀的古典經驗主義殿軍的休謨即已指出，西方社會(包含政治)的第一原則是「公義原則」。當前的西方政治哲學所論的民主政治，如 David Held 在其名著 *Models of Democracy* 一書審視西方政治哲學傳統近二千多年的發展，不但引介了民主政治從希臘以來的發展，最後綜合西方民主政治發展的方向，也提出當前的民主政治的基本原則是「自律原則」(principle of autonomy)。「自律原則」即是出於自由意志之基本的道德原則。至於主張由社會的倫理觀念以論政治結構的，如馬克斯或社會科學一般所主張的倫理或道德是社會的產物之說的，實是違反西方哲學傳統的說法。但倫理學家一般也常把這種觀點限於所謂「經驗的倫理學」(empirical ethics)之經驗研究，不能取代「規範倫理學」(normative ethics)的研究和道德原則的基礎性，因公義原則不能以社會風俗來建立，更不能認同所謂「權力即(道德上)正確」(might is right)的主張。

以推翻專制王朝，但亦必以道統置於政統之上，以天或天道去限制獨霸的王權。若改以社會政治現實的權力來規範「內聖」（無疑是以禮法指導仁心），掌權力者的意向即成為道德的唯一標準，是社會價值的唯一來源，此真是把政治暴力無限化，明顯是支持帝王專制的主張，是退化到傳統的帝王獨裁統治的思想。這種觀點何足以言超越五四時代追求民主與科學的理想，更何足以言超越當代新儒家由返本以發揚儒家的內聖本義，和由此開新以吸收消化代表西方現代化成果的民主與科學為儒家的新外王之學。

以下就「回應文」的內容和荒謬之處，作一嚴正的學術與學理的駁斥。

一、「回應文」實乃舊文併湊而成實毫無新意

林安梧此「回應文」實只是不同的舊文所剪接而成，隨意比附和前後自相矛盾，完全沒有新意。此文的觀點基本上在較近期的一文，即「從『外王』到『內聖』：新儒學之後對『內聖外王』之翻轉」（以下簡稱「翻轉文」）所擴充而成（林安梧，2021）⁵⁷。本人已在「『內聖外王』乎？『外王內聖』乎？——中國文化如何從內聖建構民主體制兼評駁所謂『外王內聖』之謬論」（以下簡稱「批謬文」）（李瑞全，2022）⁵⁸一文第5和第6節詳加批駁。而且在中國哲學研究中心以「內聖外王還是外王內聖」為題，於2022年9月3日特別舉辦之第四次「鵝湖會講」由本人與林安梧教授進行詳盡的互相就彼此不同的觀點進行詳盡的對話與論辯，而「批謬文」一文亦已先行刊出和與「翻轉文」並列於會講的參考文獻之中。本人在會講中實已直斥其非，但林安梧卻不面對「批謬文」所評其觀點在歷史事實與儒學義理之錯誤和論述之缺失等各方面的質疑和批判，作出任何正面的回應。林教授在會講中卻胡扯到王夫之的形上學等不相干的論述，而此「回應文」卻仍然一如舊貫，完全沒有任何對題的回應，只重覆其已受批判的錯誤與不實的論點，實不值得再評。只因本土諮商心理學學刊主編之力邀，乃勉為再作進一步的批評，希望林教授能正面面對其論點的錯誤，作出訂正，或指出本人的批評有何錯誤不當之處，明確地分辨，庶不枉費本人之勞力和主編之厚望。否則把學術之追求「愈辯愈明」的理想，變成「愈辯愈詭辯」的泥淖，只想混淆視聽，更嚴重的是遺忘了牟師宗三先生對這種扭曲語意文義的意識形態的嚴厲批判，實為哲學之罪人。

「回應文」中略與前之「翻轉文」論述不同的是重申其所謂當代新儒家與五四時代的「徹底反傳統主義者」雖表面看似敵對，但在方法論上卻持相同的「方法論的本質主義」（methodological essentialism）（Popper, 1945）⁵⁹，因此，林安梧教授認為不但可據此

⁵⁷ 此文刊於《鵝湖月刊》第552號(2021年6月)，頁2-14。

⁵⁸ 上文原是專為駁斥「翻轉文」而作，內容明確針對「翻轉文」的謬誤而論。原文請見《鵝湖月刊》第566號(2022年8月)，頁2-19。

⁵⁹ 此詞出自西方科學哲學家 Popper, K. (1945). *Open Society and its Enemies*. Routledge. 用此名批判西方哲學上三種理論，包括柏拉圖、黑格爾與馬克斯，認為這三種理論都是開放社會（即民主自由社會）的敵人。Popper 以此詞與 methodological nominalism 相對而言，後者自是指「開放社會」之主張，又常以這對名詞

批判全盤西化派，更可據此而一併批判當代新儒家，蓋以某些西方人士稱當代新儒家為「傳統主義」而可一同批判之。至於林教授使用此詞所含的自相矛盾和不可解之處，以及混同當代新儒家為另類的「全盤西化派」之謬，下文再作詳細的分析。由於「回應文」明顯是以「徹底的反傳統主義」一名指稱五四以來的「全盤西化主義」，而當代新儒學的許多討論實都在反駁和反對「全盤西化」的主張，因此，為免以下的論述被名詞所誤導，本文以下仍以學界熟悉而且知所明確指調的意義和代表人物之「全盤西化派」或「西化派」一詞置換「回應文」所謂「徹底的反傳統主義」一名，以利學術的討論。

二、綜述牟先生「兩層存有論」之哲學意義與林安梧之錯解與不解之處

對於「回應文」第一節所述，茲分三點作出批判。首先是林教授對牟先生的哲學體系的了解。一如林教授既往的論述方式，「回應文」第一節開始，也從自己個人的一些主觀的感受開始，一方面是自我肯定是牟門弟子，是牟先生「在臺大指導的第一位博士」，而實不知牟先生一生最強烈批評的是臺大哲學系師生之胡攪和黨派的爭權奪利的各種惡劣的行徑！另一方面，林教授表面似乎也是頌贊牟先生之學為「道貫古今」云云，但內容所述卻完全未觸及牟先生哲學如何由深研西方當代的科學、數學與邏輯的論述，見出思辨理性之特質和貢獻，由超越的反省而上溯於康德的《純粹理性批判》，而成早期的《認識心的批判》的義理體系。牟先生中年以後，學思不絕，百尺竿頭更進一步，更進而就康德之「知性之為自然立法」與「自由意志之為道德王國立法」的兩重意義，批判康德對道德理性之自由意志之解悟不足，並經過多年消化和借助中國儒釋道三家，特別是佛家之義理，建立儒家的「兩層存有論」的哲學體系。「翻轉文」籠統地以「誠通天地」或只一句話說牟先生全面地消化了康德云云，以說牟先生之龐大而圓通之體系，實不足以言知牟先生之哲學者，更不知哲學之甘苦，不知牟先生自言「一生人專注所作的唯一一件事」之哲學意義（林安梧，2011）⁶⁰。「誠通天地」云云，只是襲取前人對不同的宋明儒者的稱述，籠統而空洞，根本上接觸不到牟先生的哲學核心義理和哲學的成就⁶¹。

分別類同於「集體主義」（methodological collectivism）與「個人主義」（methodological individualism）。「回應文」以 methodological essentialism 一名指稱「當代新儒學」（也常被林安梧指為「傳統主義」）和「徹底的反傳統主義」，即五四時代的「西化派」，實是 Popper 用詞的顛倒！Popper 以此名指馬克斯主義，而馬克斯主義正與當代新儒學相對反，所以駁斥「翻轉文」與「回應文」會化很多篇幅，因為要整清其中被混淆和污衊的名詞與理論和相關的要點是很費功夫之事！

⁶⁰ 綜觀林安梧之著作，實甚少引述和討論牟先生的哲學義理，常只是泛引幾句名詞或書名，未見有何真有功力而能讓人有啟發性的深入研究的論述。其相關的專書《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》（台北：台灣學生書局，2011年）更以牟先生為名，「批評」多位被稱當代儒家的思想，而專以「牟宗三」標名的更有5章之多。且不論其處理各個新儒家的哲學，單見論述牟先生的章節，都沒有認真把牟先生的學理呈現出來，而只把自己的觀點重覆論述，且多是演講或講課隨意發揮的講述轉錄而成，並不是嚴格的學術研究而成的論文。至於假名以牟宗三哲學為題，實只是自言自顧自己的所謂「後牟宗三」的觀點而已。但由此也可見林教授對牟先生的哲學實只有浮光掠影的名詞，而逕以為可據此而批判了牟先生的哲學云云，此見其不自量力和不見道之弊。

⁶¹ 林教授也曾就所要樹立的「後牟宗三」之發展而曾論列和批判牟先生之說，以至中國歷史精神與史實，

如此云云，便以為可蓋括牟先生的哲學體系之基本要義，又可進而妄稱自己進入了「後牟宗三時代」，超越了牟先生的成就，實是自欺欺人之言。

由於林教授的由「外王開內聖」的主張與其自認為批判了和超越了牟宗三先生的「兩層存有論」而來的「後新儒學」的「哲學」有直接的關係，在此需要先剖釋其主張和根本的錯解和不解當代新儒學之義理，特別是牟先生的哲學體系的要點和哲學上的貢獻，以見其由「外王開內聖」之說之謬。茲先正面略陳牟先生哲學的要點。牟先生在早期主要深研西方當代哲學、邏輯學、數學哲學和科學哲學的研習，中期全力反省中國現代化的課題和深研中國哲學與文獻之後，更進一步吸收和消化康德的《純理性批判》和《實踐理性批判》（含《道德形上學之基本原則》等論述）之後，以及融通海德格對康德的批判與發揚，在《現象與物自身》一書提出著名的「兩層存有論」，而哲學的建構首先表現為「知體明覺」的開展。牟先生依儒家之以道德意識為生命之首出之關懷，由道德本心或良知之呈現以確立道德世界的本體意義之存有，又名為「無執存有論」。道德意識直接開道德界，在道德行動中所呈現的主客一體之經驗，必有天人合一之義。而由道德主體要達成的道德實踐理想的需求，必須對行動世界中生活上的事事物物有所「認知」，方能使道德要求得以更有效地施行，因而由道德行動之「攝物歸心」的表現退而為「主客對立」的認知模式。此即所謂「客觀化」對象之義，即把在道德實踐中原為一體的存在，把客體的存在刺出去而成為主客對立的認知關係⁶²，由此以成功對於對象的認知，用以輔助道德本心之要求，如通過對食物與藥物和人體生理之知識，而使子女對父母之「孝」得以更好地完成。此即所謂由「良知之自我陷坎」以開現象界之學理意義。

由道德本心之「實踐理性」開展出「知性主體」，正明確回應道德理性與思辨理性（或認知理性）的不同表現的方式，建立兩層存有論的基本的存有論的觀點。這不是一般籠統不解的人所說的「開出說」，或無理地扭曲了良知之為主客相通一體之意義，或更垢病為主觀的「唯心論」等等的胡亂批評。由此可見，兩層存有論不但關注良知天理之為道德實踐之超越而內在的根據，亦解明如何落實在實踐的行動上，須要有對象之認知的要求和認知之不同於道德實踐的表現方式。兩層存有論自是貫通形上與形下的世界，

但實都是虛妄不實而錯誤連篇之說。彼以為牟先生的核心焦點是「智的直覺」、以「致曲」解讀「良知之自我坎陷」等，以及以為中國歷史中的儒學實是「道之錯置」，是一種「君父獨裁之血緣」表現，等等。完全不解，也看不到儒學之貶帝王獨裁、以道統置政統之上，當代新儒家更以「天地聖親師」取代在帝王專制下的「天地君親師」的觀點，更不知牟先生以及唐、徐二位先生，所據以申論中國文化與歷史之論述，均出自柳貽徵與錢穆等史學大家之論述，牟先生的歷史哲學更是直接以五經的文獻分析而來的中國文化，特別是儒家在中國歷史中的表現。傳統儒者如朱子等都無取於秦漢以下的發展，對三代也只是就其護衛中華文化與具有分權共治的一種天下為公的說法，當代新儒家更共同推動對內聖的深研與新的外王的建構為代表儒家回應時化問題的發展。牟先生對王夫之「史論」更具隻眼而大力發揚，建立歷史判斷與道德判斷之分野和應有的合理性。而林教授亦無任何學術和扣緊文獻的分析以建立自己之說，而敢謂自己已進到「後牟宗三」時代，可謂狂妄不實之至了。

⁶² 牟先生的論述，是依於海德格在著名的《康德書》中詮釋康德在《純粹理性批判》中最重要的建立知性認知的超越域（transcendental horizon），即由主體把客體「刺出去」（ob-jectify）而為對象（ob-ject）之說。不像林教授在其諸多著述中所籠統的說為「主體客觀化」一詞之含糊之說。

世界只是即形上即形下的一個世界，沒有兩個世界，或二元論的意思！而且，道德實踐自是在日常生活中的實踐，道德心或良知即躍動其間，是我們一切論述的起點，豈有如林教授批評牟先生之說為使心體成為一「理論化、超越化、形式化、純粹化」，以至「抽象化」⁶³等等之義（林安梧，2011）！牟先生和唐、徐三位當代新儒家都極為重視道德主體在日常生活中的實踐，都以道德實踐為良知所具體地呈現實現出來的所在。此自是直接繼承熊十力先生之「良知是呈現」與自孔子以下，歷代儒者對道德本心和良知之解悟與證悟之核心義理。三位先生常就每個人，以至全人類，特別是中華民族在當前各種人為災難，於具體的社會、政治、民生所受的痛苦與傷害等，對當權者的鞭撻，都是直接以良知提出明確而嚴厲的批判，以身體力行來表現，豈是一般躲在學院中，依附權威的「知識分子」之所為。此中所及的每一個「自我」，包括他們自己，都是活生生而且在巨大的政治力量和苦痛的生活之下的不斷奮鬥提升的生命。儒者所述都是在生活實踐中，千辛萬苦，披荊斬棘而來反省批判，在天性與命限中的實存實感而生，是日日在道德實踐中時時作出存在的道德決定的我（牟宗三，2000）⁶⁴，豈是林安梧教授所謂的「是一個超越的，純粹形式之我」（林安梧，2011）⁶⁵。

但此「我」所表現的理性意義，卻不受限於經驗特殊的情狀，而為通於一切相若的情況而為共同的理，故有超越之存有論的意義。說為道德主體，認知主體正在表示此主體之超越的地位，以及由此所成的道德與知識的普遍性，所具備的客觀性。在上述引用林教授之文之後一段，林教授又進一步指控牟先生所建立的道德主體的我，說：「那個我其實就是一個純粹的、超越的、自性的我，或睿智界的我，即可以及於物自身界的我。那個我不是經驗所能限制的，也不是歷史所能限制的，遠超乎經驗與歷史之上，而又作用於經驗與歷史之中。所以牟先生講的這樣的一個我，其實是一個超越的、純粹形式之我」云云（林安梧，2011）⁶⁶。如果林教授真懂熊先生所說的「建體立極」之義，他應不會如此不了解牟先生的「兩層存有論」所建的良知明覺的本體（心性天理為一的「本體」，即活動即存有的心體），這就是當代新儒家和熊先生所要重建的「本體」。但這本體不是如林教授所扭曲的（借用道德的名言）而成為由上而下的「獨斷的形上學」。⁶⁷在牟先生

⁶³ 參見林安梧《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》（台北：台灣學生書局，2011年），特別是第10-14章。

⁶⁴ 看看牟先生在《五十自述》中對自己與對同時代的生命所感受到的哀傷，唐先生在感受中華民族自1949年後離散於世界各地而有的「花果漂零」的存在痛感，徐復觀先生在許多雜文中的憤激之言，實都是血淚交流的肺腑之痛的具體而真實的流露。此所以，讀他們的書，常有一種牟先生說的「語言般若」的力量，此因這些真切語言真能激盪我們的心志。這種影響，深遠而巨大，豈是今日逞一時之暴力而橫行的政治人物之顛三倒四的言行所可比擬！

⁶⁵ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁166。

⁶⁶ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁166。

⁶⁷ 林教授認為牟先生的「兩層存有論」有嚴重的缺失，因而又借用《老子》之用語，建立自己的所謂「存有論三態」之說。其中諸多跳躍和比附的說法實難以澄清，不能在此詳論。其中所建立的「存有論三態」由上而下的開展，實是一種獨斷的形上學。這一種比附的用法，使道家本有的一種實踐進路的形上學的說法被混蒙了，實慘不忍睹！尤幸牟先生早已點出道家的形上學是一種「境界形上學」，即由真人實踐所體證的

之義理中，儒者能如是挺立此本體是由道德實踐中而來的，即由道德經驗中所「逆覺體證」的道德本心的呈現而當下見證的活潑潑的生命體，由此人才可以得與「天地相似」，與天地參，才得以見證良知即天理。此實即牟先生所申論的「道德理性三義」與「道德形上學」的深義。

而逆覺體證的道德經驗正是在我們日用流行的生活之中，人人皆有，人人皆可以自證。實踐即是在日用倫常中的實事實理，成德即是在生命中擴充自己的仁心的感通，是每個人時刻所感受到的生命的躍動，活活潑潑的真實存在。豈有因此而以為此「本體的我」只是一抽象的、形式的「我」！這正是我們的真我之在我們的真實的經驗中時時呈現，時時使我們保持惺惺之道德實感，常有不容已的道德感悟和道德判斷和行動！由於這本體是如是地超越任何特定的經驗與歷史之局限，所以能為自由之主體，使我們能衝破現實的限制，故有「不謂命」的性分之自我要求，「不容已」的捨生取義的道德行動。林教授在上述的引文內的指控，不但無理，而其中實含有一自相矛盾的說法，即一方面承認此本體可以超越具體特定的經驗與歷史的限制，卻又可以「作用於經驗與歷史之中」。如果此本體只是超越的、形式的或抽象的，那根本無與於歷史的發展；如果此道德的「我」能發揮於歷史之中，那又如何只是一形式的、抽象的東西？！西方哲學家由思辨理性所建立的「認知的我」才真是形式的，無與於現實生命的「我」之實踐，因此，知性主體絕對講不到道德實踐上去，故康德必須超越此「知性主體」的「邏輯的我」，而進到實踐理性中的「道德的我」或自由意志以建立實踐的原則或道德原則，由此以上通自由意志和下開現代的民主政治體制。若此本體能在經驗與歷史中真有影響力，此本體自必是在我們的真實而具體特定的生活流程之中呈現和發用，豈能只是一抽象的形式的「我」。林教授此類前後自相矛盾的地方甚多，以上一小段只是其中一個小小的樣板。

又如，林教授不斷指控牟先生所確立在我們每個人生命中所具有的道德主體性所代表的「自我」，實只是「這樣一個人的主體，是一個形式的主體、抽象的主體、空洞性的主體：這樣的實踐，往往也是屬於心性修養的實踐多，在現實社會發生意義上的實踐少」云云（林安梧，2011）⁶⁸。這一種無實和明顯違反牟先生的明文的論斷，居然可以如此毫無理據辨析而明目張膽地獨斷和指控曾掛名為自己導師的身上！此段文中實又可見林教授行文中的常自相矛盾而不自知的說法。蓋若這個主體只是抽象的、形式的等等，如何又能見於我們的「心性修養的實踐」？心性修養總指在日用倫常中的具體表現。而沒有儒家不講心性之道德實踐的表現，也沒有儒家以為這是一種抽象的思考或觀念而已（陽明更強調知行合一之實踐意義，更不待說了），不管林教授是否真理解儒者日日時時在作工夫實踐的實義為何，但心性修養實踐自是在日常生活中，不管你是在個人「靜涵靜養」或「靜坐以存天理去人欲」的道德自我反省之中，或是處理公堂審裁判案之時，

道的境界和所示或體證的形上學。此即是一由實踐工夫而實證的形上境界，而此境界即見出生命與宇宙的實相。此即牟先生在《心體與性體》暢發的道德形上學之義理，此義自非林教授所能了解或接受的了。

⁶⁸ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 170。

或是與當權者力爭民義，在改變國家與社會的風氣與制度的抗爭之中，你的生命也就貫徹在日常具體而真實的境況之中，這正是生命的真正的實踐的存在的活動。

聖賢只是更能點醒和確立此中的道德實踐的主體性和實踐主體之存在，更能擴展我們生命在人與人之間和人與宇宙天地萬物之間的感通與境界，不致沈淪在人欲與腐敗生活，言不及義與虛無之中。這豈非即是儒者或當代新儒家如牟先生等所必在生活的實踐中所呈現的本體！自孔子以下，二千多年來儒家在歷史上的影響有少了嗎？儒者的理想明明也是受歷史中制度與權力所局限而不得完全申展，也因此而有不斷的激烈的抗爭和遭受獨裁的王權和附庸的外戚內監等無情的摧殘！儒者豈不知此中種種阻力，但仍是不能已的盡自己生命的性分，抗爭到犧牲性命而後已！豈有道德實踐而不在社會現實上產生影響的！或林教授所謂「在現實社會發生意義上的實踐少」另有不同於儒者或牟先生等所代表的儒家的道德實踐和所要求於生命和行動中的表現，不是一種血淋淋的現實，或他所謂的「心性修養」是另類的事物，不是真實地存在歷史與儒者的生命之中的「修養」。我相信，對於企圖由「外王改造內聖」的政黨或獨裁者敢於以暴力摧殘人民的惡行，不但儒者必反對，人民也必起而反抗，因為這是違反人性人倫之常的暴力與邪惡行為。

三、「回應文」所顯示的對中西文化與哲學之誤解誤讀以及罔視牟先生的哲學和當代新儒家的貢獻對文化與哲學的價值

至於「回應文」中又借用西方環境倫理學家所創一詞「在地全球化 (glocalization)」⁶⁹以稱儒家（概括當代新儒家和牟宗三先生等在內）之義理特色，以為用此詞可以突顯儒家講的「真理的普遍性」云云。但此實為不倫不類的比附，實不知當代新儒家之義理表現方式是「返本開新」的取向，展示所繼承的古聖先賢的義理如何具有真實的普遍性，而且是能在當前的時代發揮出進一步的創新的意義，遠非 **glocalization** 一辭所能表達的意義和內涵。由此亦可見林安梧之用詞不對當而常有比附式的跳躍，此又一例。

至於在「回應文」中提出牟先生有進於宋明儒和王船山之處以「闢佛說」為例，又是讓人感到極為片面而實不切合當代新儒學的主張的提法。「回應文」說「闢佛說」「從宋明諸儒，到王船山已經是一大進境，由王船山到熊十力，又是一大進境。由熊十力到牟宗三，又是一大進境」云云。林教授似乎忘記了王夫之也借闢佛而闢宋明儒者之為「陽儒陰釋」之說。唐君毅先生即曾評之為對宋明儒的義理「最無理之說」。此即見王船山之「闢佛說」所表現的對佛學和宋明儒學的了解實不可靠。因為，王船山把若干宋明儒者

⁶⁹ 把 **Glocalization** 一辭譯為「在地全球化」實為不相應，**Glocalization** 之對當的譯名是「全球在地化」。這是環境倫理學家討論如何進行真有意義和真能落實的行動時提出的一個方法，即，由於環境問題是全球性全人類相關的問題，但任何具體行動都必只在某一個時間在某一地區的具體的行動，但此行動必須同時具有全球性的意義，方真是一有效的保護環境的行動，故提出 **glocalization** 一詞，以表現出環境保護行動的特質。

之義理解讀為「陽儒陰釋」，不但對儒學實有嚴重的隔膜，恐怕更落後於許多宋明儒所了解之佛學和關佛的重要性與確切的觀點。但也同樣是使人失望的是回應文也沒有說出王夫之「關佛」的特點，以及如何超越了其他的宋明儒者。而更嚴重的卻是離題地假借此片面的論述把王船山夾帶進來，以為有助於表示自己曾研習王船山之學的根本為可靠，講王船山自有獨特的見解，卻無視此中的課題是內聖外王，講儒家的基本義理，與關佛之說相差不知幾萬里，更與王船山之形上學渺不相干⁷⁰。此即所謂混淆視聽，只胡扯夾帶便算是「回應」了之前在鵝湖會講中不面對質疑而講（實亦沒有講得出）王夫之的「外王」是什麼回事，只是胡扯一頓便以為論證了自己的觀點！至於說熊先生與牟先生之「關佛說」也實在是不知「回應文」說了些什麼。熊十力先生雖由唯識宗回歸儒家，亦仍多借用佛教之義理開展新儒學之論述，如擬開展佛家的「量論」等，用以開闢儒家的知識論方面的發展，具有積極的意義。熊先生所批的主要是認為熊先生不當背離金陵內學院之教的信徒而已。牟先生自然也是歸宗儒家之說，但對佛家的理論與境界，亦實極為借重和欣賞，對於佛家的義理的闡述，也具有高度的啟發與發揚，「實有貢獻於佛學」（牟先生語），更有批評牟先生多用佛學的義理，如「一心開二門」、「識心之執」、肯定天台宗之「圓教」義等等，已不是儒家云云。當然，這種批評實不入流，毫無學術義理之可言的瀾言。然而，林安梧教授以「關佛說」來比附牟先生之為「關佛」有巨大進步云云，實為比附無實義之詞，由此牽扯出王夫之，更是不倫不類之比附。如此之「表揚」牟先生，不但不能切於牟先生在佛學的創見與貢獻，也不外只是藉以此為自己的「後牟宗三」之說背書而已。

林教授更有一莫名其妙的嚴重的指控，即認為牟先生等之當代新儒學所主張的「本心論」，即「良知學」，實與中國古文化中的「巫祝」、「咒術」和君主專制密不可分。林教授認為，「本心論之所以會在中國哲學中成為一個重要的傳統，基本上是和中國的帝王專制、原先的巫祝咒術有著密切的關連」（林安梧，2011）⁷¹，又說，「所以我們可以發現良知學的傳統，是在明代達到顛峰，而明代也正是中國帝王專制最為顛峰的時代」云云（林安梧，2011）⁷²。這真不知何來的「神來之筆」的指控。中國歷史上專制的帝王統治不管是明朝，或是秦朝或清朝，都是都是帝王專制，在末期都是極度荒淫無道，殘害人民與儒者之烈實難以分高下，也終至滅亡而後止。帝王專制之禍又何止明朝。歷史記載彰彰明甚，帝王之專橫暴戾，又何止明朝，以此獨加罪於「本心論」或陽明學實為反對當代新儒家之特重陽明心學之義理而已，藉此牽連以為自己反對良心之說製造藉口而已！但儒學如何與帝王之專制獨裁有不可分的關係，本心論與專制之顛峰又有何關連，都是莫須有的罪名，實為蒙心之言。難道明朝的王帝都是心學家？難道林教授不知道陽

⁷⁰ 回應文更以為唐先生之「中華民族花果飄零」之嘆，而求「靈根自植」為「形而上的保存」云云，實是莫名其妙的亂混淆視聽的瀾言。

⁷¹ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 173。

⁷² 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 173。

明在生時也受到朝廷的排擠迫害？清朝雍正皇帝倒是以能通「禪」意而壓制學界和儒者的大獨裁者，而其政也以嚴苛為稱，不知是否算是相關？但相對其他大皇帝，他也不算太腐敗無道無能的獨裁者。

有謂日本明治維新的動力和成功來自治陽明學的學者與幕府將軍，此又是否可反證林教授之臆測為無理。這種類似西方也有人認為納粹黨的專制獨裁來自黑格爾的哲學影響，在學界少有接受的誣妄之詞。若依嚴謹的學術與論證而言，實則都是無根之談。回到陽明所主的「致良知」之說，此良知自是發自每個人內在本有的心體，也通於性體、天理、天道。何嘗有或只有通於專制帝皇之「心」之說？更何有連結於「巫祝」、「咒術」之處？一般在中國哲學的發展上都認可孔子是以天道轉化傳統的不可知的天命之說，更截斷了成德與巫術符咒的關係，而且孔子以仁心之安不安來定住人之為人的價值，使道德理性成為中國文化的核心動力與依據。事實上，在孔子之前的西周的文誥所見，早已有以「敬」、「敬德」為回應「天命」的道德實踐的方式，實已一步步脫離殷人之「尚鬼」的風俗。而道德意識所顯示出中國文化的特質之「憂患意識」，即是以治者和人民都以道德實踐為一切價值的首出之處，是政治文化發展所依據的基本取向。

而徐復觀先生在詳考由西周到春秋時代的文獻，可以見出中國文化已日漸從個人或家族獨佔「天命」的方式，轉為天命下降成每個人的生而有的內在的本性和價值（徐復觀，1969）⁷³，再經由孔子以「仁」定住人之為人的價值，使「天命」結合「人性」，因而才有近千年之後的《中庸》首句：「天命之謂性」，結穴成為中國的人性論的基本義理。此實是儒者在義理上轉化天命之古代宗教信仰的傳統，文化成為實踐理性的體現，不知此中何有與巫祝或咒術任何關連之處！至於那種以禮與祭、禮之主祭者為巫祝，祭治所用之符咒之遠古關係，以至古代文字所示的祭祀與鬼神的關係來限定禮文與巫祝的關係之說，限定禮制與咒術不可分的關係，而不顧歷史文化之發展與歷代賢哲的創造和轉化提升的實況，實一無可取。正如徐復觀先生已嚴正地批判了清末以來的疑古派或歷史語言學派一味以文字之原始根源意義來限制和曲解人類歷史文化創新的表現，莫名其妙地不准古聖先賢或哲學家可以開創新觀念，新理境和新世界觀，如以為「大禹只是一條大蟲」、「仁是二人為偶」之說等。這種觀點實不知如何理解周文以後的歷史發展？對祭治的解讀，荀子早已說：「民以為神，君子以為文」。這是儒者對祭治的最理性的理解和詮釋，足以反駁這種「文化原始論」，把人類文化和中國文化限定在遠古的巫術文化之中，以及由此而有諸如林教授之仍然以良知或道德本心牢結在巫祝與咒術之中，更無辜地被縛成為支持帝王專制的支柱！此實誣妄儒學太甚！也誣妄中國文化太甚！中國日後的祭天地等大祭，確是由帝王主持的，只因帝王為代表全體人民的身份而矣，豈能理解為由帝王扮演巫祝，因而把儒家追求聖王的理念結合巫術而成支持專制獨裁之說？這實是

⁷³ 詳論請參見徐復觀先生之《中國人性論史：先秦篇》（台灣：臺灣商務印書館，1969年）一書第1至第4章。

荒唐無理的想法。

人類歷史不斷向前發展，也不斷在轉化和提升語言與文化的創新，而有無可限制的新的論述的創造和發展。《中庸》、《大學》都不斷把道德實踐工夫提到「慎獨」，提到「人所不知而已所獨知」的深度，提到每個人之「良知良能」的出自自己本心本性的判斷和行動去，這正是儒家從工夫論進入最深層的道德實踐的自我反省和道德實踐的要求，以及由此以成就真實的道德行為，以通貫家國天下成為一明朗的道德世界。在西周之後，尚以為儒家之仁心與良知之說，仍然是結合在巫祝咒術專制之內等等，實是扭曲中國文化，厚誣儒者之說，更是為專制獨裁的統治作出為虎作倀的言論。至於其下又說「我這麼說，並不是說良知學就是帝王專制之學，而是說良知學就是在一個極端的不合理的帝王專制高壓統治之下，知識分子為了要對抗那個帝王專制，所形成的另外一個對立面的思考」云云（林安梧，2011）⁷⁴，這似乎是說良知學與帝王專制不但毫無關係，而且是對立的和針對帝王專制的真實的抗爭。若認真看待這幾句話，那麼林教授應該說是支持本心論或良知學的，以至認為儒家講良知不但不與帝王專制為同道，而且實是不斷對抗的。但林教授下一句卻認為「兩者在結構上是一致的，也就是良知學與帝王專制思考的內在本質結構往往是一樣的」云云（林安梧，2011）⁷⁵！這實在是不知所謂的自相矛盾的胡言亂語，混淆視聽的「語術」！

四、「回應文」對當代新儒家之追求現代化之盲點

林安梧教授總喜歡自稱自己是進到所謂「後五四」、以「後牟宗三」的口號自稱，但實質上如何的「後五四」、「後牟宗三」卻完全莫名其妙。林安梧以為牟宗三諸位先生只是到「五四後」，即尚未能越過五四的階段，而他自己則為「後五四」云云。「回應文」開始時提出牟先生等之回應五四之返本開新乃是保守主義的方式，又竟謂第二代的當代新儒家「與敵對的陣營有一點是一樣的，對於現代化的民主與科學，基本上是全盤接受的，都認為西方是先進的、進步的文明，華族應該努力的學習，要迎頭趕上」云云。讀來似乎都是「全盤西化」或後來「共產主義化」的口吻，完全不了解當代新儒家對「五四運動」之批判，即接受其中所含的對民主與科學的肯定，而且認為這正是儒家在外王方面所追求而未能達到的外王學問與事業上的理想，但從未認為西方文化是全面地先進和優越於中國傳統文化與哲學的。當代新儒家也不會認為傳統儒者忽視了外王的實踐，而是認為傳統儒者由內聖直接開出外王的方式並不成功，這是歷史事實，而反省如何能開出現代的民主與科學，因而有「良知之自我坎陷」之說，由道德實踐理性開出知性主體和政治主體，以開出現代的民主與科學。這是從人類的思辨理性與實踐理性之功能之

⁷⁴ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 173。

⁷⁵ 林安梧著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》，頁 173。

差別上，以重建儒家的內聖外王的理論，這正是一方面重新詮釋和發展儒家的基本義理（返本），而且由此開出新的民主與科學的發展（開新），這豈是如「回應文」所妄指為保守主義、更不是對西方現代化的「全盤接受」。

可以說，凡以為當代新儒家接受民主與科學即是對西方文化和政治全盤接受，實不知儒家的義理或當代新儒家的說法，也可說不知西方現代化的優點與缺失所在。林安梧教授似乎完全不知牟先生（以及唐君毅與徐復觀兩位先生）對西方政治與社會也有許多中肯的批評，牟先生即陳列出中國文化現代化所應有的社會實體的基本原則，即以儒家的倫理價值推展出現代化中的家庭與社會建構。唐先生更多從人文主義的反省和發展，表現出對西方社會與文化的批判，絕不是盲目的全盤接受，也不是片面的否定或反對。徐復觀先生也多有相類的批評。西方文化與哲學上種種的偏激和無理的表現，特別是演變成獨裁的法西斯主義和共產黨的組織和制度，都是當代新儒家所洞悉，也是儒家批判的對象。因此，當代新儒學真正是對西方哲學與文化的「批判地接受」的態度與方法，由此方見得出當代新儒家的「返本開新」的取向，完全不同於「中學為體，西學為用」，與「全盤西化」，更不同於「全盤馬克斯主義化」或「共產主義化」等取向。當代新儒家之吸收民主與科學所推行的現代化並不是「西方文化的現代化」，而是以中國傳統文化之核心義理吸收消化西方文化的優點，批判其缺點。此中的「開新」實即開發我們的思辨理性的功能，以開發我們當前所需要的民主與科學的建構，但從沒放棄或貶低實踐理性或道德理性的崇高地位。而且，當代新儒學並不像「回應文」所反映的一般庸俗不通義理和不知文化發展的複雜性與長期性的論述，以為儒者相信如此轉換一下心態，現代化即可以一蹴而至，更遑論一個哲學家即可以完成現代化的工作。當代新儒家當然都希望能當身見到中國文化成功真正的「現代化」，但也絕不虛矯以為已經成功了現代化。中國在民主政治體制與科學的思辨精神，仍然有長路要走，而且此中實有無盡的曲折與起伏，又豈是一、二位哲學家的思想即可竟其功的事。

林教授的說法常是混淆一通的，常把極端西化派的說法加諸當代新儒家頭上，而加以橫逆的誣衊。林教授其實一直在運用西化派或共產主義的術語形容當代新儒學，如指稱當代新儒家為「新保守主義」、「文化的保守主義者」、「新傳統主義者」、「新傳統主義者的、徹底反傳統主義的」，這兩方陣營看似對，但他們都全面肯定了西方現代化的基本內容、「當代新儒學之作為新傳統主義者」云云，實是在運用語言的「以名亂實」的方法，通過蒙混夾雜，把許多真正是傳統的保守主義者、傳統主義者混同當代新儒學，特別是把當代新儒學扣上「新保守主義」之名，打成與西化派一樣的主張，於是就可以在當代新儒學身上扣上各種根本不相干的罪名來批判，猶如共產主義總是把當代新儒家反對共產主義的論述必扣上「反共反華」的罪名來批判。此所以「回應文」讓人讀起來根本不是學術討論，只是亂扣帽子，在自己面上貼金的宣示，不知何有學術的意義。林安梧教授這種種混淆視聽和前後自相矛盾的說法，實在使清明的讀者的都感到「昏昏」！

在嚴正批判其以當代新儒家和澈底反傳統主義都共有一種名為「方法論本質主義」的謬誤之前，謹再舉一例以見此種誣衊與自相矛盾而不可解的說法。林教授指出，「一九四九之後，避居香港的當代新儒家們，不免感嘆花果飄零……在這情境下，要尋求『靈根自植』何等不容易」（林安梧，2024），又說：「錢穆、唐君毅、牟宗三、張丕介」，徐復觀等經營的新亞精神，真切的起了『靈根自植』的工作」（林安梧，2024），又說「不只靈根自植，而且這靈根必須植於天壤之間，必須要有雨露之滋潤，日月光華」，卻又說「當代新儒家由於太強調靈根自植，這『靈根』經由哲學的深度詮釋，它成了形而上的本體」（林安梧，2024）。「當代新儒家由於太強調靈根自植，這『靈根』經由哲學的深度詮釋，它成了形而上的本體。既為『形而上的保存』當然也就必要有『形而下的開啟』，本內聖以開出新外王，也就這樣成了一個必然要啟動的實踐力量」（林安梧，2024）云云。此中的問題是不知林教授如何理解「何以要靈根自植」？何謂「靈根」？眾所周知，唐先生提出「靈根自植」是祈求中華民族離散在異國的地方，寄居異族籬下，而遭受種種磨難與迫害（如東南亞國家排華、印尼暴亂之搶劫奸殺無數華僑婦女等）之生活中，得以身心和能夠安身立命於異域。這是祈望中華兒女在生活上能與異族異國融合而心安，此自是極為困難之事，但唐先生根於中國文化之儒家精神，仍然以樂觀的態度去面對，這是植於異國的土壤中的實事實況的問題，豈是什麼「形而上學的保存」！這是血淚斑斑的世代中人的生命之事！然後林教授認為「『形而上的保存』的是『道德』，而『形而下開啟』的是『知識』」云云。道德居然是靈根自植的形而上學的保存，這真是莫名其妙的夢囈，道德本是真實的見諸實踐的東西，不知如何形而上地保得了靈根？「形而上保存」一詞根本就不知所謂？真不知林教授是從那種形而上的思維而得出如此荒誕無聊的申論，而把當前中華民族在異地所受的災難視如一種語言玩弄的把戲！

凡此，只是略示「回應文」之多是夢囈式的自說自話，使人無法與學術文獻或歷史事實加以認真的考驗與檢驗。究其實，只是不知所謂的一堆語言，也實無學術和客觀的意義。

五、「回應文」批評當代新儒家與澈底反傳統主義者之方法論批判

林安梧不但誤解和不解當代新儒家以「返本開新」的方法重建儒學和已有的內聖外王的成果，更認為當代新儒家雖然反對「澈底反傳統主義」的西化派，但兩者其實是採取同一種方法論上的本質主義的同路人。林教授並借用波柏反獨裁專制的用語，作為「回應文」表示採取從外王開內聖所具有的最重要的理據。此因當代新儒家與西化派都犯了同樣的錯誤，即「方法論的本質主義」，當代新儒家變成與西化派和專制的擁護者，所以「後新儒學」就可以有戲唱了。表面看，這似乎是相對「翻轉文」而言，是「回應文」所舉的唯一有學理意義的論點（林安梧，2024），雖然依然不過是之前的一個自以為是的

論點，把一長串不是當代新儒家的論述，以及所指控而實不存在的觀念與歷史，由此虛構自己的「後牟宗三」、「後新儒學」的論述作為對照。由於此明確的指控宛似有合理的學術論據可言，也值得借此機會嚴正地批駁其錯謬之處。

反本質主義原是存在主義批評西方傳統哲學自柏拉圖以來的「本質先於存在」的失誤，存在主義認為人之真實存在更重要，更有優先性，故轉為主張「存在先於本質」，以解除現代人的疏離異化的痛苦。存在主義之從西方傳統哲學之由抽象的普遍的理念或概念的思考回到每個人在現實存在中的許多真實的存在感受，如焦慮、恐懼、怖慄、異化等，自有其合理性。但反本質主義最有力而且是順西方哲學傳統而來的是由思辨理性批判西方傳統形上學的謬誤，如康德所謂傳統哲學論證上帝存在、世界有開始或沒有開始、有沒有最簡單的單位等等判斷，都逾越了感性與知性的限制，所產的只是似是而非的「辯證的虛幻」。這是從思辨理性而來的對西方傳統形上學所建構的沒有經驗和認知基礎的虛構觀念之自身的批判。而近代的發展則是由維根斯坦的語言分析而來的指出形上學是語言的誤用，即，把只適合用於描述世界的語言用於虛構而不存在的事物，如靈魂、實體等，更以為這種用詞指謂出一種形而上的存在，作為人類與宇宙的「本質」(essence)，而實全是虛構。維根斯坦的「語言的批判」開出了之後邏輯實證論的「反形上學」的潮流，成為西方哲學在上世紀，即二十世紀二十年代以後的英美哲學的主流，至今不衰。但西方此一反形上學的主張不是所謂「方法論的」，而是指西方傳統中各種哲學實即本質主義或形上學的錯誤主張。維根斯坦後期的日常語言分析更指出許多名詞，如「宗教」一詞，用在各種宗教，如天主教、佛教、伊斯蘭教等，實只有「家族的相似性」(family resemblance)，並無確定的定指或實指。這一分析成為當代英美哲學的一個基本的教條。邏輯實證論者用於科學的研究上，則以檢證理論 (confirmation theory) 作為科學的實證的根據，並由此指出由形上學的重要「概念」而來的論述其實都是不能檢證其真假的判斷或真實存在，如「絕對精神」、「實體」(substance) 等，因為名詞都不能通過經驗的驗證，也不能依邏輯分析而得到其真理性，因此，都是「無意義的」(meaningless) 語詞。

波柏的否證論也是依一肯斷或語句能否被否證 (falsified) 作為科學與形上學的「分界線」(demarcation)。在反形而上學的說法上，波柏實與邏輯實證論者無異。⁷⁶波柏反對

⁷⁶ 在邏輯實證論的陣營中，波柏也被認可為同道。而波柏的「否證論」實不如邏輯實證論更接近科學家日常的工作，因而波柏的說法更為科學家所拒絕。六十年代孔恩 (Thomas Kuhn) 的科學史研究成果指出，由科學史之研究與發展所見之科學家的工作，日常只是做「常態科學」(normal science) 的工作，即不斷去檢證科學理論和推展到更廣的科學領域去，而不是去否證科學理論，甚至明知有些科學現象是有違現行的科學理論的，也不會如波柏所主張的即認為該科學理論已被否證而放棄。這些有違現行科學理論的現象，只是暫列為異象 (anomaly)，直到此異象日後漸擴大化、嚴重化，成為一科學「危機」(crisis)，乃有偉大的科學家起而提出新的理論，形成一科學革命，化解此一異象，科學家們才會慢慢放棄原來的理論，接受新的科學理論。此如歷史上的哥白尼革命之以日心說取代地心說、氧化論取代燃素論，以及當代的愛因斯坦的相對論取代牛頓的古典物理學等。而且，牛頓的理論也沒有完全被趕出科學的領域之外，只被視為相對論的一個特殊狀況，即在質量不大和運動速度相對光速而為慢的情況中，可以有效地使用，只是其中的時空概念不再是絕對的時空。這才是上世紀六十年代之後被科學哲學家 and 科學家所接受的科學的實質工作和方法，也因此邏輯實證主義和波柏的否證論都被放棄了。這本是當前西方科學哲學界的常

邏輯證主義是在科學方法的了解上的爭議，波柏也沒有認為邏輯實證論是他所說的「方法論的本質主義」！這可說是林教授的「錯誤詮釋」。若此指控可說，則不知林教授如何分析或理解邏輯實證主義在上世紀數十年來大力反對本質主義和形上學的現象，包括對黑格爾哲學的嚴重批評與主張，何以邏輯實證論仍然是一種波柏所謂的「方法論上的本質主義」？由此可見林教授對於科學方法的了解實有嚴重的錯誤，根本沒有學術和學理的依據的亂用。林教授由此而用到中國哲學如儒家的實踐進路的哲學上，根本是牛頭不對馬嘴的扣帽子的方法，只是借用波柏的用詞，通過由全盤西化派而來的對當代新儒家的不實指控，以表示自己的所謂「後牟宗三」、「後當代新儒學」之說之為有理有據！不知林教授所精熟的王船山是否認為傳統儒學是帝王專制的支持者，或實只是帝王借用陽儒陰法（再加所謂「陽儒陰釋」）的私心而引致中國政治的專制和腐敗？這種片面採取西方思辨哲學的架構硬套在當代新儒學的說法實比很多認為中國沒有哲學的人更惡劣，因為當代新儒學實已高度消化西方主流的哲學和論述，形構成與西方哲學大家足以相比較的龐大體系（如「回應文」表面地在文字上也承認的），而展現出中國哲學現代化的巨大進步。由此可見，林教授所謂對孔孟、宋明儒學以來和當代新儒家的「方法論的本質主義」的指控實為無理，不但不如理不如實，更扭曲宋明儒和當代新儒家之說，誣指為是造成「極端的專制」的禍首。從五四和之後的中國政治發展來看，「回應文」之說實是依當權派以歷史唯物觀和全盤西化派，而無理指控儒家是中國文化和社會政治上一切腐敗和獨裁的根源之反中國文化教條而來。由此可見其所謂的超越當代新儒學的構想，實是一種大話的幻想。

至於「回應文」批評胡適的「大膽的假設，小心的求證」一類的本質主義，不但不知胡適之說實近於波柏的「否認論」，而其根本理念是來自杜威的「實用主義」的「科學方法」，也沒有一點本質主義的意涵。這種指控實是以無可對證的人而立，可以胡亂批判一番以示自己之高明的自欺欺人之說。至於以自己的小孩時候的一個莫名的「錯誤的經驗」，日後的自我糾正，以為即可比於波柏和邏輯實證主義的「科學方法」，不知這種小兒科的學習糾正之舉，縱使提升到「試誤方式」（*trial-and-error method*）的方法，與真正的現代科學方法相差何止千萬里，根本上與現代科學的方法為不同類的初民式的經驗學習表現。西方現代科學也是經過幾千年思辨理性的發展，特別是十六、十七世紀幾位大科學家的突破，才逐漸打破宗教與神權的控制與迫害，而形成科學與科技的長足發展。林教授在此中的錯誤與浮泛聯想等等，實不足再論。至於「回應文」下一節討論所謂「自然科學的因果性」與「人文科學的因果性」之用詞，可謂逆返到西方十九世紀或更前的「科學方法」的幻想，不知現代科學與人文學都已不談「因果性」，實不知如何能有二十一世紀或已進到「現代化之後」的哲學與文化的進步可言？此無怪林教授所堅持的由「外王開內聖」實是前現代化的帝王極權主義的主張而已，何足以言解放和進步。

識，而在此寫此長注是為了批判以下林教授提到波柏的「證誤論」所犯的錯誤說法先做一鋪陳而已。

六、總評所謂「由外王而內聖」的謬論

澄清以上的所謂方法論上的分判之關鍵之後，只須要簡要地指出「回應文」所糾纏不清的歷史和現實的論述內容即見出其虛假性。首先，「回應文」一方面認為中國傳統文化與哲學實只是帝王專制獨裁的依據和落後西方文化的根源，一方面又認為傳統文化中的人倫、自覺與民本並非是落後腐敗的主張，更應在現代世界發揚，云云。「回應文」主張我們現代要「有人倫的人權、有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」，但又不知所謂的人倫、自覺（實踐上的自覺而有的自主自律自由的行動）、民本等如何由實踐來，為何在二千多年來，現代的人權、自由與民主都得不到客觀的落實，如落實在社會政治的制度安排，以使人權、自由、民主得以在中國生根？至於現實政治上的帝王獨裁自非儒家所說的仁政王道的外王，中國歷史上沒有自由民主政權的法制，彰彰明甚的是法家的專制獨裁取向所主張的，結合了佔據國家權力和武力的帝王所形成。此皆是歷代儒者所深感不安和不能為力的地方，故有明末儒者之祈能有「至仁大義的聖人」出來，以實現儒家的仁政王道，以解人民的倒懸。至於儒家所接受的「天視自我民視，天聽自我民聽」，以及如孟子所說的「天子不能以天下與人」等語所表示的天下最高的主權在人民的民主觀念，「回應文」根本上視而不見，或不理解此說中的「民主」的意義。這種觀念之被漠視，被傳統帝王所打壓，即顯見儒家的傳統實有民主人權與自由的基本理念，但被法家式的獨裁統治所禁制了，不但不能見諸行動，連口頭說說都被株連三族至死。而當代新儒家見出傳統文化與哲學由道德理性直接開不出現代化的民主自由之政治制度，所以要吸收西方文化中的科學與民主的成素，正是要在現代中國產生出人權、自由與民主政體，成立現代世界的客觀的社會政治制度。

當代新儒家的核心觀念正是主張學習西方之思辨理性的精神，從中國文化開展出人權、自由與民主政治，而在科學上開出認知主體或思辨理性的內容。由道德理性以道德倫理為核心，以確立外王制度上的人權、自由與民主，以保障治權上的民本，以科學科技發揮現代知識與生產效能，使人民生活無憂，資源充足，真正達到讓人民都能安身立命，養生送死無憾。何曾有當代新儒家主張沒有人倫的人權，沒有民本的民主，沒有自覺的自由？這是當代新儒家共同的核心觀念，實不知林教授所謂「後新儒學」在理念上和學理上如何超過了「當代新儒學」諸位大師之說，更不要說「回應文」沒有一分及得上三位大師所具有的全面和紮實的歷史與學理分析和返本開新的開創性的工作成果。「回應文」或在其他論述都沒有對題和有效的分析或反對儒家的理據可言，而只由各種違反理性的口號而主張無理的由「外王而內聖」的說法，實只是一種無理無據的謬說。細看「回應文」所指為自五四以來不少人之以為反傳統即得到現代化的民主人權和自由等現代化成果，實是由極端西化派與共產主義者的謬說而來，根本與當代新儒家的說法

不相容，不知如何得出當代新儒家即具有所謂「方法論上的本質主義」的弊病，更不知如何可以說當代新儒家與西化派有任何方法論上的共同的而且在政治理論和哲學上嚴重錯失！至於林教授以為採用波柏的「方法論的唯名論」主張，就會取得「有人倫的人權、有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」成果，好像一旦這樣結合便可成功！豈是借用波柏的一個分判，即可以得到西方幾百年的政治奮鬥的成果，這真是語言「魔術」了！

至於「回應文」後文所指為「道之錯置」、中國歷史為「君父聖」之「血緣縱貫系統」等之說，實只是自己的臆造，與中國歷史不相應，更與儒家的外王論述毫無關係。儒家從來沒有什麼「道的錯置」，從來都把道統置在政統上面，歷史上正有無數儒者以道統抗拒無道的政統，自然也有無數儒者被殘殺，被株連三族以至十族的慘劇。如此血淚斑斑的歷史，都是儒者與儒家的太學生在歷史上遺留的和平抗爭史實，西方歷史也不多見。儒家主張的人倫也是倫理義務相對應的關係（reciprocal relation），明顯反對片面的遵從君父的無道無德之行，豈能說這是中國歷史文化的基本錯失，更何能加於儒者身上！人類歷史基本上是從野蠻走向文明的發展，統領部落或國家武力的領導人常是獨裁者，儒家早已知道這個政治暴力是人倫世界罪惡的根源，更表現在集體的治理上，因此，都全力支持以仁為核心，依禮樂而治，行仁政王道；如獨裁者施行暴力，人民得起而革命之（孟子之主張）。由此可見，「回應文」所代表的對儒家與中國文化歷史的詮釋都不對題，完全沒有歷史文獻依據。

林教授所謂的在中國歷史上的政治結構如「君父聖」、「道之錯置」等，大概是最接近法家的主張和現實帝王專制統治的狀況，以及由此扭曲儒家所主張的仁政王道、把以武力取得王者地位的大皇帝打扮成「得天命的聖人」。但這種說法不但只是片面地看中國傳統文化被扭曲的獨裁專制的一面，而完全不見中國傳統士人所力求「申張民主與理性」的行動與實踐的更重要的文化歷史的使命與行動。而中國歷史上專制獨裁的帝制和由一家一姓獨佔國家主權的制度，在中華民國革了滿清王朝之命之後，就已成為歷史。由「外王開內聖」的主張可說是要倒退回中國文化中這一負面和更顛倒的政治權力控制道德，即由帝王專制控制道統與學統的局面。由此可見林教授的主張都不是「後五四」的進步，更是違反當代新儒家開新的主張。當代新儒家從無擁護帝王復辟，更不會懷抱所謂「君父聖」的血緣縱貫式的專制主義和專制關係。至於「回應文」最後更以一般人誤認儒家道德的要求為「太道德」云云，以為是儒家應改為「由外王開內聖」的理由之一，實是莫名其妙毫無理據可說的民粹之言。

至於「回應文」所提的使中國文化能成功發展出民主與科學，必須要從教育與學習西方自由民主開始，而當代新儒家所主張的都只是「理論邏輯次序」的說明，也不是「歷史序的發生次序」云云。這都不是當代新儒家的理論和說法。當代新儒家所重建的由「內聖開外王」是以價值本末輕重之價值層位而立，自是以道德原則和判斷為優先，而以承體起用而由道德開展為社會政治制度。當代新儒家自然不是依歷史的發生次序來論述新

外王，因中國傳統社會在過去二千多年都開不出現代的民主自由的政制，自然也無所謂歷史發展的次序可言。但當代新儒家都知道實現民主政治制度並不是易事，而且必須在國民長期進行實踐方可望有成，民主制度須要相應的教育與社會的一步步發展而成。但這種學習與發展必須依「內聖開外王」的取向才可望能成功現代的民主體制。學習與實踐必須依內聖為基礎，所學習得到的才是民主與科學。如果所學習和教育的是要人民服從政治獨裁者的權威與權力的由「外王開內聖」的方式開展，根本上是與民主科學背道而馳的他律道德方向，只是讓人民更向反民主與反自由的，反智與反人權的發展，以獨裁者的主觀而殘酷的行事和強力壓迫的武力方式而生活和受教育，只是馴化的奴隸，毫無獨立思考能力的愚民，不知如何能成功現代的民主制度和使得科學能獨立發展？林教授把人民的教育與學習為依從政治權力而行，實與成功民主與科學背道而馳的向，實只回復當今人類已不能再接受的被奴役和成為奴隸的順民的政治制度和封閉社會，此豈是合理和有效的發展民主自由社會和取得相應的科學和科技發展的構想。

當代新儒家與宋明儒，以及先秦儒家都是從真切的道德經驗與實踐而來。都是從生命所受和在生活實踐中的經驗而立，因此稱為實踐的進路的哲學，不同於西方從思辨理性或純粹認知理性而來的哲學與長期的形上學的奮鬥。孔孟與宋明儒都明顯地從道德實踐和工夫作為起點而展現心、性、天、命、理、道的實義，孔子以禮樂生活的實踐而指引出仁之為道德價值根源和仁之生命直接而當下的感通意義，而由此進到對天命、人性與天道的詮釋，陳述自己實踐的進階：由立志、立於禮、不惑、知天命、耳順、從心所欲不踰矩等六個道德境界；孟子則由見孺子將入於井之類的日常道德經驗而見證不忍人之心或道德的本心，以及由此證知「盡心知性知天」之道德形上學，以知言和養浩然之氣為工夫，建立「善信美大聖神」六個道德位階。宋明儒者天天在進行道德工夫的實踐，由存天理以克人欲，他們所關心和討論的都是實踐中如何體現天理以成德行，都是見諸於日常的生活中的道德主體的發展，也都關懷和實踐於天下國家大事之中。陽明在朝之戒慎恐懼，東林黨之抗爭，都是儒者堅持良知與帝王專制對抗的血淋淋的史實。宋明儒者豈只是關起門來做聖賢，宋明儒者也實時刻對不當的朝政國事不但口誅筆伐，更捨生取義，不惜為人間公義洒熱血，擲頭顱。縱使在巨大的王權與錦衣衛的恐怖壓力之下，何曾有什麼太「內傾」、「躺平」、「內捲」的畏縮。

唐、牟、徐三位當代新儒家抗拒獨裁專制的統治，流亡海外，不但在學術和文化反省和推展中歷盡艱辛，仍然學富五車，而且受盡中共與左派人士的瘋狂攻擊，和在台的西化派的排擠與打壓，而仍昂然立於天地之間，對不當的政治政策和行動，發出嚴厲的批判與聲討，如牟先生之批判毛澤東的言論，大陸的鳥籠經濟，徐先生彈劾鄧小平的感謝日本人侵華之說，唐先生之痛心見到四個外國人的人像掛於天安門上，強烈象徵中國成為馬列主義的文化殖民地，等等。凡此都表示儒者對中國文化對中華民族受到的屈辱，敢於奮起而爭，不知林教授是否以為此尚不足以言活生生的存在行動，林教授或有更切

近時政時事的針砭之言與社會實踐？當代新儒家之為人景仰，不只是因為他們能為中國文化推動真實而宏大的文化建構，而更是因為他們對現實政治權力的不低頭，而不惜犧牲自己的私人利益，以至家庭的幸福，敢於強烈地批判這些當權者，以全幅生命頂上去，保持人間的正氣與正義。這豈是那些在玩弄哲學名詞，誇誇其談而實無擔當與貢獻之「有識之士」，那些藏頭露尾自甘為權力附庸者的人之所能望其項背者，或被大陸當權者稱為「有用的白痴」的各個領域的專家學者所能及一二者！

貳、結論：當代新儒學邁向成為全人類的共同理想世界

以牟先生的「兩層存有論」作為當代新儒家經由確實而深刻的「返本」於中國歷史文化與經典的研究和抉發其中的義理與洞見所成的中國哲學與文化的現代化的努力，由此所達成的中國哲學現代化的成果，實已融攝西方哲學與文化的精深論述在內，而成為當代儒學的宏偉體系。當代新儒學奠基於人類的日常經驗中的各種理性與價值的表現，建立上通於天理之常道，即人類崇高的價值與貢獻，確立人之為人的價值，人之存在上不可被剝奪的生命尊嚴，以及可寄望從中國文化發展出現代化的理性的新外王，永遠摒除政治權力的腐敗與壓逼民生的惡政，以使人人的生命真正得以「安身立命」，人人皆能各盡其道德的性分與才能之發展，真正達到養生送死無憾。新儒家所主張的圓教和所建立的多元世界，多元的人格和境界的表現，足以使人類由此邁進真正和而不同的大同世界，達到永久的和平和共同的富裕。這不是西方以思辨理性為主的文化所能獨力完成，更不是專制獨裁而暴戾的共產主義的政權所能達致的最高的政治社會民生的大同世界。中國文化與儒家由「內聖開外王」的主張所含藏的結合人倫與社會政治的有序而和諧的世界，此中自然具備人倫道德、民主人權、政治為民生服務，獨立的司法以保障人民的生命財產和安全，社會政治結構為能使人文各方面的價值得以各自發展和創造。如斯方是當代新儒家邁向全球一家，仁者與天地萬物為一體的世界。

在「翻轉文」中，林教授曾認為東南亞國家可以說是他所構想的由學習而成的「由外王開內聖」的範例。我在「批謬文」已根據東南亞的政治實況和發展，指出東南亞家的當權者用以抗拒現代民主人權的所謂「亞洲價值」，實是主張獨裁統治的制度。東南亞國家中所存在的宗教歧視，如以伊斯蘭教為唯一國教，馬來西亞之規定華人的商業體制必須給馬來人佔百分之 50 以上，必須由馬來人任最高的職位，等等，都是違反民主與人權的宗教歧視和種族歧視的制度，由此對人民，特別是華僑的侵凌傷害，已見諸歷年的慘烈的「排華」暴亂之中！但「回應文」卻對此有力的反駁和事實不置一詞，也沒有承認錯誤。若以一最接近林教授所謂「有倫理的人權，有自覺的自由，有民主的民本」的國家制度來說，則中華民國所成的在台灣的社會，可說既有倫常的家庭生活，公平的民主人權社會，執掌政治權力的政黨必須以人民的幸福為依歸，順乎民生需求來施政，

否則即被人民以和平而有效的政治權力，以公開公平的投票和平地趕下台等等。此豈非林教授所祈望能成功的「理想社會」嗎？如此之理想只能是由儒家之以「內聖開外王」才會達成，即，在人人皆為具有道德自覺的道德主體，道德地行使公民的權力，使政府的權力受到道德原則，即公義原則之駕馭和規範，一切政黨與政治機關都受到民眾握有的代表主權的選票所控制，任何政治權力（包括憲法、法律與政策）都不可以違反道德和人性，以及一切行政都必須依道德原理所制訂的至高無上的憲法與法律來施行，而且以政治分權的平衡方式所成的真正有客觀效力的制衡的民主制度。由此所成的人文社會，正是儒家的由「內聖開外王」的理想和目標。

昔日孔老夫子教門人之工夫曰：「博學而篤志，切問而近思，仁在其中矣。」孟子亦以「知言」、「養氣」為工夫。知言是能洞察各種以名亂實、混淆視聽的詖辭、淫辭、邪辭、遁辭而不為其所亂，養氣是培植自己的正義感和道德勇氣，視一切富貴、威武、貧賤等外在壓力如無物，方足以不為所動，而達到道德上的不動心。而王夫之在綜覽和反省歷代之興亡，痛感士人之各種議論之無知而誤國誤民，曾慨歎「害莫大於膚淺」。牟先生亦多反覆引述此言，是有見於當今之世，馬克斯主義者有意以語術傳播反人性的意識形態之禍害之深，使人陷於其意識羅網而不能自拔。凡此，是我們今日辨誣返正所應有之戒慎恐懼的態度。如孟子所言，此文若有所辯，實不得已也。

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Critical Comments on An-Wu Lin's "A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'"

Shui-Chuen Lee*

Abstract

This paper extends the criticism I made in my paper 'From Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness or Vice Versa? - How to Develop a Democratic Government within Chinese Culture? With a Critique of the Fallacy of Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood'(hereafter referred as "critique of fallacy", published in 2022, in response to Lin's paper 'From "Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood" : Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Turn of the Thesis of "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness" ', published in 2021. Hereafter referred as "overturning paper." Hence in the following I will focus my criticism more on his newly expanded arguments. First, this paper points out that Lin's self-proclaimed "Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism," which he claims surpasses Mou Zongsan and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, is an unreasonable and unsubstantiated self-designation. This includes several misunderstandings and misinterpretations. First, he follows the mistaken view that characterizing Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as conservatism or traditionalism is a misunderstanding and distortion of the "returning to the root and opening new development" movement of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism in their attempt to rejuvenate and development of Confucianism, which culminates in the building of an encompassing system of Confucian philosophy with new themes such as professor Mou's twofold ontology and moral metaphysics in contrast to the West. Lin also attacks the renewed theory of the moral mind of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, claiming it in fact has the same philosophical structure as its arch enemy of total westernizationism, that fell into the same obsolete "methodological essentialism" that Karl Popper raised as a critique of a major branch of western traditional philosophies that made the west into a closed society and ended up in totalitarianism. His charge is simply without ground since he did not know the problem of metaphysical essentialism that Popper critique and the completely different practical and moral approach of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism with

metaphysics embodied in a moral approach. He simply neglects the new Outer Kingliness that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism pursued in order to turn Chinese society into an open one with democracy and scientific development as part and parcel of a new Chinese culture. Lin's charge is no less than a categorical fallacy. His further charge is that since the ritual ceremony in traditional Confucianism had a lineage with the old sorcery tradition of ancient China, the theories of moral mind and moral conscience of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism are theories that support what Lin called the "King-father-sage" blood tie system of traditional Chinese society, and thus are theories that support totalitarianism with superstitious belief. This is obviously a distorted way of viewing both traditional and contemporary Confucianism. Pre-Chin Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius upheld the democratic saying from one of the most ancient classics, the Book of Documents: "Heaven sees through what the people see and hears what the people hear." This proposes that the ruler should be determined by the consensus of the people, and political governance should be guided by ren (benevolence), which was a rational and moral state far beyond a superstitious magical society. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has incorporated democracy and science into their "new Outer Kingliness" program. Lin's charges are obviously unfounded. Lin even mocks the heart-breaking expressions of one of the most prominent contemporary Neo-Confucian, Professor Tang Chun-I. Tang spoke about the difficult situation where many Chinese have been forced into exile by political turmoil in recent centuries, facing cruel political persecutions. He emphasized the need to seek self-protection and survival in foreign societies through with mental strength. Lin strangely interprets this as a kind of "metaphysical preservation" to escape the turmoil of real life. This interpretation sounds ignorant and heartless, disregarding the bloody suffering and shameful way of life of our Chinese fellows in such diaspora situations. Lin's idea of rebuilding the inner sagehood of Confucianism with "Outer Kingliness" is, in fact, not Confucianism at all. Instead, it's a camouflage of legalism with a modern totalitarianism and collectivist face.

Last but not least, this paper strongly criticizes Lin's ignorance of the development of Asian countries as good learners of Western culture and their becoming democratic and civic countries. Lin is totally ignorant of the fact that the so-called "Asian values" upheld by some political leaders of Southeast Asia is a slogan in opposition to democracy and freedom, and in fact a reaction against democracy and science development of modernization. Their anti-democratic governance is clearly exposed in their exclusion of the political rights of Chinese immigrants and is a kind of closed society with strong racial and religious discrimination, especially against Chinese immigrants. They are far from Lin's ideal of a society with "human rights with ethical relationship, liberty with self-consciousness, democracy with ethical

governance for people.” If there is any society close to his so-called ideal, it may be Taiwan society under the democratic constitution of the Republic of China, which is basically under the strong influence of the Confucian conception of “Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness” in its historical setting.

Keywords: Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Mou Zongsan, Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Shui-Chuen Lee, An-Wu Lin.

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I. Introduction: The Debate on Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness Is a Debate between Righteousness and Interests in Human Nature

Since the mid-nineteenth century, China and Chinese culture in the late Qing Dynasty were subjected to military and cultural invasion by Western powers. This unveils the nearly two hundred years of Chinese culture's history of resistance and development in pursuit of survival, which has not been successful. Among them, modernization affects the core of Chinese culture in response to the strong challenge of Western culture. Under the suppression of the Manchu Dynasty for more than 200 years, Chinese scholars were not only severely suppressed politically by the comprehensive dictatorship but also by the "literary prison" of confiscating their families and exterminating their clans. In addition, the Manchu royal power occupied the orthodoxy, and traditional intellectuals did not dare to discuss government affairs, did not dare to ask for orders from the people, and even reduced themselves to slaves. Scholars or intellectuals completely lacked an independent and spontaneous mind. They were imprisoned in the prison of textual criticism and lost the ability to respond to the challenges of the times. Therefore, in the first half of the 19th century, it was constantly being invaded by foreign powers, but it was retreating steadily and was on the verge of being partitioned. The corrupt Manchu dynasty's inability to resist foreign aggression led to an intellectual revolution and a total rejection of its politics and culture.

The Revolution of 1911 was a peak. It overthrew the autocratic dynasty, moved towards modern democratic politics, and started modernization. The May Fourth Movement was a peak of cultural reform. However, this high point descended into self-abandonment and struggle for survival due to self-abasement and humiliation. The blindness and fanaticism of intellectuals have instead caused incredible frustration and embarrassment to China and Chinese culture. Taking advantage of its successful Westernization, Japan began to devour China and Asia, not only interrupting China's process of accepting modernization, but also causing unspeakable suffering of its people. Japan's invasion of China was undoubtedly representative of the Western powers. However, traditional Chinese scholars and people could still resist the overwhelming force of powerful ships and cannons. China did not fall in response and did not become a Japanese colony. But in terms of culture, the "total Westernization" that emerged during the May Fourth Movement has expanded into total communism, and Chinese culture has suffered more severe internal oppression and arbitrary slander. Confucianism has been involved in various movements as a burial object since 1949. Foreigners have not ruled the land of China, but China has become a cultural colony of the extreme communist ideology of the West. The

"May Fourth Movement" held high "science and democracy" seemed to be enlightenment, but it was just a slogan. Instead, it transformed into a mountain of extreme Western cultural party ideologies, pressing down on Chinese culture and the Chinese nation. Because the subjectivity of Chinese culture has been exhausted, it cannot make decisions. It can only be like a slave, letting others slaughter it! This can be borrowed from Li Zehou's phrase "Western learning as the body, Chinese learning as the application" to describe China's situation as a Western cultural colony. Subject and object have changed places; the Chinese are merely carriers of the extreme side of Western culture! Among them, the inner sagehood and the outer kingliness are two major cultural topics: the value order and the realistic system of the master-slave relationship between moral ethics and social politics. Chinese traditional culture is "the inner sagehood creates the outer kingliness", which takes morality as the basis of politics. On the contrary, advocating that Chinese culture should be transformed into "the outer kingliness opens up the inner sagehood" is actually to completely replace the subjectivity of Confucianism and Chinese culture in concept. This is not due to the stubbornness and corruption of Confucian scholars, but the result of unlimited violence and authoritarian control exerted by political dictators, and a group of so-called "intellectuals" working together to help them. Therefore, we return to the roots and reconstruct the Confucian way of "inner sagehood and outer kingliness" and criticize the fallacy of the so-called "outer kingliness and inner sagehood". Thoroughly criticizing and eliminating the core principle of communism, that is, the proposition that people have no humanity but only class nature, is an issue of the times that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism cannot be exempted from. This is the practical manifestation of the so-called "outer kingliness opening up inner sagehood" in today's topic. As Mr. Mou has pointed out many times, if the principles of communism remain unchanged, Chinese culture will inevitably be eradicated, and the Chinese nation will always be enslaved and culturally colonized. The idea of "the inner sagehood opening up the outer kingliness" in traditional Chinese culture means that Confucianism insists that everyone has human nature; that is, they have "the inalienable original value of being a human being." Each person is an end in themselves, has personal dignity, and cannot be used merely as a tool. The ultimate political system pointed to by this is a democratic system that can protect people's lives, dignity, and property. Therefore, this is still an issue of the times that Confucianism cannot escape today. This article still has important philosophical and cultural significance. It also points to the necessary distinction between righteousness and interests in human nature to complete the Confucian ambition of "creating lives for the people."

The Confucian theory of "the inner sagehood creates the outer kingliness" has many theoretical implications and crucial aspects that need clarification. Furthermore, the issue of

Chinese cultural modernization (not Westernization) that this concept points to must be discussed in depth and critically examined. However, An-Wu Lin's article "A Side View of Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood" (hereinafter referred to as the "response article") is merely a brief overview of his self-proclaimed arguments from the past twenty years. This article uses the word "response," which seems to mean responding to other people's criticisms to defend one's views or to reconstruct one's argument. However, if you look closely at the content of this article, it does not contain any new ideas. It only reiterates the points stated in many related articles or books before and does not truly and clearly respond to the severe criticisms made. In the following, we will use documentary evidence and reasoned arguments to demonstrate in detail how the content of this "response" is hollow and self-enclosed, and how it misinterprets Contemporary Neo-Confucianism discourse as well as the expression and direction of Chinese culture. As a starting point for the detailed discussion that follows, I will first provide a summary critique of this article's core themes.

After the passing of Mr. Mou Zongsan, Professor An-Wu Lin began to proclaimed that the arrival of the so-called "post-'Mou Zongsan' era." He consistently maintains that his thinking has surpassed not only Mr. Mou's scholarship and doctrines but also Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, thus referring to himself as a proponent of "Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism." I have pointed out the inaccuracies in his views and arguments at numerous domestic and international conferences on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, but have received no response either during or outside these events. Professor Lin, meanwhile, remains as self-assured as ever. Moreover, Professor Lin even refers to the discussions of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism disciples and friends as "the protector of Confucianism." It seems that many disciples and friends of Masters Tang and Mou are just repeating the statements of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism masters and unreasonably defending Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. In many discussions, Professor Lin further advocates a synthesis with Marxism (or what some mainland Confucian scholars euphemistically term the Confucianization of Marx's philosophy). However, the essence of this approach is to subordinate Confucianism to Marxism or communism, distorting or diminishing its fundamental principle to accommodate communist ideology. This amounts to a "Marxistization of Confucianism." Any assertion that the outer king determines the inner sage (i.e. that political power determines morality) exemplifies this "Marxist Confucianism." Such a stance echoes the theory of traditional Chinese Legalism, where the emperor monopolizes all political power to rule his subjects. This political theory of outer kingliness stands in direct opposition to the Confucian ideal of benevolent

kingship.

Confucian scholars have always criticized the Legalist view that advocates for a private world serving only one person or one family. What is worse than traditional Legalism is that this approach distorts the principles of Confucianism and the political philosophy of Western democracy and human rights to support autocratic politics, thereby slandering the basic tenets of Confucianism. Regarding the relationship between morality and politics, Confucianism has always advocated using inner sagehood to establish the right path for outer kingliness, or using morality to establish the structure and direction of the political system. This is exemplified by how Confucius and Mencius used benevolence or empathy as the basis for rituals and music (that is, social and political systems) to establish a benevolent government; Xunzi also believed that people possess "righteousness" and "discernment." He advocated the strengths of individuals to form a community based on etiquette and righteousness, working together to overcome challenges. He also established an objective etiquette principle based on righteousness and discrimination. Although Xunzi is not the mainstream thought of Confucianism, it is still one way of transforming Confucianism from "the inner sagehood to the outer kingliness." Even in the modernization of the West, Western philosophers still established political systems based on morality, which is also a manifestation of the principle that "the inner sagehood creates the outer kingliness." For example, Hume pointed out that the Western philosophical tradition regards justice as the first principle of society. Another example is that Kant established a political system based on the free law of free will, directly based on the free law of will, to establish a "civil society" (Kant, 1965/1999). Today's classic statements in Western political philosophy, such as *A Theory of Justice* by Rawls (1999), are also typical discussions on constructing modern democratic regimes based on the principle of justice. Principles of justice are moral principles. It can be seen that Western political philosophy's theory and practice both construct political systems based on moral laws and develop political theories based on morality. This is the basic principle of building a democratic government, that is, the fundamental method of "internal saints opening up external kings." This also shows that Confucian political theory, constructed from morality, is not incompatible with liberal democracy. On the contrary, it can also be seen that the notion of "outer kingliness creating inner sagehood" violates Confucianism's fundamental principles and represents an anti-Confucian political discourse based on the power of those in authority.

The traditional Legalist view of a great emperor with exclusive power is the concubine way that Confucians despise. The Legalist idea of "opening up the inner sage through the outer king" places the "Tao" on the power of an individual or a political party, the emperor and the

father. Only by relying on political dictatorial power to regulate morality and control subordinates and people can it truly be a "misplacement of Tao." This statement flatters and pleases the dictator who holds power. How can it be a proposition of Confucianism? It can also be seen that this theory of stipulating inner saints by outer kings obviously violates Confucianism's core principles. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has continuously and clearly stated that it supports the new foreign king of modern democratic and liberal political systems and cuts off the evil roots of dictatorship. This idea of letting the outer king determine the inner saint is even more arrogant than Confucianism's harmful use and suppression by traditional imperial autocracy! Traditional Confucians could not overthrow and resist the autocratic emperor through actions because Confucianists opposed forming political parties for personal gain and did not have the corresponding armed force to overthrow the autocratic dynasty. However, the Taoist system must be placed above the political system, and the heaven or heavenly law must be used to limit the monopoly of the royal power. If we instead use the power of social and political reality to regulate the "inner saint" (no doubt using etiquette and law to guide benevolence). The intention of those in power becomes the only standard of morality and the only source of social value, allowing political violence to be completely unrestricted. It supports the idea of imperial autocracy and is a regression to the traditional notion of imperial autocracy. How can this view go beyond the pursuit of democracy and scientific ideals of the May Fourth era? How can it go beyond the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism that returns to its origins to promote the original meaning of Confucianism? Thus, a new Confucian study of foreign kings was created that absorbed and digested the democracy and science that represented the achievements of Western modernization. The following is a serious academic and theoretical refutation of the content and absurdity of the "response article."

1. The "Response Article" is Actually a Collage of Old Articles and Has No New Ideas.

An-Wu Lin's "response article" is merely a compilation of old articles. It is self-contradictory and lacks any new ideas. The views of this article are expanded from a more recent article, "From 'Outer Kingliness' to 'Inner Sagehood': The reversal of 'Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness' after Neo-Confucianism" (from now on referred to as "reversal article") (Lin, 2021). I have already published an article on "'Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness'? 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'? - How Chinese Culture Constructs a Democratic System from the Inner Sagehood and Refutes the Fallacy of the So-called 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'" (after this referred to as "Criticism" Article") (Li, 2022) Sections 5 and

6 of the article will be criticized in detail. Moreover, at the Chinese Philosophical Research Center, the fourth "Ehu Lecture" was held on September 3, 2022, with the theme of "Inner Sagehood, Outer Kingliness, or Outer Kingliness, Inner Sagehood." Professor An-Wu Lin and I conducted detailed mutual discussions. Different viewpoints were discussed and debated in detail, and the article "Criticizing Essays" was published in advance and is listed alongside the "Reversal Essays" in the lecture's reference materials. I directly criticized it in the lecture, but An-Wu Lin failed to respond positively to the questioning and criticism of his views in various aspects, including errors in historical facts, misinterpretations of Confucian doctrines, and lack of substantive exposition in the "criticism article." In his lecture, Professor Lin talked nonsense about Wang Fuzhi's metaphysics and other irrelevant discussions. However, this "response essay" remains the same as before, without any response to the topic at all, and only repeats the errors and mistakes that have been criticized. False arguments are not worthy of further comment. Because of the strong invitation from the editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Indigenous Counseling Psychology*, I reluctantly made further criticism. I hope Professor Lin can face the errors in his argument head-on and make corrections. Or point out the mistakes and inappropriateness of my criticisms and clearly distinguish them so that my efforts and the high hopes of the editor-in-chief are not in vain. Otherwise, the academic pursuit of the ideal that "debate brings clarity" will degenerate into a situation where "more debate leads to more sophistry." They only want to confuse the audience. More seriously, they have overlooked Mr. Mou Zongsan's stern criticism of ideology that distort semantics and meaning. Such distortion, in his view, is truly a sin against philosophy.

The "response article" is slightly different from the previous "reversal article" in that it reiterates that although Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and the "thorough anti-traditionalists" of the May Fourth era may seem hostile on the surface, they hold the same "methodology": "methodological essentialism" (Popper, 1945). Therefore, Professor An-Wu Lin believes that not only can this be used to criticize all Westernizers, but also Contemporary Neo-Confucianism can also be criticized based on this. This is because some Westerners call Contemporary Neo-Confucianism "traditionalism" and can be criticized together. As for the self-contradiction and incomprehensibility contained in Professor Lin's use of this term and the fallacy of confusing Contemporary Neo-Confucianism with an alternative "total Westernization school," we will provide a detailed analysis below. Since the "response article" clearly refers to the "total Westernization" since the May Fourth Movement as "thorough anti-traditionalism," and many discussions in Contemporary Neo-Confucianism refute and oppose the idea of "total Westernization". Therefore, to prevent the following discussion from being misled by

terminology, in the following article, the term "comprehensive Westernization school" or "Westernization school" will be used to replace the so-called "thorough Westernization school" in the "response article" with the meaning and representative figure that is familiar to the academic circle and clearly understood. "anti-traditionalism" to facilitate academic discussion.

2. A Summary of the Philosophical Significance of Mr. Mou's "Two-Level Ontology" and An-Wu Lin's Misinterpretations and Incomprehensible Points

I will criticize the first section of the "response article" in three points. The first is Professor Lin's understanding of Mr. Mou's philosophical system. Consistent with Professor Lin's previous discussion methods, the first section of the "response article" starts with some of his subjective feelings. On the one hand, he confidently asserts that he is Mou's disciple and the "first Ph.D. supervised by Mr. Mou at National Taiwan University." But he seems unaware that what Mr. Mou most strongly criticized in his life was the various forms of misconduct by teachers and students in the Department of Philosophy at National Taiwan University, including chaos and partisan power struggle. On the other hand, Professor Lin seems to praise Mr. Mou's teachings as "the Dao connecting the past and the present." However, the content fails to address how Mou Zongsan's philosophy evolved from an in-depth study of contemporary Western science, mathematics, and logic. See the characteristics and contributions of speculative reason. The transcendental reflection can be traced back to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and formed the early theory system of "Critique of the Cognitive Mind." After middle age, Mr. Mou kept learning and thinking and made significant progress. He further understood Kant's dual meanings: "intelligence is the law of nature" and "free will is the law of the moral kingdom." Criticizing Kant's insufficient understanding of free will in moral rationality and after years of digestion and use of the three schools of Chinese Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. In particular, Buddhist principles establish the Confucian "two-level ontology" philosophical system. The "reversal article" generally states that "sincerity connects the world," or just one sentence says that Mr. Mou fully digested Kant. Talking about Mr. Mou's vast and comprehensive system is not enough to explain his philosophy, let alone the joys and sorrows of philosophy and the philosophical significance of his self-statement that "philosophy is the only thing a person concentrates on in his life" (Lin, 2011). "Sincerity connects the world" is merely a repetition of previous descriptions applied to various Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming Dynasties. It is general, empty, and unrelated to Mr. Mou's core philosophical principles and achievements. By doing this, he assumes that he has captured the basic essence

of Mr. Mou's philosophical system, and then proceeds to falsely claim that he has entered the "post-Mou Zongsan era" and surpassed Mr. Mou's achievements. This is actually deceiving oneself and others.

Since Professor Lin's idea of "outer kingliness opening up the inner sagehood" is directly related to his self-proclaimed "philosophy" of "post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" that he believes criticizes and transcends Mr. Mou Zongsan's "two-level ontology." Here, we need to first analyze its propositions and fundamental misinterpretations and misunderstandings of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, especially the key points and philosophical contributions of Mr. Mou's philosophical system, in order to see the fallacy in his theory of "the outer kingliness opens the inner sagehood." First, let's briefly review the key points of Mr. Chen Mou's philosophy. In his early days, Mr. Mou mainly studied Western contemporary philosophy, logic, mathematical philosophy, and scientific philosophy. In the mid-term, Mr. Mou fully reflected on the topic of China's modernization, studied Chinese philosophy and literature, and further absorbed and digested Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and "Critique of Practical Reason" (including "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" and other discussions), then integrating Heidegger's criticism and development of Kant, he proposed the famous "two-level ontology" in the book "Phenomena and Things in Itself", and the construction of philosophy first manifested itself in the development of "awareness of the body." Mr. Mou relied on the Confucian concern that moral consciousness is the first source of life, and the existence of the ontological meaning of the moral world is established through the presentation of the moral original heart or conscience, also known as the "non-attachment theory of existence." Mr. Mou pointed out that Moral consciousness directly opens up the moral world, and the experience of the unity of subject and object presented in moral actions must have the meaning of the unity of nature and man. Moral practice ideals must be achieved by moral subjects, who must have "cognition" of things in life in the action world to implement moral requirements more effectively. Therefore, the "objects" of moral actions the performance of "returning to the heart" has retreated into the cognitive model of "subject and object opposition." This is the meaning of the so-called "objectification" of objects, that is, the existence of objects that are integrated initially in moral practice is pierced out to form a cognitive relationship of subject and object opposition to achieve successful cognition of objects and assist the requirements of the original moral heart, For example, get knowledge of food, medicine, and human physiology can better fulfill children's "filial piety" toward their parents. This is the academic significance of the so-called "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" to open up the phenomenal world.

The "intellectual subject" developed from the "practical rationality" of the original heart

of morality is a clear response to the different expressions of moral rationality and speculative rationality (or cognitive rationality), establishing an essential ontological perspective of two-level ontology. This is not the "explanatory theory" commonly used by general and incomprehensible people, the random criticism that unreasonably distorts the meaning of conscience as the unity of subject and object, or even the subjective "idealism" and other random criticisms. It can be seen that the two-level ontology not only focuses on conscience and natural principles as the transcendent and internal basis for moral practice but also explains how to implement practical actions, which require the recognition of objects and the differences between cognition and moral practice way of expression. The two-level ontology naturally connects the metaphysical and metaphysical worlds. The world is just one metaphysical and metaphysical world. There are no two worlds or dualism! Moreover, moral practice is daily, and the moral heart or conscience is active, the starting point of all our discussions. How can it be like Professor Lin criticizing Mr. Mou for making the mind become "theoretical and transcendental," formalizing, purifying, and even "abstraction" (Lin, 2011)? Mr. Mou and three Contemporary Neo-Confucianists, Tang and Xu, all attach great importance to the practice of moral subjects in daily life and regard moral practice as the concrete manifestation and realization of conscience. This is the direct inheritance of Mr. Xiong Shili's "Liangzhi is the manifestation" and the core principle of the understanding and realization of the original heart of morality and conscience by Confucian scholars of all ages since Confucius. The three gentlemen often criticize those in power directly with their consciences regarding the current various man-made disasters, the pain and harm suffered by the Chinese nation regarding specific social, political, and people's livelihood, and so on. Putting forward clear and severe criticism and expressing it through personal actions is not what ordinary "intellectuals" who hide in academies and rely on authority do. Every "self" mentioned here, including themselves, is a living being constantly striving to improve under the vast political power and painful life. What the Confucianists say is based on introspection and criticism through countless hardships and hardships in life practice and is born from the real sense of existence in nature and destiny. It is me who makes the moral decisions of my existence in moral practice every day (Mou Zongsan, 2000). Is it what Professor An-Wu Lin calls "a transcendent, pure form of me" (Lin, 2011) ?

However, the rational meaning expressed by this "I" is not limited to specific experience situations but is a common principle that applies to all similar situations, so it has a transcendent ontological meaning. Said to be a moral subject, the cognitive subject expresses the transcendent status of this subject and the objectivity of the universality and universality of

morality and knowledge resulting from it. In the paragraph following Professor Lin's article quoted above, Professor Lin further accuses Mr. Mou of establishing the moral subject of self: "I am actually a pure, transcendent, self-natured self, or the self in the wisdom world. That is, I can reach the realm of things themselves. That self cannot be limited by experience or history. It is far beyond experience and history and also affects them. So Mr. Mou talks about the self as a transcendent, pure form of self" (Lin, 2011). If Professor Lin really understood the meaning of "building the body and establishing the pole" mentioned by Mr. Xiong, he would not be so ignorant of the ontology of conscience and awareness established by Mr. Mou's "two-level ontology" (The "noumenon" of the nature and nature of mind is one, that is, the mind-body that is active and exists.) that contemporary New Confucians and Mr. Xiong want to reconstruct. But this ontology is not a top-down "arbitrary metaphysics" as Professor Lin distorts it (to borrow a famous saying from morality). In Mr. Mou's theory, the Confucian's ability to stand upright in this ontology comes from moral practice, that is, a lively life entity witnessed by the presentation of the original moral heart that is "reversely realized" in moral experience. Through this, people can be "similar" to heaven and earth, can sympathize with heaven and earth, and then witness that conscience is the law of heaven. This is the deep meaning of the "three meanings of moral rationality" and "moral metaphysics" discussed by Mr. Mou.

The moral experience of "ni-chueh-ti-jeng"(conscience insight) is present in our daily lives and actions. Everyone has it, and everyone can realize it. Practice is the practical principle in daily ethics, and becoming virtuous means expanding one's sense of benevolence in life. Virtue is the vitality of life that everyone always feels, the lively and real existence. How could one think this "substantial self" is just an abstract, formal "self"? This is how our authentic selves always appear in our actual experience, which enables us to maintain a sense of moral reality and often have unyielding moral perceptions, judgments, and actions! Because this ontology transcends the limitations of any specific experience and history, it can be a free subject, allowing us to break through the limitations of reality. Therefore, it has the self-requirement of "not prescribing fate" and "not allowing ourselves to be tolerated." A moral act of sacrificing one's life for righteousness. Professor Lin's accusation in the above quotation is not only unreasonable but actually contains a self-contradictory statement. On the one hand, it admits that this ontology can transcend the limitations of specific experience and history, but it can also "act on experience and history." If this ontology is only transcendent, formal, or abstract, it has nothing to do with the development of history; if this moral "I" can be developed in history, how can it be just a formal and abstract thing?! The "cognitive self" established by Western philosophers through speculative reason is truly formal and has nothing to do with the practice

of the "self" in real life. Therefore, the intellectual subject can never discuss moral practice, so Kant must transcend the "logical self" of this "intellectual subject" and enter into the "moral self" or free will in practical reason to establish practical principles or morality. This principle leads to free will and opens up the modern democratic political system. If this ontology can influence experience and history, it must be present and used in our natural and specific life processes. How can it be just an abstract form of "I"? Professor Lin has many such contradictions; the above paragraph is just a tiny sample.

For another example, Professor Lin constantly accuses Mr. Mou of establishing that the "self" represented by the moral subjectivity in each of our lives is actually just "the subject of such a person. It is a formal subject, an abstract subject, and an empty subject: such practices are often more practices that belong to the cultivation of mind and less practice in the sense of happening in actual society." (Lin, 2011). This kind of unfounded and obviously contrary to Mr. Mou's clear statement can actually be so blatantly arbitrary and accuse someone who once claimed to be his mentor without any basis for analysis! This passage shows Professor Lin's often self-contradictory statements in his writing without realizing it. If this subject is only abstract, formal, etc., how can it be seen in our "practice of mind cultivation"? The cultivation of the mind always refers to the specific manifestation of daily ethics. There is no Confucian who does not talk about the expression of moral practice of mind, and no Confucian thinks that this is just an abstract thinking or concept (Wang Yangming emphasized the practical significance of the unity of knowledge and action, not to mention), Whether Professor Lin truly understands the true meaning of the Confucian practice of Gongfu every day, the practice of character cultivation is present in daily life. Whether you are in the process of moral self-examination of personal "quiet meditation" or "sitting quietly to preserve the natural principles and eliminate human desires," or when handling cases in court or fighting for people's justice with those in power, in changing the country and in the struggle between the social atmosphere and the system, your life will be implemented in the daily concrete and real situations. This is the actual practical existence activity of life.

Sages merely excel at illuminating and establishing the subjectivity of moral practice and the existence of practical subjects. They can also expand the connections between people, and between humanity and the universe, preventing us from sinking into human desires and corrupt living, or into discourse devoid of righteousness and emptiness. Isn't this the ontology that Confucians or contemporary New Confucians such as Mr. Mou must present in their daily life practice? Since Confucius, has Confucianism less influenced history over the past two thousand years? The ideals of Confucianism are obviously limited by the system and power in history

and cannot be fully expressed. Therefore, there are constant fierce struggles and ruthless destruction by the authoritarian royal power, vassal relatives, and internal prisons! Don't Confucians know all the resistance involved, but they still have no choice but to devote their lives to fighting until they sacrifice their lives? How can there be a moral practice that does not impact social reality? Perhaps what Professor Lin calls "little practice in the sense of real society" is different from Confucian moral practice and the performance required in life and actions represented by Confucian scholars or Mr. Mou. It is not a bloody reality. What he calls "cultivation of mind" is something different, not a "cultivation" that truly exists in history and in the lives of Confucian scholars. I believe that not only the Confucian scholars will oppose the evil deeds of political parties or dictators who dare to use violence to destroy the people, but the people will also rise to resist because this is a violent and evil act that violates human nature and ethics.

3. The Misunderstanding of Chinese and Western Culture and Philosophy Shown in the "Response Article" and the Disregard of Mr. Mou's Philosophy and the Contribution of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism to Culture and Philosophy

As for the "response article" that borrows the term "glocalization" coined by Western environmental ethicists to refer to the philosophical characteristics of Confucianism (which summarizes Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and Mr. Mou Zongsan, etc.), Professor Lin thinks it is useful, and this word can highlight the "universality of truth" that Confucianism talks about. However, this comparison is inappropriate and ill-fitting. It is not known that the way Contemporary Neo-Confucianism expresses its principles is the orientation of "returning to the roots and creating new ones" to show how the inherited principles of ancient sages and sages are truly universal and can be brought into play in the current era. The significance of further innovation is far beyond the meaning and connotation that the word glocalization can express. This serves as another example of An-Wu Lin's tendency to use inappropriate terminology and make unjustified leaps in his comparisons.

As for the "response article" in which Mr. Mou advanced over Song and Ming Confucianism and Wang Chuanshan, citing his "rejection of Buddhism" as an example, this is a highly one-sided and incompatible statement that is inconsistent with Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. The "response article" said that "the theory of rejecting Buddhism" "From the Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming Dynasties, it was already a big step forward to Wang Chuanshan, and from Wang Chuanshan to Xiong Shili, it was another big step forward. From

Xiong Shili to Mou Zongsan, it was another big step forward entry," and so on. Professor Lin seems to have forgotten that Wang Fuzhi also used the rejection of Buddhism to refute the Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties as "Yang Confucianism and Yin Buddhism." Mr. Tang Junyi once commented that it was "the most unreasonable theory" of Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties. This shows that Wang Chuanshan's "rejection of Buddhism" reflects an unreliable understanding of Buddhism and Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. This is because Wang Chuanshan interpreted the meaning of some Song and Ming Confucian scholars as "Yang Confucianism and Yin Buddhism." Not only did he have a severe estrangement from Confucianism, but he also probably fell behind what many Song and Ming Confucian scholars understood about the importance and precise views of rejection of Buddhism and Buddhism. But it is also disappointing that the response article did not explain the characteristics of Wang Fuzhi's "rejection of Buddhism" and how he surpassed other Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming Dynasties. What is more serious is that Wang Chuanshan was brought in under the guise of this one-sided discussion, thinking that it would help to show that the foundation of Wang Chuanshan's studies was reliable and that Wang Chuanshan had his unique insights but ignored them. The topic is "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness," which talks about the basic principles of Confucianism, which are tens of thousands of miles away from the theory of evading Buddhism and have nothing to do with Wang Chuanshan's metaphysics. This is the so-called confusion. Professor Lin just talked nonsense, regarded as a "response." In the Ehu lecture before, he did not face doubts and talked about (in fact, he could not tell) what Wang Fuzhi's "Outer Kingliness" was about. It was just talk nonsense, and I think you have proved your point! I don't know what the "response article" said about Mr. Xiong and Mr. Mou's "rejection of Buddhism." Although Mr. Xiong Shili returned to Confucianism from the Consciousness-Only Sect, he still used Buddhist doctrines to develop discussions on New Confucianism, such as planning to develop the Buddhist "Quantitative Theory" to open up the development of Confucian knowledge theory, which is of positive significance. What Mr. Xiong criticized was mainly those who believed that Mr. Xiong had improperly deviated from the teachings of the Jinling Academy. Mr. Mou is naturally a Confucianist, but he also relies heavily on and appreciates the theory and realm of Buddhism. He is also highly inspiring and forward in elaborating on the principles of Buddhism, and "has made a real contribution to Buddhism" (Mr. Mou's words). Some even criticized Mr. Mou for using Buddhist principles, such as "one mind opens two doors", "knowing the persistence of the mind", affirming the meaning of "Yuanjiao" of Tiantai Sect, etc. This is no longer Confucianism. Of course, this kind of criticism is really out of line and has no academic

rationale. However, Professor An-Wu Lin used the "rejection of the Buddhist theory" to far-fetch Mr. Mou's claim that the "rejection of the Buddhist theory" has made great progress. This is actually far-fetched and has no real meaning. The implication of Wang Fuzhi is even more far-fetched. Such "praise" to Mr. Mou not only cannot fully reflect Mr. Mou's original ideas and contributions to Buddhism, but also only uses it to endorse his own theory of "post-Mou Zongsan".

Professor Lin also made an inexplicable and serious accusation, that is, he believed that the "original mind theory" advocated by Mr. Mou and others in Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, that is, the "philosophy of conscience", is actually related to the "witchcraft" and "spells" in ancient Chinese culture. Inseparable from the monarchy. Professor Lin believes that "the reason why original mind theory has become an important tradition in Chinese philosophy is basically closely related to China's imperial autocracy and the original witchcraft and incantation" (Lin, 2011). He also said, "So we can find that the tradition of conscience studies reached its peak in the Ming Dynasty, and the Ming Dynasty was also the era when China's imperial autocracy reached its peak." (Lin, 2011). I don't know where this accusation comes from. The autocratic imperial rule in Chinese history, whether it was the Ming Dynasty, the Qin Dynasty or the Qing Dynasty, were all imperial autocracies. In the end, they were extremely barbaric and unethical. It was difficult to distinguish between the brutality of the people and the Confucianism. Until death and then stop. The disasters of imperial autocracy were not limited to the Ming Dynasty. Historical records clearly show that the emperors were tyrannical and violent, and it was not limited to the Ming Dynasty. Using this to blame "original mind theory" or Yangming school is actually an opposition to the principles of Yangming mind theory, which is a characteristic of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Implicated in thinking that he was just making excuses for opposing the theory of conscience! However, how Confucianism is inseparably related to the autocratic dictatorship of the emperor, and how the theory of mind is related to the pinnacle of autocracy, are all unfounded accusations and are actually deceptive words. Could it be that all the emperors of the Ming Dynasty were mentalists? Doesn't Professor Lin know that Wang Yangming was also ostracized and persecuted by the imperial court when he was alive? Emperor Yongzheng of the Qing Dynasty was a great dictator who suppressed academia and Confucianism because of his ability to understand "Zen", and his administration was also known for being harsh. I wonder if this is related? But compared to other great emperors, he was not too corrupt or an incompetent dictator.

It is said that the motivation and success of Japan's Meiji Restoration came from scholars and shoguns who studied Wang Yangming's teachings. Does this prove that Professor Lin's

recollection is unreasonable? This is similar to the false accusation that some people in the West believe that the Nazi party's autocratic dictatorship came from the influence of Hegel's philosophy, which is rarely accepted in academic circles. According to rigorous academic and argumentation, it is groundless talk. Returning to Wang Yangming's theory of "illumination conscience," this conscience originates from everyone's inherent mind and body and also connects to nature, heavenly principles, and heavenly ways. Is there any, or only one, theory that can relate to the "mind" of an autocratic emperor? How can it be connected with "witchcraft" and "spell"? Generally speaking, in the development of Chinese philosophy, it is recognized that Confucius transformed the traditional unknowable theory of destiny with the way of heaven and cut off the relationship between virtue and witchcraft. Moreover, Confucius used peace of mind to stabilize human values, making moral rationality the core driving force and support of Chinese culture. As seen in the Wen Gao of the Western Zhou Dynasty before Confucius, there had already been a way of moral practice that responded to the "mandate of heaven" with "respect" and "respect for virtue," which had gradually separated from the Yin people's custom of "respecting ghosts." Moral consciousness shows the "consciousness of worry" characteristic of Chinese culture. Both rulers and people regard moral practice as the first source of all values. It is the basic orientation on which political and cultural development is based.

Mr. Xu Fuguan's careful study of documents from the Western Zhou Dynasty to the Spring and Autumn Period shows that Chinese culture has gradually shifted from how individuals or families monopolize "destiny" to how destiny has come to everyone's inherent nature and value. (Xu Fuguan, 1969). Then Confucius fixed the value of human beings with "benevolence" and combined "mandate of destiny" with "human nature". Therefore, the first sentence of "The Doctrine of the Mean" written nearly a thousand years after the Zhou Dynasty: "The destiny of heaven is called nature." It became the basic tenet of China's theory of human nature. This is the Confucian tradition of transforming the ancient religious beliefs of destiny in terms of doctrine. Culture has become the embodiment of practical rationality. I don't know how this relates to witchcraft or incantation! As for the theory that the relationship between rituals and witchcraft is limited by the ancient relationship between rituals and sacrifices, the presiding priest of the rituals, the talismans used in sacrifices, and the relationship between sacrifices and ghosts and gods shown in ancient texts, the relationship between ritual texts and shamanistic blessings is limited to the relationship between sacrifices and ghosts and gods shown in ancient texts. It is useless to limit the inseparable relationship between rituals and mantras and ignore the development of history and culture and the creation, transformation, and improvement of

sages in the past. Just as Mr. Xu Fuguan has severely criticized the school of antiquity or the school of historical linguistics since the late Qing Dynasty for blindly limiting and misinterpreting the expression of human historical and cultural innovation by using the original meaning of words, inexplicably, ancient sages or philosophers were not allowed to create new ideas, new concepts, and new world views, such as saying that "Yu was just a big worm" and "Benevolence is a pair of two people." I don't know how to understand Zhou Wen's subsequent historical development from this point of view. Regarding the interpretation of sacrifice and governance, Xunzi has already said: "The people think of gods, and the gentlemen think of literature." This is Confucianism's most rational understanding and interpretation on sacrifice and governance, which is enough to refute this "cultural primitive theory". Limiting human culture and Chinese culture to ancient witchcraft culture, and as a result, some people such as Professor Lin are still firmly bound to witchcraft and incantation with conscience or morality and are even more innocently bound to support the pillar of imperial despotism! This is too much to slander Confucianism! They also falsely accuse Chinese culture of going too far! The great sacrifices to heaven and earth and other major sacrifices held in various dynasties in China were indeed presided over by the emperor simply because the emperor represented the entire people. How can it be understood that the emperor plays the role of witchcraft, thus combining the Confucian concept of pursuing a holy king with witchcraft to support autocratic dictatorship? This is a ridiculous and unreasonable idea.

As human history progresses, language and culture innovations are constantly transforming and improving, and new discourses are created and developed unlimited. Both "The Doctrine of the Mean" and "The Great Learning" constantly refer to the practice of morality as "being cautious about independence," the depth of "what others don't know but what one knows alone," and the judgment of each person's "conscience and ability" based on his or her nature, and go with the action. This is exactly what Confucianism requires from Gongfu theory: the deepest moral practice of self-reflection and moral practice, thus achieving true moral behavior and connecting the family, country, and world into a clear moral world. If we say that after the Western Zhou Dynasty, it was thought that the Confucian theory of benevolence and conscience was still combined with the autocracy of witchcraft, incantation, etc. This statement distorts Chinese culture and slanders Confucianism. It is also a statement that contributes to the authoritarian rule. As for what he said next, "What I say is not to say that the study of conscience is the study of imperial autocracy, but that the study of conscience is under the high-pressure rule of an extremely unreasonable imperial autocracy. To fight against that imperial autocracy, intellectuals "Thinking about another opposite" (Lin, 2011). This seems

to mean that the science of conscience not only has nothing to do with imperial autocracy but is also the opposite and a real struggle against it. If these sentences are taken seriously, then Professor Lin should be said to support the theory of conscience or conscience, and even think that Confucianism's emphasis on conscience is not the same as imperial autocracy, but is in constant opposition. But Professor Lin's next sentence states that "the two are structurally consistent, that is, the inner essential structures of conscience theory and imperial autocratic thinking are often the same" (Lin, 2011)! This is really self-contradictory nonsense and confusing "linguistics!"

4. "Response" to the Blind Spots of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism's Pursuit of Modernization

Professor An-Wu Lin always likes to claim that he has entered the so-called "post-May Fourth movement" and calls himself "post-Mou Zongsan". But what he meant by "post-May Fourth" and "post-Mou Zongsan" is incomprehensible. An-Wu Lin believed that Mr. Mou Zongsan and others were only in the "late stage of May Fourth"; that is, they had not yet surpassed the stage of May Fourth, while he himself was a "post-May Fourth" and so on. The "response article" begins by stating that Mr. Mou and others' response to the May Fourth Movement was a conservative approach to returning to the roots and innovating. It also goes so far as to say that the second generation of Contemporary Neo-Confucianists "have one thing in common with the hostile camps: they are interested in modern democracy and science, they basically accept it in full, and they all believe that the West is an advanced and progressive civilization, and the Chinese should study hard and catch up." It all sounds like "total westernization" or later "communization". Completely unaware of the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism criticism of the May Fourth Movement, that is, they accept the affirmation of democracy and science contained in it, and believe that this is exactly what Confucianism pursues but fails to achieve in the ideal pursuit of outer kingliness in terms of knowledge and career, but has never believed that Western culture is comprehensively advanced and superior to traditional Chinese culture and philosophy. Contemporary Neo-Confucians do not think that traditional Confucians have ignored the practice of outer kingliness but believe that the traditional Confucian method of directly developing outer kingliness from inner sagehood was unsuccessful. This is a historical fact and reflection on how to develop modern democracy and science. Therefore, there is the theory of "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," which creates intellectual and political subjects from moral and practical reasons to create modern democracy

and science. This is an attempt to reconstruct the Confucian theory of inner sagehood and outer kingliness from the functional difference between human speculative rationality and practical rationality. On the one hand, this is reinterpreting and developing the basic principles of Confucianism (returning to the roots) and thereby opening up new ideas. The development of democracy and science (breaking new ground) is not conservatism as the "response article" arbitrarily refers to, let alone being a "comprehensive acceptance" of Western modernization.

It can be said that those who think that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism's acceptance of democracy and science means a complete acceptance of Western culture and politics do not know the principles of Confucianism or what Contemporary Neo-Confucianism says. It can also be noted that they do not know the advantages and disadvantages of Western modernization. Professor An-Wu Lin seems utterly unaware that Mr. Mou (and Mr. Tang Junyi and Xu Fuguan) also have many pertinent criticisms of Western politics and society. Mr. Mou has laid out the basic principles of the social entity that Chinese cultural modernization should have: using Confucian ethical values to promote family and social construction in modernization. Mr. Tang's criticism of Western society and culture is more based on the reflection and development of humanism. It is neither a blind acceptance nor a one-sided denial or opposition. Mr. Xu Fuguan also made similar criticisms. Various extreme and unreasonable manifestations in Western culture and philosophy, especially fascism and the organizations and systems of the Communist Party that have evolved into dictatorships, are all seen by contemporary New Confucians and are also the target of Confucian criticism. Therefore, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is truly an attitude and method of "critical acceptance" of Western philosophy and culture. From this we can see that the contemporary New Confucian orientation of "returning to the roots and creating new ones" is completely different from "Chinese learning as the body and Western learning as the application" and "total Westernization". It is also different from the "total Marxist" or "communist" orientations. The modernization promoted by Contemporary Neo-Confucianism by assimilating democracy and science is not "the modernization of Western culture", but rather absorbs and digests the advantages of Western culture and criticizes its shortcomings based on the core principles of traditional Chinese culture. The "breaking new ground" here is actually developing the function of our speculative reason to develop the democratic and scientific construction we need now, but never giving up or belittling the lofty status of practical or moral reason. Moreover, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is not like the common vulgar and unintelligible doctrines and ignorance of the complexity and long-term nature of cultural development reflected in the "response essays." Confucians are believed to believe that by changing their mentality in this way, modernization

can be achieved overnight, let alone that Philosophers can do the work of modernization. Of course, contemporary New Confucians hope to witness the successful and true "modernization" of Chinese culture, but they are by no means pretentious about their belief that they have successfully modernized. China still has a long way to go regarding its democratic political system and scientific thinking spirit, and there are endless twists and turns. How can the ideas of one or two philosophers accomplish this?

Professor Lin's views are often confusing. He often applies the views of extreme Westernizers to Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and slanders them. Professor Lin has been using Westernizer or Communism to describe Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. For example, referring to Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as "neoconservatism," "cultural conservatism," "Neo-traditionalists," "neo-traditionalists, and thoroughly anti-traditionalists. These two camps seem to be right, but they both fully affirm the basic content of Western modernization", "Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as neo-traditionalism," and so on. In fact, he is using language to "disguise reality" by confusing many truly traditional conservatives and traditionalists with Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and especially labeling Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as "neoconservatism." The name is the same as the Westernization school. Therefore, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism can be criticized on various charges that are entirely unrelated to it. Just as communism always accuses Contemporary Neo-Confucianism of opposing communism as being "anti-communist and anti-China". Therefore, the "response article" makes people read that it is not an academic discussion but a declaration to pull people on one's own side, and I don't know what academic significance it has. Professor An-Wu Lin's confusing and contradictory statements make it even clear that readers feel "dazzled"!

Before severely criticizing the fallacy called "methodological essentialism" shared by Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and outright anti-traditionalism, I would like to give one more example to illustrate this slanderous, self-contradictory, and inexplicable statement. Professor Lam pointed out, "After 1949, contemporary New Confucians who fled to Hong Kong can't help but lament that the flowers and fruits are scattered... Under this situation, it is not easy to seek "self-plantation of spiritual roots" (Lin, 2024). He also said: "Qian Mu, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Zhang Pijie," and the New Asia spirit managed by Xu Fuguan and others have indeed started the work of "self-plantation of spiritual roots"" (Lin, 2024). He also said, "Not only are spiritual roots self-planting, but these spiritual roots must be planted between the sky and the earth. They must be moistened by rain and dew and illuminated by the sun and moon." However, he also said, "Contemporary Neo-Confucianism places too much emphasis on the self-planting of spiritual roots. This "spiritual root" after deep philosophical

interpretation, becomes a metaphysical ontology” (Lin, 2024). "Contemporary Neo-Confucianism places too much emphasis on the self-plantation of spiritual roots. After deep philosophical interpretation, this 'spiritual root' becomes a metaphysical ontology. To achieve 'metaphysical preservation,' of course, there is also a need for 'metaphysical enlightenment.' In this book, Shengyi created a new outer kingliness and thus became a practical force that must be activated” (Lin, 2024) and so on. The problem is that I don't know how Professor Lin understands “why spiritual roots need to be self-established.” What is a "spiritual root"? As we all know, Mr. Tang's idea of “self-plantation of spiritual roots” is to pray for the Chinese nation to be dispersed in foreign countries, living under the fence of foreigners, and suffering all kinds of hardships and persecutions (such as anti-Chinese in Southeast Asian countries, the robbery, rape and murder of countless overseas Chinese women during the Indonesian riots, etc.) in their lives, they can be physically and mentally healthy and be able to settle down and live in a foreign land. This is to hope that the Chinese people can integrate with foreign races and foreign countries in their lives and feel at ease. Of course, this is extremely difficult. However, Mr. Tang, who is rooted in the Confucian spirit of Chinese culture, still faces it with an optimistic attitude. This is a real problem planted in foreign soil. How can it be "metaphysical preservation"! This is a matter of human life in this generation, stained with blood and tears! Then Professor Lin believed that “what is ‘metaphysically preserved’ is ‘morality’, while what is ‘metaphysically opened’ is ‘knowledge’” and so on. Morality is the metaphysical preservation of spiritual roots. This is an inexplicable dream. Morality is real and can be seen in practice. I don't know how to preserve spiritual roots metaphysically. Don't you even know what the term “metaphysical preservation” means? I really don't know that Professor Lin came up with such absurd and boring arguments based on that kind of metaphysical thinking and regarded the current disasters suffered by the Chinese nation in a foreign place as a language trick!

This is just to show that most of the "response articles" are just talking to themselves in a sleep-like manner, which makes it impossible for people to test and verify them seriously with academic documents or historical facts. It is just a bunch of language I don't know and has no academic or objective meaning.

5. "Response Article" criticizes the methodology of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and radical anti-traditionalists

An-Wu Lin not only misunderstood and failed to understand the achievements of

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism in reconstructing Confucianism and the existing inner sage and outer kingliness through the method of "returning to the roots and creating a new one." He also believes that although Contemporary Neo-Confucianism opposes the "thoroughly anti-traditional" Westernization school, the two are fellow travelers who adopt the same methodological essentialism. In his "response article," Professor Lin also borrowed Popper's anti-dictatorship terminology to express the most crucial rationale for opening the inner sagehood from the outer kingliness. Therefore, both Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and Westernizers have made the same mistake: "methodological essentialism." Contemporary Neo-Confucians have become supporters of Westernizers and autocracy, so "post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" can have a role. On the surface, this seems to be the only academically significant argument raised in the "response article" compared to the "reversal article" (Lin, 2024). Although it is still just a self-righteous argument from before, using a long list of discussions that are not Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, as well as the alleged concepts and history that do not exist, to fabricate one's own "post-'Mou Zongsan'" and "post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" discussion as a comparison. Given that this clear accusation appears to have reasonable academic arguments, it is worth taking this opportunity to seriously refute its fallacies.

Anti-essentialism was originally an existential criticism of the mistake of traditional Western philosophy since Plato, in which "essence precedes existence." Existentialism believes that the actual existence of human beings is more important and has priority, so it advocates that "existence precedes essence" to relieve the pain of alienation and alienation of modern people. Existentialism returns from the thinking of abstract universal ideas or concepts in traditional Western philosophy to the many real existential feelings everyone has, such as anxiety, fear, terror, alienation, etc., which have their rationality. But the most powerful anti-essentialism, which comes from the Western philosophical tradition, is to criticize the fallacies of traditional Western metaphysics through speculative reason. For example, Kant said that judgments such as traditional philosophical arguments for the existence of God, whether the world has a beginning or not, whether there is the most straightforward unit, etc., all go beyond the limitations of perceptuality and intelligence, and produce only specious "dialectical illusions." This is a self-criticism of the fictitious concepts constructed by Western traditional metaphysics, which have no empirical or cognitive basis and come from speculative reasons. Modern development comes from Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis, which points out that metaphysics is a misuse of language, that is, using language that is only suitable for describing the world for fictitious and non-existent things, such as souls, entities, etc., and even think that

this terminology refers to a metaphysical existence as the "essence" of human beings and the universe. Still, it is all fiction. Wittgenstein's "Critique of Language" ushered in the subsequent "anti-metaphysics" trend of logical positivism, which became the mainstream of Western philosophy in the last century, that is, in British and American philosophy after the 1920s, and continues to this day. However, this anti-metaphysical proposition in the West is not so-called "methodological" but refers to various philosophical realist, essentialist, or metaphysical erroneous claims in the Western tradition. Wittgenstein's later analysis of everyday language even pointed out that many nouns, such as the word "religion," are used in various religions, such as Catholicism, Buddhism, Islam, etc. Still, they only have "family resemblance" (family resemblance) and have no meaning. Definite designation or actual designation. This analysis has become a fundamental dogma of contemporary British and American philosophy. When applied to scientific research, logical positivists use confirmation theory as the empirical basis of science and thus point out that discussions based on important metaphysical "concepts" cannot verify them. Judgments of true and false or real existence, such as "absolute god", "substance", etc. Because nouns cannot be verified by experience, nor can their truth be obtained through logical analysis, they are all "meaningless" words.

Popper's falsification theory also relies on whether an assertion or statement can be falsified as the "demarcation line" between science and metaphysics. In anti-metaphysical terms, Popper is no different from the logical positivists. Popper's opposition to logical positivism was a dispute over the understanding of scientific methods. Popper did not think that logical positivism was what he called "methodological essentialism"! This can be said to be Professor Lin's "wrong interpretation." If this accusation can be made, I don't know how Professor Lin analyzes or understands the phenomenon that logical positivism has vigorously opposed essentialism and metaphysics for decades in the last century, including serious criticisms and assertions of Hegel's philosophy. Why does logical positivism still exist? Is it what Popper calls "methodological essentialism"? This shows that Professor Lin's understanding of scientific methods is seriously flawed. He uses them indiscriminately without an academic and theoretical basis. Professor Lin thus applied Chinese philosophy, such as Confucianism, to the philosophy of practice, which was simply a misleading method. He only borrowed Popper's words and used contemporary new ideas from total Westernizers. The false accusations made by Confucians are justified by their so-called "post-Mou Zongsan" and "post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism!" I wonder if Wang Chuanshan, whom Professor Lin is familiar with, believes that traditional Confucianism is a supporter of imperial autocracy, or is it just the selfish motives of emperors who borrowed Yang Confucianism and Yin Law (plus the so-called "Yang

Confucian Yin Shi") to cause autocracy and corruption in Chinese politics?

This one-sided adoption of the framework of Western speculative philosophy imposed on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is worse than many people who think that China has no philosophy because Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has actually highly digested mainstream Western philosophy and discourse and formed a structure that is different from Western philosophy. A huge system that everyone can compare with (as the "response article" also admits in the text). It also shows the significant progress made by the modernization of Chinese philosophy. It can be seen that Professor Lin's so-called accusation of "methodological essentialism" against Confucianism, Mencius, Song, and Ming Confucianism, as well as Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, is unreasonable. As the culprit of "extreme dictatorship." Judging from China's political development after the May Fourth Movement, the "response article" is based on the establishment's historical materialism and total Westernization. It unreasonably accuses Confucianism of being the root of all corruption and dictatorship in Chinese culture and social politics. Come against Chinese cultural dogma. This shows his so-called conception of transcending Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is a superb fantasy.

As for the "response article" criticizing Hu Shi's "bold assumptions and careful verification" type of essentialism. Not only do they not know that Hu Shih's theory is close to Popper's "falsification theory," but that its fundamental concept comes from Dewey's "pragmatism" and "scientific method," and it does not have any essentialist implications. This kind of accusation is actually based on people who have no evidence to back it up. They can make random criticisms to show their own cleverness and self-deception. As for Professor Lin's self-correction based on an inexplicable "wrong experience" he had as a child, he thought it could be compared to the "scientific method" of Popper and logical positivism. I don't know that this kind of pediatric learning and correction behavior, even if it improves. The "trial-and-error method" is thousands of miles from the modern scientific method. Fundamentally, it is a different type of primitive experiential learning expression from the contemporary scientific method. Modern Western science also experienced thousands of years of speculative and rational development, especially the breakthroughs of several great scientists in the 16th and 17th centuries. It gradually broke through the control and persecution of religion and theocracy, leading to the rapid development of science and technology. Professor Lin's errors and loose associations, etc., are not worthy of further discussion. As for the next section of the "response," the terminology of the so-called "causality of natural sciences" and "causality of humanities" is discussed. It is a return to the fantasy of the "scientific method" of the 19th century or earlier in the West. Modern science and humanities no longer discuss "causality." I don't know how we

can have the 21st century or have entered the "post-modernization" period. Is there any progress in philosophy and culture? It is no wonder that Professor Lin's insistence on "creating inner sagehood from outer kingliness" is the proposition of pre-modern imperial totalitarianism. It cannot be said to be liberation and progress.

6. General Comments on the Fallacy of "From Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood"

After clarifying the critical points of the so-called methodological judgment above, it is only necessary to briefly point out the entangled historical and realistic content of the "response article" to see its falsity. First of all, the "response article" on one hand believes that traditional Chinese culture and philosophy are only the basis for imperial autocracy and the source of China's backwardness compared to Western culture, while on the other hand it argues that the ethics, self-awareness, and people-oriented principles in traditional culture are not backward or corrupt ideas and should be promoted in the modern world. The "response article" advocates that in modern times, we should have "ethical human rights, conscious freedom, and people-oriented democracy." However, we do not know the so-called human ethics, consciousness (in practice, conscious and autonomous actions with self-discipline and freedom), and people-oriented democracy. How can I learn from practice? Why, for more than two thousand years, have modern human rights, freedoms, and democracy not been objectively implemented, such as in the social and political institutional arrangements, so that human rights, freedoms, and democracy can take root in China? As for the imperial dictatorship in real politics, it is not the foreign king of benevolent kingship according to Confucianism. There is no legal system of liberal democratic regimes in Chinese history. It is obviously what the legalist autocratic orientation advocates, which combines the occupation of state power and the Formation of the emperor of force. Confucian scholars of all ages have been deeply uneasy and helpless in these areas. Therefore, Confucian scholars in the late Ming Dynasty prayed for the emergence of "the most benevolent and righteous saint" to realize the Confucian benevolent kingship and relieve the people's insecurities. As for the democratic concept accepted by Confucianism that "Heaven sees itself and the people see it, and Heaven hears it, and the people listen," as well as the democratic concept that the supreme sovereignty of the world lies in the people, as Mencius said, "the emperor cannot treat the world with people," "response Wen" basically turns a blind eye, or does not understand the meaning of "democracy" in this theory. This concept was ignored and suppressed by the traditional emperors. Obviously, the Confucian tradition had the basic concepts of democracy, human rights, and freedom, but the Legalist dictatorship banned

them. Not only could it not be put into action, it could even be spoken. All three clans were implicated to death. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism sees that traditional culture and philosophy cannot directly develop a modern political system of democracy and freedom based on moral rationality. Therefore, it is necessary to absorb the elements of science and democracy in Western culture to produce human rights and freedom in modern China—and democratic government to establish an objective social and political system in the contemporary world.

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freedom based on moral rationality. Therefore, it is necessary to absorb the elements of science and democracy in Western culture to produce human rights and freedom in modern China—and democratic government to establish an objective social and political system in the contemporary world.

The "misplacement of Tao" mentioned later in the "response article" and the "bloodline system" of "king, father, and sage" in Chinese history are actually just Professor Lin's own inventions and do not correspond to Chinese history. They have nothing to do with Confucianism's discussion of foreign kings. There has never been any "misplacement of Tao" in Confucianism, and Taoism has always been placed above political power. In history, countless Confucians have used Taoism to resist unjust political systems. Naturally, numerous Confucian scholars were massacred, and tragedies involving three or even ten clans were implicated. Such a blood-stained history is a historical fact of the peaceful struggle left by Confucianists and Confucian students, which is rare in Western history. The human ethics advocated by Confucianism are also reciprocal relations of ethical obligations. They clearly oppose the immoral and unethical behavior of one-sided obedience to the emperor and father. How can we say that this is a basic mistake in Chinese history and culture? How can it be imposed on Confucians? Human history develops from barbarism to civilization. Leaders who command tribal or national forces are often dictators. Confucians have long known that this political violence is the root of evil in the human world and is also reflected in collective governance. Therefore, they all fully support taking benevolence as the core, governing according to etiquette and music, and practicing benevolent government; if a dictator commits violence, the people can make a revolution (Mencius's proposition). This shows that the interpretation of Confucianism and Chinese culture and history represented by the "response article" is incorrect and unsupported by historical documents.

Professor Lin calls the political structures in Chinese history, such as "King, Father and Sage," "Dislocation of Tao," etc., the closest to the legalist propositions and the actual situation of imperial autocratic rule. As a result, it distorted the benevolent kingship advocated by Confucianism and transformed the great emperor who obtained the king's status through force into a "sage who received destiny." However, this view is not only a one-sided view of the distorted authoritarian side of traditional Chinese culture but also completely misses the more important cultural and historical mission and practice of traditional Chinese scholars' efforts to "advocate democracy and rationality." The autocratic imperial system in Chinese history and the system of one family and one surname monopolizing national sovereignty have become history after the Republic of China overthrew the Manchu Qing Dynasty. The idea of " from

outer kingliness to inner sagehood " can be a return to the negative and more inverted political power controlling morality in Chinese culture, that is, the emperor's autocratic control of Taoism and academic tradition. This shows that Professor Lin's ideas are not "post-May Fourth" progress and are even more contrary to contemporary New Confucian ideas of opening up a new world. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has never supported the restoration of emperors, let alone the so-called "king, father, sage" blood-line despotism and autocratic relationship. As for the "response article", it ends by saying that most people misunderstand the requirements of Confucian morality as "too moral". Thinking that this is one reason why Confucianism should be changed to "from the outer king to the inner sage" is actually a populist statement that is inexplicable and unfounded.

As for what the "response article" mentioned, for Chinese culture to successfully develop democracy and science, it must start with education and learning about Western liberal democracy. However, what Contemporary Neo-Confucianism advocates is only an explanation of "theoretical logical order" and is not "The order of occurrence of historical order" and so on. These are not the theories and statements of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. The Contemporary Neo-Confucian reconstruction of "the inner sagehood and the outer kingliness" is based on the level of value, which naturally prioritizes moral principles and judgments and develops social and political systems based on morality. Naturally, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism does not discuss the New Foreign Kings according to the order of historical occurrence because traditional Chinese society has not been able to develop a modern democratic and free political system in the past two thousand years. There is no such thing as the order of historical development. However, Contemporary Neo-Confucians know it is difficult to realize a democratic political system, and the people must practice it long before it can be achieved. A democratic system requires corresponding education and social development step by step. However, to achieve the success of a modern democratic system, this kind of learning and development must be based on the orientation that "the inner sage opens up the outer king." Learning and practice must be based on the inner sage, and what is learned is democracy and science. If what we study and educate is to ask the people to obey the authority and power of the political dictator, it is carried out in the way of "outer kingliness and inner sagehood," which is fundamentally a heteronomous moral direction that runs counter to democratic science and will only make the people more anti-democratic. And anti-liberal, anti-intellectual and anti-human rights developments. Living and being educated by the subjective and cruel actions of dictators and violent and oppressive methods are just domesticated slaves, ignorant people who cannot think independently. I don't know how to succeed in a modern

democratic system and enable science to develop independently. Professor Lin regards people's education and learning as complying with political power. It goes against the direction of thriving democracy and science. It only restores the political system and closed society of enslaved and submissive people who are no longer acceptable to today's human beings. How can this be considered a reasonable and effective concept for developing a democratic and free society and achieving corresponding scientific and technological development?

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Song and Ming Confucianism, and Pre-Qin Confucianism come from real moral experience and practice. Philosophies are all based on life experiences and experiences in life practice, called practical approaches. They differ from Western philosophy and long-term metaphysical struggles that come from speculative or pure cognitive reason. Both Confucius, Mencius, and Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties clearly showed the true meaning of heart, nature, nature, destiny, reason, and Tao from moral practice and Gongfu. Confucius used the practice of ritual and music life to guide benevolence as the source of moral value and the direct and immediate significance of the life of benevolence, and then proceeded to the interpretation of destiny, human nature, and the way of heaven, and state the advancement of his practice: It consists of six moral realms: determination, etiquette, no confusion, understanding destiny, obedience, and following the heart's desires without exceeding the rules; Mencius witnessed the unbearable heart or the original intention of morality through daily moral experiences such as seeing a child about to fall into a well. From this, he demonstrated the moral metaphysics of "knowing heaven with all your heart and soul," which is based on knowing words and cultivating the awe-inspiring spirit. Work hard to establish the six moral levels of "Good Faith, Beautiful Holy Spirit." Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties practiced moral skills daily, preserving nature's principles to suppress human desires. They cared about and discussed how to embody the principles of nature in practice to achieve virtue. They were all seen in the development of moral subjects in daily life, and they all cared about and practiced in major national affairs worldwide. Wang Yangming's caution, fear in the court, and the Donglin Party's resistance are bloody historical facts of Confucianism's persistence in conscience and confrontation with imperial autocracy. The Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties not only closed their doors and became sages, but they also criticized improper government affairs with words and writings, sacrificed their lives for righteousness, and did not hesitate to shed their blood and heads for justice in the world. Even under the terrifying pressure of the huge royal power and the royal guards, there was never any fear of being too "introverted", "lying flat", or "involving".

Three Contemporary Neo-Confucians, Tang, Mou, and Xu, resisted the rule of

authoritarianism and went into exile overseas. Not only did they endure hardships in academic and cultural reflection and promotion, but they were still highly knowledgeable. They were also subjected to crazy attacks by the CCP and leftists, as well as Westernization in Taiwan. Despite the sect's exclusion and suppression, he still stands proudly between heaven and earth. Issue severe criticism and condemnation of improper political policies and actions, such as Mr. Mou's remarks criticizing Mao Zedong, the birdcage economy in mainland China, and Mr. Xu's impeachment of Deng Xiaoping's remarks about thanking the Japanese for invading China, Mr. Tang was saddened to see the portraits of four foreigners hanging on Tiananmen Square, which powerfully symbolized China becoming a cultural colony of Marxism-Leninism, etc. All of this shows that Confucian scholars dare to rise and fight against the humiliation of Chinese culture by the Chinese nation. I wonder if Professor Lin thinks this is insufficient to describe living actions. Professor Lin may have some critical remarks and social practices that are more relevant to current affairs? Contemporary Neo-Confucians are admired not only because they can promote real and grand cultural construction of Chinese culture but also because they do not bow to real political power and do not hesitate to sacrifice their own private interests and even the happiness of their families and dare to Strongly criticize these people in power, support them with all their lives, and maintain righteousness and justice in the world. Is this something that can be surpassed by those "intelligent people" who play around with philosophical terms and boast without actually having any responsibility or contribution? Those who hide their heads and tails and are willing to be subordinates of power or are called "useful" by those in power in mainland China. "Idiot" experts and scholars in various fields can achieve one or two!

II. Conclusion: Contemporary Neo-Confucianism moves towards becoming a common ideal world for all mankind

Taking Mr. Mou's "two-level ontology" as the Contemporary Neo-Confucian efforts to modernize Chinese philosophy and culture through a genuine and profound "return to the roots" of the study of Chinese history, culture, and classics and the elucidation of the principles and insights therein, the achievements of the modernization of Chinese philosophy achieved thereby have integrated the profound expositions of Western philosophy and culture, and become the grand system of contemporary Confucianism. Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is based on the manifestations of various rationalities and values in daily human experience and establishes the common principles that lead to the principles of nature, the noble values, and the contribution of human beings. It creates the value of human beings and the inalienable rights of

human existence. The dignity of life and the new outer kings who can hope to develop modern rationality from Chinese culture forever get rid of the corruption of political power and the bad governance that suppresses people's livelihood so that everyone's life can truly "settle down and live in peace", and each person can develop their moral character and talents to maintain health and die without regrets indeed. The Perfect Teaching and pluralistic world advocated by Neo-Confucianism, the expression of diverse personalities and realms, are enough to enable mankind to move into a truly harmonious world of harmony and achieve permanent peace and shared prosperity. This is not a world that Western culture, which is dominated by speculative rationality, can accomplish alone, nor is it a harmonious world with the highest political, social, and people's livelihood that an autocratic and violent communist regime can achieve. Chinese culture and Confucianism imply an orderly and harmonious world that combines human ethics and social politics with the idea that "the inner sagehood opens up the outer kingliness." This world naturally has human ethics, democracy, human rights, and politics to serve the people's livelihood and an independent judiciary to ensure the people's life, property, and safety. The social and political structure is designed to enable the development and creation of values in all aspects of the humanities. In this way, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is moving towards a world where the world is one family, where benevolent people and all things in heaven and earth are one.

In the "reversal article," Professor Lin once believed that Southeast Asian countries could be considered examples of what he envisioned as "from the outer kingliness to the inner sagehood" through learning. In my "critique of fallacy," based on the political realities and developments in Southeast Asia, I pointed out that the so-called "Asian values" used by those in power in Southeast Asia to resist modern democracy and human rights advocate a system of authoritarian rule. Religious discrimination exists in Southeast Asian countries, such as Islam as the only state religion, Malaysia's regulations that Chinese business systems must account for more than 50% of Malays, and Malays must hold the highest positions, etc. They are all systems of religious discrimination and racial discrimination that violate democracy and human rights. The resulting abuses and harm to the people, especially overseas Chinese, have been seen in the tragic "anti-Chinese" riots over the years! However, the "response" did not mention this powerful rebuttal and facts, nor did it admit its mistakes. If we take a national system that is closest to what Professor Lin calls "ethical human rights, conscious freedom, and democratic people-oriented", then the society in Taiwan formed by the Republic of China can be said to have ethical family life. In a fair democratic human rights society, the political parties in charge of political power must be based on the people's happiness and govern according to their needs.

Otherwise, they will be peacefully ousted by the people with peaceful and effective political power, open and fair voting, etc. Isn't this the "ideal society" that Professor Lin hopes to succeed? Such an ideal can only be achieved by Confucianism's "inner sage and outer king," that is, when everyone is a moral subject with moral consciousness and exercises the power of citizens morally so that the power of the government is subject to ethical principles, that is, The control and regulation of the principle of justice. All political parties and institutions are controlled by the votes of the people, who represent sovereignty. No political power (including the constitution, laws, and policies) can violate morality and human nature. All administration must be implemented in accordance with the supreme constitution and laws formulated by moral principles. The balanced method of political decentralization forms a democratic system of checks and balances with real objective effectiveness. The humanistic society thus formed is precisely the ideal and goal of Confucianism: "the inner sagehood creates the outer kingliness."

In the past, the master Confucius taught his disciples: "Be knowledgeable and determined, ask questions carefully and think deeply, and benevolence lies in it." Mencius also regarded "knowing words" and "nourishing Qi" as his skills. "knowing words" can discern all kinds of rhetoric, obscenity, evil rhetoric, and evasive rhetoric that confuses the public and the public without being confused by it. Nurturing Qi means cultivating one's sense of justice and moral courage and treating all external pressures, such as wealth, power, poverty, etc., as nothing to remain unmoved and achieve moral indifference. When Wang Fuzhi reviewed and reflected on the rise and fall of the past dynasties, he felt deeply that the ignorant opinions of scholars had misled the country and the people. He once lamented that "nothing is more harmful than superficiality." Mr. Mou also quoted this statement many times, which is relevant today. Marxists intentionally use vocabulary to spread the harmful effects of anti-human ideology, making people trapped in their consciousness and unable to extricate themselves. This is the cautious and fearful attitude we should adopt when we discern false accusations and return to justice today. As Mencius said, if there is any argument in this article, it is really a last resort.

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諮商心理學與新儒家實踐哲學的交會： 回應林安梧教授「關於外王—內聖」問題一文

吳美瑤*

摘要

本文試圖從新儒家實踐哲學與諮商心理學共同關注的人格發展議題出發，說明內聖外王的實踐次序或以德行做為個體社會發展的基礎，是新儒家實踐哲學與當代諮商心理學的共識，以回應林安梧教授對於「外王—內聖」問題的看法。作者首先，闡述東西方學術傳統如何回應當代越來越快速的社會變遷問題，再進一步地聚焦在從西方哲學分化出來的心理學，特別是諮商心理學，和新儒家實踐哲學共同關注的「自我覺察」的實踐工夫。接著，作者從新儒家學者牟宗三先生的論點與當代西方品德教育的相關研究，說明重視品德教育對於學習科學知識有所助益。最後，再從儒家的人倫互動關係與阿德勒諮商心理學中有關社會平等的角度，說明以人倫為基礎的民主社會，是以每個個體的人格尊嚴皆平等所建立起來的。本文希望能將諮商心理學的理論和實務與新儒家的修養工夫論相互連結，以作為發展本土諮商心理學的基礎。

關鍵詞：諮商心理學、儒家、實踐哲學、內聖、外王

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壹、問題背景：東西方哲學傳統對內聖外王問題的基本看法

自從十九世紀下半葉，西學東漸以來，儒學在過去一百多年來，受到相當大的衝擊與挑戰。東亞社會中的中國、日本、韓國或台灣等這些深受儒家文化影響的地方，在西學衝擊下，皆持續地在傳統與現代、東方與西方文化之間來回擺盪（oscillation）（Wu, 2009, 2014）⁷⁷，甚至激發起一些社會運動，譬如：發生在中國大陸的 1919 年五四運動、1925 年到 1930 年代的復古運動（王雲五，1925，1925）⁷⁸、1960 年代到 1970 年代的文化大革命等。在這種長期來回擺盪在傳統與西化的時代背景下，當代新儒家承載著儒學發展史的第二次重要轉化⁷⁹，也就是消化西方學術的精華，建立起嶄新的、融匯儒釋道三家與西學的新儒學傳統。

過去一百多年來，當代新儒家歷經了幾代的傳承，誠如林安梧教授（2024）所言，第一代學者如：梁漱溟、馬一孚、熊十力等，第二代學者如：唐君毅、牟宗三、徐復觀等人。上述學者皆從其所處的特殊歷史社會文化環境出發，發表了他們對儒學與西學的獨特見解，特別是 1949 年以後隨著第二代新儒學學者遷移到香港台灣，也影響了港台地區的一批新生代學者，譬如：劉述先、戴璉璋、王邦雄、曾昭旭等；此外，余英時、杜維明、成中英、沈清松等，則以其優秀的英語能力，直接將當代新儒學的思想傳播到國際，並與國際學者溝通。

正當東亞社會歷經西方殖民主義挾著工業革命與科學優勢的威脅，而進行著內部的自我反思與轉化之時，過去一百多年來，西方社會也同樣因為其自身科技、工業革命與交通運輸的快速發展，而產生深刻地社會結構的變遷。此外，其學術傳統也同時歷經快速地分化（differentiation）和專業化，各學科的專業領域，逐漸地從「哲學」這個數千年的學術傳統分化為上百個科學學門，譬如：自然科學的物理學、化學、天文學、生物學……等，和人文社會科學的歷史學、心理學、社會學、經濟學……等。因此，無論是東方的儒學或是西方從哲學逐漸分化的各個學科系統，皆須對時代的快速變遷所引發的各類問題做出回應。譬如：牟宗三和唐君毅等當代新儒家學者對於民主與科學議題的回應；西方哲學面對資訊科技與全球化快速發展的多元化社會處境，發展出後現代主義思潮；西方心理學面對當代人心理適應問題，提出各種心理治療理論等。換句話說，無論是東方或西方的學術傳統，皆須面對快速的社會結構變遷，做出適當地回應，以協助當代人面對時代變遷所產生的各式社會或心理上的適應問題。

⁷⁷ 請參見拙著 Wu, 2009; 2014。

⁷⁸ 請參見王雲五（主編）（1925）。教育當局復古思想之實現。《教育雜誌》，17(12)，27091；王雲五（主編）（1925）。湘省復古思想之抬頭。《教育雜誌》，23(7)，115。

⁷⁹ 第一次重要轉化乃是自宋朝時期逐漸成功地將原始儒家的精神消化了佛學思想，而轉化成為融通儒釋道三家的宋明理學的新儒家時期。⁸⁰ 見宋·朱熹(1984)《論語》〈憲問〉篇。

面對時代的衝擊，林安梧教授對儒家思想如何回應當代問題亦有長期的關注，並發表相當多的相關論述，令人由衷敬佩。不過，在拜讀林安梧教授發表〈後新儒家實際哲學的一個側面—關於「外王—內聖」問題的一些回應〉一文後，個人一方面欣賞林教授對時代問題的敏銳覺察，但另一方面，又對林教授行文中的一些快速地推論，感到相當地遲疑、困惑與擔憂。譬如：何謂「後新儒學」、「舊內聖」、「方法論的本質主義」、「方法論的約定主義」等。或許是我個人受到西方分析哲學學派的部分影響，我個人認為上述這些概念的使用，如果能在文中有更清楚且明確地界定和說明，而不是讓讀者們各自從林教授的上下文意中和其以前著作中的論述加以揣摩，或許比較能夠增進學術論文與對話之間的溝通成效。

不過，林教授這篇文章真正讓我最感到擔憂的，是有關其對「外王—內聖」的論述，似乎沒有一個明確地邏輯論述可以說服我們，這樣可以更有利於建構一個讓人人可以在社會中可以過得幸福安康的人生。其實，無論是從東方儒學傳統或西方哲學與心理學傳統對人生議題的反思，其所關切地莫過於此。孔子在《論語》中提出「修己以敬」、「修己以安人」、「修己以安百姓」⁸⁰的觀念與《禮記·大學》中提及的「修身、齊家、治國、平天下」的觀念是一脈相承的，也就是，由內聖到外王的實踐次第，是儒家的傳統，其明確地邏輯論證早已見諸於四書，特別是《大學》之中，儘管其中的邏輯論證是否真的可以依據如此的說法而推論，並適用於當代社會，仍可商議，但也不表示吾人可以因此任意將其功夫次序前後顛倒，這其中仍然需要有一步一步嚴謹地邏輯推論和闡述說明，方能真正協助當代新儒學去面對時代劇變所引發的挑戰。

此外，如何讓社會中的人人皆能過得幸福美滿的人生，也是西方自蘇格拉底、柏拉圖、亞里斯多德以降這一系哲學傳統所關心核心課題。亞里斯多德在其《尼克馬各倫理學》（*Nicomachean Ethics*）提到的一個首要且終極之善的概念：「*eudaimonia*」，中文大都翻譯為「幸福」，英文則翻譯為：「*happiness, flourishing, prosperity, well-being*」等。亞里斯多德在這本書的第一卷〈善〉中提到，政治學的目的是為了追求這個終極的最高善「幸福」，而從事政治學的人，必須是有德性和智慧之人，才能對高尚與公正做出恰當地考察和判斷，從而讓城邦或社會獲得更完滿的善（亞里斯多德，2003）。換句話說，即使是亞里斯多德的政治學概念，仍然堅信德性是從事政治學事務的前提。換句話說，西方哲學傳統也同樣認為個體內在的道德修養與智慧，是其能否為整個社會、城邦或社稷創造完善生活世界的基石。這樣一系列完整且嚴謹的邏輯論述，我們不僅可以從亞里斯多德的系列性論著中發現，在西方倫理學傳統的諸多論述中，也隨處可見。

因而，從東西方兩大哲學傳統來看，從內聖到外王的實踐功夫次第是明確且無庸置疑的。然而，誠如前文所言，過去一兩百年來，西方科學傳統歷經了快速地科學學門的分化，各類自然科學、人文學、社會科學等紛紛地從哲學的學術傳統中分支出來，為了

⁸⁰ 見宋·朱熹(1984)《論語》〈憲問〉篇。

回應林教授文中所關切的內聖與外王兩者之間如何順利地開展出來，個人想從一百多年前才從哲學分支出來的心理學，特別是過去百年來快速發展的「諮商心理學」所關切的「人的完整發展」的議題，以及儒家實踐哲學中一直關切的「由成己到成人」的議題出發，說明在當代社會中，內聖或內心的安頓，仍然是作為外王以及學習客觀知識系統的必要基礎，方能使人人有機會活出幸福美滿的人生，以回應林教授前文中所謂「由外王而內聖」這種看似有點矯枉過正的說法。換句話說，個人想從諮商心理學和新儒家實踐哲學之交會處，來回應林教授該文中的一些論點，希望可以釐清一些關鍵問題，讓吾人生活於當代複雜多變與充滿挑戰的世界中，有一個比較可靠和可供依循的參考方向。

貳、諮商心理學與新儒家實踐哲學的起點：自我覺察

在儒學的傳統中，我們可以從孔子與弟子的對話中發現，孔子是持續地透過與弟子的對話，來喚醒並告知弟子們有關「仁」、「忠恕」等各種道德概念體現在人與人互動中的合宜之道。在論語中，孔子為弟子闡釋何謂「仁」，有多種的表達方式，主要是因為他與每位學生互動的情境各不相同，他在每個獨特的情境中，試圖透過對話「喚醒」學生們對仁、各種品德特質、合宜的人際互動與生命意義等的體會和領悟。因此，整部論語可以說就是透過師生之間的對話，喚醒學習者如何在日常生活中進行道德實踐的歷程。

儒學的發展到了漢代以後，隨著佛教東傳到中國與東亞，經過數百年或近千年與中國文化傳統中的儒道兩家相互影響和交流，到了宋代以後，逐漸形成融會儒釋道三家核心思想但仍然以儒學為正宗的宋明理學傳統，也稱為新儒家。此時的新儒家除了融會道家和佛教的思想精華與修行方法，更重視工夫論。在《宋元學案》與《明儒學案》中可以見到各知名宋明儒學的學者們提到的各式工夫論、修養論或心法，闡述了各種豐富的內在修養功夫來增強自我覺察的能力和敏銳度的方法，譬如：在〈濂溪學案〉（下）第十二卷：「《說》中『無欲故靜』一語，非其工夫之下手處乎？」、〈明道學案〉（上）第十三卷：「程子首識仁，不是教人懸空參悟，正就學者隨事精察力行之中，先與識箇大頭腦所在，便好容易下工夫也。識得後，只需用葆任法，曰『誠敬存之』而已。而勿忘、勿助之間，其真用力候也。」、「敬，即念而存也；義，即事而存也。指此敬義工夫，便將天地萬物打成一片，都存在這裡了。方成其為人。」（黃宗羲，2021）⁸¹ 上述的引文，簡單地說，也就是反身自省，無欲無求，並體察自己內在的仁心仁性，如何在面對事情的時候，透過行為體現於外。有關類似的工夫論論述，在宋明理學的各經典著作中，俯拾皆是。

⁸¹ 上述幾則引文，請見（清）黃宗羲（編著）全祖望（補修）（2021）。**宋元學案**。中華書局。
<http://skqs.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/dragon/>

同時，也可以發現宋明時期的新儒家學者在修養工夫上，也融入了禪宗的靜坐冥想等方式。譬如：在〈伊川學案〉（上）第十五卷：「學者先務，固在心志。……有欲屏去思慮，患其紛亂，則需是坐禪入定。」、〈崇仁學案〉（二）第二卷：「周子有主靜之說，學者遂專意靜坐，多流於禪。」、〈白沙學案〉（上）第五卷：「伊川先生每見人靜坐，便歎其善學」等⁸²（黃宗羲，2008）。換句話說，透過靜坐冥想的工夫來增進內心的自我覺察，也是宋明理學中的其中一種工夫方法。

另一方面，儘管西方心理學史的發展，只有短短一百多年左右的歷史，但其所發展出來各種增進個體自我覺察的方法卻是越來越豐富、多元且對個體的生活實踐確實可以產生明顯的影響與改變的，更有趣地，近年來諮商心理學和心理治療的各理論學派逐漸融合了東方的靜坐冥想（meditation）或正念（mindfulness）的方法，來增進個體對自我意識的訓練和覺察。

其實，在諮商心理學的發展史上，強調個體對自我意識之覺察的重要性，已經是由來已久。早在 1950 年代精神分析取向的 Carl Jung（1951/1959）就曾經說過：「你所沒有覺察到的內在，它將顯現成為你的命運。」（德文：Wenn eine innere Situation nicht bewusst gemacht wird, erscheint sie im Außen als Schicksal.；英文：when an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside, as fate.）⁸³ 換句話說，個體如果對自己內在的意識狀態沒有清楚地自我覺察，個體表現在外的行為將受到潛意識所左右，其所做出來的各種選擇或行為，將逐漸地一步一步地實現成為一個人的命運。因此，只有當個體對自己的內在狀態有清楚地覺察或覺知，它才有機會看清楚自己內在的心理動機並做出調整，進而改變自己的外在行為、自己與他人以及自己與世界的互動關係，從而改變自己的人生命運。

自 1930 年代起，精神分析取向的心理治療理論與技術從歐陸開始蔓延開來的同時，行為主義心理學及其心理治療理論與技術也在美國蔚為潮流，此後，人本主義取向的存在主義治療、個人中心治療、完形治療等，以及認知行為治療、現實治療、家族系統治療、後現代主義治療取向等各種心理治療學派更是在二十世紀中葉以後如雨後春筍般地百花齊放，它們發展出各式各樣精彩且豐富的治療理論與技術，幫助個體自我覺察其內在的認知、行為與情緒之間的關聯，乃至個體對自己內在的深層覺知等。上述這類的諮商心理學的理論與技術在過去百年間，已經取得相當大的進展，並對隨著醫藥進步人口快速增長的人類社會產生相當大的幫忙，也改變了許多的人生和命運。換句話說，透過諮商心理學的科學研究與實務工作的相互結合和印證，人類已經慢慢地找到可以安頓

⁸² 上述幾則引文，請見（清）黃宗羲（編著）（2008）。**明儒學案**。中華書局。
<http://skqs.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/dragon/>

⁸³ 見 C.G. Jung (1959). Christ: A Symbol of the Self (pp.36-71). In S. H. Read, M. Fordham & G. Adler (Eds.): *Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self* (2nd ed.), Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1951)

內在身心的方法，並因此使個體可以由內而外完整地發展，使個人與自己的內在、個人與社會、個人與世界有和諧一致且正向的連結。

過去半個世紀以來，諮商心理學在實務工作上，更傾向結合了東方冥想(meditation)或正念(西方用 mindfulness)的方法，協助人們找回內心的平靜，以及身心靈內在的和諧和統一。譬如：在台灣風靡流行的薩提爾模式之提倡者 John Banmen (2023) 在台灣出版《薩提爾的 52 個冥想練習：覺察內在的冰山，跟自己和解，與他人共好》一書，藉由正念冥想以及心理治療中的一些對話引導方式，引領個體對自己的內在進行覺知、完全地接納，並與之和解，進而能與他人以及世界建立起更好的連結。此外，已經經由許多的科學研究證實對治療憂鬱症這個當代流行的心理疾病有正向療效的認知行為治療法(Beck, 2011/2014)，近年來，也與正念冥想方法結合，以更有效地協助憂鬱症患者走出情緒風暴和恢復內心的平靜(Segal et al., 2013/2015；Williams et al., 2014/2016；Kabat-Zinn, 2003；Kabat-Zinn, 2005)。換句話說，當代諮商心理學已經從東方傳統的自我覺察工夫上，找到一些合宜的切入點或連結，透過具體明確地操作步驟，引導深陷情緒風暴者或即使是一般普羅大眾找回內心的安定與平靜之道，並進而與他人和世界有更好的互動和連結。

相較於西方的諮商心理學，新儒家的儒學傳統中，雖然也累積了許多增進個體自我覺察的功夫和方法，然而，其所缺少的是讓新儒學的修養工夫方法透過科學化的驗證，更清楚地確認那些方式能更有效地協助個體進行自我覺察，進而使其自我內在的心性得以更完整的發展，而不是如林教授(2024)在其文章中所言：「宋明理學他們只強調『心法』，但卻一點『辦法』也沒有。」更明確地說，當代新儒家不是只有心法而沒有辦法，其在這個時代可以努力的方向，或許是與西方諮商心理學進行積極地對話和交流，並透過更多科學實證的方法將其過去千年傳統中的各式各樣的工夫論，透過具體的科學操作步驟加以體現或驗證，以確認其對人的內在心性和外在社會行為的發展等，有具體的助益。

參、由內聖到外王：人與社會完整發展的合理次序

當然，林教授在其文章中之所以提出「由外王到內聖」的說法，主要是針對為何傳統儒家的實踐哲學無法開展出西方科學知識和民主制度的問題而發。針對這個問題，當代知名的新儒家學者牟宗三先生提出了「良知之自我坎陷」這個說法，來解決當代新儒學如何開展出西方的科學和民主問題。對於牟宗三的論述，林教授在其文章中，直接點出新儒家傳統過去因為「太過內傾」、「太道德」、「太形而上」，因而需要將內聖與外王的實踐次序倒轉過來。個人認為，林教授這樣的論述，似乎跳躍的太快，並且忽略了牟先生等當代新儒家學者們兢兢業業努力地想透過「一心開二門」和「兩層存有論」

等嚴謹的邏輯論述架構，說明如何讓「道德心」轉化為「知性主體」，以吸收知識來面對現實世界中的各種複雜的實際問題，以及如何「本內聖之學以開出新外王」的系統性闡述。

有關良知的道德本心，如何轉化成為認知心，將全宇宙攝入於吾人的知識系統中，牟宗三在其專書《從陸象山到劉蕺山》（牟宗三，1979）的〈第三章王學的分化與發展〉，特別是該篇章〈附錄：致知疑難〉，以及《現象與物自身》的〈第四章：由知體明覺開知性〉等篇章中有相當完整且細膩地論述（牟宗三，1990）。依據牟宗三的觀點，良知是屬於道德心，而不是認知心的範疇。道德心可以做出價值的判斷，就像良知可以判斷如何恰當地「使用桌子」，但良知無法知道桌子的成分是甚麼所構成的，認知心才能判斷桌子的成分是甚麼所構成的。但當吾人從內在的良知發動，在「致」良知的時候，判斷當時的情境有需要「製作桌子」才能使用桌子去完成一件有價值的事時，這個時候良知這個道德心需要轉化成為認知心，透過認知心來認知桌子的成分造型以及相關的技術等知識，才能完成製做桌子的行為，進而有價值地去使用桌子。換句話說，此「致良知」的「致」這個工夫，迫使吾人不能只停留在道德心的修養工夫上，而且還需要有認知心去吸收知識，才能使良知天理在真實的世界中加以實現。對於這樣的轉化過程，牟宗三先生用「良知之自我坎陷」來形容（牟宗三，1979）。更明確地說，良知或道德心可以為吾人的生命做出價值判斷，並決定從事哪些行為、事情或職業是有價值的，然而，要成功地完成一件行為、事情或職業等，需要相關地專業知識，這個時候，透過「良知之自我坎陷」將道德心轉換出認知心去吸取知識，以完成一個有價值的行為、事情或職業，讓現實世界中的萬事萬物統攝於良知所安置的合理的世界秩序之中。對牟宗三先生來說，這是從內聖之學轉化以開展出新外王世界的關鍵樞紐。由良知所發動出來，在「致良知」的過程中，個人持續地在進行價值與社會行為的抉擇，並以此為基礎去認知客觀知識，以為自己、他人與社會做出一些有價值的社會貢獻。換句話說，若從良知和道德心出發去吸收知識，個體在認知學習過程的背後，是有強烈的價值動機，也因此，能夠賦予其學習客觀知識的行為相當的意義和價值，也因而更容易提升其知識學習的成效。

其實，上文的論述與當代西方推動品德教育運動的學者之相關研究可以說是一致的。根據 Berkowitz（2021/2022）的說法，「學術成就」和「品格發展」兩者之間存有相互增強的效果或協同作用（synergy），他和 J. Banninga 一起研究美國加州一百二十所小學，結果發現學校重視品格教育與其能否在州立考試成績獲得更好的成績之間有正相關。此外，他從事的有關「品格教育的有效做法」之相關研究中，也顯現出類似的研究結果⁸⁴。換句話說，推動道德教育或品德教育並不妨礙吾人在知識學習上的成效。

⁸⁴ 依據 Berkowitz（2021/2022）的說法，美國學校中推動品德教育的關鍵推手，或是將品德教育帶入學校的正式課程中的人，往往是學校的諮商輔導老師（school counselors）。

當然，牟宗三先生有關新儒家學者如何致其良知的論述，與西方品德教育學者 Berkowitz 等人所談論的道德教育，在修養功夫的層次上，或許有所落差。但兩者皆重視個體如何對自己內在的知覺感受、思考和行為等進行敏銳地自我覺察，進而能夠與自己、與他人、與世界或全宇宙建立起和諧且正向的連結。也就是，內聖或內心的安頓，是吾人能否發展出個人與自己、與他人、與世界有良好的互動和連結之基礎。

肆、自我與他人和世界的關係：平等與和諧的互動關係

林教授在其文章中點出儒家政治傳統的根本困結在於「道的錯置」，因而需要讓傳統的「君、父、聖」三者恰當地歸位。在這裡，林教授提到其問題根源在於：

儒家「聖王」的理想，轉而成為「王聖」的現實，儒家本來主張「聖者為王」，有德行、有智慧、有能力的聖者，應當成為政治社會共同體的統治者，這有點像柏拉圖哲學王的意思。結果適巧相反，一旦登上了權力的高峰，作為政治社會共同體的最高統治者，就宣稱自己是有德行、有智慧、有能力的聖者了。……這樣的「王聖」，我稱之為「道德錯置」（misplaced Dao）。（林安梧，2024）

對於林教授上述的說法，個人深表贊同。此外，在儒家的政治社會體系中，誠如林教授所言：「在君主專制的兩千年傳統裡，『君』是作為政治社會共同體最高階位的頂點，『父』是做為家庭人倫共同體最高階的頂點，『聖』是做為文化教養共同體最高階位的頂點」（林安梧，2024）這「君、父、聖」或「天地親君師」一旦人們在整個社會體制中，扮演了某個角色，不論其個人實際的道德修養如何，我們的儒家傳統社會就會因其所扮演的社會位階，而將其人格神聖化，並給予其相當的權力，致使人倫之間的關係，在人際互動是非混亂之時，變成一種霸權或宰制的力量。

然而，為何會產生這種「道的錯置」或是「宰制的關係」呢？除了林教授在文中提到因為「教條化」和「刻板化」了人的培育與構成之外，我個人認為，這是因為忽略了儒家的人倫關係是講究「相互性」（reciprocity）的（Wu, 2013）⁸⁵，或是這種人倫關係的「相互性」已經失衡了。也就是，父慈子孝、兄友弟恭、夫婦有別、君臣有義、朋友有信，應該是一種正向循環的互動關係。換句話說，父母對子女慈愛，子女自然地對父母孝順，這樣的人倫關係是平等的且具「相互性」的，而不是單方面地要求或期待某一方面無止盡地付出，另一方面卻沒有對等的或相對應的回應或回饋。儒家的人倫關係，原本是建立在人與人之間自然平等的互動交流上，且隨著每個人因為在家庭或社會中扮演著不同的角色，其以這些角色在與他人互動時，也是本著「仁心」的「相互性」以及「怵惕惻隱」、「推己及人」之心與他人互動，這種人際互動的情感是自然地相互交流、

⁸⁵ 有關這方面的論述，可同時參考拙著（Wu, 2013）。

體諒、理解和接納的。因而，兄長友愛弟妹，弟妹恭敬兄長；夫婦之間互相體貼、分工合作；君王對臣子有義，臣子對君王盡忠等。

因而，誠如牟宗三先生在《道德的理想主義》一書的〈道德的理想主義與人性論〉一文中提到，儒家所談的善性善端、怵惕惻隱、良知等，是與階級的地位和利益無關的（牟宗三，1985）。也就是，每個人在人性的基本尊嚴和善心善性上，是相同的、平等的，沒有階級地位高低之分，只是在人與人的相互來往和互動的過程中，每個人因為其所扮演的角色不同，為了實際地體現其善性善端，會因時因地因人而有不同的「表現方式」。

上述的觀點，與當代諮商心理學中的多個理論學派對人際互動關係的看法是一致的。譬如：阿德勒學派的親職教育學者 Rudolf Dreikurs 在其專著《社會平等：當代的挑戰》中所說：「阿德勒提出『社會生活的鐵律』(ironclad logic of social living)，解釋了所有社會互動的基本法則……阿德勒意識到『平等』才是我們生活邏輯上的基本先覺要素，少了他，社會穩定與和諧便無法發生。……最根本的是我們需要學習如何與他人平等共處……。」（Dreikurs, 1971/2019）此外，人本主義治療取向的個人中心治療法創始者 Carl Rogers 也強調將心比心地正確地同理當事人、治療者與個案之間需建立起真誠一致的平等互動關係；或是後現代主義治療取向主張治療者應把當事人當成是面對其內在問題的專家等。上述的諮商心理學理論或學派，在協助人發展出其完整人格的過程中，皆強調教育者、輔導者、治療者與當事者之間的互動關係，宜建立在一種真誠且平等的互動交流上，在這樣的人際互動基礎上，才能協助個人逐漸地發展出良好的個人與其自己、與他人、與世界的連結或互動關係。

伍、結論

從東西方哲學傳統與當代諮商心理學的觀點來看，人的完整發展到建議一個合理、平等且公義的社會，是其所共同關注的焦點。要實現這個理想，須從個體內在的自我覺察開始。在新儒家實踐哲學的千年傳統中，已經累積了許多有關如何覺察內在的工夫論，而當代諮商心理學也已經從東方傳統中吸取了冥想或正念的方法，並將其轉化到各個不同的心理諮商或心理治療的學派中，並透過科學的實證研究證實這些正念或冥想的方法，對於治療當代流行的一些心裏疾病有明顯地幫助。當然，這些方法若能更廣泛地推廣到所有普羅大眾的日常生活中，不僅能夠預防心理疾病，也能對一般人更有效地發揮其生活功能有所幫助。

誠如前文所述，從宋明理學以來新儒家的哲學傳統已經累積了許多不同層次的修養工夫論，然而，尚缺乏科學的實證研究證實這些工夫方法論，對於協助人的完整發展有所助益。過去幾十年來，諮商心理學結合正念冥想的方法，證實對個體內在身心的安頓，

可以產生相當的助益。這個諮商心理學與東方修養工夫論相結合的實例，頗適合做為一個示範的起點，讓諮商心理學與新儒家實踐哲學的傳統繼續尋找合適的交會點或切入點，以協助個體和社會可以和諧地完整發展，並證實從內聖到外王、從內在身心的安頓到個人與他人和社會有良好的互動關係，是協助人完整發展的合理次序。

至於林教授提出的有關「外王—內聖」跟牟宗三先生提出的「良知之自我坎陷」的說法，都是想要回應新儒家傳統如何開展出西方的科學知識與民主體制的問題。基本上，我個人還是比較認同牟宗三先生有關良知的論述，至於「良知坎陷」過程中的心理轉折，道德心如何轉化為認知心的這個內在心理歷程的轉折，如果可以與當代的諮商心理學的科學研究相結合，探討其中的轉折歷程，並將其論述的更細緻化，或許將更有助於人們釐清自己的價值抉擇和在價值抉擇中如何吸收或發展實用的科學知識，以完成其內聖外王或個人與社會的和諧發展之目標。

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The Intersection of Counseling Psychology and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: In Response to Prof. An-Wu Lin's Article on the "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood"

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Abstract

This article attempts to clarify the order of "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood" or virtue as the foundation of social development of individuals from the perspectives of the practical philosophy of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and counseling psychology, both of them concern the issues of personality development, in order to respond to Prof. An-Wu Lin's opinions on the problem of outer kingliness and inner sagehood. At first, the author explains how Eastern and Western academic traditions responded to the problem of increasing rapid social changes, then it further focuses on the practical work of "self-awareness" that is shared by psychology, especially counseling psychology, that is differentiated from Western philosophy and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism practical philosophy. Then, the author uses the arguments of the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism scholar, Mou Zongsan, and the relevant research on contemporary Western character education to illustrate that attaching importance to moral education is helpful for learning scientific knowledge. Finally, from the perspectives of Confucian human relations and social equality in Adlerian Counseling Psychology, it is explained that a democratic society based on human relations is established based on the equality of personal dignity of each individual. This article hopes to connect the theory and practice of Counseling Psychology with the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism self-cultivation theory as a basis for the development of indigenous Counseling Psychology.

Keywords: Counseling Psychology, Confucianism, Practical Philosophy, Inner Sagehood, Outer Kingliness

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I. Problem Background: The Basic Views of Eastern and Western Philosophical Traditions on the Issue of Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness

Since the spread of Western learning to the East in the second half of the 19th century, Confucianism has been subject to considerable impact and challenges over the past 100 years. East Asian societies such as China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which are deeply influenced by Confucian culture, continue to oscillate between tradition and modernity, and Eastern and Western cultures under the impact of Western learning (Wu, 2009, 2014), and even inspired some social movements, such as the May Fourth Movement in 1919 in mainland China, the restoration movement from 1925 to 1930s (Wang, 1925; 1925), the Cultural Revolution from the 1960s to the 1970s, etc. Against the background of this long-term oscillation between tradition and Westernization, contemporary Contemporary Neo-Confucianism embodies the second important transformation in the development of Confucianism. This information involves digesting the essence of Western academics and establishing a Contemporary Neo-Confucianism tradition that integrates Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism. and Western learning.

In the past more than a hundred years, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has been passed down through several generations. As Professor An-Wu Lin (2024) said, the first generation of scholars, such as Liang Shuming, Ma Yifu, Xiong Shili, etc., and the second generation of scholars, such as Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, and others. As mentioned above, the scholars expressed their unique views on Confucianism and Western learning based on the particular historical, social and cultural environment in which they lived. After 1949, the migration of the second generation of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism scholars to Hong Kong and Taiwan also affected Hong Kong and Taiwan. A group of new-generation scholars, such as Liu Shuxian, Dai Lianzhang, Wang Bangxiong, and Zeng Zhaoxu, etc.; in addition to Yu Yingshi, Du Weiming, Cheng Zhongying, Shen Qingsong, etc., use their excellent English skills to translate Contemporary Neo-Confucianism directly thought Spread internationally and communicate with international scholars.

Just as East Asian societies underwent internal self-reflection and transformation after Western colonialism posed the threat of industrial revolution and scientific superiority, Western societies have faced challenges over the past 100 years due to their technology, industrial revolution, and transportation. The rapid development has resulted in profound changes in social structure. In addition, its academic tradition has also experienced rapid differentiation and specialization. The professional fields of various disciplines have gradually differentiated from the thousands-year academic tradition of "philosophy" into hundreds of scientific disciplines, such as natural sciences, Physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology, etc. history,

psychology, sociology, economics, etc. of humanities and social sciences. Therefore, whether it is Confucianism in the East or various disciplinary systems that have gradually differentiated from philosophy in the West, they must respond to different problems caused by the rapid changes of the times. For example, the responses of contemporary Contemporary Neo-Confucianism scholars such as Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi to the issues of democracy and science; Western philosophy has developed postmodernism in the face of the diversified social environment with the rapid development of information technology and globalization; Western psychology has faced contemporary people Psychological adaptation issues, various psychotherapy theories are proposed, etc. In other words, both Eastern and Western academic traditions must respond appropriately to the rapid changes in social structure to help contemporary people face various social or psychological adaptation problems arising from the changing times.

Facing the impact of the times, Professor An-Wu Lin has also paid long-term attention to how Confucianism responds to contemporary issues and has published many relevant discussions, which is truly admirable. However, after reading Professor An-Wu Lin 's article "A Side of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy—Some Responses to the Issue of "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood," I appreciate Professor Lin's keen awareness of the issues of the times, but on the other hand, and felt quite hesitant, confused and worried about some of the quick inferences in Professor Lin's writing. For example: what is "post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism", "old Inner Sagehood", "methodological essentialism", "methodological conventionalism", etc. Perhaps it is because the Western school of analytical philosophy personally influences me. I think the above concepts could be more clearly defined and explained in the text rather than allowing readers to interpret Professor Lin's context and interpretation. By studying the discussions in his previous works, the effect of communication between academic papers and dialogues may be improved.

However, what worries me the most about Professor Lin's article is its "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood" discussion. There seems to be no clear, logical argument that can convince us. This can be more conducive to constructing a world that everyone can understand. You can live a happy and healthy life in society. Whether it is a reflection on life issues from the Eastern Confucian tradition or the Western philosophy and psychology tradition, nothing is more concerning than this. In "The Analects of Confucius," Confucius put forward the concepts of "cultivating oneself to be respectful," "cultivating oneself to be at peace with others," "cultivating oneself to be at peace with the people," and "cultivating oneself to be at peace with the people" and "Book of Rites." The concepts of "cultivating one's moral character, regulating

one's family, governing the country, and bringing peace to the world" mentioned in "The Great Learning" are in the same vein. That is to say, the practical order from the Inner Sagehood to the Outer Kingliness is a Confucian tradition, and its clear, logical argument has long been seen in the four books, especially "The Great Learning." However, it is still open to debate whether their rational arguments can be inferred based on such statements and apply to contemporary society; this does not mean that we can arbitrarily reverse the order of their work, which still requires step-by-step rigorous logical deduction and explanation to help Contemporary Neo-Confucianism face the challenges caused by the drastic changes of the times.

In addition, how to enable everyone in society to live a happy and fulfilling life is also a core issue of concern in the Western philosophical tradition since Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Aristotle mentioned a concept of primary and ultimate good in his "Nicomachean Ethics": "eudaimonia," which is mostly translated as "happiness" in Chinese and "happiness, flourishing" in English, prosperity, well-being," etc. Aristotle mentioned in the first volume of their book, "The Good," that political science aims to pursue the ultimate highest good, "happiness," and those who engage in political science must be virtuous and wise. Only people can adequately examine and judge nobleness and justice so that the city-state or society can achieve complete good (Aristotle, 2003). In other words, even Aristotle's concept of politics still firmly believes that virtue is the prerequisite for engaging in political affairs. In other words, the Western philosophical tradition also believes that an individual's inner moral cultivation and wisdom are the cornerstone of whether they can create a perfect living world for the entire society, city-state, or country. Such a series of complete and rigorous logical discussions can be found in Aristotle's series of works and in many discussions in the Western ethical tradition.

Therefore, from the perspective of the two major philosophical traditions of the East and the West, the order of practical Gongfu from Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness is unmistakable and unquestionable. However, as mentioned above, in the past one or two hundred years, the Western scientific tradition has experienced rapid differentiation of scientific disciplines. Various natural sciences, humanities, social sciences, etc., have branched off from the academic tradition of philosophy in response to the Professor's concern in the article about how the relationship between the Inner Sagehood and the Outer Kingliness can be developed smoothly. I want to start with psychology, which branched out from philosophy over a hundred years ago, especially "Counseling Psychology," which has expanded rapidly over the past hundred years. Starting from the issue of "the complete development of human beings" that is concerned by "psychology" and the problem of "from becoming a person to adulthood" that has always been a concern in Confucian practical philosophy, it shows that in contemporary society,

Inner Sagehood or inner peace is still a matter of only by learning the necessary foundation of the external king and the objective knowledge system can everyone have the opportunity to live a happy and fulfilling life, in response to Professor Lin's previous article, the so-called " from the external king to the inner saint" which seems to be going to the other extreme. In other words, I would like to respond to some of the professors' arguments in this article from the intersection of counseling psychology and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism practical philosophy, hoping to clarify some critical issues for living in the contemporary complex, changeable, and challenging world, there is a relatively reliable and reference direction to follow.

II. The Starting Point of Counseling Psychology and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Self-Awareness

In the tradition of Confucianism, we can find from the dialogue between Confucius and his disciples that Confucius continued to awaken and inform his disciples about various moral concepts such as "benevolence" and "loyalty and forgiveness" that are reflected in human beings through dialogue with his disciples—appropriate ways to interact with people. In the Analects, Confucius explained what "benevolence" means to his disciples in various ways of expression, mainly because the situations in which he interacted with each student were different. In each unique situation, he tried to "awaken" students through dialogue to experience and understand benevolence, various moral traits, appropriate interpersonal interactions, and the meaning of life. Therefore, the entire Analects can be said to be a process of awakening learners on how to carry out moral practice in daily life through dialogue between teachers and students.

Confucianism developed after the Han Dynasty, and as Buddhism spread eastward to China and East Asia, after hundreds or nearly a thousand years of mutual influence and exchange with Confucianism and Daoism in the Chinese cultural tradition, after the Song Dynasty, it gradually formed a fusion of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. The Contemporary Neo-Confucianism tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties, whose core ideas are still based on Confucianism, is also called New Confucianism. At this time, in addition to integrating the essence of Daoist and Buddhist thoughts and practice methods, New Confucianism paid more attention to Gongfu theory. In "The Case of Song and Yuan Studies" and "The Case of Ming Confucianism," one can find various Gongfu theories, cultivation methods, and mental techniques mentioned by well-known Confucian scholars of the Song and

Ming dynasties. These expound on diverse, rich inner cultivation skills to enhance self-awareness. The ability and sensitivity of the technique, for example: in the 12th volume of "Lianxi Academic Cases" (Part 2): "Is the phrase "no desire, so quiet" in "Shuo" not something he can handle with his skill?", "Book of Ming Dao Studies (Part 1), Volume 13: "Cheng Zi first recognized benevolence and did not teach people to comprehend it in the air. When scholars observe things and do their best, they first know where the big brain is, and then it is easy to work hard. After realizing it, you only need to "respect and keep it sincerely." But don't forget it, and don't help it. The truth is to wait for it with force. It means that the work of respect and righteousness integrates everything in the world and exists here." (Huang Zongxi, 2021) The above quotation means self-reflection and self-examination. And understand how your inner benevolence and benevolence can be reflected externally through your actions when facing things. Similar discussions on Gongfu theory can be found in various classic works of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties

At the same time, it can also be found that the New Confucianism scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties also incorporated Zen meditation and other methods into their self-cultivation. For example, In Volume 15 of "Yichuan Academic Case" (Part 1): "A scholar's primary concern is with the mind and will. If one wishes to eliminate distracting thoughts and is troubled by their chaos, then one needs to practice seated meditation and enter a state of concentration.", "Chongren Academic Case" (2) Volume 2: "Zhou Zi had a theory of mastering tranquility, so scholars devoted themselves to meditation and became more devoted to Zen." "Baisha Academic Cases" (Part 1) Volume 5: "Mr. Yichuan would praise people's good scholarship whenever he saw them sitting in meditation." and so on (Huang Zongxi, 2008). In other words, enhancing inner self-awareness through meditation is also one of the Gungfu methods in the New Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties.

On the other hand, although Western psychology's history is only about a hundred years old, the various methods it has developed to enhance individual self-awareness have become increasingly richer, more diverse, and more practical for individual life. It can indeed produce obvious effects and changes. More interestingly, in recent years, various theoretical schools of counseling psychology and psychotherapy have gradually integrated Eastern meditation or mindfulness methods to enhance individuals' understanding of themselves. Consciousness training and awareness.

In fact, in the history of the development of counseling psychology, the importance of individual awareness of self-awareness has been emphasized for a long time. As early as the 1950s, Carl Jung (1951/1959), who had a psychoanalytic orientation, once said: "When an inner

situation is not made conscious, it happens outside, as fate." (German: Wenn eine innere Situation nicht bewusst gemacht wird, erscheint sie im Außen als Schicksal.) In other words, if an individual does not have a clear self-awareness of his or her inner state of consciousness. An individual's external behavior will be influenced by the subconscious mind. The various choices or actions he makes will gradually realize his destiny step by step. Therefore, only when an individual is clearly aware or aware of his or her inner state, can the individual have the opportunity to clearly see his or her inner psychological motivations and make adjustments. Then change the individual's own external behavior, the interactive relationship between the individual himself and others, and the individual self and the world, thereby changing his or her life destiny.

Since the 1930s, psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy theories and techniques have spread from Europe. At the same time, behaviorist psychology and its psychotherapy theories and techniques have also become popular in the United States. After that, after the mid-20th century, humanistic-existential therapy, person-centered therapy, Gestalt therapy, etc., as well as various psychological therapies such as cognitive behavioral therapy, reality therapy, family systems therapy, and postmodern therapy orientation schools of thought emerged like a hundred flowers blooming and like bamboo shoots in the spring after the rain. They have developed a variety of rich therapeutic theories and techniques to help individuals become aware of the connections between their cognition, behavior, and emotions, and to deepen their self-awareness. The theories and techniques of counseling psychology, such as those mentioned above, have made considerable progress in the past hundred years. It has dramatically helped human society, which is rapidly growing due to the advancement of medicine, and has also changed the lives and destinies of many people. In other words, through the combination and verification of scientific research and practical work in counseling psychology, human beings have slowly found ways to settle the inner body and mind. Thus, individuals can develop holistically from the inside out, fostering harmonious and positive connections with their inner selves, society, and the world.

Over the past half-century, counseling psychology has tended to incorporate Eastern meditation or mindfulness methods in its practical work. Helping people find inner peace, as well as inner harmony and unity of body, mind, and soul. For example, John Banmen (2023), the advocate of the popular Satir model in Taiwan, published "Satir's 52 Meditation Exercises: Become Aware of the Inner Iceberg, reconcile with Yourself, and Live Well with Others" in Taiwan. Through mindfulness meditation and some dialogue guidance methods in psychotherapy, individuals are guided to become aware of, fully accept, and reconcile with their

inner self, thereby establishing better connections with others and the world. In addition, many scientific studies have confirmed that cognitive behavioral therapy has a positive effect on treating depression, a widespread mental illness today (Beck, 2011/2014). In recent years, it has also been combined with mindfulness meditation methods to more effectively assist patients with depression in overcoming emotional storms and restoring inner peace (Segal et al., 2013/2015; Williams et al., 2014/2016; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 2005). In other words, contemporary counseling psychology has found suitable entry points or connections from the traditional Eastern self-awareness techniques. Through specific and clear operation steps, we can guide people trapped in emotional storms or even ordinary people to find inner stability and calmness. And then have better interactions and connections with others and the world.

Compared with Western counseling psychology, the New Confucianism tradition has accumulated many techniques and methods to enhance individual self-awareness. However, what is missing is that the New Confucianism self-cultivation methods can be scientifically verified. To more clearly identify those methods that can more effectively assist individuals in self-awareness, thereby allowing their inner psyche to develop more completely. Rather than what Professor Lin (2024) said in his article: "New Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties only emphasized the 'mind method,' but there was no 'method' at all." To put it more clearly, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism does not only have mental methods but no methods. The direction it can work towards in this era may be to have active dialogue and exchanges with Western counseling psychology. And through more scientific and empirical methods, various Gongfu theories in its tradition over the past thousand years are embodied or verified through specific scientific operation steps. To confirm that it has specific benefits for developing people's inner character and external social behavior.

III. From Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness: The Rational Order for Human and Social Development

Professor Lin proposed the concept of "from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood" in his article mainly to address why traditional Confucian practical philosophy failed to develop Western scientific knowledge and democratic systems. In response to this problem, the well-known Contemporary Neo-Confucianism scholar Mr. Mou Zongsan proposed the term "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" to solve the problem of how Contemporary Neo-Confucianism can develop Western science and democracy. Regarding Mou Zongsan's discussion, Professor Lin directly pointed out in his article that the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism tradition used to be

"too introverted," "too moral," and "too metaphysical," so it was necessary to reverse the practical order of Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness. Personally, I think Professor Lin's discussion seems to jump too fast. And they ignore the efforts of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism scholars such as Mr. Mou to use rigorous logical discussion structures such as "one mind opens two doors" and "two-level ontology". Explain how to transform the "moral heart" into an "intellectual subject." Absorb knowledge to face various complex practical problems in the real world. And a systematic explanation of "using the knowledge of Inner Sagehood to develop a new Outer Kingliness".

How can the original moral heart of conscience be transformed into a cognitive mind and absorb the whole universe into our knowledge system? Mou Zongsan, in his special book "From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan" (Mou Zongsan, 1979), "Chapter 3: The Differentiation and Development of Wang Xue", especially the chapter "Appendix: Addressing Problems". Chapters such as "Chapter 4: The Enlightenment of Intellectual Nature from the Awareness of the Perceiving Body" of "Phenomena and Things Itself" contain quite complete and detailed discussions (Mou Zongsan, 1990). According to Mou Zongsan, conscience belongs to the realm of moral intuition rather than cognitive understanding. The moral heart can make value judgments, just like the conscience can judge how to "use the table" appropriately, but the conscience cannot know what the table is made of. Only the cognitive heart can judge what the table is made of. But when we start from our inner conscience, in the Illumination of Conscience, when it is judged that the situation at that time requires "making a table" to use the table to accomplish a valuable thing. At this time, the moral heart of conscience must be transformed into a cognitive mind. Through the cognitive mind, one can understand the composition, shape, and related technologies of the table, to complete the act of making the table, and then use the table in a valuable way. In other words, the process of "extending innate knowledge" compels us not to stop at cultivating our moral heart. Still, we also need to have a cognitive mind to absorb knowledge so that conscience and heavenly principles can be applied in the real world and be realized. Mr. Mou Zongsan described this transformation process as "the Self-Entrapment of Conscience" (Mou Zongsan, 1979). More specifically, conscience or morality can make value judgments about our lives and decide which actions, things, or occupations are valuable. However, to complete an action, thing, or occupation requires relevant professional knowledge. At this time, through the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," the moral heart is transformed into a cognitive mind that absorbs knowledge to complete a valuable behavior, thing, or career. Let everything in the real world be governed by the reasonable world order established by conscience. For Mr. Mou Zongsan, this is a crucial hub for transforming from

the Inner Sagehood to developing a new outer sage world. Motivated by conscience, individuals continue to make choices about values and social behavior in the process of "illumination of conscience." Use this as a basis to recognize objective knowledge and make valuable social contributions to yourself, others, and society. In other words, if one absorbs knowledge based on conscience and morality, individuals will have a strong value motivation behind the cognitive learning process. Therefore, the behavior of learning objective knowledge can be given considerable meaning and value, and it is, thus, more accessible to improve the effectiveness of knowledge learning.

In fact, the above discussion can be said to be consistent with the relevant research of scholars in the contemporary West who promote the moral education movement. According to Berkowitz (2021/2022), there is a mutually reinforcing effect or synergy between "academic achievement" and "character development". He and J. Banninga studied 120 elementary schools in California, USA, and found a positive correlation between the schools' emphasis on character education and their ability to obtain better results on state examinations. In addition, his related research on "effective practices in character education" also showed similar results. In other words, promoting moral or character education does not hinder our effectiveness in learning knowledge.

Of course, Mr. Mou Zongsan's discussion on how Contemporary Neo-Confucianism scholars illuminate their conscience. Compared with the moral education discussed by Western character education scholars Berkowitz and others. There may be a gap in the level of Kung Fu cultivation. However, both of them attach great importance to the ability of individuals to be keenly self-aware of their inner perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. Then, we can establish a harmonious and positive connection with ourselves, others, the world, or the universe. That is, Inner Sagehood or inner peace is the basis for whether we can develop good interactions and connections with ourselves, others, and the world.

IV. The Relationship between Self, Others and the World: An Interactive Relationship of Equality and Harmony

In his article, Professor Lin pointed out that the fundamental dilemma of the Confucian political tradition lies in the "misplacement of Dao," and therefore it is necessary to properly return to the traditional three elements of "King, Father, and Sage." Here, Professor Lin mentioned that the root of the problem is:

The Confucian ideal of "sage king" became the reality of "sage king".

Confucianism initially advocated that "the saint is king" and that saints with virtue, wisdom, and ability should become the political and social community rulers, which is a bit like Plato's meaning of the philosopher king. The result is just the opposite. Once you reach the peak of power, as the supreme ruler of the political and social community. He declared that he was a virtuous, wise, and powerful saint. ... This kind of "King Sage" I call "moral misplacement" (misplaced Dao). (Lin, 2024)

Personally, I deeply agree with Professor Lin's above statement. In addition, in the Confucian political and social system, as Professor Lin said: "In the two-thousand-year tradition of monarchy, 'king' is the highest level of the political and social community, 'father' is the highest level of the family and human ethics community, and 'sage' is the highest level of the cultural and educational community." (Lin, 2024) Once people play a specific role in the entire social system, this is "king, father, sage" or "heaven, earth, parents, king and master." Regardless of their actual personal moral cultivation, our traditional Confucian society will sanctify their personality and give them considerable power because of their social status. As a result, when interpersonal interactions are chaotic, the relationship between human beings becomes a hegemonic or dominating force.

However, why does this "misplacement of Dao" or "relationship of domination" occur? In addition to Professor Lin's mention in the article that "dogmatization" and "stereotyping" have affected the cultivation and shaping of people. Personally, I think this is because it ignores the fact that Confucian human relations emphasize "reciprocity" (Wu, 2013). Or the "reciprocity" of this human relationship is out of balance. That is to say, the father is kind, the son is filial, the elder brother is friendly, and the younger brother is respectful, the husband and wife have different roles and functions, the monarch and his ministers are righteous, and friends are trustworthy. It should be a positive, cyclic, interactive relationship. In other words, parents love their children, and children are naturally filial to their parents. This kind of human relationship is equal and reciprocal. Instead of unilaterally asking or expecting the other party to give endlessly without an equal or corresponding response or feedback. Confucian human relations were originally based on natural and equal interactions between people. Everyone plays different roles in the family or society, and when they interact with others in these roles, they are also based on the "reciprocity" of "benevolence" and the heart of "wariness, compassion," and "respect for oneself and others." The emotions of this kind of interpersonal interaction are naturally exchanged, considerate, understood, and accepted. Therefore, the elder brother loves his younger brother and sister, and the younger brother and sister respect the elder

brother and sister; the husband and wife consider each other and cooperate in the division of labor; the king is righteous to his ministers, and the ministers are loyal to the king, etc.

Therefore, as Mr. Mou Zongsan mentioned in the article "Moral Idealism and Theory of Human Nature" in the book "Moral Idealism". Confucianism discusses good nature, kindness, vigilance, compassion, conscience, etc., which have nothing to do with class status and interests (Mou Zongsan, 1985). That is to say, everyone is the same and equal in terms of basic human dignity and kindness, and there is no distinction between high and low-class status. It's just that in interactions between people, each person has different "expressions" due to the different roles they play. In order to embody their good nature and virtues, they will have different "expression methods" depending on the time, place, and person.

The above views are consistent with the views of multiple theoretical schools in contemporary counseling psychology on interpersonal interaction. For example, Rudolf Dreikurs, a parent education scholar of the Adlerian school, said in his monograph "Social Equality: Contemporary Challenges": "Adler proposed the "ironclad logic of social living," which elucidates the fundamental principles governing all social interactions.Adler realized that "equality" is the essential logical element of our lives. Without it, social stability and harmony cannot occur.The most fundamental thing is that we must learn how to live with others as equals...." (Dreikurs, 1971/2019). In addition, Carl Rogers, the founder of person-centered therapy with a humanistic treatment orientation, also emphasized the need to empathize with the client correctly and establish a sincere, consistent, and equal interactive relationship between the therapist and the client. The postmodern treatment orientation advocates that the therapist should treat the client as an expert facing their inner problems. These counseling psychology theories and schools, in their aim to facilitate the development of a fully integrated personality, all emphasize that the relationship between educators, counselors, therapists, and clients should be grounded in sincere and equitable interactions. In terms of communication, based on such interpersonal interaction, individuals can be helped to gradually develop good connections or interactions with themselves, others, and the world.

V. Conclusion

From the perspectives of Eastern and Western philosophical traditions and contemporary counseling psychology, a shared focus emerges: the holistic development of individuals towards creating a rational, equitable, and just society. To realize this ideal, we must start from the individual's inner self-awareness. In the thousand-year tradition of New Confucianism

practical philosophy, many Gongfu theories on how to be aware of the inner self have been accumulated. Contemporary counseling psychology has also absorbed meditation or mindfulness methods from Eastern traditions and transformed them into various schools of counseling or psychotherapy. Through scientific empirical research, it has been confirmed that these mindfulness or meditation methods are significantly helpful in treating some of the world's most popular psychological diseases. Of course, if these methods can be more widely promoted in the daily lives of ordinary people, they will not only prevent mental illness but also help ordinary people perform their life functions more effectively.

As mentioned above, the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism philosophical tradition, which began with New Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, has accumulated many different levels of self-cultivation theory. However, there is still a lack of scientific empirical research to prove that these technological methodologies help people develop fully. Over the past few decades, counseling psychology combined with mindfulness meditation has proven to be of considerable help to an individual's inner physical and mental settlement. This example of the combination of counseling psychology and Eastern self-cultivation theory is quite suitable as a starting point for demonstration. Let the traditions of counseling psychology and New Confucian practical philosophy continue to find suitable intersections or entry points to assist individuals and society in developing wholly and harmoniously. It also proves that the sequence from Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness, from inner physical and mental settlement to good interactive relationships between individuals, others, and society, is reasonable and helps people develop completely.

The "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood" proposed by Professor Lin and the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" proposed by Mr. Mou Zongsan both respond to the question of how the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism tradition developed Western scientific knowledge and democratic systems. Basically, I personally agree with Mr. Mou Zongsan's discussion about conscience. As for the psychological turning point in the process of "conscience being trapped" and the turning point in the inner psychological process of how the moral heart is transformed into the cognitive heart. If it can be combined with contemporary scientific research in counseling psychology to explore the transition process and discuss it in more detail. This approach may better assist individuals in clarifying their value choices and in understanding how to assimilate or develop practical scientific knowledge within these value frameworks, ultimately achieving the goals of Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness, or the harmonious development of individuals and society.

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走向公民儒學——回應〈後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王-內聖」問題的一些回應〉

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摘要

本文主要回應林安梧〈後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王-內聖」問題的一些回應〉一文。該文肯定牟宗三先生對中國儒學的貢獻，回應牟先生「良知的坎陷」，認為新儒家的內聖修養，仍然容易引生道德實踐教條化的蔽病。主張人們進入公民社會，應理解社會規範是共同約定，而非不可調動的至高行動指導原則。就因為這些行為規則是可調動的，隨時節不同而變化的，主體參與其中，也隨著調動。這個主體與社會相互配合調動的過程，即是主體學習的過程。由此可以將主體從絕對的道德框架中解放出來，同時也避開主觀境界型態自我封閉的情形，而可參與社會。林先生自稱「從外王到內聖」是一「儒學革命」，但它並不真的否定牟先生藉康德理路融入的儒學心性系統以「內聖開外王」的這套系統，而只是強調現代儒者必須調整實踐方式來回應新局。筆者肯定林安梧問題意識的意義，也肯定他二十餘年思考的成果，完成《當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學》一書。但筆者認為林安梧未意識到儒者之所以為儒者，乃「正德利用厚生」的自我期許，不會安於是個守法公民。提出三點想法回應：一、既是儒者，就要有「存天理，去人欲」的氣魄；二、公民儒者當積極參贊社會行公義；三、千萬不能失去主觀境界形態的道德論述。

關鍵詞：新儒家、牟宗三、內聖外王、正德、公民

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壹、前言

〈後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王-內聖」問題的一些回應〉一文首先肯定牟宗三先生對中國儒學的貢獻、對自身學養的深刻影響，並簡述新儒家唐、牟、徐三先生在外王事業接上民主與科學的學術立場。接著以回應牟先生良知的坎陷為主，認為牟先生作為新傳統主義者，其「方法論的本質主義」引生道德實踐偏至化、教條化、專制化。要解決這偏向，應代之以「方法論上的約定主義」，社會規範既是共同約定，不但是群體的最大共識，以共約處理眾人事物，也能夠順應時節調動，透過「不斷的經過循環往復的檢覈」，去回應當下生命的存在。

筆者忝為後學，站在向林先生請益、對話的立場，試著表達對林先生觀點的理解，進而參考林先生其他著作後，提出個人淺見，以盡切磋問對之宜，深廣自家學識。敬請林安梧先生指教。

一、關於新儒家—後新儒家

「新儒家」之所以為「新」，乃是為回應新世局，面對不同的時代議題，提出解決方法，且其方法大不同於前，而謂之「新」。牟先生的重要貢獻是以西方哲學話語系統分析、建構儒家的道德哲學，而能與西方哲學系統對話。除了學術上的成就之外，也呼籲並立定新儒家的當代使命：「接上民主與科學」，去實現儒者經世濟民、利用厚生的理想。至於新儒家如何接上民主與科學，牟先生主張「良知之自我坎陷以開出民主科學」。

儒學自孔子後的發展，幾經受挫與挑戰，首先是秦漢大一統的君主專制，將法家操控臣民的技術帶入儒家，至唐宋，儒道吸納廣大信眾，儒學沒落，但宋明諸儒吸收佛、道的心性論後，理路更加深密壯大，因其學之「實」（人倫日用）進而成為思想場域的主流。直到進入現代，西方民主與科學挾其強大的經濟武力背景，衝蕩中國傳統社會，儒學不得不順應時勢接招。牟先生在傳統儒學以心性論為正宗的學術基礎上，提出一心開二門的架構，主張「良知自我坎陷」去接上民主與科學，為現代儒者奠基法政思維、民主制度的道德理論基礎。

牟宗三（1996）直言「儒家的當前使命——開新外王」⁸⁶，曰：

儒家的理性主義在今天這個時代，要求新的外王才能充分的表現。今天這個時代所要求的新外王，即是科學與民主政治。事實上，中國以前所要求的事功，亦只在民主政治的形態下，才能夠充分的實現，才能夠充分的被正視。（牟宗三，1996）

⁸⁶ 牟宗三（1996）。新版序。《政道與治道》，學生書局，頁 11。附註：為省略繁冗，標註引文出處時，只於第一次列出版本資訊。以下皆同。

儒家的政治理想就是「藏天下於天下」，牟先生（1996）說：

民主政治能夠表現一些「藏天下於天下」的理想。儒家學術最內部的要求亦一向在於此，但是從未在現實上出現，而今天之現代化亦主要在要求此一理想的實現，此亦即是儒家當前使命所要求的「新外王」。民主政治是新外王的「形式條件」，事功在此形式條件的保障下才能充分實現，在民主政治下才有事功，才能讓你做事；除此之外，還需要科學知識作為新外王的「材質條件」。新外王要求藏天下於天下、開放的社會、民主政治、事功的保障，科學知識，這就是現代化。（牟宗三，1996）⁸⁸

「藏天下於天下」即是「開放的社會」（Open Society），自三代以後中國君主政治則「藏天下於框篋」即是家天下，以天下為個人的私產，並承認「天天講王陽明、講良知，是講不出科學的」（牟宗三，1996）⁴，儒家心性之學要開出新外王，必須透過「道德理性的自我坎陷」（牟宗三，1996）⁸⁹這一種「曲通」的方式：

「誠心求知」行為卻必然為道德理性所要求所意欲，既要求此行為，而若落下來真的去做此行為，則從「主體活動之能」方面說，卻必須轉為「觀解理性」（理論理性）及由動態的成德之道德理性轉為靜態的成知識之觀解理性。這一步轉，我們可以說是**道德理性之自我坎陷**（自我否定）。（牟宗三，1996）⁹⁰

牟先生「良知自我坎陷」說，掀起一波熱烈的討論⁹¹⁷。有反對⁸，有認同，較為中肯的意見主要是認為良知坎陷說過份集中於形上學分析，對實質的制度與社會組織倫理反省則太少：「自我坎陷說對中國文化走上現代化的探討，在邏輯也許無可厚責。然而在現實上總感有所不足。」（顏炳罡，1991）⁹新儒家從傳統社群走出，立基儒學基

⁸⁷ 牟宗三又曰：「要求民主政治乃是新外王的第一義，此乃新外王的形式意義、形式條件，事功得靠此解決，此處才是真正的理想主義。」〔牟宗三（1996）。新版序。**政道與治道**，頁15〕。

⁸⁸ 牟宗三（1996）。新版序。**政道與治道**，頁20。

⁴ 牟宗三〈新版序〉：「另一面則是科學，科學是「新外王」的材質條件。亦即「新外王」的材料、內容。……天天講王陽明、講良知，是講不出科學的。因為良知不是成功科學知識的一個認知機能。然而，科學亦可與儒家的理性主義相配合，科學乃是與事功精神相應的理性主義之表現。……儒家內在的目的及要求科學，這個要求是發自於其內在的目的的。何以見得呢？講良知、講道德，乃重在存心、動機之善。然有一好的動機卻無知識，則此道德上好的動機亦無法表達出來。所以，良知、道德的動機在本質上即要求知識作為傳達的一種工具。……要想貫徹其內在的目的，都得要求科學，肯定科學。」〔牟宗三（1996）。新版序。**政道與治道**，頁15〕。

⁸⁹ 牟宗三。新版序。**政道與治道**，頁58。

⁹⁰ 牟宗三（1996）。新版序。**政道與治道**，頁57。

⁷ 參考李明輝（2021）。公德、私德之分與儒家傳統。**鵝湖學誌**，（66），1-34；李翔海（1993）。「牟宗三與當代新儒家」學術思想研討會紀要。**鵝湖月刊**，（215），35-41；王大德（1995）。評介《當代新儒學論文集·外王篇—關於「良知的自我坎陷」的討論》。**鵝湖學誌**，（14），165-177。

⁸ 如蔣慶（1996）。良知只可呈現而不可坎陷：王陽明良知學說之比較及「新外王」評議。**中國文化**，（14），14。

⁹ 顏炳罡（1991）。牟宗三先生的自我坎陷說與當代文化癥結。劉述先（主編），**當代新儒學論文集·外王篇**，文津出版社，頁197-214。

礎去適應西方民主與科學可見卓學與胸懷，而牟先生這一套以康德融入心性理學的新儒學，除了開闢一與西方哲學對話的學術框架，在事功層面，正如蔣年豐所說：

法政主體雖然不是從固有的中國文化中開發出來的，儒家的原始思想中也的確沒有這個精神側面在。儒家雖然沒有開出這個精神側面，但他卻以其道德主體為法政主體預定了位子。(蔣年豐，1989)¹⁰

不管怎麼說，後新儒家的確在牟宗三之後，接著談「內聖外王」之學。其中林先生自 1996 年《儒學革命論》起，構築「公民儒學」，已二十餘載。

貳、後新儒家林先生的「新內聖學」

牟先生於 1995 年逝世之後，留下深厚紮實的思想遺產，也留下許多爭論。孔子死後儒分為八，牟先生逝世之後，進入「後新儒家」則有護教派與批判派。林先生自居為批判一派，許多論點的確有別於牟先生的思路。在接上民主與科學問題，林安梧(1998)於《儒學革命論》批評牟先生的外王理論，「儒家實踐論的缺失在於這實踐是境界的，是宗法的，是親情的，是血緣的，是咒術的，是專制的這些一直都掛搭粘合在一起，分不清楚……沒有提到一自為主體的對象化情況下來理解。」¹¹，於 2023 年直言：「內聖而內傾、內捲，境界型態的圓教系統，生出許多問題」(林安梧，2023)¹²，他認為：

(良知自我坎限以開出民主)強調那道德的形而上之體，承體啓用，可以開出現代化。這樣承體啓用的方式，卻忽略了真正具體真實的世界，就此來說，面對現代化的開出與否，其實，只有消極意義，而很難有積極作為。這也就是說，他們沒有真正為開出現代化如何落實，提供更有力量的實踐。(林安梧，2023)¹³

怎麼才能提供更有力量的儒學實踐呢？林先生提出的解方是「新外王而內聖」的主張，從對舊社會的反思「解開道的錯置」，到民主體制的道德實踐約則「方法論的約定主義」，再到理路背景的支持「新外王而內聖」，明顯有一條思考的脈絡。

一、解開道的錯置

傳統儒學乃伴隨君權、父權結構而有的道德系統，心性儒學的主觀境界型態，尤其

¹⁰ 蔣年豐解釋道：「我的論證之一康德的道德形上學所凸顯出來的形式主義性格的道德主體可以輾轉轉化成法政主體，而與真實的道德主體並立。就在這樣的意義之下，我們可以說儒家的道德主體為法政主體預定了位子。」〔蔣年豐(1989)。法政主體與現代社會——當前儒家應該思考的問題。中國文化月刊，(111)，60。〕

¹¹ 林安梧(1999，頁42)。儒學革命論：後新儒學哲學的問題向度序言。鵝湖月刊，(288)，42-47。

¹² 林安梧(2023，頁18)。「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」辯論之後——敬答周群振、李瑞全兩位學長。鵝湖月刊，(578)，17-25。

¹³ 林安梧(2023，頁22)。「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」辯論之後——敬答周群振、李瑞全兩位學長。鵝湖月刊，(578)，17-25。

助長了道德的異化，造成「父、聖、君」不當其位，變成是「君、父、聖」，由君主掌握社會結構的核心，主宰父、聖，林先生認為這是傳統儒學在歷史發展過程中，產生的歷史事實，名之曰「道的錯置」。若要避免此一根本困結「道的錯置」，讓「君、父、聖」三者能恰當歸位，即是正視原有的君權結構已經瓦解，代之以「較為獨立的社群、社會的組織結構」（意指當時尚不夠成熟的臺灣民主社會），則維持此社會結構的道德系統當改為「契約性的社會連結」（林安梧，2009）¹⁴。「契約性的社會連結」構想之由來，主要是回應當下的社會生活，既然已不是舊有的君父家國型態，真正要進入既有的社會生活中，當然就要改變，以相應於民主、法治社會。就是這一儒家姿態的改變、儒學的轉向，林先生稱之為「第二波的儒學革命」（林安梧，1999）¹⁵，這是後新儒家進入廿一世紀對人類文明的貢獻。

二、方法論的約定主義

林先生主張「我們應該跨出主體性哲學的限制，歸返到豐富的生活世界中尋求一真存實感的啟動處，參贊處，應摒棄方法論上的本質主義，而代之以方法論上的約定主義。」（林安梧，2023）¹⁶，才能解開舊社會「道的錯置」。這意思即是呼籲現代儒者，應該拋棄經典裡頭君父家國的思維，重新去觀照社會，去實踐道德（主觀境界型態的道德）。這一方面提醒現代儒者，主觀境界型態的心性之學在過去無法改變君父的宰制，反造成道德規範壓迫主體生命的歷史事實¹⁷；另一方面也要求後新儒家正視現今迥然不同的社會結構、生活型態以及價值觀，改變道德實踐的方法為「約定主義」有其必要。

林先生認為「境界形態的心性修養」不足以回應民主政治，主要有鑑於儒學在秦漢以後，二千多年大一統帝制壓抑之下，無法真正實現它的理想，只好走向內在心念的涵養檢視，「境界形態的心性修養取代了真實世界的社會實踐，本來修身是為了齊家治國平天下，現在修身就只是檢點心念」（林安梧，2016）⁹³。

三、由外王而內聖

¹⁴ 林安梧（2009，頁7）。「公民儒學」下的「道德思考」。鵝湖月刊，（413），7-19。

¹⁵ 林安梧（1999，頁47）。儒學革命論：後新儒學哲學的問題向度序言。鵝湖月刊，（288），42-47。

¹⁶ 林安梧（2024）。後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王--內聖」問題的一些回應。本土諮商心理學學刊，15（3），1-51。

¹⁷ 林安梧（2021，頁6-9）。當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學。作者序：儒家還有戲嗎？。提到「五倫」在大一統的君主專制制度下被扭曲為「三綱」：「這是帝制的絕對化造成的，豈是儒學？……這是『偽儒學』、是『假儒學』，這是被帝皇專制暴虐過的儒學。」〔林安梧（2021）。當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學〕。商周出版〕。

⁹³ 林安梧。作者序：儒家還有戲嗎？。當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學，頁8。林安梧（2016，頁141）。血緣性縱貫軸，學生書局。

林先生主張後新儒家的「外王」議題，不是「內聖開出外王」——主體自覺之仁轉出自由民主，而是：吾人現今已處在以契約精神運行的現代社會裡，如何調整內聖學去回應「新外王」：

在現代性的社會裏面，以契約性的政治連結為構造、以責任倫理為準則，重新審視如何達到「一體之仁」；不是如何地「由舊內聖開出新外王」，而是「在新外王的格局下如何能夠調理出新的內聖學」。(林安梧，2009)¹⁹

「由外王而內聖」的提出，並非對「內聖開出外王」的否定，林先生認為「良知的自我坎陷以開出知性主體」是為了在儒學理路根源給出一個後設的解釋，儒學有能力接上科學與民主，但「內聖開出外王」並不是現實實踐的理論指導。²⁰若要落在儒學的道德層面，應當轉換思考問題的方式：

在民主化與科學化的過程中，儒學如何扮演一個調節者，參與者的角色，在理論的、特別是後設的考虑的層次，它如何扮演一理解、詮釋，進而瓦解與重建的角色。(林安梧，2009)²¹

亦即，後新儒家已經接受現有的開放社會框架，如何在這「新外王」時代，成為一個涵具公民意識的儒者。為此，後新儒家必須轉換思維方式，如何調整原有內聖學的內容。這一調整的過程，就是一個學習、轉化的過程——道德主體學習如何進入眾多道德主體並立的社會。林先生：

強調「境界型態的形而上學」，如此一來，便容易忽略了真正的外王。「外王」很重要的就是從「血緣人倫的共同體」，進到「政治社會共同體」，到「天地自然的共同體」，而凡此種種，都離不開人文化成這個「人文教養的共同體」。(林安梧，2023)⁹⁴

這個「人文教養的共同體」，就是新內聖學的載體。新內聖學主張人是不斷再進化的個體，「本心」本質主義的談法將忽略現實環境的變動，以及道德主體在經驗界的不成熟，以及趨向成熟的成長過程，是林先生受王船山人性論啟發而提出的，認為「天命之謂性」的道德不能只是先驗的，須知：「命日降、性日生日成，未成可成，已成可革；道德是發展的，是變動的，是人文化成的。」(林安梧，2023)⁹⁵他進一步說：

你把宋明儒學的義理講透了，講明了，那還是不足的，那是不夠的。其實，現代化是要活生生地，要從具體生活世界活生生的，生長出來的。這是具體而真實的實踐，不是理論的邏輯次序可以安排的，它涉及到的是「實踐的學習次序」。(林

¹⁹ 林安梧 (2009)。「公民儒學」下的「道德思考」。鵝湖月刊，(413)，7-19。

²⁰ 林安梧 (2009)。儒學革命論：後新儒家哲學的問題向度。學生書局，頁 23。

²¹ 林安梧 (2009)。儒學革命論：後新儒家哲學的問題向度。學生書局，頁 23。

⁹⁴ 林安梧 (2023)。「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」辯論之後——敬答周群振、李瑞全兩位學長。鵝湖月刊，(578)，18-19。

⁹⁵ 林安梧 (2024)。後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王--內聖」問題的一些回應。本土諮商心理學學刊，15 (3)，1-51。

安梧，2023）⁹⁶

總而言之，林先生提出「由外王而內聖」的重要意義，不在「外王」，而在「新內聖學」。「本心」沒有新舊之別，它是恆常的，它是人之所以為人的真誠惻怛。但從道德實踐層面來看，「本心」有義務，也有其不容己的趨動力，要去理解所在的社會、文化處境。儒家經典所載所言都是面對著封建制度、君主專權制度、父權體制而有的思想與行動，我們不能一言一動照搬到公民社會裡來，必須有意識地調整和取捨，因而吾人一現代儒者，都必須學習如何理解經典的訓諭、指點，學習公民社會的運作方式以及價值觀，兩相涵攝融通，成為公民儒者。這也意謂著，從新內聖學的觀點，公民儒者不再從「聖賢」的角度直貫回答「人何以為人」這個問題，而是「性日生日成」，把每個共存的個體視為成長中的仁人。他提醒讀者，從五四之後，儒者就已經處在「新外王」的大環境中，不斷地學著理解現代社會，回應種種變動。在這新外王學習過程中，吾人不曾從中反思「原先帶有專制性的內聖之學」以及這一「由外王而內聖」的過程，有何意義。（林安梧，2023）⁹⁷進而提出「新內聖」說：

要問一問，在一個新外王學習過程裡，必須好好的學習一個新內聖的方式。我重視之所在，是在這個地方。這便是我所謂的「由外王而內聖」，強調的是在外王（包括：民主、科學）的學習過程裡，我們好好的去調解內聖，為內聖調理出、融通出一個新的方式。（林安梧，2023）⁹⁸

關於「學習一個新內聖的方式」，他曾說：

我們必須去正視，當自己作為一個具有主體性的個體時，是以何種身份進入社會，並且如何面對具體的制度結構問題？顯然地，這時候的修行方式便會有所不同。這個修行方式我覺得是會在一個具體的發展過程中慢慢去學習到，而不是去選一個懸空的、構作的理論。（林安梧，2009）⁹⁹

這個學習新內聖的方式，就是先意識到自己是公民這個身份，因而呼籲「先成為公民，再成為君子」（林安梧，2021）¹⁰⁰。所學「不是在宗法親情底下的那個『禮』，而是應該在一個社會正義底下的正義之『理』」。（林安梧，2009）¹⁰¹在他《當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學》這一本書裡，他提到公民教育的內容，強調公民要公私分明，保護個體性並尊重其他具有個體性的個人；現代公民社會以分別性原理為主，且強調客觀法則性的共同認定；去了解，自由就是尊重自己跟他人以及群體客觀法則性的共同認

⁹⁶ 林安梧（2023）。「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」辯論之後——敬答周群振、李瑞全兩位學長。《鵝湖月刊》，（578），17-25。

⁹⁷ 林安梧（2023）。「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」辯論之後——敬答周群振、李瑞全兩位學長。《鵝湖月刊》，（578），17-25。

⁹⁸ 林安梧（2023）。「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」辯論之後——敬答周群振、李瑞全兩位學長。《鵝湖月刊》，（578），17-25。

⁹⁹ 林安梧（2009）。「公民儒學」下的「道德思考」。《鵝湖月刊》，（413），7-19。

¹⁰⁰ 林安梧（2021）。《當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學》封面。

¹⁰¹ 林安梧（2009）。「公民儒學」下的「道德思考」。《鵝湖月刊》，（413），7-19。

定，個體性的意志自由必須符合群體的普遍意志；私人領域的維護是對個體性的尊重，是對社會公益法則的深層認定。不管是個體性還是公共性，其所求所行仍然通於天理良知，天理良知放在公民社會裡會轉成理性普遍性的要求。(林安梧，2021)¹⁰²

參、簡評

以上簡述牟先生「內聖外王」的架構，以及林先生翻轉儒學，提出「從外王到內聖」這條方向相反的思維。為什麼我們需要談「內聖外王」問題，討論儒學與民主、科學的關連？是因為希望在既有的傳統文化底蘊底下，跟上現代化的腳步。這是為了文化主體的自信，強國富民的時代要求，而儒者作為知識分子之主流，以利用、厚生為理想，應當肩負起這個責任，去開出民主與科學。這是唐君毅、牟宗三、張君勱及徐復觀四人聯名發表的〈為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言〉關心之所在，其惺惺所念者乃「中國文化之前途」。其中，牟先生就儒學心性之學做出說明，以「良知坎陷」去接上民主與科學。牟先生這套融會康德哲學的學術架構，就是一個成功的典範，保住儒學的中國文化道統。然而這套「內聖外王」之學能開展什麼樣的「外王」，牟先生未有進一步的描繪，有待後人接續。

筆者以為，雖然唐、牟、徐三先生學識宏大深廣，尚能在學術論述之餘，鞭辟時政，然自牟先生提出「內聖外王」去回應現代化問題之後，其後之學者的確給人感覺：「外王」說得多、做的少，如陳昭瑛：「(當代儒學)在政治上，儒家一直在各種重大政治改革運動中缺席，而所有重大的政治改革也多援引西方政治思想作為社會實踐的理論基礎。儒家不論在實踐或理論方面都是缺席的。」(陳昭瑛，2012)¹⁰³，甚至招來阻礙臺灣的民主化之負評。杜維明(2012)¹⁰⁴

因而，當林先生將儒學是否開出民主科學視為一個假問題，推開那些討論，直接從「走進民主社會」入手，即以「吾人已在民主社會當中，吾人已具公民身份」這一事實為前提，主張現代儒者要做的外王工夫，就是做一個公民。這的確是一「新外王」事業，也符合儒家道德實踐上的自我要求。正因這套「從外王到內聖」的理路，符合儒學道德實踐上的期待，林先生雖自稱是「儒學革命」，然有本於船山學，並不真的否定傳統儒學學問本身，也不真的否定牟先生藉康德理路融入的儒學心性系統以「內聖開外王」的這套系統，而只是強調：不能只有思想根據，必須調整實踐方式來回應新局。牟先生在儒學理論背景下足了工夫，給予儒學學者經典詮釋上的滋養與依據，肯定儒學的現代意義，

¹⁰² 參考林安梧(2021)。關於「公民教育」的哲學思考。當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學，頁274-290。

¹⁰³ 陳昭瑛(2012)。徐復觀與自由主義的對話。思想，(20)，175-193。

¹⁰⁴ 杜維明(2012)：「美國政治學界一批具有影響力的教授，對東亞儒家社會的民主前景做了悲觀的評估。……堅持民主運動在「儒教文化圈」極難開展。」〔杜維明(2012年6月28日)。走自己的民主路。天下雜誌，138)。〕

牟先生的「開出」，不是「經驗界的創造出」，而應是如霍晉明所言的「開展並護持」（霍晉明，2011）¹⁰⁵，賦予當代儒者在價值層面一個充足的理由與背景，肯定儒者有能力去迎向、甚至去創造民主與科學（雖然歷史上不曾有，初期也尚未創造民主與科學）。

由於牟先生在學術層面已經做了很大部分的工作，完成接上民主與科學的可能與解釋，在這個基礎上，只須接著談就好了。「良知坎陷」的優越在於它既可以保有中國文化的道統體系「天道性命相貫通」的道德主體，同時也不礙於這個詮釋體系下的道德主體去發展民主與科學。它提供儒者一個思想地圖，身份認同、文化歸屬安身之處，在立德的基礎上，積極擁抱實現民主科學，這是現代儒者的自我期許。良知開出知性的主體，去接受、學習傳統沒有的民主與科學，學習身為一個公民如何洽宜地回應開放社會，也就順理成章。

這中間不能是一個轉換，而必須是一個承接的過程。意即，林先生的「儒學革命」實是「接續」，因為關注的議題改變，從「儒學開出民主與科學」改成「儒學如何實踐民主與科學」，因而說「儒學轉向」。林先生的確也意識到對舊傳統批判得太多，易生誤會，所以他也在文章裡面屢屢強調「仁」才是儒學的核心。

歷史的推進，讓我們進入現代化，進入民主與科學的新世界，儒家經典所對應的君權、父權社會可想見不會復返，現代儒者除了孺慕經典，陶養自家心性、氣質之外，在實踐層面的確需要有一應對公民社會的意見與借鑑，供作學習、參照與思考，成為與時俱進的君子。林先生《當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學》就是這樣的一本書，提供一套相對完整的想法供參。

肆、三點想法

一、既是儒者，就要有「存天理，去人欲」的氣魄

林先生提出「由外王通內聖」，意指公民儒者接受現有的社會架構、歷史事實，並充份發揮、實現民主制度應有的樣態，在這過程中，將反過來再理解、再詮釋「內聖」應有的性質，從而更良好地回應環境。這是一個內外往復交流，學習、提升的過程。他對儒者做為一個公民在開放社會裡的形象，進行以下的描述：

我們不必再去強調主體的自覺該當如何，而應當強調，當我在一個開放的、自由的言說論述空間裏，通過清明理性的思考，彼此交換意見之後，就能夠慢慢地得

¹⁰⁵ 霍晉明（2011）：「不要將『開出』解釋為『生長出』，而是解釋為『開展並護持』（一個可供民主科學生長的空間），則應無理論其意義是：良知可以自覺地放下它對主客圓融一體的德性境界之要求，而容許以認知心（分別心）作主，去充暢其『分解的盡理』之作用，則一個『客觀對列之局』可以打開，而良知只盡一個『監臨』的責任，以防其『客觀對列之局』所產生的作用逾越了『利用、厚生』的原始初衷。」〔霍晉明（2011）。「現代化」情境下的道德實踐問題－從牟宗三先生的「坎陷說」到曾昭旭先生的「愛情學」。鵝湖月刊，（435），55-64。〕

出新共識；並且預期，當我們展開一個自由的交談之後，共識就會浮現出來。我們一個在一個契約的社會裏慢慢尋求一個恰當的制度結構，在這個制度結構裏，我們可以依著自己的個性本身想說什麼就說什麼，在這想說什麼就說什麼過程中，就會慢慢地調適出恰當的方式。

處在開放社會的儒者，因為受到保障的發言權利，得以從容地向他人表達自己的個性、需求與想法，同時也開放傾聽他人表達各自的需求與想法，透過彼此充份的交流，最後得出一個共識，且相信這個共識是可以被實現的。林先生想像，在這樣的處境中，公民儒者不須被天理所壓迫，他可以單純是一「七情六欲的存在」：

這時候我們便能夠正視自己是有七情六欲的存在，而不需要想到一個問題時馬上想到「存天理、去人欲」，因為我們不是以這樣的道德論式作為我們時時刻刻去警覺的核心，而是作為一個人就是這麼自然地進到社會裏頭來開始展開我們的論述。這樣的倫理學不再是高階思考之倫理學，不是個要求九十分、一百分的倫理學，而是只要求六十分倫理學。這樣說的社會公民，就是一個以六十分為基礎點的社會公民，可以暢達其情，回溯到自然本身的存在而說的，而不是個宗教苦行式的倫理學。（林安梧，2009）¹⁰⁶

就林先生的描述，在公民社會中，不必「去強調主體的自覺該當如何」，只須清明理性思考後陳述自己的主張，以期求得共識。這只是一個公民的權利以及最低的自我要求：說話不要亂說造謠、不要惡意攻擊，要清明理性。而且這個說話者，因為自由地「正視自己是有七情六欲的存在」，不需時時刻刻「存天理、去人欲」，不必被道德壓迫去受道德的「宗教苦行」，生活舒適自在。

筆者以為，儒者跟其他的公民不同，他必須有更高的自我要求。首先，我的言說還是必須出於自覺，雖然共識不見得同意我自覺的需求或訴求，儒者在有自覺的情況下，會了解到「公民」著眼於群我關係，重視的是法治、是社會正義，此中即有道德意義在，修養的是自身的「公德」。儒者既須內備「公德」，那麼「存天理去人欲」，就是必要的工夫。

這裡有個問題：一個對民主制度抱有信仰的人和一名儒者充份實現民主制度，有什麼實踐上的差異？若無差異，能夠說儒學對民主制度的完善提供什麼貢獻嗎？換個方式問，如若先聖先儒仁心所現之仁政是「制禮作樂」，是「君君臣臣父父子子」，面臨現代民主價值，儒者之仁心當開顯出什麼樣的民主形態或民主制度下如何實踐其德性？同是仁心，何以有不同的顯現？時局不同，儒者當以何者為判準而有別於一般公民不同的政治實踐？林先生忘了儒者對自己有如下期許：希望成為君子（甚至賢聖），而非只是守法公民，儒者會以更高的道德標準與淑世理想來要求自己。在過往的君主專制中，君子「天下為公」

¹⁰⁶ 林安梧（2009）。「公民儒學」下的「道德思考」。鵝湖月刊，（413），7-19。

的理想被埋沒在家天下的框架之下，如今民主政治「別傳」(鄧育仁，2015)¹⁰⁷而來，以儒者公天下的仁者本懷，仍可以從中發聲，整合共識，並作為公民之一，尊重此共識，甚至實現此共識。在實踐面，儒者仍是必須提出理念、理想的那個知識份子(道德標杆)，去發聲、去影響他人，提升社會，同時尊重他人各式各樣的存在—七情六欲的存在。林先生說「正視自己是有七情六欲的存在，而不需要想到一個問題時馬上想到『存天理、去人欲』」漫漶了道德主體和實踐現實。林先生若希望人倫作為人權的前導或基礎，就不能不強調道德主體的首出。只有這樣，儒者才能在人世間成就「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」。

「公民」和「草民」的差異在，公民有權制法，如公投、選民代。在立法過程意識到我的個人價值觀(合理的權益)得以申說、表達，去影響他人以謀求共識，這才是道德自覺。傳統社會的草民、人臣，服膺長上、盡忠職守，草民的道德處境是個人、家庭、家族的，沒有基本權利的概念。

公民儒者，這一身份，想必牟先生是能夠認可的。但這一身份，若由牟先生來談，恐怕就不是六十分的倫理學而已。他說「既曰外王，則其不能背乎內聖亦明矣」，內聖是外王的基礎。人倫的安頓，即道德的安頓，此立場即新儒家迎接西方民主制度之起始立場(李明輝，2014)¹⁰⁸：

夫既曰外王，則其不能背乎內聖亦明矣。並列言之，曰政道、曰事功、曰科學；總持言之，皆賅于外王。內聖之學即儒家之「心性之學」，其直接之本分乃在道德宗教之成立。然儒教之為教與普通宗教本不同。其以道德實踐為中心，雖上達天德，成聖成賢，而亦必賅攝家國天下而為一，始能得其究極之圓滿。故政道、事功與科學，亦必為其所肯定而要求其實現。反之，政道、事功與科學亦必統攝於心性之實學，而不能背離此本源。(牟宗三，1996)¹⁰⁹

誠如林先生所言在傳統的宗法儒學中養成的儒者，大不同於公民社會文化土壤下生長的儒者。(林安梧，2009)¹¹⁰然而，亦可想見現代的公民儒者，理應大不同於一般公民才對，既是儒者，即便以「社會正義」為實踐核心(林安梧，2009)¹¹¹，仍需要回應良知的叩問，去面對七情六欲。林先生似乎樂見人們脫離君父權力宰制，不必再被教條拘縛；而忘了儒者在道德層面自我修練和要求，無分時地。至於是否就是自

¹⁰⁷ 鄧育仁(2015)，《公民儒學》用語。意指儒者「深入理解、學習，並收編西方民主傳承的優點。(鄧育仁。公民儒學。國立臺灣大學出版中心，頁145-146)。

¹⁰⁸ 李明輝(2014)曾簡述新儒家對民主的態度：可以「儒學開出民主論」標致之。一、一切文化上的創新必須建立在傳統文化的基礎之上。二、民主政治必須建立在道德理想之基礎上，故政治自由必須預設道德自由。[李明輝。當代新儒家「儒學開出民主論」的理論意涵與現實意義。Asian Studies, 2(1), 7-18。]

¹⁰⁹ 牟宗三。序。政道與治道。學生書局。

¹¹⁰ 林安梧(2009)。「公民儒學」下的「道德思考」。鵝湖月刊，(413)，7-19。

¹¹¹ 林安梧：「以「社會正義論」為核心的儒學思考不再是在帝王專制底下那樣的修身養性的方式，也不再是那樣良知的自虐方式，我們可以說這是一嶄新的『公民儒學』。」[林安梧(2009)。「公民儒學」下的「道德思考」。鵝湖月刊，(413)，頁7-19。]

虐，也就因人而異。

總而言之，林先生這套公民儒學，與心性之學並不相悖，雖然實踐思維的方向不同，但精神上並不相悖，他也說：「把正德放在最前頭仍然是千古常新的道理」(林安梧，2023)¹¹²與其說是「革命」，筆者比較傾向說是當代儒學實踐面的補充，是接著講。

二、公民儒者當積極參贊社會行公義

其次，再深入思考，這個新外王的儒者，會怎回應現代公民議題？做為一個公民儒者，他會關心哪些公共議題？站在什麼基礎上回應？對公民儒者而言，哪些權利依什麼理據可以被創造、被肯定？他可能是什麼樣子？

以婦女平權議題為例。儒家宣稱要「正德、利用、厚生」、「為天地立心，為生民立命，為往聖繼絕學，為萬世開太平」，但在回應婦權問題上，除了曾昭旭屢屢撰文支持之外，”參贊”者非常少。婦女佔人口半數，這問題公民儒者不重視嗎？其餘如環境保育問題、軍中人權、勞動權益、農民運動、土地正義、司法改革種種議題，公民儒者在哪裡？”參贊”哪些公民議題？若只有「去中國化」上新聞的時候才有所作為，那麼，新儒家招來只說不做的譏評實不足怪。筆者以為性別平權問題就是最好的石蕊試紙，要看新儒學接上民主的外王事業如何，只要問問，新儒家怎麼回應婦權問題。儒者作為公民，當有促進全體公民福祉的理想，積極作為才可曰「參贊天地化育」。

從台灣 1980 狂飆年代婦女運動興起，新儒家除曾昭旭站在愛情學的立場，堅定而明確地支持性別平權，將傳統儒學從人性學角度去探討，提出以易經「人倫之始」做為兩性平權（人人平權）之基礎，實為洞見，其著書不輟，亦有其社會影響力。餘諸學者，從未能直接回應台灣女權主義者的批判、抨擊，亦未見積極認同，積極為婦女爭取權益。如果新儒家大聲疾呼「新外王」，卻從未看見其”參贊”社會改革的身影，新外王云云如何使人信服？儒學又如何能令現代公民敬仰、信仰？正如賴錫三（2015）所言：

學術和文化的實踐，除了話語論述的創新以外，更重要的還是價值信念（理）與生命氣力（氣）的競爭。（賴錫三，2015）¹¹³

新外王理論牟先生說的已經足夠，林先生所謂「約定主義」可視為補充說明，但既稱新外王，還是期待新儒家學者、士人，修練內在德性之餘（正德），在人權、環保等相關公共議題上，也能「利用」、「厚生」，為百姓盡一份力，畢竟學者仍有一定的影響力。後世之儒，亦可見台灣民主社會演進、歷史積累過程中，看見當代儒者參贊的過程，而生有為者亦若是之心。

要之，公民儒者，不能只是公民。新儒家使命既是接上民主與科學去回應新局，在

¹¹² 林安梧（2024）。後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王--內聖」問題的一些回應。《本土諮商心理學學刊》，15（3），1-51。

¹¹³ 賴錫三（2015）。「港臺新儒家」與「大陸新儒家」的「兩行」反思。《思想》，（29），頁 286。

性理層次充份闡釋、無礙接上民主與科學之後，意者自然希望進一步得見新儒家們如何開創外王事業。而懷有仁心，有著濟世理想的儒者，不能只是寄望進入官門才能利用厚生，開放的公民社會，自由發聲，自由展現理念與影響力，儒者當有更積極的自覺與作為，自利利人，讓世界更美好。

三、千萬不能失去主觀境界形態的道德論述

順著以上兩段文字的觀點，筆者強調儒者之所以為儒，就是他懷抱更高的道德要求及淑世情懷。正因為這個道德要求，是儒者自我期許，它不見得能在外王事業立功，但必然會以儒者的主觀境界形態展現。

林先生在多處著作論文當中，對「主觀境界形態的道德實踐」多所貶抑，認為它就是事功無法開展的禍首之一。然而，回溯中國學術思想史，儒學自先秦孔、孟起，即強調個體道德意識的主觀、主動，子曰：「吾欲仁，斯仁至矣。」、「苟志於仁矣，無惡也。」、「人而不仁，如禮何？人而不仁，如樂何？」道德行為、外在事功，都從此心的能動性與自主意願出發，且德行若是虛有其表，亦非孔子所肯定。發展至宋、明，心性之發越加深密，「心」、「意」、「已發」「未發」等驗證，結合道德意識，闡釋道德實踐，去討論成賢成聖的方法與可能。像這樣，不依賴人外的、超越的神秘力量，期許自身之修養能夠心意純淨，體證天道，成為至善之人，只有中國儒學。這一套鍛鍊心性的道德修養工夫，為西方倫理學所無，獨樹一格。也因此，若因為「主觀境界形態」德性學在外王事業難有明顯的成就，就以為心性理學、主觀境界型態可有可無，就太可惜了。

鄭家棟（2022）認為「內聖心性之學」是儒家可以保有純粹道德意識的命脈。對此，他有一愷切的感言：

（儒家內聖心性之學）在一個紅塵滾滾、銅臭之氣瀰漫的時代，使得儒家思想有可能突破重圍，在「超越性」的層面維繫「道統」的一線之延。唯有如此，儒家的精神義理才不至於為洶湧的「歷史洪流」所淹沒，也不至於成為一小撮為謀求滿足某種自我封聖（筆者按：指儒學政教化可能養成的鄙儒）和操控他人（「凡人小人」）的心理欲求而抱殘守缺的憑藉。是則，未來中國文明仍然可以稱之為「儒家文明」。（鄭家棟，2022）¹¹⁴

林先生也明白內聖學的重要性，才會說「把正德放在最前頭仍然是千古常新的道理」，筆者只是讀過林先生的「新外王」主張後，覺得應該再強調一下「內聖」在儒學的重要性。

由唐君毅諸先生執筆的〈為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言〉（1958）提到心性儒學在正

¹¹⁴ 鄭家棟（2022）。「牟學」前景何在？—兼談兩岸儒學紛爭與「儒」在現時代的自我定位(下)。鵝湖月刊，(564)，頁12。

德與利用厚生之間，少了一個擴充的媒介，因此無法以此仁心外推去經世濟民，只好退卻存養本心。「由此退卻，雖能使人更體悟到此內在的道德主體之尊嚴……然而亦同時閉塞了此道德主體之向外通的門路，而趨於此主體自身之寂寞與乾枯。」¹¹⁵短短數語，道盡新儒者之慨嘆。林先生接續著此一問題意識，多年撰述，思索的主題不離儒學的外王事業，尤其針對依附傳統君父權力結構的道德教條扭曲人心，有著敏銳而且執著的針砭。這是他從新儒家所承繼而來的思想養份，救儒學之蔽以開新局，以「公民儒學」為新外王的理想，意在安立千差萬別的個體，從中可見仁者胸臆，《當儒家走進民主社會：林安梧論公民儒學》一書，即是這數十年來思索的脈絡與結晶，讀之，感受得到儒者參與民主社會的情懷，不再寂寞乾枯。唯論述再精彩，言說再精闢，都是書中城堡，吾人仍期待在此基礎上，儒者可以走得更遠，實現「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」。

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- 林安梧（2024）。後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面—關於「外王—內聖」問題的一些回

¹¹⁵ 張君勱、牟宗三、唐君毅、徐復觀（1958/1989）。為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言。〔在張君勱（1989）。一九四九年以後張君勱言論集（5）。58-117，稻鄉出版社，頁89。〕

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Towards Civic Confucianism: A Response to “A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of ‘Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood’”

Ming-Chu Hsu

Abstract

This article primarily responds to An-Wu Lin's "A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'". It acknowledges Mr. Mou Zongsan's contributions to Chinese Confucianism while responding to Mou's viewpoint on the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience". Lin argues that the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism emphasis on Inner Sagehood cultivation still risks leading to moral practice becoming overly rigid and dogmatic. An-Wu Lin advocates for individuals in civil society to understand social norms as collective agreements rather than immutable principles. He argues that as these norms adapt to different contexts, individuals participate in their evolution, creating a mutual learning process between individuals and society. This approach, Lin argues, liberates individuals from absolute moral frameworks and avoids self-enclosed subjectivity, fostering active societal engagement. Mr. Lin considers the question of whether Confucianism leads to democracy and science as a false dilemma. He pushes aside such debates and directly approaches the idea of "entering democratic society." Starting with the premise that "we are already in a democratic society, we already possess citizenship," he advocates that the outer kingly effort modern Confucianists should engage in is to be a citizen. This indeed constitutes a "new Outer Kingliness" endeavor and aligns with the self-demands of moral practice in Confucianism. Mr. Lin claims that his self-proclaimed "Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood" represents a Confucian revolution. However, he does not truly reject Mr. Mou's integration of Kantian philosophy into Confucianism, including the set of theories on inner virtue and the practical theory of Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness. Instead, he emphasizes that modern Confucianists must adjust their practical methods to respond to new situations. He inherits the nourishment of thought from the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, aiming to establish "citizen Confucianism" to accommodate diverse individuals. The book

"When Confucians Enter Democratic Society" is the culmination of decades of contemplation within this context. Reading this book evokes a sense of Confucians' engagement in democratic society, no longer feeling lonely and arid. However, these arguments, while compelling, remain largely theoretical – “castles in the book,” so to speak. We anticipate that Confucians can go further and truly realize "human rights with human ethics, conscious freedom, and democracy based on the people." I affirm the significance of An-Wu Lin's awareness of the issue and commend the results of his over two decades of contemplation, culminating in the book *When Confucianism Enters Democratic Society*. However, I believe An-Wu Lin overlooks the fact that Confucians aspire to “uphold heavenly principles while restraining human desires” and would not settle for mere law-abiding citizenship. I offer three points in response: First, as Confucians, we must embody the spirit of “Zhèng Dé Lì Yòng Hòu Shēng.”(正德利用厚生, virtue cultivation and societal enrichment) Second, Confucian citizens should actively participate in promoting social justice. Third, we must not lose sight of moral discourse rooted in subjective ethical perspectives.

Keywords: Contemporary Neo-Confucianism , Mou Zongsan, Inner Sagehood to outer Kingliness, Moral Uprightness, Citizenship

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I. Preface

The article, "A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'," begins by affirming Mr. Mou Zongsan's significant contributions to Chinese Confucianism and his profound influence on the author's scholarly development. It briefly outlines the academic positions of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism figures Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan, highlighting their efforts to connect the external pursuits of Confucianism with democracy and science. The central argument critiques Mou's concept of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," positioning him as a Neo-Traditionalist whose "methodological essentialism" results in a moral practice that is overly rigid, dogmatic, and authoritarian. To address these biases, substituting "methodological conventionalism" in place of essentialism, wherein social norms are viewed as collective agreements that not only reflect the greatest consensus of the community but are also adaptable to changing circumstances through "continual iterative review," thereby responding to the realities of contemporary life.

As a junior scholar seeking insight and dialogue with Mr. An-Wu Lin, I wish to articulate my understanding of his perspectives. After reviewing Mr. Lin's other works, I offer my humble reflections in the spirit of mutual scholarly exchange, with the hope of expanding my knowledge. I respectfully invite Mr. An-Wu Lin's guidance and feedback.

1. On Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism

The term "Contemporary Neo-Confucianism" signifies an effort to address contemporary global challenges and propose solutions that are distinct from past approaches, thereby rendering it "new." A significant contribution of Mr. Mou Zongsan is his application of Western philosophical discourse to analyze and reconstruct Confucian moral philosophy, facilitating a dialogue between Confucianism and Western philosophical systems. Beyond his academic achievements, Mou advocated for and established the contemporary mission of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism: "connecting with democracy and science," with the aim of realizing the Confucian ideal of engaging in world affairs and enhancing societal welfare. He proposed that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism should "connect with democracy and science through the Self-Entrapment of Conscience."

Since the time of Confucius, Confucianism has faced numerous setbacks and challenges.

Initially, during the autocratic unification of the Qin and Han dynasties, Legalist techniques for controlling the populace were integrated into Confucian thought. In the Tang and Song periods, Confucianism experienced a decline as Daoism and Buddhism attracted more followers. However, the incorporation of Buddhist and Daoist theories regarding the mind and nature by Confucian scholars during the Song and Ming dynasties enriched and fortified its doctrines, grounding them in practical ethics and everyday human affairs, ultimately establishing Confucianism as the dominant intellectual current. As the modern era emerged, Western democracy and science, driven by economic and military power, disrupted traditional Chinese society, prompting the need for Confucianism to adapt to these new realities. Building on the traditional emphasis of Confucianism on the philosophy of mind, Mou Zongsan proposed a framework of "one mind opening two doors," advocating for the Self-Entrapment of Conscience as a means to align Confucianism with democratic principles and scientific advancements. This approach aimed to establish a moral and theoretical foundation for modern Confucian engagement with legal and democratic institutions.

Mou Zongsan (1996) explicitly stated, "The current mission of Confucianism is to initiate a New Outer Kingliness," saying:

"Confucian rationalism, in the contemporary era, demands a new form of Outer Kingliness for its complete expression. The New Outer Kingliness required in our time encompasses both science and democratic politics. Indeed, the public achievements that China has historically aspired to can only be fully realized and recognized under democratic governance." (Mou, 1996)

Confucianism's political ideal is to "hide the world in the world." Mou further elaborates: *"Democratic politics can embody the ideal of 'hiding the world in the world.' This aspiration has always been central to Confucian scholarship, although it has yet to be fully realized in practice. Contemporary modernization primarily seeks to achieve this ideal, which also represents the mission of Confucianism in the present era, referred to as the 'New Outer Kingliness.' Democratic politics establishes the 'formal conditions' necessary for this New Outer Kingliness, allowing public achievements to be fully realized. Additionally, scientific knowledge serves as the 'material condition' for the New Outer Kingliness. The New Outer Kingliness advocates for an open society, democratic governance, the protection of public achievements, and the advancement of scientific knowledge—these elements constitute the essence of modernization." (Mou, 1996)*

Mou Zongsan's theory of "hiding the world in the world" aligns with the concept of an

"Open Society." In contrast, post-Three Dynasties Chinese monarchical politics adopted the approach of "hiding the world in the ruler's treasury," treating the world as personal property governed by a single family. Mou acknowledged that "talking about Wang Yangming and Conscience repeatedly will never lead to science" (Mou, 1996). To cultivate a new form of "Outer Kingliness" through the Confucian study of the mind and nature, it must be achieved via the method of "self-sublation of moral rationality" (Mou, 1996), which is described as a form of "curved approach":

"The act of 'sincerely seeking knowledge' is inherently valued and required by moral rationality. However, when this act is genuinely pursued, it must undergo a transformation, shifting from the perspective of 'the capacity for subjective activity' to 'contemplative rationality' (theoretical rationality). This transition moves from the dynamic process of moral rationality to the static process of acquiring knowledge through contemplative rationality. This transformation can be characterized as the self-sublation (self-negation) of moral rationality." (Mou, 1996)

Mou's theory of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" has ignited intense debate among both critics and supporters. A balanced perspective suggests that the theory places excessive emphasis on metaphysical analysis while inadequately addressing the practical aspects of institutional and social organizational ethics: "The self-sublation theory's exploration of China's cultural path to modernization may be logically sound, it often appears to lack practical applicability." (Yan, 1991) Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, which has emerged from traditional communities, is grounded in Confucian principles while adapting to Western democracy and science, showcasing both scholarly depth and a broad vision. Mou's interpretation of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism incorporates Kantian elements into the exploration of the mind and nature, thereby establishing a framework for dialogue with Western philosophy. However, as noted by Jiang Nianfeng:

"Although legal-political subjectivity did not emerge from inherent Chinese culture, and Confucianism's original thought indeed lacks this aspect, it has nevertheless established a foundation for legal-political subjectivity through its moral subjectivity." (Jiang, 1989)

Regardless, post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has continued to engage with the "Inner Sagehood and Outer Kingliness" tradition, following the work of Mou Zongsan. Since the publication of *The Theory of the Confucian Revolution* in 1996, Mr. Lin has been developing the concept of "Civic Confucianism" for over two decades.

II. Mr. Lin's 'New Inner Sagehood' in Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism

After the passing of Mou Zongsan in 1995, his extensive and profound intellectual legacy sparked considerable debate. Just as Confucianism fragmented into eight schools following Confucius's death, the emergence of " Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism " after Mou's death led to the rise of both apologetic and critical factions. Mr. Lin aligns himself with the critical faction, presenting perspectives that diverge significantly from those of Mou. In his work, **The Theory of the Confucian Revolution** (1998), An-Wu Lin critiques Mou's theory of "Outer Kingliness," stating: "The flaw in Confucian practical philosophy is that its practices are bound by boundaries, clan systems, kinship, bloodlines, and authoritarianism, all intertwined without clear differentiation. It fails to consider understanding within a self-subjectifying context." (Lin, 1998) In 2023, Lin further asserted: "Inner Sagehood often turns inward, becoming self-restrictive and susceptible to circular, inward-focused systemic issues, which can lead to numerous problems within its boundary-oriented system." (Lin, 2023) Lin contends:

"The emphasis on the metaphysical essence of morality (Self-Entrapment of Conscience to open up democracy) operates on the premise that foundational essence generates function, ostensibly leading to modernization. However, this essence-to-function approach overlooks the concrete realities of the actual world. Consequently, in the context of modernization, this approach often holds only passive significance with limited active implementation. Essentially, it has not offered a robust practical strategy for achieving modernization." (Lin, 2023)

To address this gap and provide a more comprehensive approach to Confucian practice, Lin introduces the concept of "New Outer Kingliness with Inner Sagehood." This approach reflects on traditional society by "correcting the misplacement of the Way," promotes moral practice within democratic systems through "methodological conventionalism," and supports this framework with the philosophical foundations of " New Outer Kingliness with Inner Sagehood." This demonstrates a coherent line of reasoning throughout his arguments.

1. Unraveling the Misplacement of the Dao

Traditional Confucianism, which is aligned with monarchical and patriarchal structures, serves as a moral system where the subjective domain of mind-nature Confucianism often leads

to the alienation of ethics. This results in a misalignment of the roles of "father, sage, ruler, into "ruler, father, sage." In this distortion, the ruler assumes control over the core of the social structure, dominating both the father and the sage. Mr. Lin argues that this represents a historical reality stemming from the evolution of traditional Confucianism, which he terms "the misplacement of the Dao." To address this fundamental issue and properly reassign the roles of "ruler, father, sage," it is essential to recognize the disintegration of the original monarchical structure and replace it with "more independent community and social organizational structures, to the relatively nascent democratic society of Taiwan at that time. The moral system that underpins this social structure must transition to a "contractual social linkage" (Lin, 2009). The concept of "contractual social linkage" primarily responds to contemporary social life. Since the old model of ruler-father-state is no longer applicable, a transformation is necessary to align with democratic and rule-of-law societies. According to Mr. Lin, this shift in Confucian posture and orientation constitutes the "second wave of the Confucian revolution" (Lin, 1999) and represents the contribution of post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism to 21st-century human civilization. Reason: Improved clarity, vocabulary, and technical accuracy while maintaining the original meaning.

2. Methodological Conventionalism

Mr. Lin argues that "we should move beyond the limitations of subjective philosophy and return to the rich world of lived experience to seek the activation and validation of genuine reality, and replace methodological essentialism with methodological conventionalism" (Lin, 2023). This approach is crucial for unraveling the "misplacement of the Dao" in traditional society. In other words, modern Confucians are encouraged to abandon the classical notions of ruler, father, and state, and to re-examine society while practicing morality within the subjective domain of moral practice. This approach serves two purposes: on one hand, it reminds modern Confucians that the subjective domain of mind-nature studies could not alter the dominance of ruler-father structures in the past, which instead resulted in moral norms that oppressed individual lives. On the other hand, it urges post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism to acknowledge the vastly different social structures, lifestyles, and values of today, and to adjust moral practices to be based on "conventionalism" as necessary.

Mr. Lin observes that "the cultivation of moral character based on personal development" is insufficient for addressing the complexities of democratic politics. This limitation arises from the fact that, following the Qin and Han dynasties, Confucianism, constrained by over two

millennia of unified imperial rule, could not genuinely realize its ideals and was compelled to shift its focus inward toward personal cultivation. "The cultivation of moral character based on personal development replaced real-world social practice; originally, self-cultivation was intended for managing the family and governing the state, but now it has merely become an examination of one's thoughts" (Lin, 2016).

3. From Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood

Mr. Lin advocates for a post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism approach in which the concept of "Outer Kingliness" is not focused on deriving external governance from Inner Sagehood—specifically, how personal virtue contributes to democratic freedom—but rather on how to adapt internal Confucian teachings to address the new external framework:

"In modern society, structured by contractual political connections and governed by ethical responsibilities, we must re-examine how to achieve 'universal benevolence.' This endeavor is not about deriving new external governance from traditional internal saintliness, but rather about cultivating a new internal saintliness within a contemporary external framework" (Lin, 2009).

The proposal of "from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood" does not negate the idea that "Inner Sagehood leads to Outer Kingliness." Mr. Lin believes that "the Self-Entrapment of Conscience to establish a rational subject" provides a meta-theoretical explanation of the roots of Confucianism, demonstrating that Confucianism can engage with both science and democracy. However, the concept of "Inner Sagehood leading to Outer Kingliness" does not serve as a practical theoretical guide for real-world implementation. To effectively address the moral dimensions within Confucianism, it is essential to reconsider our approach to these issues:

"In the process of democratization and scientific advancement, how can Confucianism serve as both a mediator and a participant? At the theoretical and, more specifically, the meta-theoretical level, what roles can it play in understanding, interpretation, deconstruction, and reconstruction?" (Lin, 2009).

In other words, post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism have already embraced the framework of an open society. The challenge lies in becoming Confucian citizens in this new era of external authority. This necessitates a transformation in thought and an adaptation of the content of traditional internal saintliness. This process of adjustment involves learning and transformation—specifically, how moral individuals learn to function in a society composed of multiple moral subjects. Mr. Lin observes:

"Emphasizing 'metaphysical dimensions of personal development' often overlooks the significance of Outer Kingliness. Outer Kingliness is essential for the transition from a 'bloodline-based communal society' to a 'political and social communal society,' and ultimately to a 'cosmic and natural communal society.' Each of these elements is vital for establishing a 'cultural and educational communal society'" (Lin, 2023).

The "cultural and educational community" is the vessel for a new form of Inner Sagehood. This new Inner Sagehood proposes that individuals are in a constant state of evolution. The essentialist perspective on "original nature" overlooks the dynamic characteristics of the natural environment, the developmental stages of moral subjects in their experiential realm, and their growth toward maturity. This viewpoint is inspired by Wang Chuanshan's theory of human nature. According to Lin, the moral dimension of the "heavenly mandate" cannot be understood purely a priori; it must recognize that: "Destiny is given, nature is born, what is incomplete can be completed, and what is completed can be transformed.

Morality is developmental, dynamic, and culturally cultivated" (Lin, 2023). Lin further elaborates:

"Even if you thoroughly explain the principles of Song-Ming Confucianism, it remains inadequate. Modernization requires a dynamic emergence from the tangible realities of life. This is a genuine and pragmatic process that cannot be dictated by theoretical logic; it encompasses the 'practical order of learning'" (Lin, 2023). "

In summary, Lin's proposal of "from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood" emphasizes the importance not of "Outer kingliness" but of "new inner Sagehood." The concept of "original nature" is timeless and constant, representing the genuine compassion inherent in being human. However, from a moral practice perspective, "original nature" entails obligations and an intrinsic drive to comprehend its social and cultural context. The Confucian classics were formulated in response to feudal systems, monarchical authority, and patriarchal structures. They cannot be directly transplanted into modern civic society; rather, they must be consciously adjusted and adapted. Therefore, modern Confucians need to learn how to interpret the teachings of the classics while understanding the operational modes and values of civic society. This process involves both integration and reconciliation. From the perspective of new Inner Sagehood, Confucians no longer address the question, "What makes us human?" from a static viewpoint; instead, they view each individual as a person evolving toward benevolence. Lin reminds readers that since the May Fourth Movement, Confucians have been operating in an environment characterized by "new Outer Kingliness, learning to understand modern society and respond to its various changes. In exploring the concept of new Outer Kingliness, we must also reflect on the significance of "the originally authoritarian Inner Sagehood" and the process

of transitioning "from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood." (Lin, 2023) Lin further explains:

"We must ask ourselves: How can we cultivate a new approach to Inner Sagehood by understanding the concept of Outer Kingliness? This is where my focus lies. By 'transitioning from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood,' I emphasize that in the process of learning about Outer Kingliness—encompassing democracy and science—we must effectively adjust and harmonize our Inner Sagehood, thereby developing a new approach to it" (Lin, 2023)."

Regarding the "learning of a new inner sanghood," he once stated:

"We must confront the reality of entering society as subjective individuals and address specific institutional and structural issues. The approach to self-cultivation will vary at this stage. I believe that this method of cultivation should be gradually learned through a concrete developmental process rather than through the selection of an abstract or contrived theory" (Lin, 2009). "

Learning a new inner sanctity begins with recognizing oneself as a citizen, thereby advocating for the principle of "first becoming a citizen, then becoming a gentleman" (Lin, 2021). The focus of this learning should be on "not the 'rituals' of traditional patriarchal and familial relationships, but rather the 'principles' of justice under social justice" (Lin, 2009). In his book *When Confucianism Enters a Democratic Society*, Lin discusses the content of civic education, emphasizing that citizens must distinguish between public and private spheres, protect individual rights, and respect the individuality of others. A modern civic society operates on principles of distinction and underscores the shared acknowledgment of objective laws. Understanding freedom as the respect for both oneself and others, while aligning individual will with the collective will, is crucial. Protecting the private domain signifies a recognition of individual rights and a profound acknowledgment of social welfare principles. Regardless of whether actions pertain to individual or public aspects, they should align with the universal principles of natural law and conscience, which, within a civic society, translate into rational, universal demands (Lin, 2021).

III. Brief Review

The above outlines the framework of Mou Zongsan's concept of "Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness" and An-Wu Lin's contrasting approach, "From Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood." It is essential to address the issue of "Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness" and to explore the relationship between Confucianism, democracy, and science. This exploration

stems from a desire to progress alongside modernization while preserving the foundations of traditional culture. Such preservation is crucial for fostering confidence in cultural identity and meeting the demands of a stable and prosperous era. As intellectuals, Confucian scholars should embrace the ideal of utilizing and enriching their cultural heritage to fulfill the responsibility of advancing democracy and science. This concern is articulated in the joint declaration by Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Zhang Junmai, and Xu Fuguan, titled *A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture*, which focuses on "the future of Chinese culture." Mou Zongsan elucidated the Confucian study of inner nature by linking the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" with democracy and science. His integration of Kantian philosophy into Confucianism is a successful model that preserves the Confucian cultural tradition. However, Mou's vision for "Outer Kingliness" requires further elaboration, leaving opportunities for future scholars to expand upon it.

In the author's view, although Tang, Mou, and Xu were erudite and actively engaged in both academic discourse and political critique—particularly since Mou proposed the concept of "Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness" to address modernization—subsequent scholars have often been criticized for focusing more on "Outer Kingliness" than on its implementation. Chen Chaoying observes, "In contemporary Confucianism, Confucians have been absent from major political reform movements, and significant political reforms often reference Western political thought as the theoretical basis for social practice. Confucianism has been absent both in practice and theory" (Chen, 2012). This absence has even led to criticisms that it hinders Taiwan's democratization (Tu, 2012).

Thus, when An-Wu Lin considers whether Confucianism leads to democracy and science as a false dilemma, he dismisses those discussions and directly addresses the reality of "entering a democratic society" with the premise that "we are already in a democratic society, and we already possess citizenship." He argues that the work modern Confucians should undertake in terms of Outer Kingliness is to be a citizen. This represents a "new Outer Kingliness" endeavor and aligns with the self-requirements of Confucian moral practice. Although An-Wu Lin refers to this approach as a "Confucian revolution," it is fundamentally rooted in Shunshan's scholarship. It does not reject traditional Confucian learning or Mou Zongsan's integration of Kantian principles into Confucian moral systems of "Inner Sagehood leading to outward kingliness." Instead, Lin emphasizes that while a theoretical basis is essential, practical methods must be adjusted to respond to new circumstances. Mou Zongsan made significant contributions within the framework of Confucian theory, providing nourishment and justification for interpreting classical texts and affirming the modern relevance of Confucianism. His concept of "opening up" should be understood as "expanding and sustaining," as Hou Jinming

articulates (Hou, 2011), offering contemporary Confucians a substantial rationale and context to affirm their capacity to embrace and even create democracy and science, despite these not having been historically realized initially.

Since Mou Zongsan has already laid much of the scholarly groundwork for integrating democracy and science, further discussions should build upon this foundation. The superiority of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" lies in its capacity to retain the moral subject inherent in Chinese cultural tradition while facilitating the development of democracy and science within this interpretative framework. It offers Confucians an ideological map and a sense of identity and cultural belonging, encouraging active engagement with democracy and science grounded in moral cultivation—an expectation for modern Confucians. By fostering moral self-awareness, individuals can better accept and learn about democracy and science; thus, responding appropriately to an open society becomes a logical progression.

This process must embody continuity rather than mere transition. An-Wu Lin's concept of a "Confucian revolution" indeed emphasizes the focus has shifted from "Confucianism leading to democracy and science" to "how Confucianism can practice democracy and science," hence the notion of "Confucianism's shift." Lin is aware that excessive criticism of traditional values may lead to misunderstandings; therefore, he frequently emphasizes that "benevolence" remains the cornerstone of Confucianism.

As history progresses and we enter the modern era characterized by democracy and scientific advancement, the Confucian classics, which correspond to feudal and patriarchal societies, are unlikely to regain their former prominence. Modern Confucians, while valuing these classics and nurturing their moral character, require practical guidance for engaging with a civic society. This guidance should offer insights, references, and reflections to ensure they remain progressive. An-Wu Lin's "When Confucianism Enters a Democratic Society" provides a comprehensive set of ideas for consideration.

IV. Author's Three Reflections

1. As a Confucian, One Must Embody the Spirit of "Making the Course of Nature Existent and the Desire of Human Extinct"

An-Wu Lin proposes the concept of "from Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood," suggesting that Confucian citizens should embrace the existing social structure and historical facts, fully realize the ideals of a democratic system and, through this process, encourages a reinterpretation and deeper understanding of "internal saintliness" to more effectively engage

with their environment. This represents a reciprocal process of internal and external exchange, learning, and improvement. He describes the role of a Confucian citizen in an open society as follows:

Rather than emphasizing how self-awareness ought to be, we should focus on how new consensus gradually emerge within an open and free discourse space through clear, rational thinking and the exchange of opinions. We anticipate that through such unrestricted discussions, consensus will naturally develop. In a contractual society, we strive for an appropriate institutional structure that allows individuals to freely express their thoughts in accordance with their own nature. Throughout this process of self-expression, suitable methods will gradually be refined.

Confucians in an open society, where they have the protected right to express themselves, can comfortably articulate their individuality, needs, and thoughts while remaining receptive to the needs and thoughts of others. Through meaningful dialogue, a consensus is achieved, and it is believed that this consensus can be realized. An-Wu Lin envisions that in such a context, Confucian citizens are not pressured by moral dictates but can exist as beings with "seven emotions and six desires":

We can now acknowledge ourselves as beings with seven emotions and six desires without immediately associating them with the notion of "making the course of nature existent and the desire of human extinct" when confronted with a problem. We do not need to keep such moral formulas at the forefront of our constant vigilance; instead, we should engage in discourse naturally as human beings. This ethical framework does not require advanced ethical reasoning but rather a basic understanding, estimated at around sixty percent. A socially aware citizen who operates at this level can freely express their emotions and return to a natural existence, rather than adhering to a religiously ascetic form of ethics (Lin, 2009).

In Lin's depiction of a civil society, it is unnecessary to emphasize the nature of self-awareness. Instead, individuals should express their viewpoints through clear and rational thinking in order to seek consensus. This is not only a citizen's right but also a fundamental requirement: to speak truthfully, avoid malicious attacks, and maintain clarity and reason. Furthermore, this speaker, by freely "acknowledging oneself as a being with seven emotions and six desires," is not obligated to constantly adhere to the principle of "making the course of nature existent and the desire of human extinct," nor should they feel morally pressured into religious asceticism. As a result, they can live comfortably and at ease.

From my perspective, a Confucian differs from other citizens because he must hold himself to a higher standard. First and foremost, my speech must stem from self-awareness, even though consensus may not necessarily align with my conscious needs or appeals. A Confucian,

possessing self-awareness, understands that a "citizen" focuses on the relationship between the individual and the group, valuing the rule of law and social justice—these are inherently moral pursuits that cultivate one's "public morality." Since Confucians are expected to embody "public morality," the practice of "making the course of nature existent and the desire of human extinct" becomes a necessary discipline.

This raises an important question: What is the practical difference between a person who believes in the democratic system and a Confucian who fully comprehends it? If there is no distinction, can we assert that Confucianism offers anything unique to the enhancement of the democratic system? To rephrase, if the benevolent governance envisioned by the sages and Confucians of the past involved "establishing rites and creating music," with roles such as "the ruler being a ruler, the minister a minister, the father a father, and the son a son," how should a Confucian's benevolence manifest within the framework of modern democratic values? How does a Confucian practice their virtues in a democratic context? If both perspectives stem from benevolence, why do they manifest in different ways? At various times, how should Confucians differentiate their political practices from those of the average citizen? Reason: The revisions improve clarity, enhance vocabulary, and ensure grammatical accuracy while maintaining the original meaning of the text.

Lin seems to overlook the Confucian aspiration of becoming a junzi (gentleman) or even a sage, rather than merely a law-abiding citizen. Confucians hold themselves to a higher moral standard and pursue lofty ideals. Historically, under monarchical despotism, the junzi's ideal of "All under Heaven being for the public" was suppressed within the framework of a familial state. However, with the advent of democracy—a "separate transmission" (Deng, 2015)—the Confucian ideal of public-mindedness can still resonate, foster consensus, and, as one among citizens, respect and even realize that consensus. In practice, the Confucian must continue to be the intellectual (moral standard-bearer) who proposes ideas and ideals, advocates for change, influences others, and elevates society, all while respecting the diverse existences of others—as beings with seven emotions and six desires. Lin's assertion that "acknowledging oneself as a being with seven emotions and six desires, without the immediate need to consider 'making the course of nature existent and the desire of human extinct'" blurs the distinction between moral agency and practical reality. If Lin desires for human relations to guide or support human rights, he must emphasize the primacy of the moral subject. Only in this manner can Confucians attain "human rights grounded in human relations, freedom rooted in self-awareness, and democracy founded on the people" in the world."

The distinction between a "citizen" and a "commoner" lies in the citizen's right to shape

laws through mechanisms such as referendums and electoral representation. In the legislative process, a citizen understands that their personal values (reasonable interests) can be voiced and expressed to influence others and foster consensus; this understanding constitutes moral self-awareness. In traditional societies, commoners and subjects were subservient to their superiors, dutifully fulfilling their roles. Their moral framework was centered on the individual, the family, and the clan, lacking a concept of fundamental rights. The identity of a Confucian citizen is one that Mr. Mou Zongsan would presumably endorse. However, if Mr. Mou were to discuss this identity, it would likely not merely align with a "sixty-point ethics." He stated, "If we speak of outer kingliness, it is clear that it cannot be divorced from inner sageliness"; inner sageliness serves as the foundation for outer kingliness. The establishment of human relations, which refers to the settling of morality, represents the initial stance of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism in embracing Western democratic systems (Li, 2014):

"If we speak of outer kingliness, it is evident that it cannot be separated from inner sageliness. When discussed separately, we refer to governance, achievements, and science; collectively, these elements pertain to outer kingliness. The study of inner sageliness is the Confucian 'study of mind and nature,' whose primary objective is the establishment of moral religion. However, Confucianism as a philosophy fundamentally differs from conventional religions. Focused on moral practice, it aspires to heavenly virtues and culminates in the sage and the virtuous, yet it must also encompass family, state, and all under heaven as a unified whole to achieve its ultimate perfection. Therefore, governance, achievements, and science must be affirmed by it and are essential for realization. Conversely, governance, achievements, and science must also be integrated into the practical study of mind and nature and cannot deviate from this root source." (Mou, 1996)

As Lin stated, Confucians nurtured in traditional patriarchal Confucianism differ greatly from those nurtured in the cultural soil of civil society (Lin, 2009). Nevertheless, it is also conceivable that modern Confucian citizens should indeed differ markedly from ordinary citizens. As Confucians, even if they center their practice on "social justice" (Lin, 2009), they must still respond to the call of conscience and confront the seven emotions and six desires. Lin appears to be pleased to witness individuals liberated from the constraints of monarchical and paternal authority, free from doctrinal limitations; however, he seems to overlook the fact that a Confucian's self-discipline and moral obligations remain constant, regardless of time and context. Whether this constitutes self-imposed suffering varies from individual to individual.

In summary, Lin's interpretation of Confucian citizenship does not conflict with the study

of the mind and nature. While the approach to practical thinking may differ, the underlying spirit remains consistent. He also stated, "Placing virtuous integrity first is an eternal and ever-fresh principle" (Lin, 2023). Rather than calling it a "revolution," I am inclined to see it as a supplementary practical aspect of contemporary Confucianism—an extension of the discourse.

2. As a Civic Confucian, One Should Actively Engage in Promoting Justice within Society.

Moreover, upon further examination, how would this new "outer kingliness" Confucian address contemporary civic issues? As civic Confucians, what public concerns would they prioritize, and what rationale would guide their responses? What rights could be established and recognized for the civic Confucian, and on what grounds? What characteristics might such an individual possess?

Take the issue of women's rights as an example. Confucianism declares the need to "rectify virtue, utilize resources, and enrich life" to "establish a heart for heaven and earth, determine destiny for the people, continue the learning of the sages, and bring peace to all ages." However, aside from Zeng Zhaoxu, who has consistently advocated for women's rights, there are very few active participants in this discourse. Women constitute half of the population—do civic Confucians not regard this issue as significant? What about other pressing matters such as environmental conservation, human rights within the military, labor rights, farmers' movements, land justice, and judicial reform? Where are the civic Confucians in these discussions? Which civic issues do they "actively engage" in? If their involvement is limited to instances when the topic of "de-Sinicization" garners media attention, then the criticism that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism is merely rhetoric without action is hardly surprising. In my opinion, the issue of gender equality serves as a crucial litmus test for evaluating how Contemporary Neo-Confucianism interacts with democratic principles. To understand how Contemporary Neo-Confucianism tackles democratic challenges, one need only ask how Contemporary Neo-Confucianism respond to the issue of women's rights. Confucians, as citizens, should uphold ideals that promote the well-being of all citizens and act positively to be considered "participants in the transformation and nurturing of heaven and earth."

Since the emergence of the women's movement in Taiwan during the tumultuous 1980s, Zeng Zhaoxu has steadfastly and supported gender equality through the lens of love studies, examining traditional Confucianism from the standpoint of human nature. He proposed utilizing the "origin of human relations" in the I Ching as a foundational principle for gender equality (and equality for all), which represents a truly insightful contribution. His persistent

writings have significantly influenced society. However, other scholars have not directly addressed criticisms or challenges from Taiwanese feminists, nor have they actively championed women's rights. If the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism vocally advocate for the "new outer kingliness," yet fail to engage in social reforms, how can the concept of the new outer kingliness gain credibility? How can Confucianism inspire admiration and trust among contemporary citizens?

As Lai HisSan (2015) stated:

"The practice of scholarship and culture, transcending mere discourse innovation, fundamentally represents a competition of value beliefs (principles) and the essence of life (vital energy)." (Lai Xisan, 2015)

Mr. Mou has effectively articulated the theory of the new outer king, while Mr. Lin's concept of "conventionalism" serves as a supplementary explanation. However, given that it is referred to as the new outer king, there is an expectation that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism scholars and gentlemen, in addition to cultivating their internal virtues (rectifying virtue), will also engage with public issues related to human rights and environmental protection ("utilizing" and "enriching"), leveraging their scholarly influence for the benefit of society. Future Confucians will be able to observe in the evolution of Taiwan's democratic society and its historical development the process of contemporary Confucians' participation, which will inspire a similar spirit of active engagement.

In essence, a civic Confucian cannot simply be a passive citizen. The mission of Neo-Confucianism is to engage with democracy and science in response to contemporary challenges. After thoroughly elucidating the connections between democracy and science at both the principled and fundamental levels, one naturally anticipates how Contemporary Neo-Confucianism will further advance the outer king enterprise. Confucians who embody benevolence and a commitment to societal betterment should not only aspire to enter officialdom to effect change. In an open civil society, where individuals can freely express themselves and share ideas, Confucians should cultivate a heightened self-awareness and active engagement, benefiting both themselves and others, while striving to improve the world.

4. Never Lose the Subjective State of Moral Discourse

Building on the perspectives articulated in the preceding paragraphs, I would like to emphasize that what characterizes a Confucian is their dedication to elevated moral standards

and a genuine desire to contribute to the betterment of society. This moral commitment, as an aspiration of the Confucian, may not always result in notable accomplishments in the sphere of external affairs; however, it will invariably be reflected in the subjective state of the Confucian.

Mr. Lin, in many of his writings and papers, frequently disparages the "subjective state of moral practice," considering it one of the main reasons for the failure to achieve external accomplishments. However, when examining the history of Chinese academic thought, it is evident that Confucianism, dating back to the time of Confucius and Mencius in the pre-Qin period, has consistently emphasized the subjective and proactive nature of individual moral consciousness. Confucius stated, "If I desire benevolence, then benevolence is achieved," "If one aspires to benevolence, there is no evil," and "What use are rituals if one is not benevolent? What use is music if one is not benevolent?" Moral actions and external achievements originate from the agency and autonomy of the heart, and virtue that is merely superficial is not endorsed by Confucius. As Confucian thought evolved during the Song and Ming dynasties, the exploration of the mind and nature deepened. Concepts such as "mind," "intention," "aroused," and "unaroused" integrated with moral consciousness to clarify moral practice and investigate the methods and possibilities of becoming a sage or a saint. This approach, which does not depend on external or transcendent mystical forces but instead emphasizes self-cultivation to purify the heart and mind, align with the Dao of Heaven, and achieve ultimate goodness, is distinctive to Chinese Confucianism. This form of moral cultivation, which trains both the mind and nature, is unparalleled in Western ethics and is notably unique. Therefore, if we dismiss the study of moral character in the "subjective state" as unnecessary simply because it struggles to achieve clear success in external affairs, it would be a significant loss.

Zheng Jiadong (2022) argues that "the study of Inner Sagehood and mentality" is the lifeline through which Confucianism can sustain a pure moral consciousness. He poignantly remarks: (The study of the Inner Sagehood and mentality in Confucianism) In an era marked by worldly turmoil and the pervasive influence of materialism, Confucian thought has the potential to transcend these limitations, preserving a thread of the "Dao-tong" (the transmission of the Dao) at a transcendent level. Only in this manner can the spirit and principles of Confucianism avoid being overwhelmed by the surging "tide of history" and prevent becoming merely a tool for a select group seeking to fulfill their self-proclaimed sanctification (author's note: referring to the petty scholars that may emerge from Confucianism's political-educational transformation) and their psychological desire to manipulate others ("ordinary and petty people"). Thus, in the future, Chinese civilization can still be regarded as "Confucian civilization." (Zheng, 2022)

Mr. Lin also recognizes the significance of studying Inner Sagehood, which is why he

states, "Placing virtue first remains an eternally new principle." After considering Mr. Lin's advocacy for a "new Outer Kingliness," I believe it is essential to further emphasize the importance of "Inner Sagehood" in Confucianism.

In "A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture" (1958), authored by Tang Junyi and others, it is noted that mentality Confucianism lacks a comprehensive framework for bridging virtue cultivation and societal enrichment. As a result, it fails to extend benevolence outward to govern and assist the populace, leading to a retreat into self-preservation. "From this retreat, one may indeed deepen the understanding of the dignity of this inner moral subject...yet it simultaneously obstructs the outward path of this moral subject, resulting in the loneliness and desiccation of the subject itself." In essence, this encapsulates the lament of the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Mr. Lin has maintained a keen awareness of this issue, writing for many years on themes closely related to the external affairs of Confucianism. He primarily focuses on critiquing how moral dogmas, when intertwined with traditional patriarchal power structures, distort the human heart with sharp and persistent insight. This critique serves as the intellectual foundation he inherited from the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, who sought to transcend the limitations of Confucianism and explore new directions. His ideal of "Civic Confucianism" as a new Outer Kingliness is intended to create a space for a diverse array of individuals, revealing the inherent benevolence within a Confucian's heart. His book, *When Confucianism Enters Democratic Society*, represents the threads and culmination of decades of reflection. Reading it evokes a sense of the Confucian desire to participate in democratic society, no longer feeling isolated and desiccated. However, regardless of how brilliant the discourse or insightful the arguments may be, they risk remaining mere castles in the air. We hope that, on this foundation, Confucians can advance further, realizing "human rights imbued with human relationships, freedom with self-awareness, and democracy grounded in the people."

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對林安梧教授〈後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王—內聖」問題的一些回應〉之省察

黃漢忠*

摘要

在〈後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王—內聖」問題的一些回應〉一文中，林安梧教授說明了他的學思歷程中對「徹底的反傳統主義」和當代新儒家的批評，以展現他所主張的「後新儒家實踐哲學」。其中，林教授批評當代新儒家的其中一為代表人物牟宗三先生的「良知之自我坎陷」說，只是某種詮釋下的哲學構造，不是真正的歷史事實。另一方面，林教授認為當代新儒家表面上雖然與徹底的反傳統主義對立，但事實上兩者皆全盤接受西方的民主與科學，而且也同樣有「方法論上的本質主義」的問題。本文的目的，即在於進一步省察林教授對當代新儒家特別是牟宗三先生思想的批評。筆者認為，林教授沒有清楚認識牟先生提出的「本質的機緣」和「現實的機緣」之間的區別，以及只著眼於「現實的機緣」，未能注意到西方文化可開出民主與科學，而傳統中國文化則未能有這樣的開展，有其「本質的機緣」。其次，林教授忽略了牟先生曾對西方民主與科學背後所依據的「理性之架構表現」，其中的限制提出深刻的反省。此外，本文也藉由牟先生的觀點，回應林教授對「方法論上的本質主義」之批評。

關鍵詞：當代新儒家、後新儒家、牟宗三、林安梧、方法論上的本質主義

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壹、前言

在〈後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王--內聖」問題的一些回應〉(林安梧, 2024)一文中, 林安梧教授詳細回顧他個人數十年來的學思歷程, 同時說明了他在各個階段中對「徹底的反傳統主義者」(radical anti-traditionalism) 和當代新儒家的批評, 以展現他所主張的「後新儒家實踐哲學」。在該文中, 林教授批評當代新儒家與徹底的反傳統主義者一樣, 皆陷入「方法論上的本質主義」(methodological essentialism) 之困境, 而且皆全盤接受由西方文化所發展出的民主與科學, 主張應以「方法論上的約定主義」(methodological conventionalism) 取代。林教授分析了「自由科學的因果性」與「人文學問的因果性」之間的差異, 檢討西方民主制度下只強調選舉、罷免及制約平衡 (check and balance) 所衍生的問題, 從而主張「有人倫的人權, 有自覺的自由, 有民本的民主」。林教授也指出「君、父、聖」所構成的「血緣性縱貫軸」和三者混為一體所造成的「道的錯置」(misplaced Dao), 才是傳統中國文化沒有發展出民主制度的癥結所在, 批評牟宗三先生的「良知之自我坎陷」說只是「詮釋學意義下的哲學理論邏輯次序」, 既不是「歷史的發生次序」, 也不是「實踐的學習次序」, 並在船山學式的「本體發生學」(ontogenetic method) 之思考下, 在當代新儒家「本內聖以開新外王」之說以外, 提出「外王—內聖」的說法。

然而, 筆者對當代新儒學家的瞭解, 特別是對牟宗三先生「良知之自我坎陷」說之解讀, 實有別於林教授的看法。受筆者的學識所限, 也因林教授對當代新儒家的批評主要是針對牟先生而發, 筆者只針對林教授的論述, 提出三個問題:(一) 究竟林教授對牟先生「良知之自我坎陷」說之批評, 以及他個人對於為何傳統中國文化沒有發展出民主與科學之回答, 是否已切中問題的癥結?(二) 究竟當代新儒家是否如林教授所言, 全盤接受西方文化所發展出的民主與科學?(三) 當代新儒學究竟是否如林教授所說, 是「方法論上的本質主義」? 即使是「方法論上的本質主義」, 是否必然陷入林教授所說的困境? 希望藉由這三個問題, 就教於林教授。

貳、對「良知之自我坎陷」說的批評

林教授認為牟先生的「良知之自我坎陷」說, 是「由形而上的保存到形而下的開啟的歷程」。雖然從熊十力先生到牟先生, 皆已多次清楚表示, 本心良知是呈現, 而非假定或預設, 但林教授在這裏對牟先生的理解, 似乎已認定牟先生是在思考上先假定了道德是「形而上的真實」, 可作為「乾坤萬有之基」開啟一切。因此, 林教授認為這只是牟先生的哲學構造, 並非歷史事實。他說:

如果我們沒有對整個歷史的浮沉升降，好自理解，只是誤認為我們以前是一片漆黑，現在要把漆黑去掉，迎來光明。或者誤認為我們以前是一片光明，只是光明的灼人眼睛，難以看清楚，恐怕要遮蔭一下，坎陷一下才能開啟真正的清楚分別。這些呼籲，必須落實，而所謂的落實，是實事求是地去理解，我們之所以會往內傾，而忽略了外在結構，這與我們兩千年來的父權高壓、君主專制、男權中心，是有密切關係的。就是這三者所構成的「血緣性縱貫軸」再加上科舉制度、八股取士，教條化、刻板化了人的培育與構成。這麼一來，就使得這「血緣性縱貫軸」固結成難以解開的專制集權結構。正是這樣的結構，讓我們的道德成為太道德了，讓我們的人性成為太人性了，讓我們的內聖成為太內聖了。這一「太」就走向了「封閉」（林安梧，2024）。

林教授認為，不論是反傳統主義者將整個中國文化看成是漆黑一片，必須完全拋棄，才能走向現代化，還是當代新儒家認為，雖然傳統儒家在內聖方面已臻完善，但由於知識的發展不夠，未能開出民主、科學，故例如牟先生即主張良知的自我坎陷以開出知性主體，都是未能瞭解清楚中國歷史的整體事實。反傳統主義固然是面對西方文明發展的盛世而要全盤否定傳統文化的一種自卑心態，即使牟先生的坎陷說，也只不過是「某種詮釋下的哲學構造，並不是真正的歷史事實」（林安梧，2024）。對林教授而言，造成傳統儒家偏向內聖、外王得不到充分發展的真正原因，是父權高壓、君主專制、男權中心三者構成的專制集權結構對思想所造成的禁錮。本來儒家要求在位者應有其德，但在秦漢以降專制帝王的制度下，變成統治者無德而自稱有德，由儒家「聖王」的理想變成是「王聖」的事實。本來儒家要求統治者照顧人民「如保赤子」，但同樣在帝制下變成「君父」，要求臣民絕對的服從，君要臣死，臣不得死。

筆者以為，牟先生和林教授對於傳統中國文化外王得不到充分發展的問題，兩者提供的說明之間的差異，涉及到一個重要的問題，即：究竟思想模式是否完全受歷史條件所決定？對筆者而言，牟先生並非不重視歷史文化的背景對思想所造成的影響。例如，當論及「理性之外延的表現」時，牟先生也提到西方的外延表現在政治上有其現實的因緣，此現實的因緣即是在西方歷史中所出現的「階級」，故牟先生說：「他們是在『階級』本身的認定與階級間的限制與爭取中而走上『理性之外延的表現』。（牟宗三，1995，頁145）」對牟先生而言，中國歷史並沒有出現如西方歷史中所謂的「階級」，故這也可以說是中國文化在政治上理性外延表現不足之現實因緣。然而，牟先生同時指出「概念心靈」才是西方文化生命之「本質的因緣」。同樣地，我們可以說，儒家在「理性之運用的表現」下，「概念心靈」不足才是外王沒有得到充分發展的「本質的因緣」，至於歷史中的其他因素都只是「現實的因緣」。對於「理性之運用的表現」，牟先生有以下的說明：

凡是運用表現都是「攝所歸能」，「攝物歸心」。這二者皆在免去對立：它或者把對象收進自己的主體裏面來，或者把自己投到對象裏面去，成為徹上徹下的絕對。內收

則全物在心，外投則全心在物。其實一也。這裏面若強分能所而說一個關係，便是「隸屬關係」(Sub-Ordination)。聖賢人格之「化」是如此，聖君賢相的政體，君相對人民的關係猶如父母對於子女，子女不是父母的敵體，亦是如此；而道心之觀照亦是如此。是以運用表現便以「隸屬之局」來歸定(牟宗三，1995，頁52)。

牟先生在另一處指出，「理性的運用表現」是「據體以成用」，是在具體生活中牽連著「事」說的，而這種運用表現中的「理性」所指的是實踐理性。我們可以說，「理性的運用表現」是就本心良知的明覺作用而說。此明覺作用在具體的物事上表現，其表現時，是與物一體呈現的，在這裏並沒有人、我，心、物的區別。物是在本心的潤澤中的物，本心亦是在具體的物事中所呈現的本心，其實無所謂心，亦無所謂物，分心與物、能與所，都只是分解的、方便的說法，其實只是一大用流行，一於穆不已的作用。當然若要分解地、方便地說能所，則因為此時的物是在心的朗照下的物，所以可以說物隸屬於心，故牟先生說這是一種「隸屬關係」。中國傳統下聖君賢相的政體即是這種理性運用表現下的結果，人民是在君相德政的披澤下安居樂業，猶如子女在父母的庇護下茁壯成長，即孟子所說的「如保赤子」，人民或子女不是與君相或父母爭權利的敵體，所以也是一種隸屬關係。在這種思考模式下，儒家只問在位者有沒有相應的德，有沒有盡照顧人民的責任，讓人民各適其性、各遂其生，而沒有政權、主權、權利、義務、自由、平等，諸政治上的形式概念。這並不表示，儒家的政治思想就一定與透過上述這些政治上的形式概念所建構的民主體制相衝突。相反地，從孟子認為舜之有天下是「天與之，人與之」，而非出於堯之私相授受，即隱含了儒家對民主體制的肯認。牟先生說：

……「天子能薦人于天，不能使天與之天下。」此是首先提出「推薦」一觀念，即今之所謂競選提名也。「天與之」是通過「人與之」而表示。「人與之」是通過其人之行與事之得民心而表示。故「人與之」，「天與之」，無異於說經過一普選而得人民之熱烈擁護。而熱烈擁護是自然而然的，不是強為的，把持的，虛偽的。即由此「自然而然」，遂說「天與之」。……這種經過「推薦」與「普選」而得天下，踐天子位，完全是「公天下」的觀念，是「德」的觀念。這裏並沒有人權運動，也沒有訂憲法，完全就這最具體最實際的行事與民心之向背而表天理合當如此。……這天理一經被正視，被認定，就成了不可搖動的信念，良心上不能違悖的真理。這是政治世界實踐上的最高「律則」(牟宗三，1995，頁115)。

在儒家的理想政治中，堯禪讓於舜完全是出於堯的公心，即不以天下為個人的私產，只傳子而不傳賢，而是完全以人民的福祉為考量，所以堯不是要天將天下授與給舜，因為如果堯可直接要求天將天下授與給舜，則天下似乎只是天原先給予堯的私產。故堯是將舜推薦給天，由天決定，而天之決定完全是依於人民對舜的歸心與否。牟先生認為，堯之薦舜於天，已等同於今天的選舉提名；而舜相堯多年施澤於民，得到人民的擁護，故天因舜得到人民的認受、接受堯的舉薦，讓舜踐天子之位，也與今天民主制度下政府

是經人民普選產生、得到人民的認受之意相同。然而，由於在理性的運用表現下，沒有發展出政權、主權等政治上的形式概念，故當孟子仍以「天與」為理由來肯定繼世之君的合法性時，便顯得不合理。牟先生說：

是以「天與子，則與子」，在開始時，（即照孟子所說的禹、益、啟的情形說），是公的，然到世襲下去的時候，則即不能納在「推薦、天與」的觀念下而一例說。這中間似乎起了一點突變。當該分別視之，另說另講。孟子未能正視此突變，而卻把長期連續的世襲亦納在「推薦、天與」的觀念下，而說「匹夫而有天下，德必若舜禹；繼世以有天下，天之所廢，必若桀紂」。……「天之所廢，必若桀紂」，這個天廢（天不與），是須要革命的，須要用「力」來打的。本來「繼世以有天下」不是經過「推薦、天與」之方式的，乃是未經過天與人與之同意而自居的，所以其為天之所廢亦不是經過「天與或不與」之和平方式而被廢，而是經過革命而被廢。由推薦而天與或不與，這其中並不函有革命。但經過「繼世以有天下」這一突變，則必函有革命。這就是亂之源私之源（牟宗三，1995，頁 133-134）。

本來禹也是要效法堯舜，將益舉薦於天，但人民寧願奉禹之子啟為天子，而這仍是得到人民的認受。但啟之後夏朝的經世之君，卻從未經過人民的認受，而孟子卻仍以「天與」為由，說明啟之後經世之君的合法性。本來「天與」應以「人與」為本，今只言「天與」，便喪失其正當性，而孟子仍一條鞭地以「天與」說明經世之君的合法性，足見「理性的運用表現」之不足，而在此意義下所說的「天與」，適足以成為歷代繼世之君維護其政權的藉口，事實上只是將天下視為一家之私產。既然政權缺乏正當性，到了出現暴君如桀紂時，人民已不堪其苦，必定透過革命推翻前朝，而這種朝代更替的方式，必須是以「力」來爭，完全是與在禪讓中和平演變的方式不一樣。牟先生認為，孟子以至於傳統儒家之所以沒有認清其中的差異，主要的原因在於在理性的運用表現下，人我皆為一體，並非將彼此視為獨立的個體；復由於人我是一體的關係，沒有發展出民主體制所依以建立的政權、主權、權利、義務等政治上的形式概念。要有這些概念，必須依賴於理性的架構表現。牟先生說：

而架構表現則相反。它的底子是對待關係，由對待關係而成一「對列之局」(Co-Ordination)。是以架構表現便以「對列之局」來規定。而架構表現中之「理性」也頓時即失去其人格中德性即具體地說的實踐理性之意義而轉為非道德意義的「觀解理性」或「理論理性」，因此也是屬於知性層上的。（運用表現不屬於知性層）。民主政治與科學正好是這知性層上的「理性之架構表現」之所成就（牟宗三，1995，頁 52）。

在理性的架構表現下，我與其他萬事萬物並非一體，我已將其他萬事萬物推出去而加以對象化，成為科學基於觀解理性或理論理性所研究的對象。同樣地，在此架構表現下，我也並非將其他人以一體視之，而是將所有人皆視為獨立的個體，人與人之間成為

牟先生所說的「對列之局」。在這種關係下，就必須透過理論理性去思考，如果政權或主權應由一個國家中全民所共有，而不應由一家一姓所私有，則政權具有甚麼性質？統治國家的權力即治權應如何安排，始不損害政權的本性？依牟先生的分析，政權「為一民族集團所有」，是「對應全集團而起的一個綜攝的『形式的實有』，『靜態的實有』」。既非一動態之具體物，亦非一個人之屬性。因其非具體，故不可以取，因其非個人之屬性，故不可以隸屬於個人（牟宗三，1995，頁19）。」。相應於政權的概念，即有維持政權本性之政道。牟先生認為，只有民主政治才可以有政道可言。因為民主政治肯認主權在民，不贊成政權可以為一家一姓所私有，正合乎政權為民族集團所共有的原則，故能保持政權為一「定常的實有」之本性。而且在民主政治中，政權與治權分開，政府通過選舉而取得治權，這代表政府的治權是由擁有政權的全體人民所賦與的，即治權以政權為依據，治權因而得其客觀的意義，而且政權也不因治權持有者的改變而有所變化。

由此可見，雖然傳統儒家特別是孟子已有「公天下」的思想，肯定政權的取得必須得到人民的認受，但由於沒有清楚界定，在這種「公天下」的思想下，意含了政權應具有甚麼性質，以及應以甚麼制度來保障政權的這些應有的性質維持不變，而徒以對君主德性上的要求來限制君主，這對牟先生而言，都是因為只有理性的運用表現而缺乏架構表現所產生的問題。只有在理性的架構表現下，開出「對列之局」，視每個人為獨立的個體，進而運用理論理性，確認政權為一定常的實有，並建立民主制度以保障政權的定常性，才能使「公天下」的思想得以落實。另一方面，既然民主政治是以理性的架構表現，亦即理論理性為其必要條件，而理論理性其本質又與理性的運用表現即實踐理性相違反，因此，牟先生認為實踐理性必須坎陷為理論理性，使其本身有足夠的條件以應付形成民主政治所需要的知識，使政治知識暫時與道德分開而有其獨立的意義。這種轉變對實踐理性而言是必要的，而且是很自然的，因為實踐理性既然要求民主政治，但民主政治卻因為知識上的問題而不能形成，這對實踐理性來說是一種缺憾；要彌補這種缺憾，實踐理性必要求自身轉到政治知識的探求上，如此實踐理性實現民主政治的要求始能實現。

我們現在可以進一步省察林教授對牟先生良知自我坎陷說的批評。林教授認為，坎陷說只是某種詮釋下的哲學構造，並不是真正的歷史事實。造成傳統儒家在外王方面得不到充分發展的真正原因，是由於專制集權結構對思想造成的限制。然而，在孟子的時代，秦漢以降的專制帝王制度尚未形成，因此專制集權結構似乎與孟子的思想無關。林教授或許可主張，正由於孟子的時代尚沒有專制集權的體制，故孟子可發展出「公天下」的思想。但牟先生並不認為孟子「公天下」的思想即已足夠，因為孟子並未進一步依於其「公天下」的思想，發展出相應的民主制度，這正是由於在理性的運用表現下、缺乏架構表現所產生的結果。從孟子對繼世之君合法性的說明，以及牟先生對孟子的批評中，即可知道理性運用表現的不足之處。若依牟先生的區分，在理性的運用表現下缺乏架構表現，才是傳統儒家在外王方面得不到充分發展的「本質的因緣」；至於有沒有專制皇權

的限制，只是「現實的因緣」。同理，林教授所說的「道的錯置」（林安梧，2024）¹¹⁶，或許也可以依此方向去說明。也就是說，傳統儒家的「聖王」理想，希望在位者必有其德，希望以道德的要求來限制君主，或是希望在位者愛民如子，也是理性的運用表現下所產生的結果，而到最後變成是在位者無德也自稱有德，由「聖王」的理想變成「王聖」的事實，由如保赤子變成君父，成為必須絕對服從的對象，則亦可見理性的運用表現之不足，而這才是「本質的因緣」。至於專制皇權的出現，也只不過是「現實的因緣」。筆者認為，從牟先生的理論中我們可以發現，思想模式並非完全由歷史條件所決定，反而是歷史發展往往受思想模式左右。

參、當代新儒家是對西方的民主與科學全盤接受嗎？

林教授認為，當代新儒家雖然反對徹底的反傳統主義者認為傳統中國文化是阻礙科學與民主的發展之看法，主張傳統中國文化只要經過轉化，便可以開出科學與民主，但他們對西方文化所發展出的科學與民主，仍然是全盤接受，只是偶有批評（林安梧，2024）¹¹⁷。林教授也指出，民主不能只是選舉、罷免、制約平衡，就能解決問題，如果沒有德性作主導，制約平衡也只不過是權力的傾軋而已（林安梧，2024）¹¹⁸。因此，林教授批評，徹底的反傳統主義者與當代新儒家之間，對於中國文化是否妨礙現代化的爭論是毫無意義的，同時主張「不可摒棄人倫談人權，不可摒棄自覺談自由，不可摒棄民本談民主」，要努力實踐「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」（林安梧，2024）¹¹⁹。

然而，當代新儒家是否對西方文化所發展出的科學與民主全盤接受呢？就牟先生而言，他雖然也肯定西方藉「理性之架構表現」所發展出的科學與民主，但他絕非全盤接受。從他對「外延表現之缺處」之分析中，即可發現牟先生對現代的科學與民主的批評，而且牟先生的批評絕非如林教授所言只是偶有的、仍是現代性的思維方式的，而是對西方的科學與民主提出根本的反省：

理性自始即客觀地向外延方面施展，而其客觀的落實處即在那些形式概念之建立，故形式概念所成的綱維網一旦造起，理性即歸寂而無著處。他自己不能見其自己在何處，而人們亦可懷疑什麼是理性，理性究竟在那裏。如是，人們把那綱維網只看成是時代中一個特定的政體形態，一個既成的空架子。理性既歸寂，虛脫，而遠颺，而這空架子也截斷了其理性之根，沈澱，下墜，而膠著（牟宗三，1995，頁 157-158）。

¹¹⁶ 林安梧（2024）。後新儒家實踐哲學的一個側面——關於「外王--內聖」問題的一些回應。《本土諮商心理學學刊》，15（3），1-51。

¹¹⁷ 同上註。

¹¹⁸ 同上註。

¹¹⁹ 同上註。

也就是說，理性的架構表現所擅長的，是形式架構的建立，包括科學理論、民主制度的建立，以及政治學中各種概念形式上的規定。然而，一旦這些形式架構建立後，我們就很容易忽視了這些形式架構有其在理性上的根源，而只在這些形式架構中操作。牟先生認為，這種順外延表現而截斷其理性之根的操作方式，在自然科學的研究上尚不會產生嚴重的問題，但在政治社會上也如此操作，則造成嚴重的惡果。因為在截斷了理性之根後，人們可將此形式架構只視為偶然在人類的歷史發展中出現的特定政治形態，可有可無，而一旦在此形式架構中出現嚴重的問題，例如經濟上的問題時，則便可以主張將此套形式架構完全推翻。即使是想要努力維護此套形式架構的人，也很容易只知道在此架構中運作，只認定通過此架構所產生的或通過其驗證的，才是有價值的，因此批評「理性」為玄學的名詞，批評「普遍的人性」為抽象的空名。至於個人方面，由於在此形式架構中，只界定了形式上的自由與權利上的平等，但不過問個人如何調適其生命的問題。因此，雖然個人的自由和權利得到保障，但到最後只知道利用自由和權利去追逐個人利益，或是放縱情欲，演變成今天個人主義所產生的流弊，這些惡果皆足見理性的架構表現之限制，以及由之而建立的西方民主和科學所造成的問題（牟宗三，1995，頁158）。牟先生認為，要解決這些問題，必須重新認識到科學與民主所依以建立的形式架構，有其理性的依據；而且在政治上，理論理性只有助於民主制度的建立和政治上的形式概念之界定，但政治的實踐必須以實踐理性或道德理性為依據：

但須知這種分開劃開，祇因政治有獨立的意義與境域，而可以純政治學地討論之之「政治學上的權法」。在此獨立境域內，不牽涉那形而上的道德理性而使民主政體內各種概念清楚確定，這種清楚確定亦不過是為名言的方便，名言上的清楚確定，即不必牽連那麼多，祇在民主政治的大括弧下就對等平列的事實而確定地說出就夠了。……至於說到真實的清楚確定，則講自由通著道德理性，通著人的自覺，是不可免的（牟宗三，1995，頁60）。

牟先生認為，把政治學劃為一門獨立的學科，使之與道德暫時分開，只是為了滿足形成民主政治的知識條件，如權利、義務、自由、平等諸概念之確定，或其他民主制度所需要的知識。但政治活動是人的活動，牽涉到價值的問題，單靠知識或理論理性是無法解決的，所以必須通於道德理性。對牟先生而言，自由通於道德理性與人的自覺，是實踐上的定然事實，而且講自由、權利必須通貫於道德理性和人的自覺，才能真正認識到，歷代先賢為了爭取這些價值的實現，不惜犧牲自己的性命，究竟所為何事。不能說只要從道德理性與人的自覺去講自由和權利，便只是形而上學的無謂爭論，更不能說這就是泛道德主義，有助於極權。牟先生更進一步認為，政治實踐的三項最高律則，可以透過理性的運用表現來加以肯認，其中一項原則是道德上確立「先富後教」，「嚴以律己，寬以待人」之教化原則。他說：

在政治措施上，就個體而順成，生存第一。即以其為一「存在的生命個體」而必

須保住之。顛連無告，不得其所，非仁者所能忍。然就個體的「生活之全」而言之，不但生存第一，暢達其物質的生活幸福，亦須暢達其價值意義的人生而為一「人道的存在」。故曰「謹庠序之教，申之以孝弟之義，頒白者不負戴於道路矣」。教者，即教此孝弟忠信，禮義廉恥之道。完整言之，即孟子所謂：「父子有親，君臣有義，夫婦有別，長幼有序，朋友有信」也。亦中庸所謂「天下之達道五，曰：君臣也、父子也、夫婦也、昆弟也、朋友之交也。」此皆起碼而普遍的人道，非外在的概念與理論而加於人民者，乃是根於人性人情之實事與實道，故曰：「達道」。教者不過教此（牟宗三，1995，頁126）。

牟先生上述的構想，其實就是孟子的民本思想。他認為在教化上要先確立「先富後教」的原則。因為老百姓遭遇到生活上的匱乏，顛沛流離不得其所，當然為仁者所不忍，所以必先使老百姓得溫飽，進而在物質生活上得到幸福，才能夠施以教化。而且政治上的教化也只能限於人倫的維持上，不能要求每一個人當聖人。因為道德實踐是個人之事，在位者應要求自己勉力為聖，至於對待人民，則應「直接以主觀服從客觀」，尊重每一位人民為獨立的「存在的生命個體」，把每個個體都視為目的，而不是當作手段，以疆化的教條去迫使人民服從，這樣反而是不道德的。因此，在位者應先自修其德，再以其德感化人民，使人民亦自覺其固有的德性，這就是儒家「以德治天下」、「嚴以律己，寬以待人」的精神。至於政治上的教化限於人倫的維持，也只是要致力讓人民維持其「人之所以為人」的身分，教以普遍的人道，不能因此就認為是妨礙自由。但也只能止於此，過此則非在位者所應過問，不能責望人民成為聖人，這顯示了政治與道德之間的分際。

由此可見，林教授認為當代新儒家對西方的民主和科學採全盤接受的態度，至少就牟先生的思想而言並非如此。事實上，牟先生對理性的架構表現之不足，以及由之所開出的西方民主和科學，有相當深入的批評和反省。另一方面，林教授所主張的「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由，有民本的民主」，其實早已見於牟先生的思想中。對牟先生而言，不論是理性的運用表現還是架構表現，皆有其不可取代的價值和應有的分位，缺一不可，兩者的充分展現和相互調和，始見理性之全。

除此之外，筆者也希望以上述兩節的分析為基礎，進一步檢視林教授「外王-內聖」的說法。林教授認為，從東亞各國在民主科學上「歷史的發展次序」和「實踐的學習次序」來看，並非如牟先生所說，是「本內聖以開出新外王」，而是在新外王的學習過程中，調整內聖學的內容，其中最重要的，是由「君子儒學」，轉化為「公民儒學」，即以「心性修養」為優位的道德學，轉化為以「社會公義」為優位的道德學。「社會」是經由「公民」以「契約」締結成的總體，而「公義」則是經由一「話語的公共論域」而達致。林教授說：

進入到現代化的社會中，契約性的社會連結是優先於血緣性的自然連結的，原先長自血緣性的自然連結的「仁愛之道」，現在當長成一「社會公義」。真切的涉入

到公共領域中，經由「交談」互動，凝成共識，上契於社會之道，在這樣的社會公義下，才有真正的「心性修養」，才有真正的內聖（林安梧，2021）。

然而，從內聖到外王的先後次序，是儒家對政治的基本主張。從孔子言「政者，正也。子帥以正，孰敢不正？」，孟子言「先王有不忍人之心，斯有不忍人之政」，到大學言「自天子以至於庶人，壹是皆以修身為本」，莫非如此。對儒家而言，本心良知是隨時皆可呈現的，不論外王是否實現皆可呈現，而且不論是在專制社會還是在民主社會中，也可呈現，皆可在不同的社會中，為吾人指向處之之道。若說「在這樣的社會，才有真正的心性修養，才有真正的內聖」，難道並非處在林教授所說的公民社會的人例如孔孟，就沒有所謂心性修養嗎？他們就不是聖人嗎？「孝弟也者，其為仁之本與」，難道沒有在公民社會中，就沒有所謂孝道嗎？若果真如此，則林教授所主張的「有人倫的人權，有自覺的自由」，其中的自覺難道只是政治上自覺為公民嗎？而且沒有人權就沒有人倫可言嗎？

肆、「方法論上的本質主義」是否一困境？

林教授認為，徹底的反傳統主義和當代新儒家，表面上是兩個對傳統中國文化的價值持相反意見的敵對陣營，但事實上他們的思想同樣是基於「方法論上的本質主義」，容易造成偏至化、教條化、專制化。因此，林教授主張應以「方法論上的約定主義」取代，視語言文字只是一套定位系統，並不是存在本身；而定位系統也只不過是約定的，必須不斷地經過檢覈，使之更能趨近事實，取得大家的共識。即使已取得共識的定位系統，仍必須不斷地檢覈，不能一錘定音。對於徹底的反傳統主義和當代新儒家皆是「方法論上的本質主義」之問題，林教授提出以下的說明：

他們一樣都採用了方法論上的本質主義，一個說中國文化傳統本質上並不妨礙現代化，另一個說中國文化傳統，其本質上是徹底妨礙現代化的。須知：依著本質主義的方法論來思考，極容易陷入片面性，兩者相較，徹底的反傳統主義的片面性則更為嚴重。因為，他們握有較大的勢頭，須知握有愈大勢頭的，愈會走向片面性、甚至專斷、專制，乃至極權。當代新儒學之作為新傳統主義者，最可貴的是對於這樣的徹底反傳統主義，提出另一個相對反的主張。但方法上，兩者則是同一個對立面的兩端（林安梧，2024）。

當代新儒學究竟是否如林教授所說，是「方法論上的本質主義」呢？如果所謂「方法論上的本質主義」，是指只認定一套方法，來解決一切人生宇宙的問題的話，則林教授所批評的「徹底的反傳統主義」，似乎更接近「方法論上的本質主義」。因為這一類反傳統主義者大抵認為，只有科學方法才能為一切人生宇宙的問題提供正確的答案，即所謂「科學一層論」。相比之下，當代新儒家基本上認為，許多有關倫理道德人生的問題，並

非科學方法所能解決。例如牟宗三先生的兩層存有論，即意含了科學真理以外還有其他真理，並非科學方法所能知，或可被科學方法所否定，科學真理也只不過是俗諦。對牟先生而言，由本心良知在現實生活中顯露而逆覺體證，始能體證吾人真實生命之所在，以及吾人與天地萬物為一體，吾人的生命與天地萬物之感通無礙。而由於道德問題一定涉及知識問題，所以本心良知也同時必須自我坎陷，開出認知主體，同時將天地萬物對象化以加以瞭解，這自是本心良知自身的必然要求。不論是本心良知還是認知主體，對牟先生而言皆有其定常，即使作為俗諦的科學真理也有其諦性。或許這就是林教授所謂的「本質」，但儒家對於本心良知、或是對人的本質之肯認，並不是透過思辨去設想一個形而上的本體，也不是透過定義去界定人是甚麼，而是透過道德實踐去體證，而且儒家相信人人皆可以有這樣的體認。牟先生在深入瞭解康德哲學和西方近代邏輯的基礎上，分析純理的自我展現，以及時空、範疇和知性為自然立法之實義，並依儒家德性之知、見聞之知的區分、佛家一心開二門的義理，會通康德哲學，給予認知主體恰當的定位，也有其堅實的學理依據。套用林教授的話，筆者相信，牟先生不論是對道德主體還是認知主體的體會和掌握，皆可以經得起回到存在自身去不斷檢覈。反觀林教授所稱許的「方法論上的約定主義」，到最後是否只是淪為相對主義？難道我們在乍見孺子將入於井的情境下，當下呈現的既是吾人之性、同時即是天理的怵惕惻隱之心，都只不過是在特定時空人與人之間約定下的結果？如果都只是一種約定，則究竟有沒有所謂的天理？如果沒有天理，所有道德規範都只是個別社會中人與人之間約定下的產物，則與相對主義有甚麼分別？如果所有道德規範只是如此，則林教授所肯定的易之三義，簡易、變易、不易，其不易者何在？對於「科學一層論」者，牟先生曾提出以下的批評：

美其名曰科學方法，斥「理性」為玄學名詞，斥「普遍的人性」為抽象之空名，斥言「本質」者為本質主義，只落於現象主義，唯名主義，只著眼於既成之事實，截斷其所維護者之理性之根，忘其為前人本「超越的平等性」之理性與理想奮鬥而得之結果，好像前人皆在玄學之迷妄中，惟我今日才是在科學之清醒中，此即今日自由世界一般知識份子之心態，吾總名之曰無體，無理，無力者（牟宗三，1995，頁158）。

在此，牟先生引用黑格爾的說法，認為西方基督教「在上帝面前人人平等」的說法所顯示的人之「超越的平等性」，是西方發展出民主制度的基礎，因為此超越的平等性「必然函著對於階級限制的衝破，爭取現實存在上的權利之平等（牟宗三，1995，151頁）。」科學一層論者否定對理性、普遍的人性及本質的探求，對牟先生而言其實是截斷了理性之根。依牟先生的思路，筆者也不認為只要講「本質是甚麼」都注定是錯誤的，而是要看此講法究竟是否經得起理論上的驗證和實踐上的體證。同樣地，不能只因為牟先生認定道德主體和認知主體兩者之超越的區分，而且皆有其定常性，或是肯定西方在科學和民主方面的成就，就只以「方法論上的本質主義」為由，認定必然是錯誤的，而

是要看牟先生的兩層存有論其理據何在，是否經得起理論上的驗證和實踐上的體證。如果牟先生兩層存有論的講法，有其充分的理據，則為何只因為此理論意含了道德主體和認知主體有其定常性，就注定是錯誤呢？至於方法論上的本質主義是否即趨向獨裁專制，也應取決於持此論者是否只以自身所有的權力，排斥所有的批評和其他的方法。若某套認為天地宇宙皆有所謂「本質」的理論有其客觀實在性，且樂於回應並能充分回答所有問題，則不能因為這套理論認定有所謂「本質」，就必須視之為專制獨裁。不過，林教授所說的「方法論上的本質主義」，似乎是另有所指。他說：

當代新儒學雖對徹底的反傳統主義者多所批評，但他們所提出的中國政治傳統「只有治道，而無政道」，中國古代「只有科技，而無科學」，中國重視的是「道德」，並不重視「知識」，這些論點，看似分明，其實並不準確。其實，有治道當然也就有政道，只是這政道不是西方近現代以來的政道；有科技當然也就有科學，只是這科學不是西方近現代以來的科學。中國當然有道德、有知識，西方也是，只是彼此的道德之長成、知識的習得，卻大有差別。西方以前的君主專制，其專制的嚴苛絕不下於中國古代，甚至是有過之無不及。但與中國古代的專制是有不同之處，西方的民主並不是他本質上就如此，他也是在歷史發展歷程中長成的，中國文化傳統當然也可以在學習的過程中，長育而成。我以為打破了文化的理解上所使用的方法論上的本質主義 (methodological essentialism)，而待之以方法論上的約定主義 (methodological conventionalism)，這是使得「道的錯置」，撥亂反正的最重要理由：經由這樣的撥亂反正，就可以回到我謂的「道的正置」(林安梧，2024)。

由此可見，林教授所說的「方法論上的本質主義」，是針對那些認定文化有某種「本質」的研究方法而發，而牟先生提出傳統中國文化是「理性之運用的表現」所產的結果，西方文化是「理性之架構的表現」所產生的結果，明顯是林教授其中一位批評的對象。然而，即使不論是東西方都有說明政權的合法性之各種理論，但這些理論是否皆符合牟先生所說的政道，即「政治上相應政權之為形式的實有，定常的實有，而使其真成為一集團所共同地有之或總持地有之之道」呢？即使西方文化並非一開始就出現民主，但如果其理性的架構表現不足，在後來是否即能發展出符合政道的民主制度？即使孟子也有「公天下」的思想，但為何也沒有發展出符合政道的民主制度？即使西方也有他們的道德，但他們有發展出各種實踐工夫論，使人雖有限而可無限，達致人我、物我為一、天人為一的境界嗎？如果林教授所說的「道的錯置」，的確如我所分析的，是理性的運用表現不足所造成的結果，則是否即可證明，牟先生所瞭解的傳統中國文化與西方文化之間的差異是正確的？如果林教授也承認中國與西方「彼此的道德之長成、知識的習得，大有差別」，則這些差別只是牟先生所說的「現實的因緣」所造成的嗎？還是有其「本質的

因緣」之差別？如果這兩種文化的差異，的確有其「本質的因緣」上的差別，則即使當代新儒學是林教授所說的「方法論上的本質主義」，也不會構成任何問題。

伍、結語

經過上述的分析，筆者已以牟宗三先生的兩層存有論為例，針對林安梧教授對當代新儒家所提出的批評加以回應。對於林教授批評牟先生的「良知之自我坎陷」說只是某種詮釋下的哲學構造，不是真正的歷史事實之問題，筆者認為林教授沒有清楚認識牟先生所提出的「本質的機緣」和「現實的機緣」之間的區別，以及只著眼於「現實的機緣」，未能注意到西方文化可開出民主與科學，而傳統中國文化則未能有這樣的開展，有其「本質的機緣」。對於林教授批評當代新儒家事實上與徹底的反傳統主義者一樣，皆全盤接受西方的民主與科學，筆者已徵引牟先生批評西方文化在理性的架構表現下、科學與民主之缺失為證，以明林教授的批評有待商榷。對於林教授批評當代新儒家是「方法論上的本質主義」，筆者也對方法論上的本質主義必然錯誤提出質疑。限於文章的篇幅和筆者的學識，本文大部分都是藉由牟先生的思想，以回應林教授的問題，未能觸及當代新儒家其他代表人物包括熊十力、唐君毅及徐復觀等諸先生的思想，也未能全部回應林教授所提出的所有問題，希望在未來的研究中，能進一步探究上述幾位先輩的思想，以展現當代新儒學的全貌。

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A Reflection on Professor An-Wu Lin’s “A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of ‘Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood’”

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Abstract

In “A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of ‘Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood’” An-Wu Lin elaborates his critique on radical anti-traditionalism and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism to demonstrate his practical philosophy of post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. He criticizes “the doctrine of self-negation of Liang-zhi” developed by Mou Zongsan, one of the main figures of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, arguing that it does not align with the historical development of democracy and science and regards it as a philosophical construction under Mou’s interpretation. Moreover, Lin also thinks that both radical anti-traditionalism and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism uncritically endorse democracy and science developed from Western civilization, and both involve the fault of methodological essentialism, although they usually oppose each other. This paper examines Lin’s critique of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, especially the thought of Mou Zongsan. It argues that Lin’s critique of Mou’s thought is based on his misunderstanding of the difference between the “essential cause” and the “factual cause” suggested by Mou and his failure to recognize that the essential cause of Western democratic and scientific development is derived from a civilization of its own, which is lacking in traditional Chinese civilization. Moreover, Lin neglects Mou’s critique on the limitation of “the constitutive performance of reason,” which is the foundation of democracy and science. Lastly, this paper also responds to Lin’s critique of methodological essentialism from Mou’s point of view.

Keywords: Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Mou Zongsan, An-Wu Lin, Methodological Essentialism

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I. Preface

In "A Side View of Post Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy: Some Responses to the Issue of 'Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood'" (Lin, 2024), Professor An-Wu Lin offers a comprehensive review of his intellectual journey spanning several decades. He articulates his critiques of both "radical anti-traditionalists" and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism at various stages, with the aim of presenting his proposed "Post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Practical Philosophy." In this paper, Professor Lin contends that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism have fallen into the same trap of "methodological essentialism" as radical anti-traditionalists, and he criticizes their uncritical acceptance of democracy and science as developed by Western culture. Instead, he advocates for "methodological conventionalism." He examines the distinctions between the "causality of the liberal sciences" and the "causality of the humanities," scrutinizes issues arising from Western democratic systems that overemphasize elections, recall mechanisms, and checks and balances, and argues for a vision of democracy that encompasses "humanistic human rights, conscious freedom, and people-centered democracy." Professor Lin identifies the "bloodline axis, "Monarch, Father, and Sage," the resulting "misplaced Dao" from conflating these three elements is the root cause of traditional Chinese culture's failure to develop a democratic system. He critiques Mr. Mou Zongsan's theory of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," describing it as merely a "hermeneutical philosophical construct" that fails to represent "the historical order of occurrence" or "the practical order of learning." Drawing on the ontogenetic method inspired by Chuanshan studies, Professor Lin proposes the concept of "Outer Kingliness–Inner Sagehood" as an alternative to the Contemporary Neo-Confucianism doctrine of "beginning with Inner Sagehood to achieve Outer Kingliness."

My understanding of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism thinkers, particularly my interpretation of Mr. Mou Zongsan's theory of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," diverges from Professor Lin's perspective. Given my limited knowledge and the fact that Professor Lin's critiques of Self-Entrapment of Conscience primarily target Mr. Mou, I would like to pose three questions in response to Professor Lin's arguments: (1) Does Professor Lin's critique of Mr. Mou's theory of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," along with his explanation of why traditional Chinese culture did not develop democracy and science, truly address the crux of the issue? (2) As Professor Lin claims, is it accurate to say that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism fully embraces the democracy and science developed by Western culture? (3) Does Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, as Professor Lin argues, indeed adhere to "methodological essentialism"? Even if it does, does it necessarily fall into the predicament described by Professor Lin? I plan to explore these questions in dialogue with Professor Lin.

II. Critique of the Theory of " Self-Entrapment of Conscience "

Professor Lin interprets Mr. Mou's theory of the " Self-Entrapment of Conscience " as a process of "preserving the metaphysical to unveil the physical." Although both Xiong Shili and Mr. Mou have consistently emphasized that the original mind of conscience is a manifestation rather than a presumption, Professor Lin appears to assume that Mr. Mou presupposes morality as a "metaphysical reality" that serves as the foundation for the creation of all things. Consequently, Professor Lin regards this as merely Mr. Mou's philosophical construction rather than a historical fact. He states:

"If we lack a proper understanding of the ebbs and flows of history, we might mistakenly believe that our past was shrouded in darkness, leading us to think that our current task is to dispel this darkness to usher in the light. Conversely, we might erroneously believe that our past was illuminated by blinding light, necessitating that we shield and sublimate it to achieve true clarity. These perspectives must be grounded in a concrete, factual understanding of why we have turned inward and neglected external structures, which is closely related to two thousand years of patriarchal oppression, monarchical despotism, and male-centered dominance. These three elements form a 'vertical axis of bloodline,' compounded by the imperial examination system and stereotypical education, which rigidly shaped individuals. Consequently, this axis solidified into an unbreakable autocratic structure. Such a structure has rendered our morality excessively moral, our humanity excessively human, and our inner sagehood excessively inward. This excess ultimately leads to 'closure'" (Lin, 2024).

Professor Lin argues that both radical anti-traditionalists, who view Chinese culture as entirely negative and believe it must be completely discarded to achieve modernization, and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, who assert that while traditional Confucianism has perfected inner sagehood, it has failed to develop democracy and science due to a lack of knowledge—exemplified by Mr. Mou's advocacy for the Self-Entrapment of Conscience to cultivate the cognitive subject—fail to fully grasp the complexities of Chinese history. Radical anti-traditionalism reflects a self-deprecating mindset that arises from the recognition of the flourishing development of Western civilization, leading to a complete rejection of traditional culture. Similarly, Mr. Mou's theory of self-sublation is merely "a philosophical construction under certain interpretations, not an actual historical fact" (Lin, 2024). For Professor Lin, the

primary reason traditional Confucianism emphasized inner sagehood while outer kingliness remained underdeveloped lies in the autocratic power structure shaped by three factors: patriarchal oppression, monarchical despotism, and male-centered dominance, which constrained intellectual thought. Initially, Confucianism required those in power to possess virtue. However, under the autocratic rule of emperors from the Qin and Han dynasties onward, rulers claimed virtue without embodying it, transforming the Confucian ideal of the "sage-king" into the reality of the "king as sage." Confucianism originally called for rulers to care for the people "as if nurturing infants." However, under imperial rule, this evolved into the "lord-father," demanding absolute obedience from subjects, leading to the notion that "if the lord wants the minister dead, the minister must die."

In my view, the differing explanations provided by Mr. Mou and Professor Lin regarding the reasons for the incomplete development of traditional Chinese culture's outer kingliness raise a critical question: To what extent are patterns of thought shaped by historical conditions? From my perspective, Mr. Mou does not dismiss the influence of historical and cultural contexts on thought. For instance, when discussing the "manifestations of the extension of rationality," Mr. Mou acknowledges that tangible conditions, such as the emergence of "classes," influenced political developments in Western history. Mr. Mou states, "They achieved the 'manifestations of the extension of rationality' through the identification of 'class' itself and the limitations and struggles between classes" (Mou, 1995, p. 145). For Mr. Mou, the absence of a concept like "class" in Chinese history can be viewed as a significant factor contributing to the inadequate political manifestation of rationality within Chinese culture. However, Mr. Mou also emphasizes that the "conceptual mind" is the "essential condition" of Western cultural life. Similarly, one could argue that in Confucianism's "manifestations of the application of rationality," the lack of a "conceptual mind" serves as the "essential condition" for the insufficient development of outer kingliness. At the same time, other historical factors are merely "real conditions." Regarding the "manifestations of the application of rationality," Mr. Mou explains:

"All manifestations of application pertain to 'subordination to the integrative function' and 'absorbing objects into the mind.' Both concepts aim to eliminate opposition by either incorporating the object into one's subject or projecting oneself into the object, thereby achieving absolute interpenetration. Internal absorption brings all things into the mind, while external projection fully integrates the mind with objects. Essentially, they are one and the same. If one were to forcibly distinguish between subject and object and describe their relationship, it would be characterized as a 'subordination relationship' (Sub-

Ordination). The 'transformation' of the sage's character reflects this dynamic; the relationship between the sage-ruler or virtuous minister and the people resembles that of parents to their children, where children are not adversaries to their parents. Similarly, the contemplation of the Dao-heart embodies this principle. Thus, the manifestation of application is established through the 'structure of subordination'" (Mou, 1995, p. 52).

Mr. Mou Zongsan further elaborates that the "manifestation of the application of rationality" involves "deriving function from essence," which refers to the interconnection with "events" in concrete life. The term "rationality" in this context specifically pertains to practical reason. We can assert that the "manifestation of the application of rationality" is related to the illuminating function of innate knowledge and conscience. This illuminating function is expressed through specific objects and events, and in its manifestation, it presents itself as unified with these objects; in this context, there is no distinction between subject and object or mind and matter. Objects exist within the nurturing framework of the innate mind, and the innate mind manifests itself through concrete objects. There is no actual separation between mind and matter; the distinctions between mind and matter, as well as subject and object, are merely convenient and fragmentary expressions. In truth, they represent a unified, continuously flowing great function—a ceaseless activity of harmonious movement. Of course, if one must delineate subject and object for convenience, then, since objects are illuminated by the mind, they are subordinate to it. Hence, Mr. Mou describes this as a "subordination relationship." In traditional Chinese governance, under the guidance of sage rulers and virtuous ministers, the application of rationality yields a harmonious outcome. The people live peacefully and happily under the benevolent rule of their leaders, much like children growing up under the protection of their parents. As Mencius stated, "act as if you were watching over an infant." In this context, the people, akin to children, are not adversaries contending for rights against their rulers or parents; rather, they exist in a relationship of subordination. Within this framework, Confucianism primarily inquires whether those in power possess the requisite virtue and fulfill their responsibilities to care for the populace, enabling individuals to realize their true nature and pursue their lives. There are no formal political concepts of government, sovereignty, rights, obligations, freedom, or equality. However, this does not imply that Confucian political thought is inherently at odds with democratic systems founded on these formal political concepts. On the contrary, Mencius's assertion that Shun's possession of the world was "granted by Heaven and by the people," rather than being a private transfer from Yao, implicitly reflects a Confucian endorsement of democratic principles. Mr. Mou elaborates:

"...The sovereign can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the throne." This statement introduces the concept of "recommendation," akin to the modern notion of electoral nomination. "Heaven grants it" can be interpreted as "the people granting it." The idea of "the people granting it" and "Heaven granting it" are essentially equivalent to stating that it is through a general election that one receives enthusiastic popular support. This enthusiastic support is natural, not forced, controlled, or hypocritical. From this naturalness arises the assertion that "Heaven grants it." The process of gaining the world's favor through "recommendation" and "general election," and ascending to the position of the Son of Heaven, embodies the concept of a "public world" and the idea of "virtue." In this context, there is no human rights movement, nor is there a constitution drafted; rather, it relies entirely on the most concrete and practical actions and the alignment of the people's hearts, reflecting heavenly principles. Once these heavenly principles are recognized and affirmed, they become an unshakeable belief—a truth that cannot be contravened in one's conscience. This represents the highest "law" in the practical political realm." (Mou, 1995, p. 115).

In the ideal political system of Confucianism, Emperor Yao's abdication in favor of Shun was entirely motivated by his selfless public spirit. He did not view the world as a personal possession to be passed down solely to his descendants; rather, he prioritized the welfare of the people. Yao did not intend for Heaven to bestow the world directly upon Shun, as if it were Yao's personal property granted by Heaven. Instead, Yao recommended Shun to Heaven, leaving the final decision to Heaven, which was ultimately based on the people's allegiance to Shun. Mr. Mou posits that Yao's recommendation of Shun to Heaven parallels modern electoral nominations. Shun's years of service under Yao and his contributions to the welfare of the people earned him their support, leading Heaven to accept Yao's recommendation and allowing Shun to ascend the throne. This concept is akin to contemporary democratic systems, where governments are elected and validated by the people. However, due to the absence of developed political concepts such as authority and sovereignty in the application of reason, it became problematic when Mencius continued to justify the legitimacy of hereditary rulers using the notion of "Heaven's Mandate." Mr. Mou states:

Thus, "If Heaven grants it to the son, then it is granted," initially (according to Mencius regarding the cases of Yu, Yi, and Qi) was a public matter. However, when it extended to hereditary succession, it could no longer be uniformly explained under the concept of "recommendation and Heaven's mandate." A subtle shift occurred that should be

acknowledged and addressed separately. Mencius did not confront this shift directly; instead, he included long-term hereditary succession within the framework of "recommendation and Heaven's mandate," stating, "In the case of a private individual obtaining the throne, he must possess virtue equal to that of Shun or Yu; when the kingdom is possessed by natural succession, the sovereign who is displaced by Heaven must be like Jie or Zhou." The dethronement by Heaven (the rejection by Heaven) necessitates revolution; it must be overthrown by force. Initially, "inheriting the world" did not occur through "recommendation and Heaven's mandate," but rather through self-appointment without the consent of Heaven or the people. Thus, its downfall was not achieved through the peaceful means of "Heaven's acceptance or rejection," but through revolution. There is no inherent revolution in the recommendation process or in Heaven's decision. However, the shift to "inheriting the world" inevitably contains revolutionary elements. This is the source of disorder and the root of self-interest (Mou, 1995, pp. 133-134).

Originally, Yu intended to follow the examples set by Yao and Shun by recommending Yi to Heaven. However, the people preferred to honor Yu's son, Qi, as the ruler, which reflected their endorsement. Subsequent rulers of the Xia dynasty after Qi, however, failed to gain the people's support, yet Mencius continued to justify their legitimacy through the concept of "Heaven's Mandate." Ideally, "Heaven's Mandate" should be rooted in "the will of the people"; relying solely on "Heaven's Mandate," its legitimacy. Mencius's unwavering adherence to this justification for the rulers' legitimacy demonstrates the inadequacy of "the constitutive performance of reason." In this context, invoking "Heaven's Mandate" conveniently became an excuse for successive rulers to maintain their power, effectively treating the world as their private inheritance. Given the lack of legitimate governance, when tyrants like Jie and Zhou emerged, the suffering populace was compelled to overthrow the previous dynasty through revolution—a method starkly different from the peaceful transitions seen in abdications. Mr. Mou argues that the failure of Mencius and traditional Confucianism to recognize this distinction is primarily due to a reasoning approach that perceives the self and others as a unified entity rather than as independent individuals. This interconnected perspective of self and others hindered the development of political concepts that are foundational to democratic systems, such as authority, sovereignty, rights, and duties, which depend on the "constitutive performance of reason." Mr. Mou states:

Conversely, constitutive performance fundamentally revolves around relational opposition, establishing a "coordinative order" (Co-Ordination) through relational dynamics. Consequently, constitutive performance is characterized by this "coordinative order." Within the framework of constitutive performance, "reason" loses its significance as practical reason or moral virtue inherent in personal character. Instead, it transforms into a non-moral interpretation of "intellectual reason" or "theoretical reason," thereby aligning with the level of understanding (although constitutive performance itself does not belong to this level). Democratic politics and science emerge precisely from this constitutive performance of reason at the level of understanding (Mou, 1995, p. 52).

Under the constitutive performance of reason, I do not identify with other beings or objects; rather, I externalize and objectify them, transforming them into subjects of scientific inquiry based on intellectual or theoretical reasoning. Similarly, within this framework, I do not perceive others as extensions of myself but recognize everyone as independent individuals, thereby creating what Mr. Mou refers to as a "coordinative order" among people. In this relationship, one must employ theoretical reasoning to contemplate the nature of authority or sovereignty and whether it should belong collectively to all citizens of the state rather than to a single family or lineage. According to Mr. Mou's analysis, authority "belongs to a collective of a nation" as "a comprehensive 'formal actuality,' a 'static actuality' corresponding to the entire collective. It is neither a dynamic, concrete entity nor an attribute of an individual. Because it is not concrete, it cannot be possessed; and because it is not a personal attribute, it cannot be subordinated to an individual" (Mou, 1995, p. 19). Corresponding to the concept of authority, a political order maintains its essence. Mr. Mou argues that only democratic politics can sustain such an order because democracy recognizes sovereignty as belonging to the people and opposes the privatization of authority by any single family or lineage, thereby preserving the inherent nature of authority as a "constant actuality." Furthermore, in a democratic system, authority and governance are distinct; the government derives its power through elections, which means that its governing authority is granted by the people who collectively hold sovereignty. Thus, governance is based on authority, lending it objective significance, and authority remains unchanged regardless of who exercises governance.

It is evident that, although traditional Confucianism—particularly as articulated by Mencius—embraced the concept of "a common world," which asserts that the legitimacy of authority must be endorsed by the people, it did not clearly delineate the characteristics that authority should possess within this framework or the systems necessary to ensure the

preservation of these characteristics. Instead, it primarily imposed moral constraints on rulers to limit their power. According to Mr. Mou, these issues stem from a reliance on the applicative performance of reason, rather than its constitutive performance. Only through the constitutive performance of reason can a "coordinative order" emerge, recognizing each individual as an autonomous entity and utilizing theoretical reason to affirm authority as a stable reality. This, in turn, facilitates the establishment of democratic institutions that protect the constancy of authority, thereby actualizing the concept of "a common world." On the other hand, since democratic politics relies on the constitutive performance of reason, which requires theoretical reasoning, and given that the essence of theoretical reasoning fundamentally opposes the applicative performance of reason, or practical reasoning, Mr. Mou argues that practical reasoning must sublimate itself into theoretical reasoning to satisfy the necessary conditions for establishing democratic politics. This process temporarily separates political knowledge from morality, granting it independent significance. Such a transformation is both necessary and natural for practical reasoning. While issues of knowledge hinder practical reasoning's calls for democratic politics, the formation of democratic politics presents a deficiency for practical reasoning. To address this, practical reasoning must redirect its focus toward political knowledge, thereby enabling it to meet the demands of realizing democratic politics.

We can further examine Professor Lin's critique of Mr. Mou's theory of 'Self-Entrapment of Conscience.' Professor Lin argues that this theory is merely a philosophical construct under a specific interpretation, rather than an actual historical fact. He suggests that the primary reason traditional Confucianism failed to develop in the context of external kingship lies in the limitations imposed on thought by autocratic and centralized structures. However, during the time of Mencius, the autocratic imperial system that emerged after the Qin and Han dynasties had not yet formed, making centralized autocracy seemingly unrelated to Mencius' thought. Professor Lin might contend that precisely because such a system did not exist in Mencius' time, he was able to develop the concept of "a common world." Nevertheless, Mr. Mou does not believe that Mencius' concept of "a common world" is insufficient because Mencius did not further develop a corresponding democratic system based on this idea. According to Mr. Mou, this lack of development results from the applicative performance of reason, which is deficient in its constitutive performance. Through Mencius' explanation of the legitimacy of hereditary rulers and Mr. Mou's critique of Mencius, we can discern the inadequacies of the applicative performance of reason. Mr. Mou distinguishes that the absence of constitutive performance within the framework of applicative reason is the "essential cause" for traditional Confucianism's failure to fully evolve in the context of external kingship, while the presence of autocratic constraints is merely a "circumstantial cause." Similarly, Professor Lin's notion of the "misplacement of the Dao" (Lin, 2024) can be understood in this context. The traditional

Confucian ideal of the "sage-king" — which envisions rulers as virtuous individuals who are morally obligated to care for their subjects as if they were their own children — is a product of the practical application of reason. Over time, this expectation led rulers to claim virtue without genuinely embodying it, thereby transforming the ideal of the "sage-king" into the reality of the "king-sage." Initially expected to nurture the populace as if they were infants, these rulers evolved into paternal figures who demanded absolute obedience, further illustrating the shortcomings of the practical application of reason. This represents the "essential cause," while the rise of autocratic rule serves merely a "circumstantial cause." From Mr. Mou's theory, we can observe that historical conditions do not entirely dictate modes of thought; rather, historical development is often influenced by prevailing modes of thought.

IV. Is Contemporary Neo-Confucianism a Complete Embrace of Western Democracy and Science?

Professor Lin argues that while contemporary Neo-Confucians oppose the extreme anti-traditionalist view, which posits that traditional Chinese culture hinders the development of science and democracy, they assert that traditional Chinese culture can indeed promote science and democracy if it undergoes transformation. However, they largely accept the scientific and democratic advancements of Western culture, offering only occasional critiques (Lin, 2024). He further emphasizes that democracy cannot be reduced solely to elections, recalls, and checks and balances; without virtue as a guiding principle, these mechanisms devolve into mere power struggles (Lin, 2024). Consequently, Professor Lin critiques the debate between extreme anti-traditionalists and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism regarding whether Chinese culture obstructs modernization as ultimately meaningless. He advocates that "one should not discard ethics to discuss human rights, nor self-awareness to discuss freedom, and not overlook the people-oriented principle when discussing democracy," urging the realization of "human rights grounded in ethics, freedom rooted in self-awareness, and democracy founded on a people-oriented approach (Lin, 2024).

However, do Contemporary Neo-Confucianism fully embrace the scientific and democratic advancements of Western culture? In the case of Mr. Mou, while he recognizes the scientific and democratic achievements of the West through the "constitutive performance of reason," he does not accept them uncritically. His analysis of the "deficiencies of external performance that Mr. Mou's critique of modern science and democracy is far more profound than what Professor Lin characterizes as occasional and still rooted in modernist thinking. Instead, Mr. Mou provides a fundamental reflection on Western science and democracy.

"Reason initially manifests itself objectively through external extension, and its objective realization is found in the establishment of formal concepts. Once the network of formal concepts is constructed, reason retreats into silence, losing its self-awareness. It becomes unable to perceive its own position, leading individuals to question its true essence and where it resides. Consequently, this network of formal concepts is merely regarded as a specific form of governance for a particular era—a hollow framework that is complete yet detached. As reason retreats into silence, it becomes vacant and drifts away, severing its connection to the root of reason. This detachment leads to stagnation, as it settles and sinks. (Mou, 1995, pp. 157-158).

In other words, the constitutive performance of reason excels at establishing formal structures, such as scientific theories, democratic institutions, and formal conceptual definitions in political science. However, once these formal structures are established, it becomes easy to overlook their roots in reason, leading to a superficial engagement with these frameworks. Mr. Mou argues that while such operations, which sever their connection to foundational reason, may not pose significant issues in the natural sciences, they can have severe negative consequences when applied to political and social domains. When the roots of reason are severed, individuals may perceive these formal structures as merely contingent political forms that emerged in human history—dispensable and replaceable. When serious issues, such as economic crises, arise within these formal structures, it becomes easy for people to advocate for their complete dismantling. Even those who strive to uphold these structures often know only how to operate within them, believing that only what is produced or validated by these frameworks holds value. Consequently, they criticize "reason" as a metaphysical concept and dismiss "universal human nature" as an abstract and vacuous label. On an individual level, while these formal structures define formal freedom and equality of rights, they do not address how individuals should navigate their lives. As a result, personal freedom and rights are often protected, but they are frequently employed merely to pursue personal interests or indulge desires. This leads to the negative consequences of individualism observed today, underscoring the limitations of the constitutive performance of reason and the challenges posed by Western democracy and the scientific paradigms built upon it (Mou, 1995, p. 158). Mr. Mou argues that to resolve these issues, we must recognize that the formal structures underlying science and democracy have a rational basis. In politics, theoretical reason aids in establishing democratic institutions and defining political concepts; however, political practice must be grounded in practical or moral reasoning.

"But we must understand that this separation, which delineates the independent significance and domain of politics, enables political matters to be discussed solely in

terms of 'jurisprudence in political science.' Within this independent domain, it does not engage metaphysical moral reasoning; rather, it allows various concepts within democratic governance to be distinctly defined. This clear definition serves merely for the convenience of terminology and does not necessarily carry extensive implications. It is sufficient to articulate matters as equal and parallel facts within the broader context of democratic politics. However, true clarity and certainty inevitably involve moral reasoning, linking freedom with moral considerations and human self-awareness" (Mou, 1995, p. 60).

Mr. Mou posits that delineating political science as an independent discipline and temporarily separating it from morality primarily fulfills the intellectual prerequisites for establishing democratic politics. This includes defining essential concepts such as rights, duties, freedom, equality, and other necessary democratic knowledge. However, since political activity inherently involves human actions and values, it cannot be governed solely by knowledge or theoretical reasoning; moral reasoning must also play a role. For Mr. Mou, freedom is intrinsically linked to moral reasoning and human self-awareness—an undeniable practical truth. Furthermore, discussing freedom and rights through the lens of moral reasoning and human self-awareness is not merely a metaphysical debate, nor does it lead to a form of moralism that fosters totalitarianism. Mr. Mou further argues that the highest principles of political practice can be affirmed through rational application, which includes moral principles such as "prosperity before education" and "strict with oneself and broad-minded towards others." He states:

"In political measures, individual needs must be accommodated, prioritizing survival—each person, as a 'living individual existence,' must be preserved. It is unbearable for the benevolent to witness individuals in destitution or displacement. Beyond mere survival, the fullness of life encompasses material well-being and the realization of a life imbued with value worthy of 'humane existence.' Thus, it is stated: 'Let careful attention be paid to education in schools, particularly in instilling filial and fraternal duties; then, grey-haired men will not be seen on the roads, carrying burdens on their backs or heads.' This teaching encompasses the principles of filial piety, loyalty, faith, propriety, righteousness, integrity, and shame. It aligns with Mencius's tenet: 'Between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their respective roles; between old and young,

a proper order; and between friends, fidelity.' The duties pertain to the relationships between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger sibling, as well as those inherent in friendships. These represent fundamental and universal human virtues, not external concepts imposed upon the people, but intrinsic truths rooted in human nature and sentiment—hence, they are referred to as 'universal paths.' The teachings merely convey these principles" (Mou, 1995, p. 126).

Mr. Mou's ideas closely align with Mencius's principle of "people-centered" thought. He argues that governance and moral education must prioritize the principle of "first wealth, then education." This is because when individuals face poverty and displacement, their suffering is unbearable for those with compassion; thus, the immediate priority is to ensure that the populace is well-fed and materially secure before any form of moral education can be effective. Furthermore, political and moral education should focus on fostering human relationships without imposing the expectation that everyone become a sage. Moral practice is a personal matter, and rulers should hold themselves to the highest moral standards while respecting the independence of each citizen as an "individual existence." People should be treated as ends in themselves, not as means to enforce conformity to rigid doctrines, as such enforcement would be unethical. Rulers should first cultivate their own virtues and influence the populace through their moral example, enabling individuals to recognize their inherent qualities. This approach embodies the Confucian ideal of "governing the world with virtue" and the principle of being "strict with oneself and lenient with others." The emphasis on maintaining human relationships in political education aims to uphold individuals' dignity as human beings, teaching universal moral principles without infringing upon personal freedom. Furthermore, it is not the rulers' role to intervene in personal matters, nor should there be expectations for the populace to attain sagehood. This distinction clearly delineates the boundary between politics and morality. It is evident that Professor Lin's assertion that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism fully embrace Western democracy and science does not apply, at least in the case of Mr. Mou. Mr. Mou provides substantial critiques and reflections on the limitations of reason's constitutive performance, as well as the resulting implications for Western democracy and science. Conversely, Professor Lin's advocacy for "human rights with human relations, freedom with self-awareness, and democracy with the people at the center" is already reflected in Mr. Mou's thoughts. For Mr. Mou, both the operational and constitutive performances of reason hold irreplaceable value and necessary distinction; both must be fully manifested and harmonized to achieve the completeness of reason.

Furthermore, based on the previous analysis, it is important to re-examine Professor Lin's interpretation of "Outer Kingliness and Inner Sagehood." Professor Lin argues that, contrary to Mr. Mou's suggestion that the process begins with the Inner Sagehood to develop new Outer Kingliness, the actual approach involves adjusting the content of Inner Sagehood studies during the learning process of the new Outer Kingliness. The critical transformation lies in the shift from "Junzi (Gentleman) Confucianism" to "Citizen Confucianism," which reorients moral philosophy from emphasizing "self-cultivation of mind and nature" to prioritizing "social justice." In this context, is formed by "citizens" through contractual relationships, and "justice" is realized through a "public discourse domain." Professor Lin states:

"In modern societies, contractual social bonds take precedence over kinship-based natural connections. The original 'Way of Benevolence,' which emerged from kinship ties, must now evolve into 'social justice.' Authentic engagement in the public sphere, facilitated by interactive dialogue, fosters consensus and alignment with societal principles. It is within this framework of social justice that genuine 'self-cultivation of mind and nature' and true inner sagehood can be attained (Lin, 2021).

However, the progression from inner sagehood to outer kingliness embodies the Confucian political perspective. Confucius asserts, "To govern means to rectify. If you lead on the people with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?" to Mencius's proclamation that "The ancient kings possessed this commiserating mind, and they, as a matter of course, had likewise a commiserating government," and the Great Learning states, "From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides," the Confucian belief that innate conscience is always present, manifesting regardless of the realization of outer kingliness. It can be expressed in both autocratic and democratic societies, guiding us through various social contexts. If one were to argue that "only in such a society can true self-cultivation and genuine inner sagehood exist," does this imply that figures like Confucius and Mencius, who did not live in what Professor Lin describes as a civil society, lacked self-cultivation? Were they not sages? The saying, "Filial piety and fraternal submission! - are they not the root of all benevolent actions?" — does this principle cease to exist outside of a civil society? If so, then the claim proposed by Professor Lin that "there are humane rights and freedom with self-awareness" raises the question: does 'self-awareness' pertain solely to political self-awareness as citizens? Furthermore, can there be no humaneness without human rights?

III. Is 'Methodological Essentialism' a Predicament?

Professor Lin argues that both radical anti-traditionalism and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, seemingly opposing camps with contrasting views on the value of traditional Chinese culture, are fundamentally rooted in "methodological essentialism," which can easily lead to partiality, dogmatism, and authoritarianism. To counter these tendencies, he advocates for "methodological conventionalism," which views language and words merely as a system of positioning rather than as representations of existence itself. This positioning system is a convention that must be continually examined and adjusted to better reflect reality and achieve consensus. Even established consensual positioning systems must be subject to ongoing scrutiny and should not be regarded as definitive. Regarding the issues of radical anti-traditionalism and Contemporary Neo-Confucianism's adherence to "methodological essentialism," Professor Lin explains:

"They both adopt methodological essentialism—one asserts that the essence of traditional Chinese culture does not impede modernization, while the other contends that it fundamentally obstructs it. It is essential to recognize that viewing issues through the lens of essentialism often results in a one-sided perspective. In comparison, radical anti-traditionalism demonstrates an even greater degree of bias, as it possesses more momentum; the greater the momentum, the more likely it is to devolve into partiality, authoritarianism, and even totalitarianism. The most commendable aspect of Neo-Confucianism, as a form of new traditionalism, is its ability to counterbalance such radical anti-traditionalism. However, methodologically, the two represent opposing ends of the same spectrum" (Lin, 2024).

If "methodological essentialism" suggests adhering to a single method for addressing all existential and universal issues, then Professor Lin's critique appears to align more closely with radical anti-traditionalism. Critics of this perspective generally assert that only scientific methods can yield correct answers to all existential and universal questions, a stance often referred to as "scientific monism." In contrast, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism largely contend that many ethical and moral dilemmas cannot be resolved through scientific methods alone. For example, Mr. Mou Zongsan's two-tiered ontology posits that, in addition to scientific truths, other forms of truth exist that are neither accessible to nor negated by scientific methods; scientific truths are merely conventional truths. According to Mr. Mou, it is through the manifestation and introspective realization of one's innate moral conscience in daily life that one truly experiences the essence of human existence and unity with all beings and the universe.

Since moral questions invariably involve epistemological issues, the innate moral conscience must also sublimate itself, giving rise to the cognitive subject, which objectifies the universe for understanding—a necessity inherent within the moral conscience itself. Reason: Improved clarity, vocabulary, and technical accuracy while maintaining the original meaning. Whether considering moral conscience or the cognitive subject, both possess constants, even as scientific truths—often regarded as conventional truths—exhibit their own inherent nature. This may be what Professor Lin refers to as "essence." However, the Confucian understanding of moral conscience or human nature is not merely an abstract metaphysical construct, nor is it defined solely by definitions of what it means to be human; rather, it is realized through moral practice. Confucianism asserts that this realization is accessible to all individuals. Mr. Mou, having deeply engaged with Kant's philosophy and modern Western logic, analyzes the self-manifestation of pure reason and the true meanings of time, space, categories, and understanding as foundational principles governing nature. He aligns Kantian philosophy with Confucian distinctions between moral and empirical knowledge, as well as the Buddhist concept of mind opening two gates, the cognitive subject within a robust theoretical framework. In Professor Lin's view, the author contends that Mr. Mou's comprehension of moral and cognitive subjects can withstand scrutiny when examined in the context of existence itself. In contrast, does Professor Lin's esteemed concept of "methodological conventionalism" ultimately devolve into relativism? When faced with the imminent danger of a child falling into a well—a situation that instinctively elicits a compassionate response inherent in human nature and represents universal moral principles—can these reactions be reduced to mere products of specific social agreements? If everything were merely conventional, what would become of the natural moral order? Without such a universal moral framework, all ethical norms would be nothing more than constructs of societal agreements; how would this differ from relativism? If this is the case, where does the constancy lie in Professor Lin's acclaimed "Three Meanings of Change" —simplicity, variability, and invariability? Regarding "scientific monism," Mr. Mou presents the following critique:

"Under the guise of scientific methods, reason is dismissed as metaphysical, universal human nature is regarded as an abstract and empty term, and references to 'essence' are labeled as essentialism. This perspective reduces everything to phenomenalism and nominalism, focusing solely on observable facts. Such a mindset severs the rational foundations of what is upheld, neglecting the fact that these ideas stem from the rational and ideal struggles of previous generations for 'transcendent equality.' It suggests that earlier thinkers were ensnared in metaphysical delusion, while contemporary scientists

alone are deemed enlightened. This viewpoint reflects the prevailing attitude among modern intellectuals in the free world, whom I collectively refer to as those lacking substance, principle, or strength" (Mou, 1995, p. 158).

In this context, Mr. Mou Zongsan, drawing on Hegel's insights, argues that the concept of "transcendent equality, reflected in the Western Christian notion of "equality before God, the foundation for Western democratic systems. This transcendent equality "inevitably entails the breaking of class constraints and the pursuit of equal rights in actual existence" (Mou Zongsan, 1995, p. 151). Mr. Mou contends that scientific monists, who reject the exploration of reason, universal human nature, and essence, effectively sever the roots of rationality. Following Mr. Mou's line of reasoning, I also contend that merely discussing "what essence is" is not inherently flawed. Instead, the validity of such discussions depends on their ability to withstand theoretical scrutiny and practical application. Similarly, one cannot dismiss Mr. Mou's recognition of the fundamental distinction between moral and cognitive subjects, each possessing its own constancy, nor can one overlook his acknowledgment of Western achievements in science and democracy by merely labeling it as "methodological essentialism" and declaring it inherently incorrect. Instead, critical evaluation should focus on the rationale behind Mr. Mou's two-tiered ontology—specifically, whether it can be theoretically validated and practically implemented. If Mr. Mou's two-tiered ontology is well-founded, then why should it be considered inherently flawed simply because it asserts the constancy of moral and cognitive subjects? As to whether methodological essentialism inevitably leads to dictatorship and despotism, this largely depends on whether its proponents wield their authority to dismiss all criticism and alternative approaches. If a theory that asserts an "essence" of the cosmos and the universe is rooted in objective reality, and its advocates are open to responding to and adequately addressing all critiques, then it should not be labeled authoritarian solely for recognizing the existence of an "essence." However, it appears that Professor Lin's mention of "methodological essentialism" refers to something more specific. He states:

Although Contemporary Neo-Confucianism offers a robust critique of radical anti-traditionalists, their assertions that Chinese political tradition "has governance but no politics," that ancient China "had technology but no science," and that China prioritizes "morality" over but are, in fact, misleading. If governance exists, then politics must also exist; however, this form of politics differs from Western modern politics. Similarly, if technology exists, so too does science; yet this science is not equivalent to Western modern science. China inherently possesses both morality and knowledge, just as the

West does; however, the development of morality and the acquisition of knowledge differ significantly between the two cultures. Western monarchical despotism of the past was no less severe than that of ancient China, and in some respects, it even surpassed it. However, there are notable differences; Western democracy is not an inherent quality but rather a system that developed through historical progression. Similarly, the Chinese cultural tradition can also develop and evolve through learning. I believe that breaking away from the methodological essentialism commonly used to understand cultures and replacing it with methodological conventionalism is the key to rectifying the "misplacement of the Way" and restoring proper order. (Lin, 2024)

From this perspective, Professor Lin's concept of "methodological essentialism" critiques those who ascribe a specific "essence" to cultures. One target of Professor Lin's critique is Mr. Mou Zongsan's assertion that traditional Chinese culture represents "the manifestation of the application of reason," while Western culture embodies "the manifestation of the structure of reason. However, even though both Eastern and Western cultures propose theories regarding the legitimacy of political power, do these theories correspond with Mr. Mou's notion of political Dao—"the substantive existence that aligns politically with the form of power, a constant and substantive existence that is genuinely shared by a group"? If Western culture initially lacked democracy, could its rational structure later facilitate the emergence of a democratic system that aligns with political Dao? Similarly, despite Mencius' concept of "public governance under heaven," why did it not culminate in a democratic system that corresponds with political Dao? Even though Western cultures have developed moral frameworks, have they successfully implemented practical self-cultivation theories that enable individuals to attain a state of unity between self and others, self and the world, and heaven and humanity? If the "misplacement of the Way" that Professor Lin refers to is indeed a result of the insufficient application of reason, does this support Mr. Mou's perspective on the differences between traditional Chinese and Western cultures? If Professor Lin acknowledges that "the development of morality and the acquisition of knowledge in China and the West differ significantly, are these differences merely attributable to "real-world conditions, as Mr. Mou suggests, or do they arise from "essential causes"? If there are indeed "essential causes" underlying these cultural differences, then even if Contemporary Neo-Confucianism aligns with Professor Lin's "methodological essentialism," it may not present a problem.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the analysis above, I have addressed Professor An-Wu Lin's criticisms of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism by using Mr. Mou Zongsan's theory of two layers of existence as an illustrative example. In response to Professor Lin's assertion that Mr. Mou's concept of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" is merely a philosophical construct under certain interpretations and not a genuine historical fact, I contend that Professor Lin has not fully grasped the distinction Mr. Mou makes between "essential conditions" and "real-world conditions." He has overlooked the fact that Western culture has successfully developed democracy and science, while traditional Chinese culture has not, which underscores the significance of an "essential condition." In response to Professor Lin's criticism that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, similar to radical anti-traditionalism, fully embraces Western democracy and science, I have referenced Mr. Mou's critique of the shortcomings in the rational structure of Western culture, as well as its science and democracy, to argue that Professor Lin's criticism is open to debate. In response to Professor Lin's assertion that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism exemplifies "methodological essentialism," I question the premise that methodological essentialism is inherently flawed. Given the constraints of this article and my own academic expertise, this paper primarily engages with Professor Lin's inquiries through the lens of Mr. Mou's perspectives. It does not, however, delve into the ideas of other prominent figures in Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, such as Xiong Shili, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan, nor does it comprehensively address all of Professor Lin's concerns. I hope that future research will further explore the ideas of these predecessors to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism.

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林安梧對於「黃漢忠、許明珠、吳美瑤、李瑞全」四位教授評議之回覆

林安梧*

摘要

本文針對黃漢忠、許明珠、吳美瑤、李瑞全四位教授的評議進行了回應，主要討論了當代新儒家的實踐哲學、道德與政治的關係、中西文化的差異以及政權的合法性等問題。值得注意的是，關於牟宗三的「良知自我坎陷」說，由於其過於理想化，且重視的是詮釋上的理論次序，而忽略了社會實踐的真實歷程。作者主張應該從外王學習過程中調節內聖，並提出「方法論上的約定主義」以替代「方法論上的本質主義」。再者，他強調中國文化傳統並非本質上妨礙現代化，而是可以在適應現代社會需求的同時發揮其獨特價值。作者還討論了政權的合法性與民主制度的建立，認為道德與政治應該相輔相成，共同構建和諧社會。他最後提到，應該明確區分歷史的發生次序、實踐的學習秩序以及理論的邏輯次序，以促進現代化的有效發展。

關鍵詞：當代新儒家、實踐、良知自我坎陷、方法論、約定主義、本質主義、學習次序、現代化

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感謝「黃漢忠、許明珠、吳美瑤、李瑞全」四位教授的審閱與評議，茲擇要回覆如下：

壹、關於對黃漢忠教授的回應，如下

一、林安梧對「良知自我坎陷」說的批評是否恰當？當代新儒家是否全盤接受西方的民主與科學？

回答：牟宗三先生的「良知自我坎陷」說過於強調道德的自覺以及主體的轉折，而忽視了社會實踐與歷史情境的重要性。這種觀點在理論上十分曲折，但實踐上，過於理想化，未能充分考慮到人性的複雜性與社會環境的影響。因為，過分強調個體內在的道德自覺，可能會導致對外在社會條件的忽視，從而使道德實踐變得空洞無力。

明顯地，當代新儒家對於接受西方民主與科學，基本上反思是不足的。之所以不足，因為他們是處在花果飄零的年代，只能努力尋求靈根自植而已。它們要回答的是，中國文化是否妨礙現代化，還來不及思考更為繁複的現代化之後的問題，儘管有些觸及，仍只是隨緣說道。我認為：整個結構性的確需要去面對與處理，此其時矣。這必須涉及到總體的思考。擺脫「本內聖以開出新外王」的「內先而外後」的思考，才有新的可能。「內外本為一體」，而實踐的學習次序是「外先而內後」，理論的邏輯次序是「內先而外後」，這兩者是「兩端而一致」的。我提出「由外王而內聖」，這是一個矯治的提法，而總的來說，我主張「兩端而一致」。正如同《中庸》也說「合外內之道」也。

當然，在中國文化傳統的基礎上，有選擇地吸收西方文明的優點，強調中西文化的融合，並試圖在保持中國文化特色的同時，實現現代化，乃至對現代化之後的反思是必要的。西方民主與科學在推動社會進步的同時，也可能帶來文化同質化與價值觀的衝突。在借鑒西方經驗的同時，保持文化獨立性與自主性，並尋求一條適合中國國情的現代化道路，所謂創造性的轉化、創新性的發展是必要的，而且是可能的。

二、當代新儒家是否陷入「方法論上的本質主義」困境？中國文化傳統是否本質上妨礙現代化？

當代新儒家在某些方面確實存在「方法論上的本質主義」傾向，即過分強調文化本質與傳統價值，而忽略了具體歷史情境與社會變遷。相對來說，我提倡「方法論上的約定主義」，強調理論與實踐的開放性與多元性。過分堅持文化本質主義可能會導致對其他文化與價值觀的忽略或貶抑，從而限制了文化交流與創新。我們尊重文化多樣性的基礎上，尋求跨文化對話與合作，以實現人類社會的共同進步。當然，當代新儒家並不是封閉而保守的，但有著太強的本位意識，是妨礙更多交談對話的。

當然，中國文化傳統並非本質上妨礙現代化，而是可以在適應現代社會需求的同時，發揮其獨特價值。在尊重傳統的基礎上，進行創造性轉化與創新性發展。中國文化傳統中蘊含著豐富的智慧與價值，如儒家的人文關懷、道家的自然觀念與佛家的慈悲精神等，都可以為現代社會提供寶貴的啟示與借鑒。在保持文化傳承的同時，積極吸收現代文明的成果，以實現中國文化的現代化與世界化。值得注意的是，不必定說中國文化是道德的，西方文化是知識的，而把問題推到：「如何從道德開出知識」，推到這論題上，去做過多的論述，是完全不必要的。因為像「中國傳統文化本質上是否能開出現代化」，這根本是徹底的反傳統主義者所擬的虛假問題。徹底的反傳統主義者，認為中國傳統文化本質上是妨礙現代化的，所以他認為應該徹底地拋除傳統文化。相對來說，當代新儒家則認為中國文化傳統本質上是道德的，問題點是如何從「道德」開出「知識」的問題。其實，這問法，一開始就錯了。這是時代的限制所造成的。

三、西方民主與科學是否存在根本缺陷？道德與政治在當代新儒學中應如何定位？

顯然地，西方民主與科學，在某些方面確實存在缺陷，例如可能導致極端個人主義與物質主義。在借鑒西方文明的同時，應保持批判性思維，並努力實現中西文化的互補與融合。西方民主與科學雖然在推動人類社會進步的過程中發揮了重要作用，但也存在著價值觀衝突與道德風險。尊重西方文明的同時，積極探索適合中國國情的民主與科學發展道路，以實現社會和諧與人類福祉。這其實是一個摸石子過河的、實踐的學習過程，但絕對不是道德太盛，而忽略了知識的問題。當然，不必去思考如何從道德開出知識，也就不會有如何從良知坎陷而開出知性主體的論法。

道德與政治應該相輔相成，共同構建和諧社會。道德是政治的基礎，而政治則是道德的實踐場域。我們應該強調道德與政治的緊密聯繫，並尋求二者之間的平衡。道德與政治的結合不僅有助於提升個體的道德素養，還能促進社會公共利益的實現。在尊重個體權利的同時，關注社會整體的福祉與發展，以實現道德與政治的和諧共生。記得：不是好的道德決定了好的政治，當然也不是好的政治決定了好的道德，他們是彼此互為影響、相互決定的。

四、如何理解中西文化在道德與知識習得上的差異？林安梧提出的「方法論上的約定主義」與當代新儒學有何不同？

中西文化在道德與知識習得上的差異主要體現在價值觀與方法論上。中國文化強調道德修養與人際和諧，而知識習得則側重於內省與體悟；西方文化則更重視個人權利與自由，以及客觀知識的積累與傳承。在尊重差異的基礎上，實現中西文化的交流與融合。

中西文化在道德與知識習得上的差異反映了不同的歷史背景與文化傳統。我們應保持文化特色的同時，積極探索跨文化對話與合作的可能性，以實現人類智慧的共享與增長。

「方法論上的約定主義」強調理論與實踐的開放性與多元性，主張在具體歷史情境與社會變遷中尋求最適切的解決方案。與當代新儒學相比，這種觀點更加注重實際問題的解決，而非過分強調文化本質與傳統價值。無疑地，「方法論上的約定主義」有助於打破學術界的封閉性與保守性，促進學術創新與社會進步。在尊重學術傳統的同時，關注社會現實的需求與挑戰，以實現學術研究與社會實踐的有機結合。值得注意的是：為免於方法論上的約定主義容易導生價值相對主義，乃至價值虛無主義，我們應該徹底地回到生活世界、重視歷史社會總體，回到事物自身。「回到事物自身」的現象學式的思考是必要的，而且應該從「存在的覺知」啟動。

五、如何看待政權的合法性與民主制度的建立？當代新儒學如何回應文化本質主義的批評？

當代新儒學應該在尊重傳統價值的基礎上，關注政權的合法性與民主制度的建立。通過道德與政治的結合，實現社會的和諧與穩定，並在此過程中逐步完善民主制度。政權的合法性不僅來自於憲法與法律的規定，還應該建立在道德與民意的基礎上。在尊重政治制度的前提下，關注公民的道德素養與政治參與，以實現政權的合法性與民主制度的完善。明顯地，宋明儒學所強調的心性之學，之作為道德修養與社會實踐的根本，他不免仍然囿限在帝皇專制、父權高壓、男性中心的格局來啟動思考的。這與當今是很大不同的，民主憲政、男女平權、重視個體，這樣的外王學當然不會是以前的，這樣的內聖學也就與以前不同。所以不只是去思考：如何從內聖開出新外王，而是在新外王的學習過程裡，好好調節內聖。

我認為當代新儒學應該積極回應文化本質主義的批評，強調在尊重傳統的同時，關注具體歷史情境與社會變遷。在保持文化特色的基礎上，進行創造性轉化與創新性發展，以實現中國文化的現代化。文化本質主義的批評提醒我們，文化不是靜止不變的，而是隨著時間與環境的變化，不斷發展與演變。如同外王之學的變化一樣，內聖之學不是不變的，它們都是與時俱進的，在尊重文化傳承的同時，關注文化創新與變革的可能性，以實現中國文化的活力與創造力。

最後，我想要說的是，在探討民主與科學的發展過程時，我們應當明確區分三個不同的次序：歷史的發生次序、實踐的學習秩序以及理論的邏輯次序。這三個次序在東亞地區的發展中尤為重要，因為它們不僅受到西方歷史發展的影響，還必須結合自身的實際情況進行適應和調整。

首先，歷史的發生次序指的是西方所謂已發達國家，在歷史進程中民主與科學發展的先後順序和路徑。這一順序是基於西方特定的歷史背景和文化環境形成的，而東亞國家在發展民主和科學時，並不一定需要完全遵循這一順序。其次，實踐的學習秩序強調的是每個國家或地區在實際操作中學習和適應民主與科學發展的過程。這一秩序需要根據本國的實際情況，如文化、經濟、社會結構等因素，來確定最適合自身發展的路徑和節奏。理論的邏輯次序則是從哲學或理論的角度出發，探討民主與科學發展的邏輯關係和內在聯繫。例如，「良知自我坎陷說」是一種哲學詮釋上的理論邏輯秩序，它關注的是良知在個體和社會發展中的作用和意義。

我們應當清晰地區分這三種次序，理解它們在民主與科學發展中的不同作用和影響。特別是在東亞地區，應當基於自身的實際情況，靈活運用和調整，重視實踐的學習次序，以促進現代化的有效發展，並且反思到現代化之後的種種論題。

貳、關於許明珠教授所提出的論題

一、儒者的自我期許與道德實踐

在民主社會中，儒者是否應該僅滿足於作為守法公民，還是需要堅持更高的道德標準和淑世情懷？儒者是否應該持續強調「存天理，去人欲」的氣魄，即使在現代社會的多元價值中？

回答：當然，儒者必須要有更高的自我期許與道德實踐，但必須以公民社會的公民意識之覺醒，及符合公民之法律及倫理作為起點。就我的經驗來說，常常看到許多以儒家自居的朋友，缺乏公民意識，常自認為自己是儒家代言人，而且是主導者，這便造成了嚴重的扭曲與異化，問題的嚴重性在於最基本的「公民」要先做好。進一步，當然要有君子之風、君子之德、君子之行。

「存天理、去人欲」其實說的是「存天理之公，去人欲之私」，但說久了，這話便有了問題，而被誤認為「飲食男女之欲」都是人欲，都得盡去。須知：「人欲淨盡，天理流行」這些太過強調的、道德嚴肅主義的提法，都是有問題的。其實，人欲淨盡，天理就不行了，恰當的說，只要能推擴出去，有普遍性、理想性、總體性，這就可以了。孟子回答齊宣王，寡人好色、寡人好貨，他便是把這好色、好貨，推而擴充之，說到「室無怨女，野無曠夫」、「貨暢其流，人人得利」，這便是了。孟子學經由宋明理學的詮釋，使他變得太過於道德心性化了，其實，孟子之學是充實而飽滿的，不可以概括為「存天理、去人欲，而是「理欲合一」論。孟子說「可欲之謂善，有諸己之謂信，充實之謂美，充實而有光輝之謂大，大而化之之謂聖，聖而不可知之之謂神」。這起點就在「可欲」，「可欲」說的是為共同體之所可，同時，為道體之所可，為天理之所可，為本心之所可。我

認為「存天理、去人欲」這語彙是有弊病的。有些時、有些人還說成「存天理、滅人欲」，那更會是錯解連連。王船山的「理欲合一」才是合理的。

公民儒者的社會參與：公民儒者應該積極參與；如婦女平權、環境保護、勞動權益等社會公共議題，一方面實現「利用」和「厚生」的理想，一方面也回到自家身心上，求其「正德」。儒者應該在社會正義和全體公民福祉的推動中扮演更積極的角色。

二、主觀境界形態的道德論述

在現代社會中，儒學的主觀境界形態的道德實踐是否仍然具有重要性，不應因外王事業的挑戰而被忽視？內聖學是否仍然是儒學的核心，即使在追求民主與科學的現代化過程中，也應持續被重視和實踐？

回答：應該不是主觀的境界型態的道德實踐，而是做為一個讀書人應有的堅持。這是夫子所說的「志於道、據於德、依於仁、游於藝」的「志於道」。是曾子所說的「士不可不弘毅，任重而道遠，仁以為己任，不亦重乎；死而後已，不亦遠乎！」這是孟子所說的「萬物皆備於我矣，反身而誠，樂莫大焉，強恕而行，求仁莫近焉！」，這是實理實事，不適合說是主觀境界型態。即如道家也不適合用此語彙，這語彙常被誤解，而且太過主觀、太過境界，而忽略了真切的、務實的。記得多年前，我曾有一篇文章寫到這些論題，是對主觀境界型態批評的。在《鵝湖》我曾發表多篇文章，就兩篇短論是典型的，一是：〈走向實感的批判之路〉（卜問天，1987）¹²⁰，一是〈孔子與阿Q：一個精神病理史的反思〉（林安梧，1997）¹²¹。

「批判是一種瓦解，批判是一種重構，批判是一種瓦解與重構的辯證歷程。批判是具體的，批判是實感的，批判是一種具體而實感的創造歷程。

作為一種具有瓦解力的批判性儒學正說明他不會自我封限在爛泥之中，終而腐蝕自毀；他不會躲入象牙塔中，思想走階梯，臨風興歎世衰道微。瓦解力的批判性儒學具有一種內在的自我辯證，面向不合理的制度結構發出挑戰的呼聲。自我辯證與挑戰呼聲融匯為道德的鍛鍊。道德的鍛鍊是具體的、是實感的，他指向瓦解、批判及重構、創造。批判不是隔靴搔癢，也不是吳儂軟語，批判不是來自外在的權威，更不是內在的自慰。批判是切指要害，拳打丹田；批判是直語相向，真誠無間；批判是良知的驅策，更是架構的覺醒。良知的驅策必走向架構的覺醒，這樣才叫批判。

良知若未走向架構的覺醒，徒作自我主體的調整，這極易墮入境界的假相。境界的假相造成自我圓足、自我欺矇。自我圓足於爛泥之中，終而腐蝕自毀；自我欺矇於萬物一體之中，實則隨波逐流。

¹²⁰ 卜問天（1987）。〈走向實感的批判之路〉，《鵝湖月刊》，（146），頁1。

¹²¹ 林安梧（1997）。〈孔子與阿Q：一個精神病理史的理解與詮釋〉，《鵝湖月刊》，（262），頁56-57。

道必然開展為器物結構，道必然開展為言說理論。良知必得通過器物結構與言說理論才能參贊乎道，惟有這樣的參贊才是具體的實感的參贊；除此之外，若企求良知直接沒入「道」的實體，這是一種抽象而空泛的玄想，這是境界假相與自我矇騙。

傳統中的儒學容或為帝王家做了不少事，但除了這種帝制式的儒學（Imperial Confucianism），歷史上尚有生活化的儒學（Lively Confucianism），還有批判性的儒學（Critical Confucianism）。生活化的儒學旨在喚醒良知本體，融入一生活世界之中以成己成物。批判性的儒學旨在面對不合理的制度結構，提出建議、修正，乃至瓦解與重構。生活化儒學與批判性儒學是保住儒學生機的在野勢力，亦是抑止帝制式儒學惡化的唯一藥方。

如今帝制式儒學已頹廢乏力，逐漸解構，但鴉片戰爭以來的民族自卑及千餘年來的帝制醬缸卻使得儒學仍然喪失其生活性及批判性，思之！寧不令人憂心如焚呢？惟有走向實感的批判之路，重新挖掘儒學的底蘊，喚醒當下的存在切感，留心「鄉土的文化」，面對結構更革才能廣拓「文化的鄉土」，如此儒學才可能具有瓦解性的批判力，亦才可能展開生化活化的重建。」

另外一篇，引述一部分，如下：

「……將孔子與阿Q對舉起來，一方面說其為兩端，而另一方面則說此兩端乃是一連續的歷程所糾結而成之物。就精神病理史而言，原先儒學所強調的道德實踐是要走向社會實踐的，而魯迅筆下的阿Q卻是徹徹底底的失魂落寞，而落到用「精神勝利法」來自我蒙欺。

原先孔子所開啟的儒學強調的是一「道德的社會實踐意識」，但顯然地世代並未真從宗法封建與帝皇專制中解放出來；因而在此兩面向的糾葛下，道德的社會實踐意識無法暢達的發展，遂滑轉為一「道德的自我修養意識」。原先之轉為一道德的自我修養意識，為的是要歸返生命自身，而再度開啟社會實踐意識，傳統之要求由內聖通向外王，所指殆此。問題是：內聖通不出去為外王，反折回來，又使得那道德的自我修養意識再異化為一「道德自我的境界之追求」。此時之道德轉而為一境界型態之物，而不再是實理實事。原先的道德精神境界的追求所為的是自我的治療與康復，俾其能開啟道德的自我修養之可能；但在世衰道微的情況之下，即如道德精神境界亦成為一虛假而短暫的境界。這再度往下異化便成為一「自我的矯飾」與「自我的休閒」，明說其理由，實則為虛，終而墮入一自我蒙欺，萬劫不復的魔業之中。魂魄既喪，遊走無方，來去無所，這失魂症的病人也只能以「道德的精神勝利法」自我蒙欺罷了。

如上所說，「孔子」與「阿Q」兩者可以關聯成一個井然有序的系譜。由「道德的社會實踐意識」滑轉而為「道德的自我修養意識」，再滑轉為「道德自我的境界追求」，而後再異化為「道德的自我矯飾」與「道德的自我休閒」，終而墮到以「道德的精神勝利法」

而轉為一「道德自我的蒙欺」。我們之所以將「孔子」與「阿Q」做這個精神病理史的關聯性理解，並不是要去說當代中國族群之為阿Q為可接受的，而是要藉由這樣的理解與詮釋達到一治療的作用，進而得以瓦解這個奇怪的綜體，讓中國文化及在此中長養的中國子民有一重生的可能。」

我想許明珠教授看了我所引用這兩段話，也就能了然明白了。若對比李瑞全教授的文字，就可以更了解，沾惹在我們華夏民族的業力習氣，要解開帝制、父權是何等艱難。

參、關於吳美瑤教授的論題之回應

吳美瑤教授就我所提出的論題，轉而探討了新儒家實踐哲學與諮商心理學在人格發展議題上的交會。這樣的回應方式，間接而轉到了他自己的論題上去。這便與我另外的著作《中國宗教與意義治療》是可以相提並論的。她還對比了東西方哲學與心理學，指出東西方哲學如何回應社會變遷。最主要是聚焦於諮商心理學與新儒家實踐哲學對「自我覺察」的重視。

明顯地，這是由我所提出的「外王—內聖」的論題，轉回原先「內聖—外王」，然後轉成「新儒家實踐哲學與諮商心理學在人格發展議題上的交會」。這樣的轉進甚好，但並沒有針對我所提出的論題。我的針對點在於牟宗三先生所提出的「良知的自我坎陷」已開出知性主體，涵攝民主科學，這是在他詮釋的意義下的「理論的邏輯次序」，這不同於「歷史的發生次序」，也不是「實踐的學習次序」。這在前面，我回應的論題裡，已經表述清楚了，不必再贅述。

另外，她還強調品德教育的重要性：指出從牟宗三先生的論點與西方品德教育研究，強調品德對科學知識學習的助益。還有，人倫互動與社會平等：探討儒家的人倫關係與阿德勒心理學中的社會平等觀，強調以人格尊嚴平等為基礎的民主社會。

還有，強調從個體自我覺察開始，實現人的完整發展與建設合理社會的共同目標。提出新儒家與諮商心理學結合的可能性，特別是正念冥想在心理治療中的應用。對林教授與牟宗三先生的觀點進行比較，提出結合諮商心理學研究，深化道德心轉化為認知心的內在心理歷程的探討。這裡在在可以看到吳美瑤教授的用心良苦，而這落在品德教育及諮商心理學以及人格發展等議題上，應該都是可以開展的。

至於，有關「方法論上的本質主義」、「良知的自我坎陷」等論題，我在前面回應黃漢忠、許明珠兩位教授，已經提到，就不再重複了。

肆、關於李瑞全教授所提出的論題

一、關於「外王內聖」「內聖外王」的論題

「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」，爭議頗多。為此，鵝湖月刊與中國哲學研究中心，特別於二〇二二年九月三日，安排了一場「林安梧 VS 李瑞全」的公開論辯。後來，我在隔年寫了一篇較長的回應文章〈「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」辯論之後——敬答周群振、李瑞全兩位學長〉（林安梧，2023）¹²²，這篇文章回應了這次辯論，並且酬答早在二〇〇五年即提出異議的周群振學長。由於宋明以來的新儒學太強調「內聖」，而導致內傾、內捲，進而往境界型態的圓教系統邁進，因而生出了許多問題。面對現代化，我們須得釐清「實踐的學習次序」不同於「歷史的發生秩序」、「理論的邏輯秩序」，如此一來，就能了解「由外王而內聖」這思路提出的重要性，進而洞見「中國文化傳統是否妨礙現代化」原是一虛假問題。最後，指出跨過方法論的本質主義的謬誤，進而指出「良知的自我坎陷」的困境，解開「道的錯置」，開啟現代化之後的後新儒學之可能。這篇文章，所敘述應該有助於讀者，解其疑惑。

二、關於「牟宗三之後、後牟宗三」的問題

李瑞全教授有這樣的論斷，他說：

- 1.「林安梧教授總喜歡自稱自己是進到所謂「後五四」、以「後牟宗三」的口號自稱，但實質上如何的「後五四」、「後牟宗三」卻完全莫名其妙。」
- 2.「林教授如此云云，便以為可蓋括牟先生的哲學體系之基本要義，又可進而妄稱自己進入了「後牟宗三時代」，超越了牟先生的成就，實是自欺欺人之言。」
- 3.「林教授的由「外王開內聖」的主張與其自認為批判了和超越了牟宗三先生的「兩層存有論」而來的「後新儒學」的「哲學」有直接的關係，在此需要先剖釋其主張和根本的錯解和不解當代新儒學之義理，特別是牟先生的哲學體系的要點和哲學上的貢獻，以見其由「外王開內聖」之說之謬。」

回答：關於「五四」與「後五四」等等，我有一篇完整的文章，名為：〈從「五四後」到「後五四」——基於「存有三態論」思考中華文明在二十一世紀的角色〉（林安梧，2020）¹²³，敬請參看。又「五四」、「後五四」是目前很清楚的分劃，李教授不可能不知，當然，他故意妄稱不知，那也就罷了。

另外，「牟宗三時代」與「後牟宗三時代」，我有一本專著《牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論》（林安梧，2011）¹²⁴，李教授應該可以看看。牟先生是我尊敬的導師，我發揚他的學問，採取的是創造性的轉化與創新性的發展，並無不可，但我之努力，仍有許多要用功的地方，豈敢妄稱超越吾師。在我任何文字所及，絕無此說法，可能李教

122 該文，林安梧（2023）。「外王內聖」還是「內聖外王」辯論之後——敬答周群振、李瑞全兩位學長，*鵝湖月刊*，(578)，頁 17-25。

123 請參看，林安梧（2020）。從「五四後」到「後五四」——基於「存有三態論」思考中華文明在 21 世紀的角色，*文史哲*，(2)，頁 93-102。

124 請參看，林安梧（2011）。*牟宗三前後：當代新儒家哲學思想史論*，學生書局，頁 434。

授自己糊塗了，夢囈中之語也。

關於「後牟宗三時代」，可以參看我在 2003 年寫的〈迎接「後牟宗三時代」的來臨——《牟宗三先生全集》出版紀感〉這段文字（林安梧，2003）¹²⁵：

「牟先生甦活了中國哲學的慧命，他深入闡述了儒道佛三教哲學，並獨立譯述了康德（I. Kant）三大批判；更難能可貴的是，牟先生將康德三大批判銷融於中國傳統儒道佛之中，經由體系性的建構，成就了規模宏偉的「兩層存有論」。近一百年來的中國哲學發展，無疑的，這是一最為重要的里程碑。

牟先生跨過了「逆格義」的限制，經由「譯述」、「銷融」、「重鑄」的過程，讓中國古代典籍的話語、現代的學術話語、當前的生活話語，和合融通，鑄成偉辭，他生產了鮮活的哲學語彙，開啟了活生生的覺知與思考。

面對廿世紀初以來，中國民族的存在意義危機，牟先生隨順著熊十力先生「體用哲學」所開顯的「乾元性海」，經由一「形而上的保存」，進一步以智識化的理論構造，穩立了道德主體；並冀求「以德開智」，經由「良知的自我坎陷」以開出知性主體，並以此融攝民主與科學。

當然，牟先生將康德哲學之「窮智以見德」經由儒道佛三教的銷融，轉而為「尊德以攝智」。他看似承繼康德「超越的分解」以穩立知識體系，但卻直契陸王，上接孔孟，穩立道德之自我，再下開知識界。這樣的「下開」即是「良知的自我坎陷」之轉出，這是一「辯證的轉折」而開，這卻是近於費希特（J.G. Fichte），而遙遙指向黑格爾（G.W.F. Hegel）。只不過，康德哲學強調的超越分解，使得牟先生做了一形而上的追溯，而有了一形而上的安宅。居於此安宅中，牟先生以一「詭譎的辯證」達到一「圓教」與「圓善」的境界。

「超越的分解」為的是一「形而上的追溯」，進而凸顯由古代經典所喚起的「存在覺知」，就在這存在的覺知的召喚下，讓這難以跨越的鴻溝有了一「詭譎的辯證」之銷融與連結。當然，所謂的「圓教」與「圓善」就是在這詭譎的辯證銷融下完成的。牟先生雖然一再的強調辯證的開展的重要，但他做的卻是辯證的銷融，經由銷融而尋得一形而上的安宅，一純智所思的安宅。

他做了「現象」與「物自身」的超越區分，以「一心開二門」的方式，成就了「執」與「無執」的「兩層存有論」。他雖然一再的強調兩層存有論並不是截然區隔，而是融會通貫；但他卻居於無執的存有論所成的純智所思的安宅，指點人間善惡，規範那執的存有論。他亦贊同天台宗所說之「一念無明法性心」，欣賞其「即九法界而成佛」這種「不斷斷」的精神；但由於時代精神的限制，牟先生仍只能經由一「詭譎的辯證」而達到一

¹²⁵ 請參見，林安梧（2003）。〈迎接「後牟宗三時代」的來臨——《牟宗三先生全集》出版紀感〉，《鵝湖月刊》，（335），頁 0-1。

銷融性的和合同一，做成一形而上的圓善。我們要說這樣的圓善並不就是牟宗三哲學的完成，而是預示著一個嶄新的轉折、迴返、批判與發展。

我們當該將牟先生在形而上的居宅中，「結穴成丹」的「圓善」再度入於「乾元性海」，即用顯體，承體達用，讓他入於歷史社會總體的生活世界之中，深耕易耨，發榮滋長，以一本體發生學的思考，正視「理論是實踐的理論，實踐是理論的實踐」，「兩端而一致」的辯證開啟，重開儒學的社會實踐之門。

「轉折」，不再只停留於「主體式的轉折」，而應通解而化之，由「主體性」轉折為「意向性」，再由「意向性」開啟活生生的「實存性」。

「迴返」，不再只停留於「銷融式的迴返」，而應調適而上遂，入於「存有的根源」，進而「存有的彰顯」，再進一步轉出一「存有的執定」。

「承繼」，不再只停留於「哲學史式的論述」，而應如理而下貫，一方面上遂於文化道統，另一方面做一理論性的創造。

「批判」，不再只停留於「超越的分解」，而應辯證的落實，入於「生活世界」所成的歷史社會總體，「即勢成理，以理導勢」，成就一社會的批判，進而開啟一儒學的革命。

「發展」，不再只停留於「古典的詮釋」，而應展開哲學的交談，面對現代的生活話語，經由一活生的存在覺知，重構一嶄新的學術話語，參與於全人類文明的交談與建構。」

台灣地區九二一的大地震、美國九一一雙子星大樓的崩落、美國對伊拉克的反恐戰爭，世紀之交的後現代，人們隨著天地間的顫抖而恐懼，隨著文明的異化而驚疑。這幾個星期來，台灣、香港與大陸正為非典型急性肺炎 SARS 的肆虐痛苦，存在在掙扎中、生命在考驗中，我深切的覺知到朱夫子所說的「堅難！」

牟先生竟已逝世八年，但我仍記起一九九五年為先生所作的輓聯：

夫子飄飄來魏晉風骨好為青白眼世俗人皆驚寵辱，

吾師悠悠去宋明義理能過生死關真儒者何畏陰陽

牟先生面對苦痛與危難的「高狂俊逸」（蔡仁厚先生對牟先生的稱語）令人低迴！夜深矣！深矣！天明亦已近矣！近矣！

抬頭望見我書房上的牟先生造像，有一段文字寫著：

吾師牟宗三先生，畢其生，拓落自然，一無所罣，惟吾華族文化為終身勦力之目標。彼嘗言：惟有大感受而後有大問題，有大問題而後有大悲心，有大悲心而後有大智慧；如斯始能成就哲學志業也。

王戎之秋安梧謹誌

先生造像旁邊鑲著一副嵌名對聯，聯曰：

宗師仲尼誠通天地，

三教判列道貫古今

夜深矣！遠矣！天明亦已近矣！近矣！禱之於天地神祇，謹此虔誠，謹此虔誠！

癸未春暮五月五日晨三時於元亨齋

知者知之，不知者不知，這是平常事。只是可惜的是，我呼籲的思想之轉折，已經超過三十年，呼籲「迎接後牟宗三時代之來臨」，也超過二十年，努力示警，我們不能再拿當代新儒家第一代、第二代的問題意識，當成我們這時代的問題意識，我們必須「接著講」，不能「照著講」，我們該「薪未盡，火先傳」，接了棒，繼續努力往前邁進。這幾十年來，居然同門師友，對我多所鼓勵者有之，然若李瑞全教授，如此不解，妄議者有之、顛倒是非者有之，甚至語多涉及人身攻擊，想想歷史上諸多學派的生長，大概也免不了如此景況，面對這些，也只能付諸一笑而已。

這些年來，我最喜歡的兩個字：「從容」，這詞語雖平常，但實大有來頭，它出自老子《道德經》「孔德之容，惟道是從」。因為「惟道是從」，因此「孔德之容」也，有道是依，自爾「從容」了，真真如此也。我願意努力的「伏首甘為孺子牛」，但已不必「橫眉冷對千夫指」；因為這世界是有情分的、有義氣的、有公道的，我想到「天清月朗，與物為春」，便滿心歡喜。我也期待我的學長李瑞全教授，不必如此操急，須知：「知常容，容乃公，公乃全」，從容度日，這世界是有公斷的。善哉！且「喫茶去」！

—甲辰年，2024年6月28日，寫於台北元亨書院

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A Response to the Reviews by Professors Hon-Chung Wong, Ming-Chu Hsu, Mei-Yao Wu, and Shui-Chuen Lee by An-Wu Lin

An-Wu Lin*

Abstract

This article responds to the reviews by Professors Hon-Chung Wong, Ming-Chu Hsu, Mei-Yao Wu, and Shui-Chuen Lee, focusing on issues such as the practical philosophy of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, the relationship between morality and politics, the differences between Chinese and Western cultures, and the legitimacy of political power. Notably, regarding Mou Zongsan's theory of "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," it is critiqued for being overly idealistic and for emphasizing interpretative theoretical order while neglecting the true process of social practice. The author advocates for adjusting the inner sagehood through the learning process of the outer kingliness and proposes "methodological conventionalism" as a replacement for "methodological essentialism." Furthermore, he emphasizes that the traditional Chinese culture does not inherently hinder modernization but can exert its unique value while adapting to the needs of modern society. The author also discusses the establishment of political legitimacy and democratic systems, arguing that morality and politics should complement each other in building a harmonious society. He concludes by stating that it is essential to clearly distinguish the historical order of occurrence, the learning order of practice, and the logical order of theory to promote the effective development of modernization.

Keywords: Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, Practice, Self-Entrapment of Conscience, Methodology, Conventionalism, Essentialism, Learning Order, Modernization

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Thanks to the four professors " Hon-Chung Wong, Ming-Chu Hsu, Mei-Yao Wu, and Rui-Quan Li " for their review and comments, I would like to reply as follows:

I. Regarding the response to Professor Hon-Chung Wong

1. Is An-Wu Lin's Critique on the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" Theory Appropriate? Does Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Fully Embrace Western Democracy and Science?

Response: Mr. Mou Zongsan's theory of "Self-Entrapment of Conscience" places excessive emphasis on moral self-awareness and the transformation of the individual, while neglecting the importance of social practice and historical context. Although this perspective is theoretically sophisticated, it tends to be overly idealistic in practice and does not adequately account for the complexities of human nature and the impact of the social environment. By prioritizing an individual's internal moral awareness, there is a risk of overlooking external social conditions, which can render moral practice superficial and ineffective.

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism have not adequately reflected on their acceptance of Western democracy and science. This shortcoming arises from their existence in an era where the fruits of culture have fallen and scattered, compelling them to strive for a replanting of their spiritual roots. Their primary concern is whether Chinese culture impedes modernization, leaving little room to contemplate more complex post-modernization issues. Although some have touched upon these topics, their discussions remain incidental and incomplete. I believe it is time to confront and address this structural challenge comprehensively. This requires a holistic approach that transcends the notion of the "inner sagehood before the outer kingliness," which prioritizes the internal over the external. The new possibility lies in recognizing that "the internal and external are inherently one," where the sequence of practical learning should prioritize the external before the internal, while the logical order of theory is internal before the external—two ends that ultimately converge. I propose a corrective approach of "from outer kingliness to inner sagehood," emphasizing the "unity of both ends." As stated in *The Doctrine of the Mean*, it is essential to "harmonize the way of the internal and external."

Of course, rooted in the foundation of Chinese cultural tradition, it is essential to selectively absorb the strengths of Western civilization, emphasizing a fusion of Chinese and Western cultures. This approach involves striving for modernization while preserving the unique characteristics of Chinese culture and reflecting on the post-modernization period.

While Western democracy and science propel social progress, they may also result in cultural homogenization and value conflicts. Therefore, while drawing on Western experiences, it is crucial to maintain cultural independence and autonomy, seeking a path of modernization that aligns with China's specific conditions—a path of creative transformation and innovative development that is both necessary and feasible.

2. Do Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Encounter the Challenge of "Methodological Essentialism"? Does the Chinese Cultural Tradition Inherently Impede Modernization?

In some respects, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism exhibit a tendency toward "methodological essentialism," which excessively emphasizes cultural essence and traditional values while neglecting specific historical contexts and social changes. In contrast, I advocate for "methodological conventionalism," which prioritizes openness and pluralism in both theory and practice. An overreliance on cultural essentialism can lead to the disregard or devaluation of other cultures and values, thereby limiting opportunities for cultural exchange and innovation. By respecting cultural diversity, we should strive for intercultural dialogue and collaboration to foster the anticipated progress of human society. Although Contemporary Neo-Confucianism are not entirely closed-minded or conservative, their strong sense of cultural centralism impedes broader dialogues.

Indeed, the Chinese cultural tradition does not inherently obstruct modernization; rather, it can play a unique role by adapting to the needs of modern society through creative transformation and innovative development. The Chinese cultural tradition is rich in wisdom and values—such as Confucian humanism, Daoist naturalism, and Buddhist compassion—which can provide valuable insights and lessons for contemporary society. While preserving cultural heritage, we should actively embrace the achievements of modern civilization to facilitate the modernization and globalization of Chinese culture. It is important to note that there is no need to rigidly categorize Chinese culture as moral and Western culture as intellectual, nor to overemphasize the issue of "how to derive knowledge from morality." Such discussions are unnecessary. The question of "whether Chinese traditional culture is inherently capable of leading to modernization" is a misleading one posed by staunch anti-traditionalists, who argue that Chinese traditional culture fundamentally hinders modernization and should therefore be entirely discarded. In contrast, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism assert that the Chinese cultural tradition is inherently moral and emphasizes the issue of deriving "knowledge"

from "morality." This framing is flawed from the outset, shaped by the limitations of the prevailing context.

3. Are There Fundamental Flaws in Western Democracy and Science? How Should Morality and Politics Be Positioned within Contemporary Neo-Confucianism?

Western democracy and science possess certain flaws that may lead to extreme individualism and materialism. While drawing from Western civilization, it is crucial to maintain a critical mindset and strive for the complementarity and integration of both Chinese and Western cultures. Although Western democracy and science have significantly contributed to the advancement of human society, they also present value conflicts and moral risks. It is essential to respect Western civilization while actively seeking a path for democratic and scientific development that aligns with China's national conditions, as this is vital for achieving social harmony and enhancing human well-being. This process resembles practical learning, akin to crossing a river by feeling the stones, rather than overly emphasizing morality at the expense of knowledge. Indeed, there is no need to contemplate how to derive knowledge from morality, which undermines the notion of deriving an intellectual subject from the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience."

Morality and politics should complement one another to foster a harmonious society. Morality serves as the foundation of politics, while politics provides a platform for the application of moral principles. It is essential to emphasize the close relationship between morality and politics and to strive for a balanced integration of the two. This synergy enhances individual moral development and promotes the realization of the common good within society. While it is important to respect individual rights, attention must also be given to the overall welfare and development of society to achieve a harmonious coexistence of morality and politics. It is crucial to remember that good morality does not automatically lead to good politics, nor does effective politics guarantee moral integrity; rather, they influence and shape each other in a reciprocal manner.

4. How Can We Understand the Differences Between Chinese and Western Cultures in Terms of Moral Values and Knowledge Acquisition? How Does An-Wu Lin's "Methodological Conventionalism" Differ from Contemporary Neo-Confucianism?

The differences between Chinese and Western cultures regarding moral values and knowledge acquisition are primarily evident in their respective values and methodologies. Chinese culture emphasizes moral cultivation and interpersonal harmony, with knowledge acquisition centered on introspection and insight. In contrast, Western culture places a greater emphasis on individual rights and freedoms, as well as the accumulation and transmission of objective knowledge. Recognizing these differences is essential for the exchange and integration of Chinese and Western cultures. These distinctions reflect each culture's unique historical backgrounds and traditions. While preserving cultural characteristics, we should actively explore opportunities for intercultural dialogue and cooperation to foster the sharing and growth of human wisdom.

"Methodological Conventionalism" emphasizes openness and diversity in both theory and practice, advocating for the pursuit of the most suitable solutions within specific historical contexts and social changes. In contrast to Contemporary Neo-Confucianism, this perspective prioritizes addressing practical problems over an excessive focus on cultural essence and traditional values. Undoubtedly, "Methodological Conventionalism" contributes to breaking the closed and conservative nature of academia, fostering both academic innovation and social progress. While it respects academic traditions, it also addresses the needs and challenges of social reality, aiming for an organic integration of academic research and social practice. To prevent methodological conventionalism from devolving into value relativism or even nihilism, we must fundamentally return to the lifeworld, emphasizing historical and social totality, and engage with the things themselves. A phenomenological approach that "returns to the things themselves" is essential, beginning with an "awareness of existence."

5. How Can We Assess the Legitimacy of Regimes and the Establishment of Democratic Systems? How Does Contemporary Neo-Confucianism Address Criticisms of Cultural Essentialism?

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism should prioritize the legitimacy of political regimes and the establishment of democratic systems while honoring traditional values. By integrating morality with politics, it seeks to achieve social harmony and stability, gradually refining democratic institutions in the process. The legitimacy of a regime is not solely derived from constitutional and legal provisions; it must also be rooted in moral principles and public opinion. While acknowledging various political systems, it is essential to focus on the moral cultivation of citizens and their political participation to enhance both the legitimacy of the regime and the

development of democratic institutions. Neo-Confucianism during the Song-Ming period emphasizes the traditional school of mind and moral reason, as the foundation for moral cultivation and social practice was historically constrained by the framework of imperial autocracy, patriarchal oppression, and male dominance. This contrasts sharply with contemporary values, where democratic constitutionalism, gender equality, and individual rights are prominent. Therefore, the concept of "Outer Kingliness Learning" today differs significantly from its historical context, as does "Inner Sagehood Learning." It is not merely a matter of deriving a new "Outer Kingliness" from the "Inner Sagehood," but rather about how to appropriately adjust the "Inner Sagehood" in the process of learning about a new "Outer Kingliness."

I believe that Contemporary Neo-Confucianism should actively address the criticisms of cultural essentialism by emphasizing respect for tradition while also considering specific historical contexts and social changes. While maintaining cultural characteristics, it should engage in creative transformation and innovative development to modernize Chinese culture. The critique of cultural essentialism serves as a reminder that culture is not static; it continuously develops and evolves in response to time and environmental changes. Just as "Outer Kingliness Learning" evolves, "Inner Sagehood Learning" is not immutable. Both must adapt to the times. While honoring cultural heritage, there should be a strong emphasis on the potential for cultural innovation and transformation to sustain the vitality and creativity of Chinese culture.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that when exploring the development of democracy and science, it is essential to clearly distinguish between three distinct orders: the historical order of occurrence, the practical order of learning, and the theoretical order of logic. These three orders are fundamental to the development of East Asia, as they are not only influenced by the historical evolution of the West but must also be adapted and adjusted to fit their unique circumstances.

First, the historical order of occurrence refers to the sequence and trajectory of democratic and scientific development in developed Western countries. This order is rooted in the specific historical contexts and cultural environments of the West. In contrast, East Asian countries, in their pursuit of democracy and science, do not necessarily need to adhere strictly to this order. Second, the practical order of learning emphasizes the processes through which each country or region learns and adapts to the development of democracy and science in practice. This order should be determined based on the specific conditions of each country, including its culture, economy, and social structure, to establish the most suitable path and pace for its development.

The theoretical order of logic, on the other hand, examines the logical relationships and intrinsic connections in the development of democracy and science from a philosophical or theoretical perspective. For instance, "Mr. Mou Zongsan's theory of 'Self-Entrapment of Conscience'" exemplifies a theoretical order of logic in philosophical interpretation, focusing on the role and significance of conscience in both individual and social development.

We must clearly distinguish between these three orders and understand their distinct roles and influences in the development of democracy and science. Particularly in East Asia, it is essential to apply and adjust these concepts flexibly based on local realities. This approach emphasizes the practical order of learning to promote effective modernization while also reflecting on the various issues that arise in the aftermath of modernization.

II. On the Topic Proposed by Professor Ming-Chu Hsu

1. The Self-Expectations and Moral Practices of a Confucian

Should a Confucian in a democratic society be satisfied with merely being a law-abiding citizen, or should they strive to uphold higher moral standards and a sense of global responsibility? Should Confucians continue to emphasize the doctrine of "making the course of nature existent and the desire of human extinct," even in a modern society with diverse values?

Response: Certainly, Confucians should hold themselves to higher self-expectations and engage in rigorous moral practices; however, this must begin with an awakening of civic consciousness and a commitment to the laws and ethics of civil society. In my experience, I often observe many individuals who identify as Confucians lacking civic awareness, mistakenly viewing themselves as spokespersons or even leaders of Confucianism. This leads to significant distortions and alienations. The gravity of the issue lies in the necessity of first excelling as a "citizen." From that foundation, one can aspire to embody the virtues, morals, and conduct of a person of noble character.

"Making the course of nature existent and the desire of human extinct" signifies the importance of preserving the universality of natural principles while eliminating the selfishness inherent in human desires. However, this expression has been repeated so frequently that it has led to misunderstandings, suggesting that all desires for food, drink, and romantic relationships are human desires that must be eradicated. It is crucial to recognize that overly rigid and morally austere interpretations, such as "when human desires are completely eradicated, natural principles prevail," are problematic. If human desires were entirely eliminated, the viability of

natural principles would be compromised. A more accurate perspective is that expanding desires in a manner that embodies universality, ideality, and totality is sufficient. When Mencius responded to King Xuan of Qi, who acknowledged his fondness for beauty and wealth, Mencius expanded on this fondness by suggesting, "there be no unmarried women in chambers or men left in the fields," "goods flow smoothly so that everyone benefits." This serves as a compelling example of the concept.

I believe that the phrase "making the course of nature existent and the desire of human extinct" has its flaws. Some interpret it as "preserving the universality of natural principles while annihilating human desires," which can lead to further misunderstandings. Wang Chuanshan's concept of the "unity of principle and desire" offers a more reasonable perspective.

Civic Confucian Participation in Society: Civic Confucians should actively engage in public social issues such as gender equality, environmental protection, and labor rights. This engagement not only embodies the ideals of "utilization" and "enhancing people's welfare," but also encourages self-reflection to pursue "rectifying virtue." Confucians ought to adopt a more proactive role in advocating for social justice and the well-being of all citizens.

2. On the Subjective State of Moral Discourse

Does the subjective state of moral practice in Confucianism still hold importance in modern society, and should it not be disregarded despite the challenges posed by "outer kingliness learning"? Is "inner sagehood learning" still the essence of Confucianism, and should it continue to be emphasized and practiced even as we pursue the modernization of democracy and science?

Response: It is not about the subjective state of moral practice; rather, it emphasizes the perseverance that an intellectual should embody. This notion aligns with Confucius' principle: "Set your heart on the way; act in accordance with virtue; hold fast to goodness; enjoy the arts." It is fundamentally about aspiring to the Dao. Similarly, Zengzi meant by saying, "officer may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous endurance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. Perfect virtue is the burden which he considers it is his to sustain - is it not heavy? Only with death does his course stop - is it not long?". It is what Mencius also echoed this sentiment when he remarked, "All things are already complete in us. There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on self-examination. If one acts with a vigorous effort at the law of reciprocity, when he seeks for the realization of perfect virtue, nothing can be closer than his

approximation to it." These are genuine principles and truths; they do not conform to what we might label a "subjective state."

Even within Daoism, the use of such a term is inappropriate, as it is often misunderstood and overly subjective. This perspective places excessive emphasis on a "state" while neglecting the concrete and pragmatic aspects of the philosophy. I recall writing an article on this topic many years ago, critiquing the concept of a "subjective state" in moral discourse. In *Legein Monthly*, I have published several articles, two of which are particularly relevant: "On the Path to Critical Realization" (Bu, 1987, p. 146) and "Confucius and Ah Q: An Understanding and Interpretation from a Psychological History Perspective" (Lin, 1997, p. 262).

"Critique is a form of dismantling, a process of reconstruction, and a dialectical journey that encompasses both deconstruction and reconstruction. It is concrete and palpable; critique represents a tangible and vivid process of creation.

As a method of Critical Confucianism, it demonstrates a refusal to remain mired in stagnation, ultimately leading to its own corrosion and destruction. It will not retreat into an ivory tower, where thought ascends incrementally, lamenting the decline of the world and the erosion of the way. Critical Confucianism embodies an inherent self-dialectic, a voice that challenges unjust institutional structures. The fusion of self-dialectic and the imperative to challenge manifests as a form of moral cultivation. This moral cultivation is both concrete and vivid, aimed at dismantling, critiquing, reconstructing, and creating. Critique is neither a mere scratching of an itch from outside the boot nor a gentle whisper of the Wu Nong dialect. It does not originate from external authority, nor is it a form of internal self-gratification. Instead, critique targets the core, striking directly at the essence; it conveys truth without reservation, with sincerity and openness. It is driven by conscience and an awakening of structures. This driving force of conscience inevitably leads to structural awakening—only then can it be deemed true critique.

If conscience does not facilitate a structural awakening but merely modifies the self, it can easily devolve into a deceptive semblance of spiritual attainment. This illusion fosters a false sense of self-completion and self-deception. Such self-completion, rooted in superficiality, ultimately leads to deterioration and self-destruction. In truth, self-deception, when viewed through the lens of the unity of all things, is simply a passive drifting along the current.

Dao inevitably manifests in the structures of artifacts and evolves into discursive theories. Conscience must engage with these structures and theories to meaningfully partake in the Dao; only such participation is concrete and tangible. Conversely, if one attempts to immerse conscience directly into the essence of the Dao, it results in abstract and empty speculation—a

deceptive illusion of spiritual attainment and self-deception.

While traditional Confucianism has indeed served the imperial family in many ways, there have been other forms throughout history beyond Imperial Confucianism, such as Lively Confucianism and Critical Confucianism. Lively Confucianism aims to awaken the essence of conscience and integrate it into everyday life, facilitating self-cultivation and the cultivation of external affairs. In contrast, Critical Confucianism confronts unjust institutional structures, offering suggestions, corrections, and even advocating for dismantling and reconstruction. Both Lively Confucianism and Critical Confucianism represent the lifeblood of Confucianism in opposition to Imperial Confucianism; they also serve as essential remedies to prevent the deterioration of Imperial Confucianism.

Today, Imperial Confucianism has weakened and undergone deconstruction. However, the national inferiority complex stemming from the Opium Wars, along with over a thousand years of imperial cultural development, has led to a significant decline in both the vitality and critical spirit of Confucianism. Reflect upon this! Is it not profoundly concerning? Only by pursuing a tangible path of critique, rediscovering the profound depths of Confucianism, awakening the existential immediacy of the present, being mindful of 'local culture,' and confronting structural reform can we expand 'the cultural homeland.' Only then can Confucianism harness the critical power necessary for dismantling outdated structures and embark on a revitalizing reconstruction."

In another article, a section is quoted as follows:

"... juxtaposing Confucius with Ah Q, these figures are positioned as two extremes; however, it is also suggested that these extremes are intertwined as part of a continuous process. In the history of psychopathology, the moral practices emphasized by original Confucianism were intended to lead to social practice. In contrast, Ah Q, as depicted by Lu Xun, is utterly dejected and resorts to the 'spiritual victory method' to deceive himself.

Confucianism, as initiated by Confucius, initially emphasized a 'moral social practice consciousness,' but clearly, generations have not fully liberated themselves from the constraints of patriarchal feudalism and imperial autocracy. Consequently, caught in the interplay of these two influences, the moral social practice consciousness struggled to develop cohesively and eventually regressed into a 'moral self-cultivation consciousness.' The initial shift towards a moral self-cultivation consciousness sought to reconnect with life itself and revive the awareness of social practice. The traditional call for moving from inner sagehood to outer kingliness underscores this intention. The challenge lies in the fact that the inner sagehood does not extend into the outer kingship; instead, it retracts, leading the moral self-cultivation

consciousness to further devolve into a 'pursuit of moral self-transcendence.' At this juncture, morality transforms into a spiritual pursuit rather than a concrete reality. The pursuit of the moral and spiritual realm initially served as a means for self-healing and recovery, opening up the possibility for moral self-cultivation. However, during times of societal decline, even the moral and spiritual realm can devolve into a false and transient state. This further deteriorates into 'self-decoration' and 'self-leisure,' where the justifications become hollow, ultimately leading to self-deception and an irreversible descent into demonic affliction. With the soul lost and wandering aimlessly, such an individual suffering from spiritual malaise can only resort to the 'moral spiritual victory method' as a means of self-deception.

As previously stated, 'Confucius' and 'Ah Q' can be connected within a coherent genealogy. Beginning with 'moral social practice consciousness,' the progression moves into 'moral self-cultivation consciousness,' which further evolves into the 'pursuit of moral self-transcendence.' This trajectory then diverges into 'moral self-decoration' and 'moral self-leisure,' ultimately culminating in 'moral self-deception' through the 'moral spiritual victory method.' Our objective in establishing a psycho-pathological connection between 'Confucius' and 'Ah Q' is not to legitimize the Ah Q mentality among contemporary Chinese individuals as acceptable. Instead, we aim to foster a therapeutic effect through this understanding and interpretation, thereby deconstructing this peculiar synthesis and providing the potential for renewal within Chinese culture and the individuals shaped by it."

Professor Ming-Chu Hsu will fully understand the implications of the passages I have cited. By comparing them with the works of Professor Shui-Chuen Lee, it becomes evident how challenging it is to untangle the karmic tendencies that have persisted within the Chinese nation, particularly in the effort to liberate itself from imperial and patriarchal constraints.

III. Response to Professor Mei-Yao Wu's Topic

Professor Mei-Yao Wu, in response to my proposed topic, shifted her focus to the intersection of Neo-Confucian practical philosophy and counseling psychology concerning personality development. This approach indirectly aligned with my other work, Chinese Religion and Meaning Therapy. She also drew comparisons between Eastern and Western philosophies and psychologies, emphasizing how both respond to social changes. A primary focus of her discussion was the importance of "self-awareness" in both counseling psychology and Neo-Confucian practical philosophy.

This represents a shift from my proposed topic of "Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood," back to the original "Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness," and subsequently transitions into "the intersection of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism practical philosophy and counseling psychology concerning personality development." While this progression is commendable, it does not directly address my proposed topic. My focus is on Mr. Mou Zongsan's concept of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," which has evolved into an intellectual subject encompassing democracy and science. This concept relates to the "theoretical order of logic" as interpreted by him, which differs from the "historical order of occurrence" and the "practical order of learning." I have clearly articulated this in my previous response to the topic, and further elaboration is unnecessary.

Additionally, she emphasized the significance of moral education, highlighting that Mr. Mou Zongsan's perspectives, along with Western research on moral education, underscore the advantages of integrating morality into the acquisition of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, she examined human interactions and social equality, delving into Confucian concepts of human relationships and Adlerian psychology's interpretations of social equality, while emphasizing the importance of a democratic society founded on the principle of personal dignity for all.

Moreover, she emphasized the importance of beginning with individual self-awareness to achieve comprehensive human development and to establish a rational society with shared goals. She proposed the potential integration of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism with counseling psychology, particularly through the application of mindfulness meditation in psychotherapy. She compared the perspectives of Professor Lin and Mr. Mou Zongsan, suggesting a collaborative approach in counseling psychology research to deepen the understanding of the internal psychological processes that facilitate the transformation of the moral mind into the cognitive mind. Here, we can genuinely appreciate Professor Mei-Yao Wu's insightful considerations, as they encompass moral education, counseling psychology, and personality development—areas that hold great promise for further exploration.

As for topics such as "methodological essentialism" and "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," I have already addressed these in my previous responses to Professors Hon-Chung Wong and Ming-Chu Hsu, so I will not reiterate them here.

IV. On the Topic Proposed by Professor Shui-Chuen Lee

1. On the Topic of "Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood" vs. "Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness"

The debate over "Outer Kingliness to Internal Sagehoodhood" versus "Internal Sagehoodhood to Outer Kingliness" has been contentious. In response, Erh-Chih Monthly and the Center for Chinese Philosophy Research organized a public debate titled "An-Wu Lin vs. Shui-Chuen Lee" on September 3, 2022. Subsequently, I authored a more extensive response titled "After the Debate on 'Outer Kingliness to Inner Sagehood' or 'Inner Sagehood to Outer Kingliness'—A Respectful Response to Senior Scholars Zhou Qunzhen and Lee, Shui-chuen" (Lin, 2023, p. 578). This article addresses the debate and responds to Senior Scholar Zhou Qunzhen, who raised objections as early as 2005. Since the Song and Ming dynasties, Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has placed excessive emphasis on the "inner sagehood," leading to introversion and entanglement, ultimately advancing toward a realm-focused, ideal teaching system that has generated numerous issues. In the face of modernization, it is crucial to clarify that the "practical order of learning" differs from the "historical order of occurrence" and the "theoretical order of logic." This understanding underscores the importance of the "outer kingliness to inner sagehood" approach and reveals that the question "Does the Chinese cultural tradition hinder modernization?" is fundamentally a false dilemma. Finally, the article addresses the fallacy of methodological essentialism, elucidates the predicament of the "Self-Entrapment of Conscience," corrects the "misplacement of the Way," and opens the possibility for a post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. This article aims to assist readers in resolving their doubts.

2. On the Issue of "After Mou Zongsan and Post-Mou Zongsan"

Professor Shui-Chuen Lee has made the following statements:

- (1) "Professor An-Wu Lin often refers to himself as part of the so-called 'Post-May Fourth' and uses the slogan 'Post-Mou Zongsan.' However, the true meanings of 'Post-May Fourth' and 'Post-Mou Zongsan' remain entirely unclear.
- (2) "Professor Lin asserts that by making this statement, he can encapsulate the fundamental essence of Mr. Mou's philosophical system. He arrogantly claims to have entered the 'Post-Mou Zongsan era' and to have surpassed Mr. Mou's achievements. This is, in fact, a manifestation of self-deception."
- (3) "Professor Lin's advocacy of 'outer kingliness leading to inner sagehood,' which he asserts critiques and surpasses Mr. Mou Zongsan's 'two-level ontology,' is closely tied to his so-called 'post-Contemporary Neo-Confucianism.' It is essential to analyze his claims and address his fundamental misunderstandings, or lack of comprehension,

of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism principles. This includes a thorough examination of the key aspects of Mr. Mou's philosophical system and his contributions, in order to expose the fallacies inherent in Lin's 'outer kingliness leading to inner sagehood' theory."

Response: Regarding "May Fourth" and "Post-May Fourth," I have a comprehensive article titled "From 'Post-May Fourth' to 'Post-May Fourth'—Considering the Role of Chinese Civilization in the 21st Century Based on the 'Theory of the Three States of Existence'" (Lin, 2020, p. 2). Please refer to it for further details. The distinctions between "May Fourth" and "Post-May Fourth" are currently well-defined, and it is unlikely that Professor Li is unaware of them. However, if he chooses to feign ignorance, then that is his prerogative.

Additionally, regarding the "Mou Zongsan era" and the "Post-Mou Zongsan era," I have authored a dedicated monograph titled "Before and After Mou Zongsan: A Historical Discussion on Contemporary New Confucian Philosophy" (Lin, 2011), which I invite Professor Li to review. Mr. Mou was a respected mentor of mine, and in advancing his scholarship, I have pursued a path of creative transformation and innovative development. However, I acknowledge that my efforts are incomplete, and I do not claim to have surpassed my teacher. In all my writings, I make no such assertion, and Professor Li may be mistaken, speaking from a state of confusion.

For a deeper understanding of the "Post-Mou Zongsan Era," please refer to my article titled "Welcoming the Arrival of the Post-Mou Zongsan Era—A Reflection on the Publication of 'The Complete Works of Mou Zongsan'" (Lin, 2003, p. 335):

"Mr. Mou Zongsan revitalized the wisdom of Chinese philosophy. He conducted an in-depth exploration of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, and independently translated I. Kant's three Critiques. Most notably, Mr. Mou integrated I. Kant's three Critiques with traditional Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist teachings, systematically constructing the comprehensive 'two-level ontology.' Over the past century of Chinese philosophical development, this achievement undoubtedly represents a significant milestone.

Mr. Mou transcended the limitations of 'reverse hermeneutics' and, through the processes of 'translation,' 'fusion,' and 'reconstruction,' harmonized and interconnected the discourses of ancient Chinese texts, modern academic discourse, and contemporary life, thereby creating a profound philosophical lexicon that ignites vibrant awareness and thought.

In response to the existential crisis faced by the Chinese nation since the early 20th century, Mr. Mou, building upon the 'Qiányuán Xinghai' articulated by Mr. Xiong Shili's 'philosophy

of substance and function,’ further established the moral subject through a process of ‘metaphysical preservation,’ with the aim of ‘enlightening wisdom through virtue.’ He advanced the intellectual subject by integrating the ‘Self-Entrapment of Conscience’ and incorporating democracy and science into this framework.

Naturally, Mr. Mou transformed I. Kant’s philosophy of virtue through the limits of intellect by integrating Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist teachings into the concept of virtue to encompass intellect. Although he appeared to adhere to I. Kant’s ‘transcendental decomposition’ to stabilize the system of knowledge, he directly connected with the teachings of Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming, ultimately returning to the foundational ideas of Confucius and Mencius. This approach firmly established the moral self, which subsequently opened the realm of knowledge. This transformation of ‘Self-Entrapment of Conscience, closely aligns with J. G. Fichte and indirectly points to G. W. F. Hegel. However, I. Kant’s emphasis on transcendental decomposition led Mr. Mou to a metaphysical retrospection, forming a metaphysical abode. Within this abode, Mr. Mou attained a state of ‘perfect teaching’ and ‘perfect goodness’ through a subtle dialectic.

The purpose of ‘transcendental decomposition’ was ‘metaphysical retrospection,’ further underscores the ‘existential awareness’ evoked by ancient classics. Under the summons of this existential awareness, the insurmountable chasm is bridged through ‘a subtle dialectic’ of fusion and connection. Therefore, this nuanced dialectical fusion culminates in what is referred to as the so-called ‘perfect teaching’ and ‘perfect goodness.’ Although Mr. Mou repeatedly emphasized the importance of dialectical development, he ultimately achieved a dialectical fusion through which he sought a metaphysical abode—a pure intellectual dwelling.

He established a transcendental distinction between ‘phenomena’ and ‘things-in-themselves,’ employing the metaphor of ‘one mind opening two doors’ to achieve a ‘two-level ontology’ of ‘attachment’ and ‘non-attachment.’ Although he emphasized that this two-level ontology is not a strict separation but rather a harmonious integration, he remained rooted in the metaphysical ontology of non-attachment, which guided human judgment regarding good and evil and regulated the ontology of attachment. He also endorsed the Tiantai school’s concept of the ‘mind of fundamental nature manifesting in a single thought of ignorance,’ appreciating its spirit of ‘realizing Buddhahood through the integration of the nine realms.’ However, due to the limitations of the prevailing spirit of his era, Mr. Mou had to attain a fused unity through a ‘subtle dialectic,’ thereby creating a metaphysical notion of perfect goodness.

We must recognize that this concept of perfect goodness is not the culmination of Mou Zongsan’s philosophy; rather, it serves as a prelude to a new direction—a return, critique, and

development. We should reintegrate Mr. Mou's notion of 'perfect goodness,' which was conceived in his metaphysical realm, back into the 'Qiányuán Xinghai.' This reintegration embodies the essence of perfect goodness and extends it into practical functionality, allowing it to reenter the holistic living world of historical society, where it can cultivate and nurture growth profoundly. From a genetic phenomenological perspective, we must confront the reality that 'theory is the theory of practice, and practice is the practice of theory.' This understanding opens the dialectic of 'two ends but one unity,' thereby reopening the gateway to the social practice of Confucianism."

- (1) "Turning" should no longer be confined to the "subjective turn but should be redefined as the "intentionality turn," which then opens up to a dynamic exploration of "existentialism."
- (2) "Returning" should no longer be confined to a "fusing return" but should be adapted to align with the "roots of being," then the "manifestation of being," and further develop into a "determination of being."
- (3) "Inheriting" should no longer be viewed merely as a "philosophical, historical discourse," but should be a logical continuation. On one hand, it should progress towards the cultural orthodox tradition, while on the other hand, it should foster theoretical innovations.
- (4) "Critique" should not be confined to "transcendental decomposition," but should be dialectically integrated into the "lifeworld" shaped by historical and social totality. This approach aims to achieve "situations shaped by principles and principles guiding situations," thereby facilitating a societal critique and ultimately initiating a Confucian revolution.
- (5) "Development" should not be confined to a "classical interpretation," but should evolve into a philosophical dialogue that engages with contemporary discourse. Through a dynamic existential awareness, it ought to reconstruct a new academic discourse, actively participating in the dialogue and construction of human civilization.

As the turn of the century unfolds in the postmodern era, people tremble in fear at the tremors of the earth and sky. They are bewildered by the alienation of civilization, marked by events such as the 921 earthquakes in Taiwan, the collapse of the Twin Towers in the United States on September 11, and the U.S. war on terror in Iraq. In recent weeks, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China have been grappling with the devastating effects of SARS, struggling to survive as life is put to the test. I deeply resonate with Zhu Xi's statement:

"Perseverance is hard!"

It has been eight years since Mr. Mou passed away, but I still remember the elegiac couplet I wrote for him in 1995:

"The Master, drifting with the elegance and integrity of the Wei and Jin, favored by the world yet shocked the common folk; My Teacher, who embraced the principles of the Song and Ming, transcended the barriers of life and death—what would a true Confucian have to fear from the cycles of yin and yang?"

Mr. Mou's "lofty and spirited resilience in the face of suffering and adversity" (phrase coined by Mr. Cai Renhou to describe him)—leaves one in awe. The night is profound, so profound! However, dawn is approaching, so close!

Looking up, I see the image of Mr. Mou in my study, accompanied by a passage inscribed below:

"My teacher, Mr. Mou Zongsan, devoted his entire life to the unrestrained and natural pursuit of knowledge, with no attachments other than his dedication to the culture of the Chinese people. He once stated, 'Only through significant experiences can one encounter profound challenges; only through these challenges can one cultivate great compassion; only with great compassion can one attain profound wisdom; thus, one can achieve the aspirations of philosophy.' Respectfully inscribed by Anwu in the autumn of the year Renxu."

Next to the image of Mr. Mou is a couplet that incorporates his name:

"Mou, the great master, sincerely connects heaven and earth. The three teachings are distinctly arranged, with the Way weaving through both past and present."

The night is profound and distant, yet dawn approaches—so close! I pray to the deities of heaven and earth with the utmost sincerity and reverence. At the break of dawn on May 5, at 3:00 a.m., during the late spring of the Guisi year, I find myself at Yuanheng Studio.

It is a common occurrence for some to understand while others do not. What is regrettable is that I have been advocating for a philosophical shift for over thirty years and promoting the idea of "embracing the arrival of the post-Mou Zongsan era" for more than twenty years. I have earnestly warned that we can no longer regard the concerns of the first and second generations of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism as relevant to our current era. We must "speak forward" rather than merely "speak as it was." We should "carry the fire before the embers burn out,"

pass the baton, and continue to advance our efforts. Over the past few decades, I have been greatly encouraged by fellow disciples and friends. However, there are also individuals, such as Professor Shui-Chuen Lee, who, through misunderstanding, make reckless criticisms, distort the truth, and even resort to personal attacks. Reflecting on the development of various historical schools of thought, such situations may be unavoidable. In response to these challenges, one can only smile.

In recent years, my favorite phrase has been "composure." Although it may seem typical, it has profound origins, deriving from Laozi's Dao De Jing: "The grandest forms of active force From Dao come, their only source." Because it "follows only the Way," there exists "the form of supreme virtue," and with the Way as a guide, composure naturally ensues. Indeed, this is the case. I am willing to strive and "bow my head, willing to be an ox for the children," but there is no longer a need to "frown in defiance of a thousand fingers pointing." For this world is one of affection, righteousness, and justice. When I reflect on the phrase, "The sky is clear, and the moon is bright, in harmony with all things like spring," I feel immense joy. I also hope that my senior, Professor Shui-Chuen Lee, need not be so anxious; remember: "Knowing constancy leads to acceptance, acceptance to impartiality, impartiality to wholeness." If we live our days in calm composure, this world will reach a fair judgment. Well said! Now, let us "enjoy a cup of tea!"

—Written on June 28, 2024, at Yuanheng Academy in Taipei, during the year of Jiachen.

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「本土諮商心理學學刊」徵稿通告

一、主旨

「本土諮商心理學學刊」由國立彰化師範大學輔導與諮商學系本土諮商心理學研究發展中心、世界本土諮商心理學推動聯盟與台灣心理諮商資訊網共同出版暨發行，採學刊與電子形式出刊。本學刊以發表心理衛生、輔導、諮商心理、臨床心理、復健諮商、社會工作、精神醫學、精神護理、職能治療、語言治療、特殊教育、員工協助方案等與心理學及助人專業相關學科之本土化學術專論與實務專論為主，包括：量化、質性或質量整合的實徵研究（empirical research）、綜論性文章（review essay）以及個案研究等（不同文章類型稿件適用不同之審查標準）。本學刊採雙匿名審查制度，發行主要目的在於增進心理諮商與助人相關專業之學術交流、提升學術研究風氣，希望透過本學刊的平臺，能結合更多的華人與華文使用者，善用華人語言與華人文化的特色，做出更多更好的學術探討與研究，為增進與亞洲地區專業人員及國際的交流我們也提供英文的標題與摘要，同時也接受英文的稿件，我們期待能跨越國際推動含攝文化（Culture Inclusive）與本土化的研究風氣。

二、稿件格式（請參閱「本土諮商心理學學刊」投稿論文格式之說明）

本刊歡迎海內外中英文稿件，中文稿件以正體、簡體投稿皆可。來稿請參考「美國心理學會出版手冊」第七版（*Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 7th ed.*）規定體例，每篇以三萬字以內為原則。請勿一稿兩投。稿件內容依序包括下列各項：（有關作者個人之相關資料，僅能於作者基本資料表中呈現）

（一）作者基本資料表（表格請至 <http://jicp.heart.net.tw/04.html> 下載）

填寫作者基本資料表，載明論文題目、全體作者之中英文姓名、任職機構中英文名稱、第一作者與通訊作者之位址、電話、傳真及 E-mail（通訊作者為本學刊為提供學術交流而設置，請作者於投稿時提供相關資料以利進一步學術對話之開展）。

另外，請下載作者自我檢核表乙份，以核對規定的格式是否正確，若否則填寫其理由。填畢再以電子檔的方式與作者基本資料表一併寄回。

（二）中文摘要頁

以 500~800 字為原則，含論文題目、摘要及關鍵詞（以不超過五個為原則）。

(三) 正文

正文段落標題可有彈性，但宜有前言、本文、結論、以及參考文獻等之結構。

(四) 英文摘要頁

含論文題目、摘要本文及關鍵詞（以不超過 5 個為原則）。為助於與國際學者交流，摘要本文請不少於 500 字，並以 800 字以內為原則（自第九卷第一期適用）。

(五) 著作權授權同意書（表格請至 <http://jicp.heart.net.tw/03.html> 下載）

投稿文章之所有作者均需分別填寫一式兩份。

文稿格式、符號、標題、數字、圖表、引用書目及參考文獻等撰稿體例請參閱本學刊投稿論文格式與本學刊之內容，或依照「美國心理學會出版手冊」第七版（*Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 7th ed.*）規定體例（文稿格式不符者，本學刊將退回給作者，修正後歡迎再投稿）。

來稿請由左至右、直式橫寫電腦打字，註明頁碼（每頁印 38 行，每行 35 字，12 級字，段落距離 0 列，1.5 行行距）為原則。

三、著作權授權條款

投稿論文經本學刊接受刊登，作者同意非專屬授權國立彰化師範大學輔導與諮商學系台灣心理諮商資訊網做下述利用：

- （一）以紙本或是數位方式出版。
- （二）進行數位化典藏、重製、透過網路公開傳輸、授權用戶下載、列印、瀏覽等資料庫銷售或提供服務之行為。
- （三）以非專屬授權方式，授權給學術資料庫業者，將本論文納入資料庫中提供服務。
- （四）為符合各資料庫之系統需求，並得進行格式之變更。

四、審稿

本學刊收到稿件之後，由主編確認內容、格式是否符合本學刊之原則，交由編輯委員推薦二位相關領域之專家進行匿名審查，審查意見與結果將主動回覆稿件作者。凡經審查委員要求修改之文章，於作者修改後再行刊登。凡曾在相關研討會上發表過之文章、改寫的學位論文或研究經費的來源等，請於作者基本資料表之作者註一欄中加以說明。

本學刊採常年徵稿、先到先審制。請將稿件以電子郵件寄至 jicphheart@gmail.com，註明「投稿本土諮商心理學學刊」。著作權授權同意書，可擇一寄發，但以電子檔為佳：

(1) 電子檔：列印紙本簽名後掃描成電子檔，或將個人簽名以圖檔插入著作權同意書電子檔，再將成果直接寄至刊物信箱；或 (2) 紙本：寄至 50007 彰化市進德路 1 號國立彰化師範大學輔導與諮商學系轉「本土諮商心理學學刊」編輯委員會收，或傳真至 (04) 7276542；電話：(04) 723-2105 #2220, 2208；E-mail：jicphheart@gmail.com

「本土諮商心理學學刊」投稿論文格式

本學刊以發表輔導、諮商心理、臨床心理、復健諮商、社會工作、精神醫學、精神護理、心理衛生、職能治療、語言治療、特殊教育、員工協助方案等與心理學及助人專業相關學科之本土化專論為主。接受全球之正體中文、簡體中文與英文稿件之投稿。

版面的左右邊界 3.17 公分、上下邊界 2.54 公分，行文請由左至右。稿長以 3 萬字以內為原則，並以電腦繕打直式橫寫，以 Word 98 以上版本格式存檔，正文中請勿使用任何排版技術。

正文請統一採 12 級字，段落距離 0 列，單行間距，中文部份（含標點符號）請以新細明體與全形輸入，英文部分（include punctuation marks）請以 Times New Roman 與半型輸入為原則。若文章中有出現表與圖，文字請在 8~12 級字間彈性調整。稿件格式請依下列規定：

一、標題層次

（一）中文書寫者請依序使用

層級一：壹、（粗體、上下空一行、內文開一個新段落撰寫）

層級二：一、（粗體、上下空一行、內文開一個新段落撰寫）

層級三：（一）（不加粗、上空一行、句後要加上句點、內文接著層級標題同一行撰寫，成為完整的一段）

層級四：1.（不加粗、不空行、句後要加上句點、內文接著層級標題同一行撰寫，成為完整的一段）

層級五：（1）（不加粗、不空行、句後要加上句點、內文接著層級標題同一行撰寫，成為完整的一段）

如下列範例所示：

壹、（粗體、上下空一行、內文開一個新段落撰寫）

一、（粗體、上下空一行、內文開一個新段落撰寫）

（一）（不加粗、上空一行）。

1.（不加粗、不空行）

(1) (不加粗、不空行)

(二) 英文書寫者請依序使用

Centered, Boldface, Uppercase and Lowercase Heading

(置中，加粗，每個單字字首大寫，上下空一行)

Text begins indented as a new paragraph.

Flush Left, Boldface, Uppercase and Lowercase Heading

(置左，加粗，每個單字字首大寫，上下空一行)

Text begins indented as a new paragraph.

Flush Left, Boldface, Uppercase and Lowercase Heading

(置左，加粗，每個單字字首大寫，上下空一行)

Text begins indented as a new paragraph.

Indented, boldface, lowercase paragraph heading ending with a period.

(空四格半形，標題加粗，第一個字字首大寫，上下空一行)

Text begins on the same line and continues as a regular paragraph.

Indented, boldface, italicized, lowercase paragraph heading ending with a period.

(空四格半形，標題加粗，第一個字字首大寫，不空行)

Text begins on the same line and continues as a regular paragraph.

二、正文

(一) 行文原則

一頁以 38 行、一行 35 字為原則，並註明頁碼。

(二) 標題與註解

1. 文內標題請依標題層次規定方式處理，體例如前述。
2. 表的標號與名稱的格式，包含以下原則：
 - (1) 表的標號與名稱皆為 12 級字，內容則為 8~12 級字為彈性調整範圍。
 - (2) 標號和名稱置於表格之上，靠左對齊，分兩行，第一行為標號，第二行為表名。

(3) 標號的寫法：中文為「表一」、「表 1」或「表 1-1」，中文不必加粗體；英文為「**Table 1**」、「**Table1.1**」，英文則應以粗體呈現。

(4) 表名在撰寫上需盡量以簡短、清楚且有效的說明表達出表格的重點，不應過長。中文表名需以粗體呈現，英文表名則為斜體。

(5) 資料來源請於表格下方列示，以靠近正文引用處隨後出現為原則。

3. 圖的標號與名稱的格式，包含以下原則：

(1) 標號和名稱置於圖片上方，分兩行說明，第一行為標號，第二行為圖名，皆靠左對齊。

(2) 標號的寫法：中文為「圖一」、「圖 1」或「圖 1-1」，不加粗體；英文為「**Figure1**」、「**Figure 1.1**」，英文標號則應以粗體呈現。

(3) 圖名在撰寫上應盡量簡短並能表達出圖形的重點，中文圖名需以粗體呈現，英文圖名則以斜體呈現。

(4) 中文圖名之行距設定則以可清楚看出標號和圖名之區隔為原則；英文的圖名在行距上應設定為「2 倍行高」。

(5) 資料來源請於圖下方列示，以靠近正文引用處隨後出現為原則。

4. 正文當中使用註解時，請以阿拉伯數字標於相關文字的右上方，註解內容則列於頁尾之處，以註腳方式、新細明體 10 號字處理

(三) 參考文獻與其它體例

1. 參考文獻依照中文、英文順序排列，前者依作者姓氏筆劃順序，後者依作者姓氏英文字母順序排列，同一筆資料自第二行起中文須內縮 2 個全形字元、英文亦同。
2. 文稿格式、符號、標題、數字、圖表、文獻引用方式及參考文獻等撰稿體例請參考「三、撰稿體例說明」，未在體例範圍內請依照「美國心理學會出版手冊」第七版(Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 7th ed.) 之規定體例或本學刊之內容。

三、撰稿體例說明

(一) 文獻引用方式

正文中引用文獻，以標示作者名（中文作者姓名全列，英文作者只列出姓）、出版時間（一律以西元年代表示），中文引用使用全型符號，英文引用使用半型符號，範例如下：

1. 單一作者

- (1) 中文，如：（林杏足，2002）

(2) 英文，如：(Hsieh, 2003)

2. 兩位作者

(1) 中文，如：(謝麗紅、鄭麗芬，1999)

(2) 英文，如：(Chang & Chu, 2001)

3. 三位以上作者

(1) 中文，第一次出現即以第一作者等表示，如：(賀孝銘等，2007)。

(2) 英文，引用規則如上述之中文文獻，如：(Wang et al., 2002)。

4. 翻譯本引用：請註名原作者姓名，以及作品及譯本之年代，如：(Johnson & Johnson, 2003/2005)。

5. 引用兩篇以上文獻以分號隔開(中文在前，英文在後，依姓氏或字母排序)

(1) 中文，如：(張虹雯、陳金燕，2004；趙淑珠、蔡素妙，2002)

(2) 英文，如：(Huang & Huang, 2005; Wu, 2003)

(二) 參考文獻

中文文獻在前，英文文獻在後，需依中文筆劃與英文字母序依次列出。中文篇名、期刊名與卷期以**粗體字**標示；西文篇名、期刊名與卷期以**斜體字**標示。此外，若引用之文獻具 DOI 或 URI 者，應以 <https://doi.org/xxxxx> 格式加註 DOI 或以 <https://xxxxx> 格式加註 URI (若該文獻同時具 DOI 或 URI，則呈現 DOI 即可)。

範例如下：

1. 書籍

(1) 中文

張景然(2004)。**團體諮商的觀念與應用**。弘智。

高淑貞(2006)。親子共讀、怎麼開始？載於何琦瑜(主編)，**家庭教育：贏的起點**(頁 317-321)。天下雜誌。

(2) 英文

Corey, G., Corey, M., & Collanan, P. (1993). *Issues and ethics in the helping professions* (4th ed.). Brooks/Cole.

Collie, R. K., Mitchell, D., & Murphy, L. (2000). Skills for on-line counseling: Maximum impact at minimum bandwidth. In J. W. Bloom & G. R. Walz (Eds.), *Cybercounseling and cyberlearning: Strategies and resources for the millennium* (pp. 219-236). American Counseling Association.

(3) 譯本

Jacobs, E. E., Masson, R. L., & Harvil, R. L. (2008)。**團體諮商：策略與技巧**(程小蘋、黃慧涵、劉安真、梁淑娟譯)。五南。(原著出版年：2006)

2. 期刊

(1) 中文

王智弘、林清文、劉淑慧、楊淳斐、蕭宜綾 (2008)。台灣地區網路諮商服務發展之調查研究。《教育心理學報》，39 (3)，395-412。

劉淑慧、林怡青 (2002)。國三學生選擇入學學校之抉擇歷程與其影響因素。《中華輔導學報》，11，71-123。

(2) 英文

Hsieh, Y. H. (2003). Spatiotemporal characteristics of interaction between exogenous and endogenous orienting of visual attention. *Chinese Journal of Psychology*, 45(3), 227-241.

Kao, S. C., Lin, C. E., & Chiu, N. Y. (2006). A proposed e-care center for mental health interventions. *Journal of Psychiatric Practice*, 12(3), 180-186.

3. 會議、研討會

(1) 中文

陳巧翊、趙淑珠 (2020 年 10 月 24 日)。親密關係中性困擾者之求助經驗探究—女性當事人之敘說〔論文發表〕。台灣輔導與諮商學會 2020 年會暨學術研討會，臺北市，臺灣。

王智弘 (2020 年 10 月 24 日)。雖然不太會做研究，但沒關係：我如何走出一條學術研究的路〔專題演講〕。台灣輔導與諮商學會 2020 年會暨學術研討會，臺北市，臺灣。

(2) 英文

Meister, K. L. (2018, April 26-29). *Gender identity as a three dimensional model: Taking identity beyond the continuum* [Roundtable session]. American Counseling Association 2018 Conference & Expo, Atlanta, GA.

Jin, Y. Y. (2018, April 26-29). *Counseling in China* [Poster presentation]. American Counseling Association 2018 Conference & Expo, Atlanta, GA

4. 學位論文

(1) 中文

李鴻昇 (2020)。母親罹患思覺失調症之子女家庭角色轉換歷程之敘事研究〔未出版之碩士論文〕。國立彰化師範大學。

施郁恆 (2019)。大學生網路成癮危險因子、網路成癮與心理健康問題之相關研究 (系統編號：107NCUE5464018)〔碩士論文，國立彰化師範大學〕。臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統。

(2) 英文

Massa, A. (2006). *Psychophysiological correlates of childhood maltreatment and physical aggression perpetration* [Unpublished master's thesis]. Purdue University.

Kado Hogan, R. M. (2011). *Ethical decision making of psychologists: Emotions, ethical decision frame, and social context* [Doctoral dissertation, University of South Dakota] (Publication No. 3473582). ProQuest Dissertations & Theses A & I.

5. 專門研究報告

(1) 中文

趙淑珠、程小蘋 (2001)。中學行政主管人員性別意識之評估研究。行政院國科會研究計畫 (NSC89-2413-H-018-031)。

(2) 英文

Mazzeo, J., Druesne, B., Raffeld, P. C., Checketts, K. T., & Muhlstein, A. (1991). *Comparability of computer and paper-and-pencil scores for two CLEP general examinations* (College Board Rep. No. 91-5). Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.

6. 有團體作者的網頁

(1) 中文

台灣輔導與諮商學會 (2001)。台灣輔導與諮商學會諮商專業倫理守則。
<http://www.guidance.org.tw/ethic.shtm>

(2) 英文

American Counseling Association (2005). *ACA Code of Ethics*. May 25, 2013, Retrieved from
<http://www.counseling.org/Resources/odeOfEthics/TP/Home/CT2.aspx>

(文稿格式不符者，將退回給作者，修正後歡迎再投稿)

著作權授權同意書

論文名稱：_____（以下稱「本論文」）

- 一、若本論文經本土諮商心理學學刊 (*Journal of Indigenous Counseling Psychology*) 接受刊登，作者同意非專屬授權予 國立彰化師範大學輔導與諮商學系台灣心理諮商資訊網 做下述利用：
 1. 以紙本或是數位元方式出版
 2. 進行數位化典藏、重製、透過網路公開傳輸、授權用戶下載、列印、瀏覽等資料庫銷售或提供服務之行為
 3. 再以非專屬授權方式授權給學術資料庫業者將本論文納入資料庫中提供服務
 4. 為符合各資料庫之系統需求，並得進行格式之變更。
- 二、作者同意國立彰化師範大學輔導與諮商學系台灣心理諮商資訊網得依其決定，以有償或無償之方式再授權予其他資料庫業者，有償資料庫之權利金收入則歸【彰化師範大學】所有。
- 三、作者保證本論文之研究與撰寫過程中合乎相關專業倫理之要求，並為其所自行創作，有權為本同意書之各項授權。且授權著作未侵害任何第三人之智慧財產權。本同意書為非專屬授權，作者仍對授權著作擁有著作權。

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- The terms and conditions take effect as the date of the approval or amendment of the Editorial Board meeting.

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		Accept as is	Accept after revision	Re-review after revision	Reject
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	Accept after revision	Accept after revision	Accept after revision	Accept or re-review after revision*	Include a third reviewer
	Re-review	Accept or re-review after revision*	Accept or re-review after revision*	Reject or re-review *	Reject or re-review *
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Journal of Indigenous Counseling is a scholarly, electronic journal published quarterly by Center for Indigenous Counseling Psychology, Department of Guidance & Counseling, National Changhua University of Education, World Indigenous Counseling Psychology Alliance and Taiwan Counseling Net in Taiwan. The journal publishes contributions on many topics, such as guidance, counseling psychology, clinical psychology, rehabilitation, counseling, social work, psychiatry, mental health, Psychiatric nursing, occupational therapy, speech-language therapy, special education, employee assistance programs, etc. Our purpose is to represent the achievements of the academic research, enhance the indigenous and culture-inclusive research of counseling, and advance the transnational and interdisciplinary academic development and communication. We welcome previously unpublished empirical and review papers. Journal of Indigenous Counseling Psychology publishes papers in the areas of:

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